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Abstract 
 
Why has it become so difficult to understand and eventually predict Chinese 
foreign policy strategy at the military level? In Strategic Studies, and 
especially in Political Science, experts emphasize the employment of 
rationality in states‟ foreign policy formulation. However, the international 
relations reality proves to be, very often, quite different than predicted. In this 
scientific uncertainty, strategic culture paradigm  provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of states‟ strategic behavior in foreign policy. 
However, when it comes to China, the current literature on Chinese strategic 
culture has been adopting a dichotomous approach; that is, trying to 
demonstrate whether offensiveness or defensiveness constitute the 
fundamental nature of the Chinese strategic culture. My research goes 
beyond this debate by looking specifically at the Chinese military strategy 
per se and, specifically, which strategy really connects to – and therefore 
defines – the overall Chinese strategic culture. Hence, my research 
demonstrates how People‟s War doctrine represents a fundamental asset of 
Chinese strategic culture. To prove this, I will use a three-level analysis 
which looks at the civil-military relations, strategic design, and tactical 
dispositions. Moreover, in order to better classify the centrality of people‟s 
war in Chinese strategic culture, I will provide an extensive historical 
analysis of the doctrine through four major case studies: the first one deals 
with the doctrinal formulation occurred during the Warring States period, 
where ancient strategists started to assemble the embryonic doctrines of 
what today can be called asymmetric warfare, by looking at the 
implementation of flexibility and mobility. The second process analyzes the 
Tang dynasty, which represented an important turning point in Chinese 
history, paving the way for the creation of the Chinese modern era. The third 
case study deals with the Maoist Civil War, where people‟s war found its 
comprehensive definition and application. In conclusion, the last dimension 
1
 
 
analyzes the evolution of people‟s war doctrine, during the advent of the fifth 
generation of leadership. This last case study represents an important 
historical asset because of the radical Chinese military transformation 
occurring in the last ten years coupled with the international technological 
developments. During this period, in fact, it becomes central to identify the 
development of Chinese cyber warfare techniques and the establishment of 
maritime militia which, I will argue, represent, both doctrinally and 
technically, an evolution of the people's war doctrine. 
 
Keywords: rationality, strategic culture, people’s war doctrine, Chinese 
foreign policy, asymmetric warfare, cyber warfare, mobility, flexibility 
maritime militia, nationalism.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Trying to understand other states‟ way of waging war has always 
represented a very difficult but also fascinating task. Even more interesting if 
we try to understand why some states plan and think of strategy the way 
they do. The paradigm of strategic culture helps us to find a way. 
In the summer 2013, president Xi Jinping and president Obama met 
at Sunnylands in California in order to discuss and solve some problems 
related to the Chinese cyber attacks that targeted American firms. Two 
immediate questions came to my mind: why has China conducted an 
extensive cyber warfare? And how was it conceived, planned, and 
executed? While researching the appropriate answers to these questions, I 
came across many interesting and possible explanations. However, I felt 
that something was still hidden inside the “Chinese box” and that looking at 
it, only superficially, would not have helped. Using strategic culture as an 
scientific paradigm opened up new and unexplored boundaries that could 
not simply be based on the analysis of contingent phenomena. 
3
 
 
In this research I have, therefore, decided to analyze Chinese way 
of warfare by not only using the strategic-culture paradigm, but also 
proposing a new theoretical framework that could help other scholars 
advance the study of other states‟ way of fighting. In other words, this new 
paradigm, in my opinion, had to combine complexity with generality, that is, 
putting together specific independent with dependent variables with the 
objectives to illustrate, in depth, the nature of strategic culture, while also 
making it into a generalized model that could also be replicated. Therefore, 
the independent variable was represented by the Chinese strategic culture 
per se, while the People‟s War Doctrine, which reflects the strategic culture 
represented the dependent variable. And in order to extrapolate the Chinese 
way of warfare from the historical evolution of its military and political 
system, I decided to develop my research by using a three-level model that 
would have analyzed the civil-military relations, the strategic design, and the 
tactical disposition that clearly highlight where strategic culture is and how a 
specific military doctrine comes out of it. 
 It became extremely important then to dig into Chinese past, explore 
its military and strategic thought, understand how Chinese, as ruling elite in 
connection with their social background, conceived security both at home 
and abroad, in order to draw a complete conclusion over the Chinese way of 
conducting military operations. 
Therefore, one immediate objective of my research has been to 
intercept the traditional elements that have historically influenced the 
Chinese way of warfare. This is because, while it seems clear that 
4
 
 
“contemporary Chinese strategic thought was to an important degree 
influenced by ancient traditions in philosophy and statecraft, [however], yet 
to this point very little systematic work had been done on isolating exactly 
what elements of this tradition had persisted and how.”
1
    
But approaching history, sometimes, can be a challenging task, due 
to its vastness both in terms of sources to deal with and the complexities 
surrounding the historical periods. When looking inductively to the evolution 
of Chinese history, I decided then that in order to develop a sophisticated, 
comprehensive analysis of Chinese strategic culture, the focal point of my 
research should have been based on the evaluation of the political 
environment surrounding specific turning points in Chinese history. And this 
mainly for two reasons: the first one was related to the inevitable and evident 
nature of those periods; being the historical turning points means that these 
historical eras radically changed the political, social, and military spectrum of 
the entire civilization, dramatically altering the future, while also, apparently 
canceling the past. The second reason is related to the first one and refers 
to the fact that these historical turning points per se, due to their radical 
nature, represented, inevitably, very unprecedented contexts, one very 
different from the other, therefore breaking the historical continuity that has 
often characterized vast segments of Chinese history as well as other 
country‟s history. 
                                                          
1
 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism, 1st ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1998), p. xi 
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According to this theoretical approach, I decided to concentrate my 
study on four very different case studies: I started my analysis the Warring 
States period, since it represented one of the most important epoch in 
Chinese history, due to its radical transformation of the political, social, and 
military assets.  
The second period under investigation looks at the Tang dynasty; it 
represented another relevant turning point, since through the Tang, China 
started to enter into modern era, much earlier than its Western counterparts. 
This, therefore, means that the Tang dynasty laid the foundations for the 
institutional development of subsequent dynasties – at the cultural, political, 
and military level – both in China and abroad. For example, Japanese 
political system was critically influenced by the Tang system, and the 
bureaucratic examinations, that would have represented one of the defining 
features of Chinese political culture, started to be designed and 
implemented during the Sui-Tang, culminating, then, in what is now 
recognized as the Ming bureaucratic examination system.  
The third period, the Maoist civil war, represents in itself one of the 
most radical shifts in Chinese history. Bringing down the imperial system 
and establishing a communist regime is, in itself, an extremely radical shift 
worth studying incessantly. 
Finally, the fourth case study, more recent, also represents an 
important shift in Chinese politics, that is, the advent of the fifth generation of 
leadership of which Xi Jinping is the first representative. But in this last case 
study, the focus is not only to this generation of leadership, but also to the 
6
 
 
geopolitical and technological context which forced the Chinese leadership 
to embrace a new military transformation, pushing the institutional system 
apparently towards a new and radical paradigm.  
Having set the four historical turning points, my analysis, then, tried 
to investigate what military doctrine better responded to the Chinese 
strategic culture. Through an extensive study of Chinese primary resources 
and Chinese and Western secondary resources, I found out that some 
elements tended to be repeated with a fascinating continuity even in those 
cases where the adoption of other military doctrines would have been more 
profitable. These elements were: deception, flexibility, use of stratagems, 
total people‟s mobilization through nationalistic campaigns (with different 
levels of degree according to the different historical periods), civil-military 
interdependence, advocacy of military asymmetric strategy, centrality of the 
people with respect to technology, and finally the theorizing of active 
defense. All these features, in fact, could find a coherent theoretical 
encapsulation only if we look at that doctrine that would have been defined, 
during the twentieth century, as the People‟s War Doctrine. 
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Chapter 1  
Chinese Strategic Culture and 
the Value of People‟s War 
 
 
 
“Ignorance of strategic culture and its impact has been and remains the 
primary cause for misperception and miscalculation.”
2
 
 
 
 
The analytical objective of this chapter is to set a new 
methodological design to identify the central elements that characterize 
Chinese strategic culture. Specifically, my objective is to show that in order 
to speak of the existence of a strategic culture we need to focus – 
historically, politically, philosophically, and, of course, militarily – on a state‟s 
main military strategy. Military doctrine, I argue, reflects the core of strategic 
culture. Therefore our analysis should focus on the edification of a specific 
military doctrine. In this chapter, I seek to explain why China exhibited a 
historical preference for the application of People‟s War Doctrine and why 
Chinese policy-makers have relied – at crucial historical turning points, 
                                                          
2
 Carl G. Jacobsen, "Conclusion", in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, Carl G. Jacobsen 
ed. , 1st ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 503-506. 
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including today – on this the main doctrinal framework in their overall 
strategic thinking. 
Three relevant books published by the Chinese academia as well as 
the military widely discussed the centrality of the People‟s War Doctrine in 
today‟s Chinese strategic thinking. Unlike journal articles or other typical 
works on Mao Zedong which dealt, among other things, with the famous 
notion of People‟s War, these three books represent the unique effort to 
shed light on this widely discussed military – as well as strategic – concept. 
In one way or another, the notion of “People‟s War” played a central role in 
Chinese strategic formulation, especially in the last eighty years, that is, 
since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Published over a 
period of almost twenty years in 1992, 1997, and 2011, these books reflect 
the persistence, in academic and military circles, of the common strategic 
denominator: People‟s War Doctrine. 
The first book, published in 1992, right at the end of the Cold War, 
with the title On People’s War,
3
 seeks to offer an overview of the historical 
application of the people‟s war in Chinese history, with only one chapter 
dealing with the people‟s war in the West. Before analyzing (in the 
subsequent sections) its overall methodological and theoretical approach, it 
is worth noting that this book tried to bring to light the roots and core 
characteristics of the doctrine. The objective of the author, Guo Weitao, is to 
illustrate its historical validity and, above all, its cultural significance in 
                                                          
3
 Wei Tao [伟涛] Guo [郭], On People's War [Renmin Zhanzheng Lun - 人民战争论] 
(Beijing [北京]: Defence Military Press [jiefangjun chubanshe - 解放军出版社], 1992). 
9
 
 
Chinese history. By tracing the application of people‟s war since ancient 
times, its overall objective is to illustrate how people‟s war represented a 
tactical as well as strategic tool that China had employed with regularity. As 
stated in the preface, “studying and researching the Maoist thought on 
People‟s War, transmitting and developing his thought on People‟s War is 
our common mission. The western bourgeois class relied on the book On 
War for which they expressed pride. We should have our own theory of 
warfare, which cannot be anything else except the theory of People‟s War.”
4
    
The third book published in 2011, with the title The Overall War of 
People’s War,
5
 along with the first one, highlight the relevance that Mao‟s 
People‟s War Doctrine for contemporary strategic affairs. Unlike the first 
one, the third book‟s objective is to project Mao‟s doctrine to the future, 
especially to the unexplored field of cyber warfare, because of the increasing 
uncertainty over the future of strategy. The basic questions the author tries 
to answer are: “what shall we rely on in order to face challenges? What shall 
we rely on in order to coalesce people‟s hearts? What shall we rely on in 
order to win wars? According to the author, in order to answer those 
questions, it is important to think over Mao‟s thought, because “China is the 
homeland of Sun Tzu‟s The Art of War, the homeland of Mao Zedong‟s 
thought, and it is the homeland of People‟s War.”
6
 
                                                          
4
 人民战争论, p. 3 
5
 Xiansheng [宪生]  Meng [孟], The Overall War of People’s War [RenMin ZhanZheng 
Zheng Ti Zhan – 人民战争整体战] (Beijing [北京]: Defence University Press [Guofang 
daxue chubanshe – 国防大学出版社, 2011). 
6
 人民战争整体战, p. 5 
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These two books, therefore, made me raise the following question: 
why is People‟s War Doctrine still deeply analyzed and debated? When it 
came out, the first book was not directly related to a specific military or 
international crisis context that could have justified its publication by the 
military press. In 1992, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, China was still 
pursuing the policies and the guidelines Deng Xiaoping had established 
since Mao‟s death in 1976. The book had stepped in years before the 
outbreak of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96. 
A slightly different story surrounds the third book, since it clearly 
stated that its argument aims at identifying China‟s new strategic 
environment coming out of United States‟ invasion of Iraq and the 
progressive transformation of the international system as well as the 
strategic thinking.  
However, in order to properly answer that question – that is, why 
People‟s War is still analyzed and debated – there are other important 
reasons surrounding the strategic and doctrinal importance of People‟s War 
Doctrine. All states, in all different historical periods, commonly develop their 
own military and strategic manuals in order to explain their political 
environment and the efficient strategic means to be employed in geopolitical 
disputes. For example, in 1997 the National Defense University published a 
book (which represents one of the three textbooks under examination) which 
illustrated how to fight militarily a more powerful opponent. Under the title 
11
 
 
Contemporary Strategy of Using the Weak to Win Over the Strong,
7
 this 
book clearly tried to provide the Chinese government with apparently “new” 
strategic guidelines in order to face the military challenges in world affairs. 
That part of this theoretical explanation had laid on the 1995-96 Third 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, which pushed the Chinese government to rethink its 
overall strategic commitment in East Asia, especially with the presence of 
the United States. Therefore, even if this book does not explicitly deal with 
People‟s War Doctrine, it nevertheless considers, indirectly, People‟s War 
strategic principles as the central theme of its argument. 
Moreover, it resembles more a policy guide book which, even if less 
affected by government propaganda, ends up reaching the same theoretical 
conclusions of the previous two books mentioned above: the author argues 
that there is a traditional military policy that conditions Chinese overall 
military calculations in terms of military strategic planning; something that we 
need to analyze in order to understand where this tradition came from, and 
how it still exerts a relevant role in Chinese strategic approach to warfare. 
My objective is to identify historical features as well as legacies 
through the application of the strategic culture paradigm, that is, the 
theoretical framework that highlights how a state behaves militarily 
according to its cultural heritage. This chapter identifies the elements 
characterizing this theoretical approach to military strategy. I also present a 
new methodological structure in order to better demonstrate how strategic 
                                                          
7
 Lei [磊] Jiang [蒋], On Contemporary Strategy Of Using The Weak To Defeat The 
Strong [Xiandai Yi Lie Sheng You Zhanlue - 现代以劣胜优战略] (Beijing [北京]: Defence 
12
 
 
culture plays a relevant role in conditioning the shape and application of 
military strategy. This chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
deals with the main current literature on strategic culture, trying to 
understand the current debate and where it fails: the correct understanding 
of how a state behaves militarily, rather than focusing, as the current 
literature does, on a state‟s grand strategic behavior. The second section 
goes a step further by analyzing and dissecting the current literature on 
Chinese strategic culture. Finally the last section sets up a new 
methodological approach to the definition and operationalization of strategic 
culture. 
 
1.1 What is Strategic Culture? 
 
The objective of this section is to present the current debate on 
strategic culture, what it means, how to measure it, and therefore how to 
implement it. This section looks at both political science and military history 
literature, since they influence each other and sometimes one literature 
branch presents some elements that are not covered by the other and vice 
versa. 
 
1.1.1 Where Strategic Culture Comes from 
 
                                                                                                                                        
University Press [Guofang daxue chubanshe - 国防大学出版社], 1997). 
13
 
 
Strategic culture, in its current terminology, has been treated in 
general by the IR paradigm of constructivism. It developed as a response to 
realism, especially against its “ahistorical, non-cultural … framework for 
analyzing strategic choices”
8
 and its inconsistency in explaining why specific 
outcomes occurred in world politics,
9
 especially since “many strategists, in 
fact, appear to have what T.E. Lawrence called „a fundamental crippling 
incuriousness‟ about their adversaries.” And this has represented “a very 
noteworthy characteristic in an activity [the strategic thinking] in which the 
ostensible aim is to produce rational policy.”
10
 
                                                          
8
 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture", International Security 19, 
no. 4 (1995): 35. Johnston, moreover, highlights the fundamental theoretical problem 
affecting both realism and strategic culture. While the former‟s problem is “to explain 
differences in strategic behavior across strategic cultures when structural conditions 
are constant,” the latter‟s one is “to explain similarities in strategic behavior across 
varied strategic cultures.”  
9
 Colin Gray, one of the most famous scholars dealing with strategic cultural analysis, 
clearly articulated the importance of strategic culture by demonstrating why it “can 
make sense of those material factors which realist beliefs are utterly unable to 
decode.” In order to prove this, by discussing the case of the German rearmament 
leading to the outbreak of World War II, he posited three fundamental historical 
questions: “what would a general, acultural, theory of strategy have told us about 
German rearmament in the 1930s? … what is Germany acquiring? … what does 
Germany intend to do with it?” Clearly, as he pointed out, the realist paradigm could 
not coherently respond to the third question. Colin S. Gray, "In Praise Of Strategy", 
Review of International Studies 29, no. 02 (2003): 294. 
10
 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 26. 
Moreover, Colin Gray, on the same line, has highlighted how important “cultural 
intelligence” is in explaining “the intellectual and moral context within which decisions 
will be made.” In terms of military affairs, he has clearly stated that, since it is much 
easier “to count tanks and missiles than it is to grasp the cultural assumptions of an 
alien society … both sides have no choice other than to function in cultural ignorance 
as best they are able.” In order to avoid these types of problems, the military circles 
have been adopting the so-called “Principles of War,” one of which “asserts the utility 
14
 
 
For example, one of the common fallacies of neorealism that 
constructivism, and therefore, strategic culture tackles is the inability to 
explain how states generate military power. In fact, “neorealists estimate the 
power of states on the basis of resources, but give scant attention, if any, to 
the process whereby states produce military power.”
11
     
Two additional theoretical problems of the realist research tradition, 
moreover, deserve further scrutiny. One refers to the realist theoretical 
assumptions about the rational actor paradigm, while the second concerns 
the rational logic governing the balance of power theory. While being 
                                                                                                                                        
of maintaining the „initiative … [by] operat[ing] within his decision cycle, his OODA … 
so that he is never able to wage the kind of war he might prefer.‟” However, as Gray 
himself highlighted, this type of military philosophy works well in those cases where 
the political objective is the complete overthrow of the enemy. In other cases, 
characterized by more limited political objectives, this model, void of the cultural 
element, could not work at all. He pushed the argument over the importance of 
culture even further by analyzing, through a counterfactual approach, how the Sino-
Japanese confrontation during WWII could have developed, had both parties 
carefully analyzed their adversary‟s strategic culture. One specific conclusion is that 
war could have ended much earlier, had the Japanese understood that attacking 
Pearl Harbor would have triggered US total war commitment, and had the US 
studied the high value Japan put on honor, therefore avoiding those military 
strategies that then would have directly targeted it, creating an uncontrollable spiral 
effect. Colin S. Gray, "Out Of The Wilderness: Prime Time For Strategic Culture", p. 
20. 
11
 Theo Farrell, "Culture And Military Power", Review of International Studies 24, no. 
3 (1998): 407, original emphasis. As Farrell himself pointed out, the only exception to 
this fallacy within the realist school of thought is represented by Barry Posen, The 
Sources Of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). In his work, 
Posen created a model for understanding the process through which states organize 
for war. 
15
 
 
stimulating theories,
12
 they did not last the challenge of history.
13
 For what 
concerns our research topic – that is, the use and implementation of 
                                                          
12
 When it comes to the conceptualization of the rationality paradigm, “In strategy, 
rationality is usually conceived in an instrumental sense. It is concerned with means, 
not ends. Rationality is „choosing to act in the manner which gives best promise of 
maximising one‟s value position on the basis of a sober calculation of potential gains 
and losses, and probabilities of enemy actions.‟” This implies that “calculations will 
be made consciously and correctly, that they will be based on accurate information, 
and that decisions will be made coolly, with a clear head.” However, we all know how 
difficult it is to implement such a “rational” way of thinking. Unfortunately, history has 
clearly showed us that “when decision-makers calculate what is likely to give „best 
promise‟ of achieving a particular end their reckoning is culture-dependent.” The 
“„best promise‟ only makes sense in terms of a particular set of values, which in turn 
have their roots in a particular culture.”  Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism, pp. 
63-64. Among the most famous works that employ rationality as the central paradigm 
for their theoretical design, see: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). In this book, which represents a useful 
representative of this theoretical model, even if quite innovative in its own right, the 
author traces the quantitative pattern that leads to the rationalist decision of the 
policy-maker – what he calls the “expected utility theory of war” – whether or not 
engaging in combat operations. At first, it seems a quite convincing argument, since 
he widely applied a quantitative approach, however, it failed to explain the real 
cultural reasons that led to war that the quantitative database could not explain. On 
the same line, in another book – edited by the same author, Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita and David Lalman, War And Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992) – the argument tries, this time, also to investigate the domestic elements that 
characterize a state‟s recourse to war. However, again, the deep bias towards the 
relationship between rationality and war affected their argument, leaving out again 
the domestic variables that could explain a state‟s decision to go to war: “The 
domestic version of the game [offered in the book] is indistinguishable from any other 
model in which policy makers' choices of  what demands to make are somehow 
constrained or exogenous. In the end,  the policy process in this model, whether 
realpolitik or domestic, is still very much the „black box‟ for which third-image 
explanations have been criticized in the past.” Michael Gilligan, “War And Reason: 
Domestic And International Imperatives By Bruce Bueno De Mesquita And David 
Lalman (Book Review)”, Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (1995): 650.  
Another relevant book, Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy Of Conflict (Cambridge: 
16
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Harvard University Press, 1960) clearly explains how rationality guides any type of 
actor‟s behavior by implementing the game theory puzzle. Game theory clearly 
represents a valuable mathematic and interactive model which received a wide and 
deserved attention. However, the cultural variables that historically pushed states to 
behave differently with respect to the stylized models‟ outcome are completely left 
out, therefore critically undermining the overall strategic behavioral explanations. For 
what concerns the famous balance of power theory, one clear example of this logic 
has been offered  by Kenneth N Waltz, Theory Of International Politics (Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979). His work stands as the pioneer on the 
subject of neorealism and the rational attitude towards balancing in international 
relations.  
13
 However, still in the same theoretical field, the balance of power theory received a 
wide criticism through the work of Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality Vs. Neo-Realist 
Theory”, International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 108-148. He highlighted how the 
implementation of the theory of balance of power was actually applied in very few 
historical cases, and still more as a indirect system rather than a rationalist 
calculation. Moreover, other relevant realist works actually moved beyond the 
balance of power theory suggesting that in history the opposite actually occurred, 
something that has been defined as bandwagoning. See for example, Randall L. 
Schweller, “Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing The Revisionist State Back In”, 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107. The balance of power theory has also 
been challenged by the famous “balance of threat” theory elaborated in Stephen M 
Walt, The Origins Of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Moreover, 
within the same theoretical paradigm, other realists demonstrated that actually in 
history we can find more often the manifestation of the so-called “hegemonic 
stability,” that is, the assumption that in history states do not necessarily oppose the 
progressive manifestation of a world hegemon, since hegemony actually helps 
create a peaceful and more prosperous international system. This theoretical 
assumption not only clearly contradicts the core realist assumptions of self-help and 
balance of power, but actually it demonstrates to be one of the few theoretical 
strengths of realism, since even historians tend to agree on the scientific validity of 
the “hegemonic stability.” For realist works related to this topic see: Robert Gilpin, 
War And Change In World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
In Gilpin‟s book we can find the first theorization about the creation of empires and 
what are the processes that might lead to an overall systemic change, which pass 
through the so-called hegemonic war, also illustrated in Robert Gilpin, “The Theory 
Of Hegemonic War”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613. 
Another relevant work highlighting the theory of hegemonic stability – especially 
when it come to its effects on world trade – is Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power And 
17
 
 
strategic culture – rationality has failed to explain specific behavioral 
patterns that seemed to be, at the first glance, contradictory or even 
irrational. For example, one case in point is the use of the kamikaze tactic 
during World War II and how it had been deeply criticized in strategic 
terms.
14
 The failure to understand its real strategic nature is the result of the 
application of the so-called rationality which “can prevent an individual or 
group from seeing (or seeing as acceptable) certain options which might 
nevertheless be rational in an objective sense.”
15
 Therefore, in such an 
                                                                                                                                        
The Structure Of International Trade”, World Politics 28, no. 03 (1976): 317-347. For 
the political stability under hegemony see: William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability Of A 
Unipolar World”, International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 5-41. For an historical 
analysis of this theory see: Ronald Findlay and Kevin H O'Rourke, Power And Plenty 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). Within the “hegemonic stability” 
field of research, other scholars demonstrated how even strategic culture could 
explain the creation and ultimate acceptance of hegemony. Conceived as a political 
system mainly concerned with the “production of legitimacy,” Bradley S. Klein argues 
that the American hegemony is not simply based on military capabilities, but also on 
the ability to project a cultural model that other countries find convincing and easily 
internalized. Bradley S. Klein "Hegemony And Strategic Culture: American Power 
Projection And Alliance Defence Politics", Review of International Studies 14, no. 02 
(1988): 133-148. Other works, instead, talking about how alliances work, 
demonstrated that actually alliances were created not with the objective to 
counterbalance a hegemon, but to actually better control the other members of the 
alliance itself. See Paul Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons Of Power And 
Tools Of Management”, in Historical Dimensions Of National Security Problems, 
Klaus Knorr ed. , 1st ed. (Kansas city: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 227-262. 
14
 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage And Culture (New York: Doubleday, 2001). 
15
 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism, p. 64. Moreover, the author, as in the 
case of kamikaze, warns against the possibility to “mistake rational for reasonable 
behavior. Not all rational behavior might be thought to be reasonable: more often 
than not, „reasonable‟ behavior is that which we ourselves … are used to.” In the 
strategic cultural studies, this distinction has been constantly mentioned in order to 
clarify the relationship between rationality and behavior. On this basis, also Colin 
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uncertain world politics context, it should be remembered the one too-often-
forgotten “cardinal tenet of strategy”
16
: “知彼知己者，百战不殆 [zhi bi zhi ji 
zhe, bai zhan bu dai] ”
17
 “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred 
battles you will never be in peril.”
18
 
However, a closer look at the notion of rationality demonstrates that, 
if employed with theoretical care, it might not be completely antagonistic to 
the concept of strategic culture: “indeed, strategic culture is compatible with 
notions of limited rationality (where strategic culture simplifies reality), with 
process rationality (where strategic culture defines ranked preferences or 
narrows options), and with adaptive rationality (where historical choices, 
analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice). But the 
                                                                                                                                        
Gray underlines the fact that  the problem that we are encountering is related to the 
content of rationality, that is, “with its reasonableness in our encultured view, not with 
the process which purposefully connects means with ends. The suicide bomber is a 
rational person. But, to us, he or she is not a reasonable one.” Therefore, according 
to Gray, such a specification of the relationship between rationality and behavior 
underlines the assumption that the “culturalist perspective is not at odds with a realist 
one,” since “we are all „cultural creatures.‟” Colin S. Gray, "Out Of The Wilderness: 
Prime Time For Strategic Culture", Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced 
Systems and Concepts Office (2006): 12. 
16
 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism, p. 16. 
17
 Sunzi et al., Sun Zi (Beijing: People's China Pub. House, 1995), p. 13-14. 
18
 Sunzi, and Samuel B Griffith, The Art Of War (London: Oxford University Press, 
1971) p. 82-84. For an analysis of the reasons why this dictum still plays a relevant 
role in contemporary strategic thought see: Colin S. Gray, "Out Of The Wilderness: 
Prime Time For Strategic Culture", pp. 17-20. For a critical analysis of the difficulty of 
collecting information on one‟s enemy, see: Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
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strategic culture approach does seem potentially incompatible with game 
rationality.”
19
  
“It is hardly going too far to say that strategy as it has been narrowly 
and traditionally conceived is international relations with many of the 
complexities taken out.”
20
 Complexities that, once being eliminated from the 
overall theoretical analysis, might trigger three types of mechanisms which 
critically affect one‟s perception over another state‟s strategic attitude. They 
are: ethnocentrism, the mechanism through which a state projects onto the 
opponent one‟s own way of thinking about strategic and international 
affairs;
21
 “intolerance of ambiguity … the idea that individuals are unable to 
recognize the contradictory characteristics of a situation, and are reluctant to 
suspend judgment while examining the evidence”; and finally “cognitive 
dissonance [which] is concerned with the ways in which we try to increase 
                                                          
19
 James G. March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, And The Engineering Of 
Choice", The Bell Journal of Economics 9, no. 2 (1978): 590-592 in Alastair Iain 
Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture", p. 34. 
20
 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism, p. 24. 
21
 In this case, Ken Booth raises an important issue about the relationship between 
strategy and ethnocentrism. He stated, in fact, that: “The strategic paradigm contains 
an in-built ethnocentric perspective arising out of the nature of its practical aspects 
and because of the assumptions and ideology which inform its analytical and 
theoretical approaches. The grip of ethnocentrism is strengthened by a range of 
other factors, which affect individuals to a greater or lesser extent. Amongst the main 
factors are the psychological make-up or disposition of those who are part of the 
profession, the training received by strategists, and the climate of opinion in which 
most if not all strategist work and think. Together these factors mean that strategy as 
an activity attracts ethnocentric attitudes, as a discipline it fails to make newcomers 
aware of the problem, and as a profession it is pervaded by above-average 
pressures toward conformity. Not surprisingly, therefore, ethnocentrism is the natural 
condition of strategy.” Ibid., p. 28. 
20
 
 
our comfort with the decisions we have taken. Individuals do not like the 
psychological discomfort which comes from having „dissonant‟ thoughts, 
images or attitudes. Consequently they employ a range of techniques to 
reject or avoid discrepant „cognitions.‟”
22
   
However, on the other hand, “perhaps more serious in its 
consequences has been the tendency of some so-called statesmen and 
some so-called diplomatic historians to make the opposite mistake: they 
have conceived international relations with the military factor largely taken 
out.”
23
 Because of these extreme approaches that did not provide a 
comprehensive methodological design – not only necessary for 
understanding states‟ strategic culture, but also for providing a normative 
model that could be replicated – many scholars tried to overcome these 
theoretical obstacles by offering valid alternatives.  
For example, in terms of rational strategic planning, Graham Allison, 
in his famous book, Essence of Decision, clearly explained how the 
American strategic approach during the Cuban Missile Crisis resulted more 
in organizational, bureaucratic, therefore internal, compromise rather than a 
direct result of a strategic rational thinking by the American policymakers.
24
 
However, his design failed to provide a coherent theoretical direction for why 
that historical outcome had happened. In other words, his book emphasized 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., p. 25. 
23
 Ibid., p. 24.   
24
 Graham T Allison, Essence Of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). For an 
introductory explanation of Allison‟s model see his previous article: Graham T. 
21
 
 
the role played by the analytical framework of the organizational and 
bureaucratic model, in order to investigate American policymaking. 
However, at the end of his argument we cannot really understand, in the 
end, how the American strategy was really created and then implemented, 
let alone the fact that “bureaucracies have their own cultural idiosyncrasies” 
that are worth being investigated.
25
 Besides this clear lack of depth in 
theoretical design, his contribution, nevertheless, is important because it 
illustrates how domestic politics still plays a relevant role in foreign policy 
strategic formulation and that cannot be therefore underestimated as the 
realist theory of unitary-state emphasizes.
26
   
A different story surrounds another book, written on the same topic, 
by Jutta Weldes.
27
 This book is important because it highlights the value of 
culture in strategic thinking. She discusses, from a constructivist point of 
view, how the US clearly built its own national interests concerning the 
Soviet presence in Cuba. By asking a clear research question – “How do we 
get from the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba to the Cuban missile crisis?” 
– she demonstrates that it was how the US constructed its vision of the 
                                                                                                                                        
Allison, "Conceptual Models And The Cuban Missile Crisis", Am Polit Sci Rev 63, no. 
03 (1969): 689-718. 
25
 Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism, p. 65. 
26
 For detailed critical analysis of Allison‟s work see: Ole R. Holsti, "Essence Of 
Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis By Graham T. Allison (Book Review)", 
The Western Political Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1972): 136-140 and Barton Bernstein, 
"Essence Of Decision By Graham Allison, Philip Zelikow (Book Review)", Foreign 
Policy 114 (1999): 121-126. 
27
 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States And The Cuban 
Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
22
 
 
Russian foreign policy posture and strategy that clearly triggered US 
intervention. It was the result, in fact, “of a „strong national conviction.‟ This 
„strong national conviction,‟ this „visceral feeling‟ about the U.S. national 
interest in the Cuban missile crisis, resulted from a socially and discursively 
constructed common sense. It was the product of the postwar U.S. security 
imaginary and of the well-developed template it provided for representing 
the world of international politics and the place of the United States in it.”
 28 
 
Therefore “the constant, numbing repetition of the same stock 
phrases and descriptions … contributed to the reception of these 
representations as common sense.” Phrases like “the Soviet Union is bent 
on world  domination” characterized the American “security  imaginary,”
29
 
that is, “a set of ideas about entities that populated the international system 
as well as relations among them. The  postwar American security imaginary 
depicted the United  States as the defender of freedom, while appeasement, 
Soviet  duplicity, the creeping subversion of international communism, and 
the Cuban revolution were figured as threats. Security imaginaries clarify 
who we are and who our enemies  are and how and why they threaten us.”
30
  
This demonstrates, in other words, how other intervening factors, 
like cultural traits, determine the conduct of a state‟s foreign policy or even a 
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 McGeorge Bundy, Danger And Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 
413,  in Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States And The 
Cuban Missile Crisis 
29
 Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States And The Cuban 
Missile Crisis, pp. 226-227 
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military conduct. The example of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as other 
theoretical designs that I will explain in the following pages, highlights the 
importance of domestic variables in shaping the strategic behavior of a 
state. In other words, “the original insight behind constructivism is that 
meaning is „socially constructed‟ … In a socially constructed world, the 
existence of patterns, cause-and-effect relationships, and even states 
themselves depends on webs of meaning and practices that constitute 
them.”
31
 As an additional evidence of this argument, Jeffrey Legro explained 
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 Aaron Belkin, "Constructing National Interests: The United States And The Cuban 
Missile Crisis By Jutta Weldes (Book Review)", The American Political Science 
Review 95, no. 4 (2001): 1048. 
31
 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism”, in The Oxford Handbook Of International Relations, 
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
p. 300, 305. This theoretical specificity about constructivism is quite relevant 
because it underlines its success in the past thirty years. This success is expressed, 
as the author points out, by the fact that “other approaches have come to recognize 
the socially constructed content of some of the concepts [the constructivists] use. 
The goods of realist competition, for instance, include status, prestige, reputation, 
and hegemony, all of which make sense only in terms of either legitimated power or 
shared understandings. They are, therefore, the stuff of constructivism as well. This 
has had the result of blurring the boundaries between the approaches, making them 
hard to define in exclusive terms.” (p. 313) The last issue that the author had raised – 
that is, the progressive blurriness among the different theoretical approaches in IR – 
affected part of the constructivist theoretical development to the extent that there 
have been several attempts to combine constructivism with other paradigm. One of 
these is exemplified by the work of J.Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism”, Int 
Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003): 325-342, which tries to explain why realism and 
constructivism are not totally antithetical. While another one,  James Fearon and 
Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism V. Constructivism”, in Handbook Of International 
Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons ed. , 1st ed. 
(London: Sage, 2002), 52-72, tries to discuss what are the areas of theoretical 
convergence between realism and constructivism. In another work, John Glenn, 
"Realism Versus Strategic Culture: Competition And Collaboration?", International 
24
 
 
how constructivism conceptualizes the nature of ideas: “ideas are not so 
much mental as symbolic and organizational; they are embedded not only in 
human brains but also in the „collective memories,‟ government procedures, 
educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.”
32
 
An additional limit of realist logic of self-help inevitably paved the 
way for constructivism, since as it has been neatly summarized by 
Alexander Wendt in a famous statement: “500 British nuclear weapons are 
less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons.” 
The idea behind this assumption is that states do not automatically activate 
balancing or do not adopt defensive measures whenever any state in the 
international system is believed to embark on a military program. And this 
has to do with the basic idea that “the British are friends and the North 
Koreans are not.”
 33
  
Constructivism‟s main objective is therefore to demonstrate how 
ideas and beliefs help shape any state‟s overall projection of its own 
involvement in world affairs. Constructivism, therefore, tries to shed light on 
the always debated and apparently unexplainable states‟ behavior. In other 
words, “constructivism „views culture as an evolving system of shared 
meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions …. Culture 
                                                                                                                                        
Studies Review 11, no. 3 (2009): 523-551, the objective is to search for a common 
theoretical ground between the strategic cultural paradigm and the newly established 
neoclassical realism which, in opposition to neorealism, tries to shit again the focus 
more towards the domestic factors that shape a state‟s interests and ultimately its 
behavior.  
32
 Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking The World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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shapes practice in both the short and the long term. At the moment of action, 
culture provides the elements of grammar that define the situation, that 
reveal motives, and that set forth a strategy for success.‟”
34
  
Nevertheless, talking about behavior, inside the constructivist 
research tradition there is a quite fortunate, even if debatable, paradigm that 
is developing quite fast thanks both to its explanatory power and, above all, 
its originality: strategic culture.  
The need to develop this paradigm emerged during the Cold War, 
when policy-makers started to wonder if there were a clear and distinctive 
Soviet way of fighting. Therefore, this paradigm, as a consequence, 
immediately reflected onto the constructivist approach, which, until that 
moment, mainly dealt with states‟ behavior at the international level. As a 
consequence, a direct response to the realist monopoly on the field of 
security studies, “constructivism and culturalism [which represent a collateral 
field of study of constructivism] [started to be] both concerned with the 
impact of norms on international security … For constructivists and 
culturalists, ideas are not merely rules or „road maps‟ for action, but rather 
ideas operate „all the way down‟ to actually shape actors and action in world 
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 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics”, International Security 20, 
no. 1 (1995): 71. 
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 Valerie M Hudson, Culture & Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 
1997), pp. 28-29 in Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture And National Security Policy", 
Int Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002): 97. One clear work that uses constructivism to 
explain another state‟s behavior, therefore identity is: Ted Hopf, Social Construction 
Of International Politics, 1st ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
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politics. In other words, when ideas are norms, they not only constrain 
actors, but also constitute actors and enable action.”
35
 
And it is action that we should investigate, rather than simple and 
general attitudes of foreign policy. On these terms, in fact, “strategic culture 
becomes a generator of preferences, a vehicle for the perpetuation of values 
and preferences, and a force of action in the revitalization and renewal of 
these values.”
36
 One of the first attempts to actually define and build an 
overview on the application and significance of strategic culture has been 
represented by Thucydides‟ The Peloponnesian War. Thucydides‟ work also 
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States do what they have the power to do. For constructivists, states do what they 
think most appropriate.” On the other hand, culturalists are more concerned with the 
norms operating inside the state and which, in turn, shape the conduct of military and 
security policies. In other words, “culturalists discover norms in operation when they 
look inside the state.” According to this dichotomous distinction, strategic culture, 
then, derives from the culturalist methodology, since it “has shown how state action 
regarding military force is shaped by beliefs collectively held by policymakers and 
political elites (strategic culture) and by military officers (organizational culture).” For 
simplicity, however, in this chapter I will be dealing with strategic culture as a single 
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culturalism. My approach is mainly concerned with the central theoretical 
assumptions that ideas and norms matter. And for both constructivism and 
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 Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture And National Security Policy,” p. 104. 
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highlighted the importance of understanding the adversary‟s strategic 
culture, even if this had been indirectly highlighted. The Greek historian 
dedicated lots of space to the analysis of the Athenian vs. the Spartan way 
of war.
37
 
Culture, moreover, because it is “the most important source of the 
moral factors that are central to the nature of war as well as to the character 
of wars,”
38
 has been included into one of the most important works on war 
and strategy. Clausewitz‟s On War, for example, while dealing with the 
nature of war and its political meaning stated that “war is thus an act of force 
to compel our enemy to do our will.” It is important to understand what he 
meant by the word “will.” He continues his analysis by saying that “the will is 
itself a moral quality” which, along the material elements, constitute the two 
fundamental aspects of the nature of war. However, while “the physical 
seem little more than the wooden hilt, … the moral factors are the precious 
metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade.”
39
 This demonstrates how 
important immaterial factors are in explaining the conduct and the nature of 
war; elements that help distinguish a state‟s true strategic culture.     
Shifting the debate to the contemporary era, another valuable 
contribution towards the analysis and implementation of strategic culture has 
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been represented by Gray‟s work, which reopened the debate on the 
importance of culture for the field of strategic studies. Dealing with the seven 
classic strategic doctrines of the Cold War – such as deterrence, limited war, 
arms control, flexible response, nation-building/counterinsurgency, crisis 
management, and controlled escalation – Gray highlighted how those 
doctrines proved to be inefficient in dealing with the nuclear Soviet-US 
confrontation. And their inefficiency can be traced from the fundamental 
problems characterizing the overall American approach to foreign policy, 
that is, the application of a mirror-image type of strategy: what clearly 
worked for the US – it was believed – should have worked for the USSR.
40
  
Works that tried to highlight the behavioral specificity of a state at 
the military level had already existed. However, they usually belong to the 
category of military history. Just to cite a few, for example, the edited volume 
on Chinese ways in Warfare,
41
 Liddell Hart‟s famous book The British Way 
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in Warfare,
42
 Ruth Benedict‟s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,
43
 or 
Russell Weigley‟s The American Way of War
44
 clearly contributed to the 
development of an historical methodology targeting the cultural variable at 
the military level.  
 
1.1.2 Strategic Culture Within the Political Science Debate 
 
Within the field of political science, we encountered one of the first 
attempts to conceptualize this paradigm. It is during the „70s that scholars 
tried to investigate how to define strategic culture. Snyder‟s work on Soviet 
military-strategic conduct represented the first direct attempt to this process. 
Snyder‟s work still represents an important contribution for the field of 
cultural studies applied to security and strategic affairs, because it has been 
the first one to coin, in the field of social sciences, the term of “strategic 
culture.” In an article for RAND Corporation in 1977, while discussing the 
nature of Soviet military conduct, he explained the significance of strategic 
culture in the following terms: “as the sum total of ideas, conditioned 
emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a 
national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation 
and share with each other with regard to … strategy.” Following this 
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definition, he carried on stating that through his paper he would have 
investigated “the body of attitudes and beliefs that guides and circumscribes 
thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are 
formulated, and sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic 
debate.”
45
  
According to his definition, with which I generally tend to agree, 
strategic culture, therefore, should represent a collection of ideas that can be 
transmitted (besides being internalized) and that carry a deep meaning for 
the community involved in the strategic planning. Hence, this contributes to 
make the state‟s policy environment quite “unique.” In fact, as he correctly 
stated “individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic 
thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, 
attitudes, and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has 
achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of 
„culture‟ rather than mere „policy.‟”
46
 However, he does not specify how the 
development, transmission, and socialization of ideas work, which, in order 
to be operationalized into a concrete strategic culture must include three 
important factors: history, geography, and external shocks.
47
 Neither he 
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Press, 1990), 35-49, the author highlights how Soviet strategic culture cannot simply 
be analyzed by looking at the Marxist-Leninist ideology, but it would be wiser to look 
also at the historical traditions of Imperial Russia which are intertwined with the 
historical external shocks. Specifically, “the assumption is that thanks to unique 
historical and geographical circumstances, particular nations have had to face 
defence problems that are „uniquely defined‟” (p. 35). Therefore, in the Soviet case, 
neglecting other important variables “does little justice to a collective Russian 
memory of war that extends back beyond the Mongol and Swedish-German 
invasions of the mid-1200s” (p. 36). As a matter of fact, as the author emphasized, 
even if Soviet-Russia decided to embrace the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-
Leninism – which was supposed to be exported abroad – “[with] the proclamation of 
the goal of „Socialism in One Country‟ at home, earlier patterns reasserted 
themselves. Like their forebears, Stalin and his compatriots now became 
increasingly obsessed with perceived threats along their state‟s periphery” (p. 43). 
Therefore, “for this reason, any discussion of a specifically „Soviet‟ strategic or 
military culture must begin by recognizing that, despite the strident claims about its 
„newness‟, it is as deeply rooted in the Russian past as it is in any dogmatic 
proscriptions of the founders of the official ideology” (p. 35). On the same line of 
argument, Booth reminds us why the Soviet Union decided to embark on a huge 
military buildup: 
 
“This calculation [the huge army buildup], in turn, will be affected by the values, 
interests, priorities, problems, requirements and capabilities of the state leaders. In 
this respect the terrifying history of the country is particularly relevant. Little 
imagination is needed to understand this, and it is hardly surprising that Soviet 
leaders have always been hyper-sensitive to threats and matters of security. the 
Russian people have a deep fear of war. for its part the soviet military establishment 
has good reason to remember with horror the failure of 1941, and the need to 
prevent its reoccurrence. To all soviet people. Whenever they were born, World War 
II remains „only yesterday‟. We learn feelings from history, as well as facts, and these 
learned responses help to determine a group‟s reaction to certain stimuli and its 
commitment to certain ideas and interests.” Ken Booth, Strategy And Ethnocentrism, 
p. 66 
 
Related to this topic, it is quite interesting to note that even some neorealist articles 
reached the same conclusions of Jones‟s. In William C. Wohlforth, "The Russian-
Soviet Empire: A Test Of Neorealism", Review of International Studies 27, no. 05 
(2001), the author argues that “the primacy of the security problem; the influence of 
geopolitics on identity and domestic institutions; and the causal salience of 
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clarifies whether this “new” concept could be helpful in conceptualizing a 
state‟s long-trend military-strategic behavior nor does he explain how, 
therefore, the presence of a strategic culture produces a specific military 
doctrine. But this ambiguity on the real meaning of strategic culture and one 
of its direct outcome – strategic military doctrine – belongs to his general 
understanding of what strategic culture really is: that is, not – as he said – “a 
rigid code of behavior. Rather [it] suggests that the evaluation of the 
rationality of alternative courses of action in a specific situation will reflect, in 
part, stylistic and cultural predispositions.”
48
 In fact, as outlined also by 
Johnston, the expression “patterns of habitual behavior” and Snyder‟s 
general understanding of strategic culture raise some problems, one of 
                                                                                                                                        
socialization and adaptation to external pressures” characterized Russia and then 
Soviet military expansion. Besides the debatable nature of expansion, three crucial 
common elements that make both arguments converge are: the centrality of 
geography (here intended as topography) and its direct effects on strategy, the 
continuous security dilemma shaped by the geographical proximity of enemies, and 
finally the internal, domestic variables that conditioned Russian-Soviet strategy. 
Besides the geographical and domestic elements, another condition that has not 
been duly analyzed is the role of the external shock, either in the form of invasion by 
a foreign actor – whose invasion forces the victim state to reevaluate its own 
strategic and military doctrine – or in the form of geographical proximity which 
encourages the interested actor to emulate the perceived more sophisticated military 
technology or doctrine of the neighbor player. For a clear analysis of the role of 
external shock and how it works, see: Theo Farrell, The Norms Of War (Boulder, 
Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005). Moreover, for a deep understanding of the 
reasons why specific technologies were, then, emulated by other states, see  Emily 
O Goldman and Leslie C Eliason, The Diffusion Of Military Technology And Ideas 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003). This book is a sophisticated 
analysis on how and why specific technologies were also implemented by other 
states. Moreover, it also explains how geographical proximity – because of its 
interrelated cultures – explains why specific technologies found full implementation. 
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which refers to the impossibility to effectively “measure [strategic culture‟s] 
effects on behavior and how to determine its explanatory value vis-à-vis 
noncultural explanations.”
49
   
Another issue with Snyder‟s argument is his reference to the 
presence of “strategic subcultures” within the overall strategic-cultural 
framework. He defines it as “a subsection of the broader strategic 
community with reasonably distinct beliefs and attitudes on strategic issues, 
with a distinct and historically traceable analytical tradition, with 
characteristic institutional associations, and with more or less distinct 
patterns of socialization to the norms of subculture.”
50
 This definition does 
not help us understand what a subculture really is – that is, who are the 
institutional representatives of this subsection, let alone what role it plays in 
shaping the overall strategic culture. Nevertheless it is helpful because it 
illustrates the fact that strategic culture is not simply something that exists 
out there, but it is also something that is present and negotiated among 
institutional bodies. Moreover, Snyder tried to provide a general 
understanding of the existence of a subculture in USSR by looking at what 
he terms a “dualism in Soviet strategic thinking, with one tendency – 
embodied in certain members of the political leadership and the research 
institutes of the Academy of Sciences – emphasizing deterrence, and the 
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other – embodied in the military and perhaps in other elements of the 
political leadership – stressing war-fighting concepts and capabilities.”
51
  
More than a decade after his paper came out, Snyder himself 
proposed again a general evaluation of strategic culture. However, this time, 
he seemed to be more critical towards the applicability of strategic culture to 
explain the peculiarities of a state‟s strategic behavior. He, in fact, 
highlighted the uncertainty about the explanatory potential of strategic 
culture by stating that “as a rule, culture is an explanation of last resort. 
Cultural explanations tend to be vague in their logic, with causes that are 
quite distant in time and sequence from their purported consequences. 
Often, culture is a residual level that is affixed to „explain‟ outcome that 
cannot be explained in any more concrete way. Thus, culture, including 
strategic culture, is an explanation to be used when all else fails.”
52
 
According to his later approach, Snyder assumes that other methods 
are more valuable in explaining specific outcomes in state behavior. 
Organizational theory, “objective differences in the structure of [states] 
external or internal circumstances, structure of the decision-making, and 
“different factor endowments” such as technology could all better serve the 
objective of analysis. However, three issues are worth mentioning: first, 
when it comes to the very last element that he included among those 
variables that could better explain strategic behavior, he stated that “high-
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tech USA may be encouraged by its comparative advantage into pursuing 
SDI visions, whereas low-tech USSR may respond with cheaper offensive 
countermeasures.”
53
 However, he himself, in the previous work of 1977 
highlighted the importance of not falling into the “technological determinism,” 
and its associated effect, “mirror-imaging” since, as he clearly stated:  
 
“faced with [analytical] frustration, many analysts retreat to the 
technological-determinist view that there is a natural logic 
inherent in weapons of mass destruction that will become 
apparent to anyone who gives serious thought to the problem 
… It would be a mistake … to assume that Soviet doctrine is a 
mirror image of „American‟ doctrine. deduction from technology 
alone cannot resolve any of the interesting questions about 
Soviet attitudes toward controlled nuclear conflict. One must 
return to an inductive attack on Soviet-specific data.”
54
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The second issue is related to those elements that he named as 
“organizational” factors. While it is correct that organizations operate in a 
specific manner, it is even truer that organizational structures, specifically at 
the institutional level (but also the private sector might present the same 
features), are inevitably embedded in their own cultural environment that, 
besides shaping the organization itself, definitely shapes its functioning and 
its spirit. Just to cite an example: even if China and Soviet Union had almost 
the same institutional organizations – since they were both communist – it is 
even more evident that their functioning and their respective strategic logics 
were completely different, with few converging elements. 
Finally, the last issue is related to the identification and the definition 
he offered in the second work. It is not totally clear what role the external 
environment should play, or if it plays it at all. And what he really means by 
the phrase “objective difference in the structure of [states] external or 
internal circumstances.” Snyder‟s works, therefore, moved from the initial 
attempt to actually design a new and different way to evaluate foreign as 
well as strategic behavior to an already consolidated literature on domestic 
politics based on the analysis on how its bureaucratic structures condition 
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the foreign as well as strategic decision-making.
55
 This is clearly exemplified 
in his words, when he stated that “culture … did not figure in [my] original 
argument about Soviet strategic culture. Rather [I] sought to explain 
differences of strategy in terms of specific differences in the domestic or 
international circumstances confronting the strategist of different states, not 
in terms of a generalized difference in their political cultures.”
56
 But it is this 
type of methodology – that is, domestic structural theories – that makes 
“scant room for cultural norms to exert an independent effect.”
57
     
However, one of the central problems that, somehow, frustrated his 
attempt to conceptualize a widely recognized difficult paradigm – such as 
the strategic culture – should be found in two distinct elements. The first is 
his narrow use of the term and his emphasis on the need to rely on a 
“sociology of strategy” rather than “anthropological excursions. However, it is 
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not clear how sociology would advance the cause of understanding, or avoid 
an „anthropology of strategy‟ since, as every good sociologist knows, „The 
socio-psychological map of the world may be thought of as largely reducible 
to a cultural map.‟”
58
 Consideration that even Bernard Brodie advanced, 
when he underlined that, in history, good anthropology has led to a good 
strategy and that, conversely, “bad anthropology contributed to bad 
strategy.”
59
   
The second consideration concerns Snyder‟s narrow focus on the 
Soviet “nuclear strategic culture.”
60
 In fact, “his nuclear orientation means 
that important dimensions of strategic culture are ignored.” This is mainly 
because “a national strategic culture will be most constrained by 
technological and other imperatives at the nuclear level, for it is here where 
the strategic condition („imposed rationality‟) is at its most rigid.”
61
 In other 
words, the basic assumption is that while it is absolutely necessary to avoid 
technological determinism, it is also quite evident that nuclear weapons 
radically altered the strategic calculations of the states, creating a “rigid” 
strategic environment where alternatives are progressively shrinking. “In 
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responding to the imperatives of power, and of the symbolism of military 
technology, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with other 
nations, tend to converge in forces and doctrines. The longer two 
adversaries compete, the more parallel the perceptions of the rivalry tend to 
become … Therein the elements of convergence; the game was the same, 
and there was convergence in the definition of condition (i.e. MAD), yet not 
in rules, attitudes and symbols.”
62
  
However, even in the presence of a such technological rigidity other 
scholars did not give up in trying to define strategic culture in the overall 
nuclear environment, since “no less important differences also arise within 
the field of nuclear strategy.”
63
 That being said, the major works dealing with 
the strategic-cultural elements in the nuclear field belong to Colin Gray, who 
has been extensively discussing about the fundamental idea of strategic 
culture and its theoretical application. Talking about the American way of 
war, for example, he defined strategic culture as “modes of thought and 
action with respect to force [that derive] from perception of the national 
historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national 
terms, and from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of 
geography, political philosophy, and practice – i.e., civic culture – and way of 
life) that determine a U.S. citizen.”
64
 Extending the overall logic, and 
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therefore importance, of strategic culture, while discussing, this time, the 
Soviet/Russian national style in strategy, he goes on saying that  
 
“it is important that the Soviet Union be as well comprehended 
in the West as possible. Soviet strategic policy cannot be 
likened to as loose gun carriage on a rolling deck … it is not 
eccentric, irrational (either in local Soviet or in classic 
Clausewitzian terms), or even particularly mysterious in its 
driving motivations and its goals. However, it is different from 
U.S. policy; it cannot usefully be approached in familiar 
American terms; and many Western policy errors of the past 
forty years could have been avoided, or reduced in scope, if a 
proper respect had been paid both to Soviet cultural 
uniqueness and simply to the plain facts of local Soviet 
conditions.”
65
  
 
Gray‟s understanding of strategic culture is quite relevant at least for 
two reasons: the first one derives from his acknowledgement of the 
importance of history. Also Snyder in his works highlighted it, however, Gray 
clarifies that history should be evaluated by looking at its long term 
projection, that is, “older antecedents, deeper historical and cultural roots 
extending as far back as [in the American case] the Seven Years‟ War.”
66
 
The second reason concerns the emphasis, among other things, on the role 
of geography and political philosophy that fundamentally exerts a deep 
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influence on a state‟s strategic behavior. Features that have been totally 
neglected in the past works. 
However, Gray‟s argument presents two relevant issues that do not 
help build a deeper and sophisticated model of strategic culture. The first 
one is related to his emphasis on political culture, considered to be the origin 
from which strategic culture originates. This is not totally true, or at least it 
requires a clarification to be fully grasped. It is true that several scholars use 
political culture in order to explain specific institutional behavior,
67
 but using 
                                                          
67
 One of the clearest definitions of political culture states that: “Political culture 
consists of assumptions about the political world … that focus attention on certain 
features of events, institutions, and behavior, define the realm of the possible, 
indentify the problems deemed pertinent, and set the range of alternatives among 
which members of the population make decisions. Political culture, then, is a short 
hand expression for a „mind set‟ which has the effect of limiting attention to less than 
the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically 
possible. Since it represents a „disposition‟ in favor of a range of alternatives, by 
corollary another range of alternative receives little or no attention within a particular 
culture. Most people in any culture, therefore, will take for granted a particular course 
of action or consider only a few alternatives, that they choose for a restricted set will, 
for most of them, remain below the threshold of consciousness, because they 
seldom encounter individuals who take for granted quite different assumptions.” 
David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, "A Cause In Search Of Its Effect, Or What 
Does Political Culture Explain?", Comparative Politics 11, no. 2 (1979): 127-128 One 
of the great works that employs the theory of political culture is represented by 
Thomas U Berger, Cultures Of Antimilitarism, 1st ed. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003). Notwithstanding its well structured theory of antimilitarism, 
however, his overreliance on the idea that political culture ultimately shaped Japan‟s 
and Germany‟s repulsion of a warlike mentality is flawed, since his approach 
underestimates the role played by external shocks, in this case World War II, in 
shaping another country‟s strategic culture. For another contribution on the role of 
political culture, see: Peter J Katzenstein, Cultural Norms And National Security: 
Police And Military In Postwar Japan, 1st ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1996).  
42
 
 
it in order to explain strategic behavior I think it is inappropriate, mainly 
because strategy is a combination of several other factors that do not simply 
respond to the institutional structure of the state involved in strategic 
planning. He himself, in the same pages, mentioned the importance of 
geography, for example, as one of the determinants of strategic culture, 
without, however, putting enough emphasis on it. In fact, he stated how the 
US, because of its “continental insularity and abundant defense mobilization 
potential,” did not invest into a proper strategic thinking process. “Necessity 
is the mother of invention,” the author argues, to the extent that the US did 
not actually experience such a necessity at the strategic level. Therefore 
according to the author the US, until 1945, lacked a coherent military 
strategy, simply because the circumstances did not allow so. 
Notwithstanding the fact that, according to the author, the US from 1945 
onwards developed multiple military strategies, he still asserted, however, 
that the apparently “astrategic U.S. tradition … continued into the nuclear 
age, although it took different forms.”
68
 But, this is not historically accurate.   
The second issue is related to the strategic content of his reasoning. 
As Allison‟s model or Snyder‟s work on the myth-making process fail to fully 
grasp the substance of strategy and how it is conceptualized into a concrete 
operational and doctrinal behavior, the same applies to Gray‟s. If we are 
talking about strategy, then a different type of argument should be 
implemented. If his research objective is to demonstrate the unique 
American way of war in connection to the nuclear technology, then it is 
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important to actually understand the inner logic of American strategy; its 
intimate nature. However, he ended up analysis American politico-military 
attitude which is something else and that does not represent a real strategic 
culture. He simply states that, since 1945, the American strategic logic has 
shown a list of beliefs which include: “a belief in the essential goodness of 
one‟s cause, hence a reluctance to wage wars for goals that are 
controversial in terms of enduring American ideas of justice, hence too a 
view that wars were aberrations from a natural rational order; a basic 
optimism about triumph and inevitable victory, hence expectations for total 
victory in war; a sense of omnipotence derived from a history of successfully 
fought wars; and a sense of unlimited resources that should be applied with 
overwhelming effect against an enemy, hence a reluctance to expend many 
human lives in pursuit of victory.”
69
  
Gray‟s vision of American strategy not only is partial, but it also shows 
a caricature that does not find a neat historical relevance. Some of those 
assumptions are correct. However, the overall argument does not survive 
the test of history. For example, since its foundations, the United States had 
fought many wars, most of which fought voluntarily for political reasons, so 
they were not conceived as “aberrations.” The idea of being sensitive to 
casualties in war, it can be inferred, paves the way for the heavy reliance on 
technology (at least in principle). The American involvement in World War II 
is a case in point. There is a vast literature that debates the real reasons for 
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building the atomic bomb. Was it really an instrument to end quickly the war 
in order to avoid deploying more troops on the ground (therefore incurring in 
more casualties), or was it an attempt, in a time of war, to show to the 
Soviets the huge material and technological capability that the United States 
was able to create? Should it not be forgotten, in fact, that at the time of the 
drop of atomic weapons on Japan, in the summer of 1945, the war in Europe 
had already ended and between the United States and the Soviet Union 
embryonic cold-war-type of frictions started to emerge. Moreover, the desire-
to-avoid-casualties logic did not even stand the test of the subsequent 
American military involvement. The case of the Korean war in 1950 or the 
far too traumatic Vietnam war in 1964-1975 seem to portrait a rather 
different picture with thousands and thousands of casualties, let alone the 
recent American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2002 to 2014. 
The same issues are also present in his analysis of the Soviet 
strategic culture, even if in this second case he reached very important 
theoretical ideas. Dealing first with the issues, even in this case, it is not 
clear what the Soviet military strategy really is. Paradoxically, Snyder‟s 1977 
work, with all its limited framework on strategic culture, at least targeted 
what that strategy would be, that is, a unilateral nuclear deterrence, 
conducted through offensive and preemptive actions. This gives strategic 
culture a more prominent role and explanation, since it  Gray‟s analysis 
mainly deals with the overall politico-military attitudes, without clearly 
explaining how those attitudes were translated into specific strategic 
postures in military affairs. 
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That being said, his attempt represents a valuable research on the 
causes that deeply affect the Soviet national style in strategy. One highly 
appreciated aspect is the geographical feature that plays, according to the 
author, one of the central roles in shaping Russian/Soviet foreign policy: “the 
wellsprings of Soviet official thought and behavior may be sought in 
geopolitics (the response of the Great Russian people to a very hostile 
physical-economic and political-military environment), in ideology (Holy 
Russia and Pan-Slav Russia assuming the mantle of vanguard of the 
international proletariat in execution of the „historic mission‟ of spreading 
socialism worldwide, and so on), or in a somewhat vulgar realpolitik.” 
Moreover, Gray, unlike the other earlier strategic culture analysts, was one 
of the first to emphasize how Soviet behavioral evidence also emerged “from 
writings, from behavior in other military-diplomatic respects, from the 
technical details of Soviet military deployment, from exercises, and from 
Soviet/Russian strategic-political culture.”
70
 In other words, he 
acknowledged the importance of not only domestic factors, like ideology for 
example, but also pragmatic aspects that are relevant for the preservation 
and transmission of specific behavioral attitudes, such as writings (widely 
incorporating all those documents ranging from academic papers to official 
strategic planning) and proper military exercises, which are quite relevant for 
increasing the understanding of the value of the tactical aspect of a state‟s 
strategic culture. On this point, in fact, Gray is quite committed to go to a 
deeper level of analysis in order to really understand how such a Soviet 
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behavior manifested itself. Specifically, he stated that “Soviet statecraft, a 
malign mixture of Great Russian imperialism, Leninist opportunism and 
millennialism, and vulgar realpolitik, is capable of almost any tactical 
diplomatic maneuver (or terroristic act – recall the abortive „Bulgarian‟ plot to 
kill the Pope).”
71
  
Therefore all these elements, according to the author, should explain 
the inner logic of Soviet security attitude, which, according to geographical 
problems and historical legacies, is fully committed to the maximum 
exploitation of territorial aggrandizement, mainly because military experience 
shaped the Russian history first and the Soviet history after
72
 to the extent of 
making the Soviet policymakers “no observable sensitivity to what western 
commentators term „the security dilemma.‟”
73
 However, the author, while 
greatly contributing to the overall understating of the elements that helped 
shape Russian and Soviet strategic attitude, fails to create a coherent model 
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that could have distanced itself from the successive works of neorealism that 
used the same geographical factors in order to explain Russian/Soviet 
realpolitik.
 74
 While the latter, in fact, uses these elements in order to explain 
high levels of militarization of the Russian/Soviet society which in turn affect 
world political stability, the former failed to address the key issue 
surrounding this context: how to demonstrate that those geographical and, 
therefore, historical features were internalized into a coherent set of strategic 
behavioral norms. In other words, Gray‟s argument fails to answer the 
following question: was the territorial aggrandizement option the only 
preferred strategic condition with respect to others which might have been 
apparently more profitable according to a pure cost/benefit calculation?      
This question and its related answer do not only put face to face 
strategic culture and neorealism. It also provided the framework for the, so-
called, third generation of the strategic cultural studies. Conceptualized by 
Ian Johnston, the „90s represented – methodologically – the advent of the 
third generation of strategic cultural paradigm in opposition to the first and 
the second, which belonged respectively to the early and late „80s.  
The first one encompassed all the works mentioned above, 
specifically Gray‟s and Synder‟s. Those works, which mainly tried to analyze 
the American and the Soviet way to nuclear strategy, focused on the “unique 
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variations in macro-environmental variables such as deeply rooted historical 
experience, political culture, and geography.” This approach, continues 
Johnston, while innovative in its own sense, lacked the ability to critically 
analyze the presence of a strategic culture within a state‟s strategic choices. 
First of all, the major problem concerns the definition of the paradigm. By 
including all different variables together, such as “technology, geography, 
organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political 
culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and even 
international system structure,” first generation scholars ended up creating 
an “extremely unwieldy” concept, since all those variables represent 
“different classes of inputs; each could stand by itself as a separate 
explanation of strategic choice.” Moreover, besides the mere definitional 
problems, Johnston highlights where the critical aspect of the analysis lies: 
“the first generation implied that strategic thought led consistently to one 
type of behavior.” However, “how does one evaluate a strategic culture 
where thought and action seem inconsistent with each other?” Failing to 
properly answer this question led to an oversimplified definition of strategic 
culture, which tended to assume that one country possesses one strategic 
culture, missing the value of the counter-evidence.
75
 
The second generation mainly concerned those works which 
highlighted the conflicting nature of strategic culture with actual behavior. 
Throughout these works, strategic culture has been considered as a simple 
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ideological framework, under which concealing real action; “strategic culture 
is seen as a tool of political hegemony in the realm of strategic decision-
making; it establishes „widely available orientations to violence and to ways 
in which the state can legitimately use violence against putative enemies.‟” 
In other words, the so-called second generation‟s scholars argue that 
strategic culture is used instrumentally in order to make a “culturally and 
linguistically acceptable justification for operational strategy, and to silence 
or mislead potential political challengers.”
 76 
One of the typical arguments 
related to the instrumentality logic has been the idea that within states there 
might be an “armament culture,”
77
 which played as an “instrumental in 
maintaining the importance of a weapons culture that served to perpetuate 
the hegemony of Western interests.”
78
 The idea of instrumentality in this field 
is quite relevant, since “the armament culture is able to rearrange symbols 
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and meanings in order to harmonize opposites and to justify war through the 
symbols of peace.”
79
 
This generation‟s argument is not without merits however. One of its 
central pillars
 
is to emphasize that “elites are cognitively predisposed to 
maintain the status quo.”
80
 Therefore,  
 
“strategic culture is best characterized as a „negotiated reality‟ 
among elites … the record of past behavior for many countries 
also shows that leader choose when and where to stake claims 
of strategic cultural traditions and when and where to 
consciously move beyond previous boundaries of acceptability 
in foreign policy behavior. Contemporary scholarship contends 
that elite behavior may be more consistent with the assertion 
that leaders are strategic „users of culture‟ who „redefine the 
limits of the possible in key foreign and security policy 
discourse.”
81
 
   
 
 
However, even the second generation suffers from the conceptual 
problem which puts strategic culture in opposition to actual behavior. Even if, 
as Johnston argues, it is true that strategic culture is used instrumentally in 
order to achieve specific political objective, on the other hand, it is still not 
clear “from the literature whether we should expect the strategic discourse to 
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influence behavior. Instrumentality implies that decision-making elites can 
rise above strategic cultural constraints which they manipulate, [however] 
elites, too, are socialized in the strategic culture they produce, and thus can 
be constrained by the symbolic myths which their predecessors created.”
82
 
Supporting this argument, in fact, undermines the overall role of culture. 
While it is absolutely true that culture has been, and still is, used and 
manipulated for “popular persuasion”, on the other hand, it should be 
emphasized that “communities do not deliberately construct their cultures, 
strategic and other. Those cultures emerge and change as a kind of natural 
phenomena. They are the ever evolving product of the many efforts peoples 
make to explain their past, understand their present, and anticipate their 
future.” For example, even extreme cases like Hitler, Stalin, or Osama bin 
Laden responded to some specific cultural guidelines: “dedicated 
ideologues, culturalists in the fullest meaning of the word. Those men 
simultaneously were (and are) sincere ideologues, yet were able to behave 
tactically in ways that appeared to contradict their deepest beliefs when it 
was expedient to do so.”
83
 
Therefore the second generation‟s literature disregards the two 
fundamental levels of strategic cultural functionality: the first one concerns 
strategic culture‟s ability to be “the prime mover of thought, judgment, policy 
and all that follows therefrom.” Secondly, strategic culture “must always be 
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present as an actual, or potential, influence on our decisions and 
behavior.”
84
  
Finally, the third generation tried to offer new theoretical way of 
thinking about what strategic culture really is and what it can demonstrate. 
Specifically, the third generation‟s approach to the study of strategic culture, 
according to Johnston, tried to separate strategic culture and behavior in 
order to make the theory of strategic culture falsifiable. That is, by providing 
those elements that are deemed cultural, the analyst should be able to 
identify them more clearly than other non-cultural variables, such as 
technology, organization, and evaluation of external threat, which, at the 
same time, exert some influence on states‟ behavior and whose outcomes 
could easily be in clear opposition to the cultural outcomes. By relying on the 
second generation‟s theoretical assumptions, they assert that “strategic 
culture may not have a direct independent and societal-specific effect on 
strategic choice.”
85
 The third generation‟s scholars, moreover, “explicitly 
exclude behavior as an element, thereby avoiding the tautological traps of 
the first generation.” In other words, by so doing, strategic culture, it was 
believed, could clearly stand out as an independent variable, since this new 
approach would be “more narrowly focused on particular strategic decisions 
as dependent variables.” In order to achieve this result, Johnston argued 
that the “sources of these cultural values are, unlike the first generation, less 
deeply rooted in history, and more clearly the product of recent practice and 
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experience.” This implies that culture is allowed to vary.
 
Moreover, in order 
to develop a “more rigorous and more eclectic” approach, the third 
generation asserted that most of the works‟ definition of strategic culture 
belonging to this group “do not vary dramatically from those found in political 
culture, organizational culture, or the first-generation work on strategic 
culture.”
86
  
According to this consideration, Johnston relies on two extra works 
that, according to him, belong to the third generation approach: Jeffrey 
Legro‟s and Elisabeth Kier‟s study on military issues and the importance of 
culture. These types of analyses are conducted more through the lens of 
organizational culture. Legro‟s work,
87
 in fact, not only “allows for variation in 
both cultural and noncultural variables,” but he also envisages the idea that 
“culture is rooted in recent experience, and not in deeply historical practice 
as posited by the first generation.”
88
 Specifically, Legro‟s work tried to 
investigate the importance of cooperation during the execution of three of 
the most morally-debated military actions taking place during World War II: 
submarine warfare targeting commerce, targeting of civilians, and chemical 
warfare. In doing so, he applied three different types of approaches such as 
realism, institutionalism, and organizational culture. Among these ones, he 
concluded his reasoning by stating that organizational culture seem to have 
the upper hand over the other two variables, since explanations based on 
domestic elements could help shape the theoretical framework within which 
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states decide to cooperate. Defined as “the beliefs and the customs that 
dominated the military services of states,” organizational culture, therefore, 
represents the crucial asset that explains states‟ behavior in world politics.
89
 
In addition to Legro‟s work, also Kier‟s book
90
 on war planning is 
considered by Johnston one of the best examples of the third generation‟s 
theoretical sophistication. Her work clearly illustrates how the international 
structural constraints cannot be accounted for the French and the British 
way of planning war during the interwar period. In fact, while the 
international structure favored offensive planning, the French, contrary to the 
expectations, planned for a defensive military posture. Why? Simply 
because, as Kier greatly contributed to explain, the strength of culture in 
shaping an overall military planning did not seem to have been affected by 
the external environment. Specifically, her work‟s methodological approach 
to the identification of culture focused on three levels of ideas, beliefs, and 
norms. “The first and broadest level concerned values about the nature of 
international politics and warfare. The second concerned the relationship 
between the military, the state, and society, and the third concerned internal 
organization, technology, and officer-soldier relations.”
91
 However, she does 
not explain what was the fundamental military doctrine of France at that time 
(defining it simply as defensive in nature is not sufficient) and what were the 
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fundamental cultural-historical elements that contributed to shape that type 
of behavior.
92
  
On the same basis, other works, belonging to the third generation, 
reached both similar and different conclusions. Stephen Peter Rosen, for 
example, while analyzing how the combination of the military and the 
organizational cultures shaped India‟s strategy, defined strategic culture in 
the following terms: “strategic culture includes the beliefs and assumptions 
that frame … choices about international military behavior, particularly those 
concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or 
defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be 
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acceptable.”
93
 Even if this definition does not mention the key element 
characterizing strategic culture – that is, the creation and implementation of 
a specific national strategic doctrine – it represents one of the clearest 
definition of the objective of analysis. This is because strategic culture, in 
order to be measurable and consistent, need to rely on the study and 
evaluation of those elements that affect the way a state thinks of war and its 
overall strategic nature 
Another work, instead, that cannot be included into the generational 
divide made by Johnston even if it belongs to the major publications that 
came out in the „90s, seems to offer a deeper perspective on the 
conceptualization of strategic culture, that is, the evaluation of its major 
tactical and strategic component. Yitzhak Klein, in fact, offered two different 
definitions of strategic culture: on one hand, he defined strategic culture as 
“the habits of thought and action” while on the other, being more specific this 
time, says that strategic culture represents “the set of attitudes and beliefs 
held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war 
and the most effective strategy and operational methods of achieving it.”
94
 
However, although being more analytically refined, the so-called third 
generation of strategic-cultural approach failed to demonstrate what 
strategic culture really is and how it operates within a state. On this basis, I 
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would like to advance three criticisms. First of all, the too narrow approach to 
the study of strategic culture. It is true that by expanding the objective of 
enquiry the risk of explaining everything and nothing is high, but it is, 
nevertheless, in this broader research setting that we should concentrate in 
order to come up with a clear understanding of what strategic culture really 
is. At least for two reasons. On one hand, it is important to understand that 
“different security communities and subcommunities tend to exhibit in their 
strategic thought and behavior patterns that could be collectively termed 
cultural,” while on the other, it should be remembered that “strategic culture 
finds expression in distinctively patterned styles of strategic behavior.” While 
it is theoretically understandable why third generation‟s scholars try to 
separate strategic culture from behavior at the same time this scholarship “is 
seriously in error in its endeavour to distinguish [them] … Strategic culture 
should be approached both as a shaping context for behaviour and itself as 
a constituent of that behaviour.”
95
 In fact, in most of the researches based on 
the identification of a state‟s specific way of behaving both at the political 
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and strategic level, “norms are invoked as context effects, affecting the 
interests that inform policy choices.”
96
  
Nevertheless, on the context-type of culture, one crucial aspect 
should be pointed out: while being a fundamental aspect that clearly helps 
conceptualize the value and operativity of strategic culture, it also shows, 
however, its weakness in dealing with the “causal properties of other non-
cultural variables.” If strategic culture is a context and if material variables, 
as Gray argues, also seem to exert an influence on behavior then a 
theoretical conflict emerges: are the material variables “operating without a 
context? Or can we talk of many other contexts? In order to solve this 
problem it would be wise to adopt a “„context all the way down approach‟ 
whereby strategic culture continually constitutes and fives meaning to 
material factors.”
97
   
Even Johnston acknowledges this problem, especially at the 
definitional level. He pointed out, in fact, that third generation‟s definition of 
strategic culture does not allow scholars to actually understand why 
“particular choices are finally made.” All scholars dealing with strategic 
culture agree that this paradigm constraints policymakers‟ range of options. 
However, with all its associated problems, first generation‟s scholars 
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seemed to be more confident in understanding what these limited options 
were and which ones were then to be employed. Third generation scholars‟ 
approach, instead, gets stuck into this process. Their focus on the idea that 
strategic culture can only limit some options and that cannot actually shape 
behavior puts them in a dead-end process; their approach does not allow 
scholars to understand how and why one specific option – within a limited 
set of choices – would be finally implemented into actual behavior by a 
particular state. Put it differently, as Johnston stated: “where does the 
preference-ranking that governs choice among these limited options come 
from?”
98
 Strategic planning combined with culture should be the answer, but 
another problem associated to Johnston‟s argument is his 
compartmentalized vision of strategy. However, “strategy can have many 
dimensions, of which one is the cultural” and “although each dimension … 
can be discussed in isolation, all dimensions function synergistically to 
constitute the strategy whole.”
99
  
Even Johnston, in a subsequent publication, seems to agree with this 
last evaluation by rejecting the Goldstein-Keohane approach
100
 which he 
had employed in his famous book dealing with the analysis of Chinese 
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strategic culture. He stated that in order to understand behaviors that might 
run against specific cultural frameworks, it is not convenient to pit “cultural 
model against a „pure‟ materialist power maximizing realist model.” Instead, 
if we are dealing with the methodology that treats ideas all the way down, 
“then rival hypotheses were not materialist versus ideational ones (since the 
former is ontologically and epistemologically problematic), but ideational 
ones.”
101
 
Paradoxically, all this uncertainty comes directly from the way 
Johnston himself conceptualized strategic culture. By relying on, and 
paraphrasing, Geertz‟s definition of religion, Johnston defines strategic 
culture as “an integrated „system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, 
languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and 
long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and 
efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these 
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences 
seem uniquely realist and efficacious.‟” This definition is then broken down 
into two major parts: the first one, which he defines as the central paradigm, 
comprises the “basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic 
                                                          
101
 Alastair Ian Johnston, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply To Colin Gray", 
Review of International Studies 25, no. 3 (1999): 520-521. Johnston, moreover, 
raises an important issue in the identification and study of a state‟s strategic culture: 
how to explain the “deviant” behavior that occurred in a previous time. “By 
conceding, if accidently, that behavior at time t can be separable from an a priori 
strategic culture it becomes obvious that there are other, non-strategic culture 
(though quite possibly still ideational, e.g. individual subjective beliefs of individual 
decision-makers; the strategic ideology of a subclass of society, the strategic 
ideology of transnational actors) variables that help explain this „deviant‟ behavior.” 
61
 
 
environment, that is, about the role of war in human affairs (whether it is 
inevitable or an aberration), about the nature of the adversary and the threat 
it poses (zero-sum or variable sum), and about the efficacy of the use of 
force (about the ability to control outcomes and to eliminate threats, and the 
conditions under which applied force is useful).” The second part, instead, 
“consists of assumptions at a more operational level about what strategic 
options are the most efficacious for dealing with the threat environment.”
102
 
Unfortunately, the way Johnston conceptualizes strategic culture increases 
the level of confusion over the strategic cultural manifestation, simply 
because according to his way of reasoning, culture does not seem to have a 
determining role, but it seems a simple contextual variable. In fact, by 
looking at his definition and the first part composing strategic culture (the 
central paradigm), it is not clear where we can trace strategic culture. If we 
analyze how a state perceives the enemy and how it thinks of the efficacy of 
the use of force, we are not really looking for those elements that 
characterize a state‟s strategic culture, simply because this way of 
evaluating it pushes the focus on perceptions and on strategic evaluations 
that are conditioned by external factors. The first element – looking at the 
role of war in human affairs – might represent a valuable element from which 
extrapolating strategic culture. However, the way he frames it (whether it is 
inevitable or an aberration) shifts the debate to another level which, I 
believe, would distance ourselves even more from the conceptualization of 
strategic culture. This is because war is an institutional aspect of world 
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affairs and even state formation. Therefore, believing that by looking at the 
way humans react to the use of force we can trace the existence of a 
consolidated strategic culture is not sufficient. And this has to do with the 
fact that strategic culture does not – and cannot – deal with the research 
over a state‟s defensiveness or offensiveness in military affairs (trying to 
analyze strategic culture by looking at whether a state thinks of war as 
inevitable or as an aberration follows exactly this path). Moreover, another 
important aspect is related to the unclearness surrounding his understanding 
of the importance of history. His main idea is to look at sources that are “less 
deeply rooted in history,” however, the “central paradigm” that, according to 
him, should play a critical role in defining a state‟s strategic culture, is the 
place – as he mentioned – where shared information “comes from deeply 
historical sources.”
103
     
Moreover, his theoretical model tends to overlap with the realist one 
over states‟ behavior. Looking at a state‟s perception of zero-sum or variable 
sum goes exactly towards the realist framework, which is often at odds with 
the strategic-culture paradigm. This shortcoming, as I will show in the 
following section, undermined his theoretical design of Chinese strategic 
culture.      
Secondly, the idea of focusing on issues that are less deeply rooted in 
history might end up undermining the explanatory power of the strategic 
cultural variable, since, in order to explain how the strategic culture 
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paradigm operates, the “cultural” component requires a deeper historical 
commitment, rather than a less rooted one.  
Finally, the idea that strategic culture might get closer to the 
organizational culture and similar field of research would not increase the 
scientific complexity of the doctrine. Instead, this approach would likely 
undermine the overall concept of strategic culture, since, it should be 
remembered that the study of the organizational culture does not and cannot 
immediately translate itself into strategic culture. The former, in fact, is very 
specific and looks at detailed institutional frameworks, while the latter‟s 
objective is to understand what is the overarching element under which the 
state, in its almost entirety, tends to conform. In fact, it is not a coincidence 
that even Johnston himself is quite aware of this problem, that is, the 
attempt to trying to build an idea of strategic culture by relying on the 
organizational cultural approach:  
 
“a … problem concerns the use of organizational culture as a 
key independent variable in strategic choice. The third 
generation work shares the first generation‟s belief that 
ideational or cultural variables indeed have an observable effect 
on behavior. In doing so, however, it neglects a key strain in the 
second generation of organizational culture literature that posits 
that symbolic (cultural) strategy may not have any causal effect 
upon operational doctrine. Some of the third generation 
literature safely avoids the problem because the dependent 
variable is behavior and not foreign policy or strategic doctrine 
statements. But in some instances, military doctrine is the 
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dependent variable, and this raises the under-explored question 
whether declared and operational doctrines are different.”
104
  
  
This has represented the common problem shared by many strategic culture 
scholars. However, it should be pointed out that in order to clearly 
understand the value and the conceptual strength of strategic culture “we 
need to distinguish among: (1) public culture, (2) strategic culture; and (3) 
military (organizational) culture.” Therefore, this implies that strategic culture 
should be analyzed in its own right.
105
 
Still in the nineties, other scholars investigated the depth of the 
cultural and ideational factors in IR, whose works opened up the 
development of a new generation of strategic cultural scholars. By keeping 
Johnston‟s generational divide, we can therefore consider Peter 
Katzenstein‟s edited volume on national security culture as the precursor of 
a fourth generation of scholars whose works came out in the early decade of 
the twenty-first century. His book tried to shed light on the different ways of 
conceptualizing culture both at the domestic and international level. The 
book‟s objective was to offer “a sociological perspective on the politics of 
national security. It argues that security interests are defined by actors who 
respond to cultural factors.” It highlighted how “the cultural-institutional 
context of policy on the one hand and the constructed identity of states, 
governments, and other political actors on the other” combine in order to 
create what we now define as a specific cultural way that characterizes 
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states‟ behavior both at the domestic and international level. However, this 
project, while adding more knowledge into the overall debate of culture and 
its explanatory power, does not target only the cultural elements that 
characterize a state‟s cultural framework leading to a specific behavior. 
Katzenstein‟s book directly engages simultaneously with the study and 
application of norms, identity and culture.
106
 
The plurality of methodological engagements that Katzenstein 
provided paved the way for this fourth generation of scholars, whose major 
objective was to reconsider the theoretical value of the strategic cultural 
paradigm. This generation‟s theoretical effort can be divided into two groups: 
the first one is mainly characterized by those scholars who lost “faith” in the 
explanatory ability of strategic culture. They have been conducting extra 
research in order to understand how to strengthen strategic culture by 
lowering its centrality while mixing it, at the same time, with other theoretical 
models. The second group of this generation, unlike the first one, while also 
trying to modify the strategic cultural paradigm, did not lose “faith” in it. 
Therefore they are mainly concerned with the possibility to strengthen the 
strategic cultural paradigm by working on the paradigm itself, without 
invoking the support of other external theoretical models.    
In the first group of scholars, some advocated the possibility to 
combine methodologically strategic culture and neoclassical realism, since 
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the latter reevaluated the importance of the domestic variables necessary to 
explain specific foreign policies and strategic behaviors. According to John 
Glenn strategic culture, because of its vast methodological approaches, 
should be understood in detail before actually advocating a theoretical 
combination with neoclassical realism. He defined strategic culture as “a set 
of shared beliefs, and assumptions derived from common experiences and 
accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and 
relationships to other groups, and which influence the appropriate ends and 
means chose for achieving security objectives.”
107
 Therefore he articulated 
the existence of a total of four different conceptions of strategic culture: 
“epiphenomenal strategic culture; a conventional constructivist conception; a 
post-structuralist conception and an interpretive conception.” Among these 
four major schools of thought only the first two, he argues, have a theoretical 
design that could increase the methodological combination with neoclassical 
realism. And this has to do with the fact that those two conceptions “attempt 
to establish generalizations by identifying repetitive patterns of state 
behavior and identify causal variables/intervening variables responsible for 
such regularities.” The other two conceptions, instead, while being in 
opposition to the overall realist methodology, “may provide solid empirical 
information from their rich historical case studies.” And this has to do with 
their approaches which “do not seek to establish law-like generalizations 
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from their work.”
108
 Glenn‟s approach, therefore, helps understand that when 
dealing with the strategic culture paradigm, the ability to find regularities and 
generalizations in history represents the most relevant aspect of a research 
based on the identification of a state‟s strategic culture.     
A more critical evaluation of the applicability of the strategic cultural 
paradigm came from Christopher Twomey. He argued that strategic culture 
fails at explaining the actual behavior of states simply because of its 
“overdetermined predictions.” Strategic culture Twomey argues, stands as a 
middle ground between the theoretical designs concerned with the analysis 
of “organizationally derived military culture” and other ones dealing with 
“variation in national identity that depend on constructed, ideational 
sources.”
109
 However, his criticism does not take into consideration that 
even when dealing with “organizationally derived military culture,” the 
historical roots leading to the formation of a specific type of military 
organization are still missing in this type of research. Therefore, it is 
important to take into consideration the value of historical regularities which 
lead to the establishment of specific institutional forms of military 
organization and strategic attitude.  
However, one of Christopher Twomey‟s central criticisms deserves 
particular attention. It refers to the role played by historical shocks in shaping 
specific behaviors. Snyder and Gray argued that one of the explanations of 
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the Soviet way of conducting warfare is related to its geographical 
constraints and historical experiences, that is, the constant invasions that it 
had undertaken which, in turn, explain Soviet propensity towards aggressive 
and preemptive actions. Twomey argues that this represents “a common 
trait and not one that seems particularly unique.” For example, “the current 
American „predisposition‟ to offensive and preemptive, or rather preventive, 
war [is] the result of a single attack of moderate scale [9/11].” So if two very 
different historical experiences led apparently to two “similar historical 
tendencies at this level of military grand strategy … the utility of the strategic 
cultural approach must be questioned.”
110
 
Twomey‟s argument seems sound. However, a closer look actually 
demonstrates the opposite. 9/11 attacks even if did not represent the classic 
“invasion,” exerted, nevertheless, a powerful effect on American security 
perceptions similar to those effects that might have been caused by an 
actual invasion. Therefore, the role of external shocks is significant and it 
should be taken into consideration when dealing with strategic culture.
111
   
Alan Bloomfield, following the same pattern, criticizes strategic 
culture for being conceptualized “too coherently” and for suggesting “too 
much strategic-cultural continuity.” The latter refers to the tendency to 
advocate that a strategic policy “never changes” and when it does strategic 
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culture fails “to theorize adequately about how or why it did so.” The former, 
on the other hand, is related to the fact that strategic culture, according to 
the way it has been conceptualized so far, “contains no contradictory 
elements” implying that “all aspects of strategic behavior of a state will 
always be consistent with its strategic culture.” This criticism is connected to 
the overall argument, shared also by Johnston, that strategic policy can be 
separated from the strategic behavior: “„policy means strategic decision-
making in relatively long-term contexts – like strategic doctrines found in 
National Security Strategy reports – while „behaviour‟ means more short-
term strategic decisions, like those made by the president (perhaps in the 
so-called „Situation Room‟) during a crisis.”
112
 
While this argument seems coherent, this view faces two problems. 
The first issue is the attempt to separate policy and behavior. These two 
elements are, most of the time, so intimately intertwined that distinguishing 
them is quite impossible. We can reach this objective at the definitional level, 
but not at the theoretical level. For instance, a president in an hypothetical 
“Situation Room” is likely to set off an operative stage which responds to 
preexisting strategic guidelines shaping direct military actions. The second 
problem, the continuity issue, while being real, misses the central argument 
of strategic culture: the ability to identify what really are the central feature a 
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state‟s way of thinking and waging war. The continuity asset represents the 
strength of strategic culture rather than its weakness.  
Bloomfield‟s final remarks, therefore, explain the necessity to go 
beyond the positivist-interpretivist dichotomy, symbolized by the Johnston-
Gray debate, by illustrating the importance to cultivate strategic culture 
through the implementation of multiple coexisting subcultures that, according 
to the author, not only would increase the explanatory potential of strategic 
culture but would also frame when and why a different type of behavior 
emerges.
113
 However, the subculture approach is not new and even if 
valuable it might end up explaining something different, such as 
organizational cultures. However, strategic culture implies the need to focus 
on the strategic level of analysis. Only at this level of analysis can we 
understand a state‟s overall thinking about war even when dealing with the 
non-conformist behavior.    
Jack Snyder, the father of the term strategic culture, returns to the 
debate over the role of culture in the study of warfare, showing profound 
similarities with the arguments raised by those scholars belonging to this 
fourth generation. This time he relies on the anthropologists‟ analysis of 
culture in order to build a framework that combines the two antagonistic 
variables: anarchy and culture. “A rich body of research on war by 
anthropologies suggests that ideas and culture are best understood not as 
autonomous but as embedded in complex social systems shaped by the 
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interaction of material circumstances, institutional arrangements, and 
strategic choices, as well as by ideas and culture.” The idea, therefore, is to 
create a “more promising approach [which] would integrate the material, 
institutional, and cultural aspect of social change, drawing on the insights of 
theories of complex systems.”
114
 
For the major works belonging to the second group (that is, those 
scholars who contrary to the first group are trying to strengthen the strategic 
culture paradigm), the central idea is to strengthen the paradigm by looking 
at its overall functioning without mixing it up with other models. David 
Haglund, for example, traces where strategic culture comes from and 
highlights its importance in understanding world politics with respect to the 
structuralist explanations of international relations. He argues that strategic 
culture to be fully knowledgeable can be divided into groups: one is strategic 
culture as a context, through which we can discern national historical 
behavior and national character and identity. The other is strategic culture as 
cognition which, by relying on its direct cognate concept of political culture, 
develops “its salient quality in the dimension of symbolism.”
115
 This 
explanation is quite relevant since it illustrates not only the importance of 
strategic culture, but it also clarifies why merely relying on political culture 
proves to be insufficient for a clear understanding of strategic culture.    
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Within this second group, there is also the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA), a research agency operating within the US 
Defense Department, whose central investigation, in the recent decade, has 
been – and to a certain extent still is – to find ways to make the strategic 
cultural paradigm stronger. Among them there is Gray‟s work, which I have 
already discussed at length.
116
 Other works tried develop strategic culture 
even further, mainly because of its sometimes ambiguous definitional 
nature. Jeannie Johnson, summing up the works and the major ideas of the 
DTRA conferences, discussed how to strengthen strategic culture by 
highlighting which variables should be included into the theoretical 
framework. 
Organizational culture, though valuable, cannot claim to be the valid 
alternative to the strategic culture because of its sophisticated methodology. 
Organizational culture, like it or not, is part of the overall strategic culture. 
Johnson goes a little bit further by arguing that strategic culture (as an 
overall framework) encompasses three levels: national culture (considered 
here as a context), national policy processes (understanding who is in 
charge and what are the mechanisms for policy implementation), and finally 
organizational culture. That being said, however, in order to define the value 
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of strategic culture she argues that it is important to focus on the value of 
national culture.
117
 
National culture, in turn, is the combination of four different 
variables: identity (a nation-state’s view of itself comprising the traits of its 
national character, its intended regional and global roles, and its perceptions 
of its eventual destiny); values (in a cost/benefit analysis, the material and/or 
ideational factors which are given priority, and selected over others); norms 
(accepted and expected modes of behavior); perceptive lens (beliefs (true or 
misinformed) and experiences or the lack of experience, which color the way 
the world is viewed). These four variables should be useful because they 
capture in a synthetic way all the different variables that play a role in the 
definition of a national culture: “inputs such as geography, history, access to 
technology, experience with regimes types, religious traditions, etc., create 
identity, values, norms, and a group‟s perceptive lens.”
118
 
Nevertheless, I do not fully support Johnson‟s argument for two 
reasons: the first one concerns the lack of those variables which could help 
identify a state‟s military doctrine. The third variable that she presents 
(norms) could work, however, it is not clear how we can use it to achieve our 
goal (identification of a national military strategy). As a consequence, relying 
on history is still a fundamental condition for achieving the expected result.  
Secondly, while being particular difficult to distinguish what are 
values with respect to identity and perceptive lens, all these variables that 
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she presented seem to restate what the second generation of scholars have 
already argued, that is, the use of symbols and rhetoric as a fundamental 
part of a state‟s strategic culture. We need to move beyond this.  
As I tried to survey strategic culture literature through this long 
section, it seems clear that most of the approaches attempted so far fell 
short to grasp its theoretical essence: what a state‟s military strategy is and 
why that particular strategy has been adopted. In other words, the objective 
of a coherent theory that explains strategic culture should be to highlight why 
a state decided to adopt a specific strategic attitude and therefore what are 
the cultural traits that helped shape that specific strategy, making it the core 
of the overall national strategy. But before explaining my overall 
methodological approach that attempts to structure a coherent theoretical 
framework, it is now the time to turn to investigate the relevant western and 
Chinese literature on Chinese strategic culture, which represents the topic of 
this research. 
 
1.2 Chinese Strategic Culture 
 
In this section I will present the major works which contributed to 
explain Chinese strategic culture. I will also present and discuss their major 
pitfalls which did not contribute to acquire a deep knowledge of Chinese 
strategic culture. Some of the shortcomings that I will present resemble 
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those of the previous works which have been illustrated in the previous 
section. For what concerns us here, the present section will highlight the 
strengths and weaknesses of the strategic cultural literature dealing 
specifically with China. Hence, the objective of this section‟s analysis is to 
demonstrate where the current literature has failed in demonstrating what 
Chinese strategic culture really is and where it is necessary to intervene, 
theoretically, in order to deepen our understanding of Chinese strategic 
affairs.   
The Western literature on Chinese strategic culture, contrary to 
expectations, is not very wide. One of the central obstacles is, for sure, the 
lack of linguistic skills which undermine any serious study on Chinese 
strategic behavior. Those scholars with Chinese proficiency dedicated their 
energies, instead, to the field of military history
119
 which, in our discussion 
(especially in the subsequent chapters), will play an important role; 
especially considering that their topics get very close to any serious attempt 
to study Chinese strategic culture. Along this approach, the other relevant 
literature dealing with China‟s behavior both in foreign policy and strategic 
affairs is the analysis of leadership and how this political establishment 
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regulates Chinese institutional behavior.
120
 Moreover, there is also a vast 
literature which tries to investigate Chinese foreign policy by looking at 
domestic/bureaucratic politics.
121
  
One of the pioneers of the investigation of Chinese behavior at the 
strategic level is John Fairbank‟s edited work Chinese Ways in Warfare.
122
 
In his work we can find one of the clearest effort to define the strategic 
elements that characterized Chinese way of waging warfare from ancient 
times to the late sixteenth century. His work is based on a historical account 
of how China waged war, therefore its ultimate objective was not to define a 
clear profile of a general, comprehensive Chinese military conduct in history. 
However, despite providing a wealth of information on how the army 
was drilled, its structure and hierarchy leading the army, the book does not 
present the Chinese way of war, meaning the fundamental doctrinal and 
strategic features that tend to persist over time. The book lacks a full 
analysis of the Chinese strategic culture in the period under investigation. 
Only in the introductory chapter can we find some sort of general ideas 
about the major characteristics of the Chinese way of warfare, but the author 
fails to take that information into account for further evaluation and 
elaboration. Fairbank stated that “[China] is … a striking examplar of the 
                                                          
120
 David M Lampton, Following The Leader, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2014); Feng Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture And Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making, (London: Routledge, 2007). 
121
 David L Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002). 
122
 John K. Fairbank, Chinese ways in Warfare, p. 1. 
77
 
 
new art of militant mobilization for defense.”
123
 Moreover, he emphasized the 
Chinese preference for “defense [over] offense and [which, in turn,] stresses 
the exhausting of an attacker or the pacification of a rebel as less costly than 
their extermination.” Chinese leaders emphasize “attritional warfare over 
offensive warfare with the goal of annihilating the enemy.”
124
 Strategic asset 
which translated itself also in other contexts such as, for example, the 
military confrontation with the maritime enemies against which Chinese 
strategists applied the same concept which shaped their land strategy: 
坚壁清野 (jianbi qingye) “strengthen the walls and clear the fields;” that is, an 
attempt to concentrate all material resources, such as food, manpower, etc, 
inside the city walls in order to “starve out the attackers.”
125
  
Military Culture in Imperial China
126
 tried to fill the empirical gap left by 
Fairbank and represented the attempt to connect the depth of history with 
political science. The book even tried to articulate a new way of defining 
military culture (a coterminous meaning to strategic culture) and how that 
reflected itself into the different aspects of the overall Chinese imperial 
military structure:  
 
First, military culture refers to a discrete, bounded system of 
conduct and  behavior to which members of the military are 
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supposed to adhere, made of written and unwritten rules and 
conventions as well as distinctive beliefs  and symbols. Second, 
military culture can mean strategic culture (in Chinese zhalüe 
wenhua), which involves a decision-making process that 
transcends the specific behavior of military people and involves 
instead the accumulated and transmitted knowledge upon 
which those involved in making strategic choices, from both the 
civil and military side, base their arguments, validate their 
positions, and examine a given situation. Third, military culture 
can be understood as the set of values that determine a 
society's inclination for war and military organization. In this 
sense, for instance, Sparta may be seen to had had a more 
developed military culture than Athens. Some societies develop 
a special preference and readiness for militarylike, often 
aggressive behavior that becomes embedded in a number of 
civil institutions, from education to financial administration. 
Certain paramilitary associations (such as the Boy Scouts) and 
the militarization of certain aspects of social life in some 
societies … can also be ascribed to a military culture infusing 
society at large. Fourth, military culture may refer to the 
presence of an aesthetic and literary tradition that values 
military events and raises the status of those who accomplish 
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martial exploits to the level of heroes and demigods in epic 
cycles and poetry, visual representations, communal 
celebrations, and state rituals.
127
 
 
The above description of the different types of military cultures we can 
deal with manifests the complexity of the topic. Di Cosmo is right in pointing 
out all the possible approaches. However, if we need to cope with the 
understanding of how a state behaves militarily, the second definition – 
“military culture can mean strategic culture, which involves a decision-
making process that transcends the specific behavior of military people and 
involves instead the accumulated and transmitted knowledge upon which 
those involved in making strategic choices, from both the civil and military 
side, base their arguments, validate their positions, and examine a given 
situation” – should be fully embraced, because it represents the 
comprehensive approach we can engage with in order to understand a 
state‟s strategic behavior. Moreover, the second definition is the only one 
that combines generality with specificity, since the others tend to me too 
specific, not allowing the possibility to build a general framework.  
One of the precious contributions of the book concerns the 
understanding of the delicate relationship between the wu (the military) and 
the wen (the civil). Notwithstanding its ability to engage with the vastness of 
Chinese history, it is still a little bit far from a comprehensive evaluation of 
Chinese strategic culture. Another element expressed in one edited chapter 
                                                          
127
 Ibid., pp. 3-4 
80
 
 
is relevant for our discussion on Chinese strategic culture, that is, the role 
played by the external influence/shock in shaping Tang‟s dynasty way of 
warfare. an element that will be further elaborated in chapter three. 
Other scholars, like Michael Pillsbury, went a step further by trying to 
come up with a clear understanding of what the Chinese strategic culture 
really is, however, lacking a coherent methodological framework. In his 
Chinese View of Future Warfare
128
 and his subsequent work The Hundred-
Year Marathon
129
 both those strengths and weaknesses are present. For 
example, when it comes to the weaknesses, one of the strongest argument 
of the book is its ability to have recalibrated the centrality of the ancient 
strategies and therefore doctrines, specifically of the Warring States‟ period, 
into the overall Chinese foreign policy posture towards the US. However, 
Pillsbury‟s argument, throughout the book, tends to be quite speculative and 
too superficial in highlighting specific mechanisms underpinning the overall 
strategic culture and its contribution to foreign policy. 
His Chinese View of Future Warfare, published almost two decades 
before, presented the same problems. On one hand, the book illustrated 
how important the Chinese military tradition was in setting up the stage for 
the Chinese doctrinal formulation during the „90s. However, we do not quite 
understand why and how this is the case and, above all, how the tradition 
has been transmitted to future generations.  
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Ralph Sawyer illustrates the fundamental aspect characterizing 
Chinese strategic culture and its associated way of war. in his work, The Tao 
of Deception,
130
 he argued how Chinese leaders considered deception the 
central element of their strategic attitude. His reasoning has some relevant 
aspects and some weaknesses. Concerning the former, his contribution is 
crucial for the analysis of Chinese strategic culture because it goes into the 
right direction; that is, illustrating what the ultimate meaning of strategic 
culture is: the identification of a specific military doctrine which concretely 
reflects the overall strategic culture. On this point he correctly argued that 
China has extensively relied on deception as the central component of its 
military doctrine.  
However, his argument has some weaknesses, among which two are 
quite crucial: first of all, arguing that deception represented throughout 
Chinese history the key strategic element in war is a sort of generalization, 
affected, I would add, by an orientalist approach. Deception is a tactical 
means that whoever is involved in a life-threatening situation tries to 
implement. Therefore this does not sound particularly Chinese, since in 
world history every country, general, soldier, businessman, politician, and 
even our neighbor may use some sort of deception. At the same time, this 
type of reasoning seems to be a form of orientalism because it labels 
another country of a particular behavior to the extent of implicitly asserting 
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that the culture of the author‟s country is not deceptive at all at the military 
level. This approach is, therefore, affected by value judgments. 
The second weakness of Sawyer‟s work, connected to the first one, is 
the lack of a strategic analysis of Chinese history. The entire book focuses 
on military campaigns and war fighting. Through this type of analysis it 
would be difficult to sustain the assumption that China‟s military or strategic 
behavior in warfare has mainly been characterized by the recourse to 
deception, since it represents, in history, a mere tactical tool that every army 
is entitled, willing, and able to use. 
Sawyer‟s work seems to confound the difference that characterizes 
Chinese style of warfare with its uniqueness. That is, as Andrew Nathan 
pointed out, when dealing with a cultural analysis we need first to identify the 
different categories or classes we want to investigate. “If that class is 
populated in one society and empty in others, then the object [of enquiry] is 
properly said to be unique.” If the “attribute exists in both cultures,” then we 
are interested to examine the “degree of difference between the two in the 
attribute‟s quantity (extent, degree, etc.), quality (intensity, functional 
importance, etc.), distribution (sector of society, geographical location) or 
relationship (pattern of association with other attributes).”
131
 The use of 
unorthodox methods of warfare is not something uniquely Chinese. Other 
civilizations adopted similar systems throughout history. Here we are 
concerned with the level of distinctiveness that characterizes Chinese way of 
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war with respect to that one of other states. That‟s why it is important to 
approach people‟s war at the strategic level, rather than focusing only on 
mere tactical elements that are common cross-culturally.  
The same problems affect Zhang and Yao‟s study on the comparison 
between Western and Chinese military thinking.
132
 By employing a general 
and simplistic overview of both entities‟ military thinking, both authors end up 
highlighting what could be termed historical stereotypes rather than a 
sophisticated analysis of the actual differences belonging to both. By relying 
on the philosophical accounts of the two cultural traditions, the authors point 
out, dichotomously, that Chinese military thinking is more concerned with 
justice rather than interest.  
Notwithstanding the fact that China has a valuable philosophical 
tradition explaining the moral values of warfare and the justness that was 
supposed to govern any military engagement, this element cannot be taken 
into consideration in order to express the crucial difference between the 
Chinese military tradition with the West‟s. First, it is problematic to compare 
China (which is a nation-state even if it is undeniable that it also represents 
a civilization-state
133
) with an allegedly unique or uniform “West.” The West 
includes a large number of states with very different historical and 
philosophical traditions. Secondly, even the so-called “West” has produced a 
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wide literature on the just war; that is, creating the moral conditions that 
could justify the use of military force. Philosophical attitude that is still 
affecting today‟s states‟ recourse to warfare, even at the normative level (the 
arguments in favor of the humanitarian intervention abroad is a case in 
point).  
The second factor that distinguishes China with respect to the West, 
according to the authors, is its reliance on the “human factor” rather than 
“weapon factor;” that is, in Chinese terms the dichotomous relationship 
between “ren (people) and wu (military).”
134
 Here again, the analysis is too 
simplistic. Chinese philosophical arguments in favor of the centrality of 
people in war represents a valuable as well as complex historical-
philosophical factor that cannot be simplistically stated in those terms. This 
is because China, in its history, has also widely demonstrated how important 
weapons were for its war performance as well as technology. In other terms, 
in Chinese history the human component runs at a deeper level than many 
scholars argue and it has to do with the fundamental idea on how to mobilize 
and control the people at the same time. The same applies to the West and 
the importance of the human factor along the weapon/technological element. 
Therefore this specific difference characterizing the West-China 
confrontation runs much deeper than this. 
Finally the third element is similar to Sawyer‟s argument that Chinese 
political and military leaders rely predominantly on stratagem 谋 mou, while 
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the West is relying on strength 力 li.135 While Sawyer‟s argument is more 
sophisticated, Zhang and Yao‟s one is not. While it is undeniable that there 
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committed to the development of aggressive – I would say offensive – types of 
strategies that historically did manifest through real and concrete expansionist 
policies. Arguing that the latter where conducted under the logic of peripheral 
defense undermines first of all the logic of the Great Wall, which had been built 
mainly for defensive purposes, while also confirming the assumptions of the realist 
paradigm which argues that states tended to expand in order to create buffer zones 
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is a vast ancient literature on the use of stratagems and deception in war, at 
the same time, in Chinese history there is a plenty of evidence which 
illustrates the ability of war leaders to conduct pitched battles which relied on 
frontal engagements rather than military actions based on stratagems. 
Moreover, it is important to highlight that what the authors consider to be a 
unique cultural trait of Chinese way of fighting is not stratagem per se that 
makes the Chinese way of fighting unique, it is rather the strategic flexibility 
that derives from stratagem that characterizes the cultural uniqueness of 
China.
136
 On this topic, one of the central academic figures that has dealt 
                                                                                                                                        
for their own defense, denying the fundamental truth that one‟s own search for 
security and defense is inevitably another‟s sense of insecurity.  
That being said, however, the author points out one important aspect about the 
Chinese way to power and security. He argued, in fact, that the so-called CNP 
(Comprehensive National Power) has deep roots into the ancient Chinese practices 
of state security. The idea is that China should pursue a specific power project which 
coordinates the simultaneous development of economic, military, diplomatic, political, 
technological, and economic factors. According to this definition, in fact, Sun Tzu‟s 
famous dictum “to subdue the enemy without fighting” finds its fullest application, 
mainly because “under certain military pressures, one can coordinate a political and 
diplomatic offensive, to psychologically disintegrate the enemy forces and subdue 
them.” This therefore explains the Chinese way of war and strategy, that is, the 
combination of military with non-military elements. 
136
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stay in the camp and “light a number of fires. Then leading forth the remaining 
section of his army, he located it along the sides of the only road leading uphill. In 
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extensively with the application of stratagems in Chinese history is 
represented by Boorman‟s work. In his analysis we can find one of the 
clearest explanations for why deception is so unique in China with respect to 
the same use that other states carried out:
137
 
 
Current strategic thinking in the United States places 
comparatively little stress on stratagem or deception practices. 
Where the theory of deception is most highly developed is 
significantly in the area of electronic warfare, which is minimally 
                                                                                                                                        
this way he waited for the enemy to pass by and strike him from all sides. In this way 
“the disadvantage of terrain from which he himself had suffered had been turned 
against them.” In this example, therefore, we can witness the adoption of a specific 
technique that characterized the Western way of war, that is, the use of camp fires 
“as a form of cover in order to conceal the true location of Iphicrates‟ troops.”  
The second case, the Chinese way of warfare, illustrates, instead, another way of 
exploiting it. By relying on Sun Tzu‟s explanations, Boylan illustrates the famous 
battle, in Chinese history, between the State of Ch‟i and the State of Wei in 341BC, 
in which the leader of the State of Ch‟i Sun Pin argued that in order to win over the 
State of Wei, it was necessary to take advantage of the image of cowardice that 
Ch‟i‟s enemies had built towards it. Therefore Sun Pin “ordered that when the Ch‟i 
army crossed the borders and entered Wei, they should on the first night build one 
hundred thousand kitchen fires, on the following night fifty thousand, and on the third 
thirty thousand. P‟ang Chuan [Wei State commander] marched for three days and, 
greatly pleased, said: „I have always been certain that the troops of Ch‟i were 
cowards. They have been in my country for only three days and more than half of 
their officers and soldiers have deserted!‟” Through this stratagem Sun Pin was able 
to deceive P‟ang Chuan who decided to attack his enemy without the heavy infantry, 
encountering a sound defeat. 
137
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concerned with the long-run influencing of the behavior and 
intentions of an enemy operational commander. [This has 
implied]  the U.S. Defense establishment must be fully capable 
of attaining national objectives regardless of any course of 
action the enemy can employ. Insofar as the rationale for this 
position is explicitly formulated, it is usually phrased in terms of 
a kind of risk aversion: in modern warfare, the argument runs, 
the risks and the stakes are too high for operational planning to 
rest on the assumption that enemy intentions can be effectively 
manipulated. 
The role of stratagem in classical Chinese strategic theory is, 
however, unambiguous. In most classics of Chinese military 
thinking, successful deception is held to be a mark of high 
strategic merit. Moreover, …, exchanges of stratagem and 
counterstratagem are expected to be the normal currency of 
conflict interaction … This concept of strategy through 
stratagem goes beyond attempts merely to outwit the opponent 
by conveying false intentions; it involves the more sophisticated 
task of directly manipulating his perception of reality, and in 
particular his perception of the values to him of various 
outcome of the conflict. The aim, most particularly, is to 
manipulate his concept of his own objectives, and his own „face‟ 
to induce him – for whatever reason – to assign great 
psychological utility to courses of action favorable to one‟s own 
interest.”
138
 
   
The pioneers of Chinese strategic culture, therefore, demonstrated to 
have the ability as well as the will to pursue a highly appreciable historical 
approach in searching for a Chinese way of warfare. The end result, 
unfortunately, did not match the initial expectations. 
89
 
 
Later works, mainly published in the „90s, instead, widely influenced 
by the organizational culture literature and more interested in looking at 
direct and recent political contingencies, have been dealing with the internal 
dynamics of the Chinese state, in order to understand the role played by the 
military and its direct influence on warfare and foreign policy. At the same 
time, this generation‟s objective has been to demonstrate the rhetoric as well 
as the symbolism affecting Chinese strategic culture.   
Part of those works focuses on the role played by the PLA. Scobell 
and Saunders‟s latest book on the PLA and its influence on the Chinese 
security policymaking brings fresh insights on the internal mechanisms that 
govern Chinese policymaking process.
139
  
Other works, instead, build their own research on the findings of the 
“institutionalists” in order to demonstrate the role played by rhetoric and 
symbolism affecting the overall Chinese strategic culture. On this topic, 
Scobell himself, because of its deep commitment to the study of the 
institutional functioning, developed these additional references to the 
rhetoric of Chinese strategic culture. He emphasized the role played by the 
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so-called “Cult of Defense” within Chinese strategic culture. That is, the idea 
that the Chinese way of thinking of war and strategy has been, historically, 
well concealed by a sophisticated mixture of historical and institutional 
practices whose final objective was – and still is –  to create a symbolic 
attitude to military action which does not correspond to reality. Scobell seeks 
to demonstrate that the defensive argument advanced by the Chinese 
government is simply a symbolic attitude used to hide the real offensive 
nature of the Chinese military culture.
140
 
Concerning Johnston‟s work, it was argued that Chinese strategic 
culture is composed of two interrelated elements: one is the Mencian-
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Confucian attitude and the other is the so-called parabellum doctrine. The 
first one is merely symbolic, with Chinese policymakers using this 
philosophical-cultural framework to hide their real operative nature. The 
second element – parabellum thought in strategy – implies that China has 
internalized – culturally – throughout its history the basic features of the 
realist paradigm that explain a state‟s foreign policy behavior. Through the 
parabellum paradigm Johnston argues that China behaved offensively or 
defensively according to a rationalist calculation which evaluated the 
material as well as other important factors before deciding whether or not 
waging a defensive or offensive war.
 141
 The same assumptions – that is, 
that realist practice of foreign policy can be conceptualized as a cultural 
framework – found further application in another Johnston‟s work that dealt 
with the analysis of the Maoist strategic culture and it was included in 
Katzenstein‟s edited volume on the study of the culture of national security. 
By analyzing Maoist writings, Johnston, again, argues that the parabellum 
paradigm affected Maoist use of force.
142
  
However, Johnston‟s contribution is important for two reasons; first 
one concerns the evidence of continuity between how the Ming behaved 
strategically and how they conceived strategy. This continuity demonstrates 
that “strategic culture is not a trivial variable in the analysis of strategic 
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behavior. There is, at least in the Chinese case, a long-term, deeply rooted 
persistent and relatively consistent set of assumptions about the strategic 
environment and about the best means for dealing with it.”
143
 Second, 
Johnston argues that the role played by the Marxist-Leninist influence, which 
can be inferred indirectly from his work, did not alter, but actually reinforced, 
Mao‟s strategic design: “Mao strategic culture does indeed represent 
continuity with the past, reinforced by modern Chinese nationalist and 
Marxist-Leninist influences on strategic preferences.”
144
 This type of 
continuity is also important when dealing with the analysis of the hotly 
debated Chinese “active defense” doctrine that most scholars persist at 
including among the exclusive defensive measures. As a further 
demonstration of the ambiguous defensive nature of active defense, 
Johnston demonstrated, by looking at the major Mao‟s doctrinal texts that  
 
“defensive operations were also sources of victory, but only as 
temporary states in the offensive application of force. In one 
cause-effect relationship, Mao linked the loss of territory from  
retreat to victory over the enemy, but it is clear from the context 
that this strategy involved trading space for time and then using 
that time to create conditions advantageous for the attack by, 
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say, tiring the enemy forcing it to make mistakes that then could 
be exploited. Indeed, defensive operations were the first 
operational step in defeating the enemy.”
145
  
 
Johnston‟s main theoretical issues offered other scholars the 
opportunity to challenge his argument in order to prove the higher validity of 
the realist paradigm. Dealing with the same historical period – the Ming 
dynasty – Yuan-Kang Wang‟s book, Harmony and War,
146
 emphasized how 
China historically behaved defensively or offensively according to its 
material capabilities. Wang‟s book, therefore, tries to illustrate that basic 
relative power assessments are sufficient to provide the overall explanation 
of Ming dynasty foreign policy behavior. Moreover, explaining Ming‟s foreign 
policy through neorealism seems to be a better approach, especially if the 
starting point from which Wang‟s book was built is the idea that realist 
principles of foreign policy constituted Chinese culture through the 
parabellum attitude, as Johnston explained.  
Wang‟s argument is to test neorealism during that period in which 
Confucianism was believed to exert a profound influence on the entire 
Chinese body politic. However, even Wang failed to demonstrate why China 
behaved the way it did, but for different reasons. First, classifying the 
importance of Confucianism for the Chinese empire only because he argued 
that during the Song the number of junshi (classical texts graduates) was 
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seven times higher than other imperial eras does not seem adequate, 
considering that Confucianism exerted a considerable influence even in 
previous eras, let alone the continuous transmission of the Confucian 
principles from one generation to the other. Moreover, what Johnston and 
Wang found to be a “realist mentality” of Chinese strategic thinking “is in fact 
legalism” and Wang defines it by relying on the “orthodox political science 
answer … of international anarchy.” And this, in turn, paved the way for 
another type of misperception, that is, the consideration that most of the 
Song and Ming military operations responded to the anarchical principle of 
realism, when they were actually operations devoted to the recovery of lost 
territories.
147
   
Moreover, while Wang‟s book is well documented, especially when it 
comes to challenging Johnston‟s argument, at the same time it does not 
offer researchers what it is really needed when dealing with Chinese way of 
warfare: a clear understanding of its strategic culture. In fact, it is irrelevant 
to know whether or not a State is offensive or defensive according to 
material elements, since, as it has been already explained at length above, 
there are numerous examples in Chinese history (as well as worldwide) that 
contradict the realist assumptions. In the specific context – the Ming dynastic 
era – Wang‟s argument tries to highlight that the Ming advocated the use of 
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an offensive warfare when material capabilities were higher than the 
opponent, and defensive operations when the contrary occurred. He even 
used statistical data to show that the percentage of offensive operations 
rose in those periods of material superiority and declined in the opposite 
cases.  
Ming dynastic wars cannot simply be reconciled under the rubric of 
offensive or defensive simply by looking at the material features. 
Fundamental strategies actually adopted – that is, military doctrine – are 
different from the simple attitude to war. In other words, the Ming dynasty 
developed a specific historical vision of its empire and cultural expansion. 
Therefore we need to investigate how that vision translated into a specific 
military doctrine and how it intertwined with historical legacies. These are the 
reveling elements. And this is the direction of this research. 
Going a step further, it seems that the shortcomings in the literature 
stimulated other scholars to find a way to combine different theoretical 
approaches, because this would increase the explanatory potential of 
strategic culture in general and on strategic culture as an intervening 
variable in particular. One of the first attempts going towards this direction is 
represented by Huiyun Feng‟s work.
148
 Her work tries to investigate the 
nature of the Chinese way in foreign policy. Her methodological approach is 
original and stimulating, but the overall design does not seem to offer a 
strong overview of what can be termed the Chinese way both in foreign 
affairs and strategic thinking. This is because her work combines three 
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different approaches that instead of increasing the clearness and depth of 
the nature of China‟s strategic culture tends to offer single explanations 
which cannot be combined together as one overarching strategic culture. 
These are: heavy reliance on quantitative methods; leadership analysis; and 
strategic culture.  
In the first part of her work, she provides a detailed description of the 
nature of Chinese strategic culture, which really relies on the use and 
application of Confucian ideals, therefore putting a premium on defensive 
strategic measures. This, in turn, suggests that China is a peaceful country 
whose rise will not translate into open conflict with other states. The other 
two approaches (leadership analysis and quantitative methods) tend to run 
counter to what the first variable expressed. The author‟s second part deals 
extensively with the leadership analysis, that is, how Chinese foreign policy 
developed and changed according to the specific features characterizing 
every chairman taking office in China. This approach, then, is combined with 
a quantitative approach which measures, through diagrams, the ideological 
positioning of the leadership and how this translates itself into offensive or 
defensive foreign and strategic posture. This methodological approach, 
therefore, while sophisticated does not hit the target, that is, the identification 
of a Chinese strategic culture. Any presence of it is subjected to various 
changes according to the leadership, underestimating, or even denying that 
leaders are culturally embedded and that therefore they act according to 
specific cultural postulates. In her work “it is difficult to find … a grappling 
                                                                                                                                        
148
 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture And Foreign Policy Decision-Making. 
97
 
 
with the relationship between broader societal culture and the psychology of 
particular Chinese leaders.”
149
 
Moreover, it is important to highlight again that discussing at length 
whether a state‟s behavior in foreign policy is offensive or defensive is 
pointless, since state actors are complex entities that can use any type of 
political evaluation for justifying, in one way or another, they attitude in 
foreign policy. Therefore, at this level of analysis it is quite difficult to 
evaluate with certainty whether a state behaves offensively or defensively. 
We need to look at military doctrine which really represents the place where 
cultural elements are codified and through which we can understand a 
state‟s strategic culture. 
Other authors tried other types of combinations, especially since 
some of them based their research on comparative studies, analyzing the 
dual relationship between China and US in terms of strategy. Looking 
specifically at the Sino-US relations, two books stand out, especially 
because they focus on the same historical period: Shu Guang Zhang‟s  
Deterrence And Strategic Culture
150
 and Christopher Twomey‟s The Military 
Lens.
151
 Zhang emphasized the idea that US deterrence in the various 
crises that erupted in East Asia with China did not succeed due to the 
culturally-shaped strategic calculations that failed to take in due 
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consideration the other state‟s strategic policy. In fact, Zhang highlights how 
US reliance on the Clausewitzian principles of war and Chinese reliance on 
the principles laid out by Sun Tzu inevitably created friction in the 
implementation of a credible deterrence that could refrain the adversary from 
engaging in specific types of actions. A similar idea is illustrated by Twomey 
who, with a slight but significant difference, highlights how deterrence and 
strategic calculation failed because of the doctrinal difference between 
states. 
Zhang, moreover, also worked on another relevant research which 
got really close to the objective of the present research. His book, Mao’s 
Military Romanticism,
152
 is not only a valuable attempt to trace Mao‟s 
philosophy of war. It is also a comprehensive analysis on how he had been 
affected by Chinese tradition and how he contributed to shape Chinese 
strategic culture. His work, moreover, traces the fundamental historical, 
philosophical, and cultural roots that paved the way for the creation of Mao‟s 
military doctrine of People‟s War and, to a certain extent, China‟s overall 
strategic culture. The only major issue of his work concerns the 
overabundance of tactical details during the Chinese involvement in the 
Korean War that he provides. On one hand it represents an invaluable 
historical contribution, but on the other hand, very often, it distracts the 
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reader and brings away the objective of his research: the analysis of Mao‟s 
(and reflexively China‟s) strategic culture.  
Twomey‟s work looks at the military doctrines, also defined as 
“theories of victory.” However, they inevitably lead to miscalculation over the 
adversary‟s capability and will to engage in military conflicts. His analysis of 
the Sino-US relations during the „50s explains how both states – because of 
their significant doctrinal differences, rooted both in historical legacies and 
strategic culture (without actually explaining what these roots are) – found 
themselves entangled in a progressive process of miscalculation about the 
other‟s resolve for war. Besides Towmey‟s different methodological 
approach, his work, in my opinion fails to address where the “theory of 
victory” comes from and where strategic culture really is.  In fact, he clearly 
stated that his research “does not explain the sources of different theories of 
victory but rather their effects.”
153
 
Twomey‟s refusal to adopt the strategic-culture paradigm is well 
known. However, this shortcoming and the way he argues about the 
manifestation of Chinese strategic culture in a subsequent work do not 
contribute to a clearer understanding of a possible alternative explanation. 
First, his decision to skip the sources of “theories of victory” undermines his 
argument. According to the author, Chinese land theory of victory, because 
of its specificity (even if we do not understand how and why this is so) led to 
constant misperception of the American military and strategic actions. While 
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the Chinese naval doctrine, because it was the result of more defeats from 
which it learned, created an lower misperception, actually leading to an 
overestimation of the actual American maritime ability. This way of analyzing 
such a complex issue is not beneficial for a comprehensive approach that 
could clearly articulate the existence of a Chinese strategic culture. 
Secondly, Twomey criticized the strategic-culture assumption 
because he believes that it cannot explain the supposedly unique traits of 
the Chinese way of war in foreign disputes. For example, by listing six main 
themes
154
 that are believed to belong to the Chinese culture, he criticized 
the idea that these features can be used to explain Chinese uniqueness. 
Any other country can share all or part of those characteristics and therefore 
strategic culture fails to explain what really constitutes the behavior of a 
state. Moreover, his argument goes a step further by arguing that strategic 
culture is not applicable when we deal with the nuclear weapons, which, 
because of their unconventional power necessarily alter any potential 
cultural trait.
155
   
Generally speaking, I agree with the criticisms expressed by 
Twomey, in fact, my methodology tries to go beyond these problems. 
However, two aspects deserve to be mentioned. On one hand, Twomey 
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criticized six themes that, as already discussed, represent the weakest 
arguments in favor of strategic culture. Therefore tearing them apart does 
not represent a hard challenge. Secondly, arguing that the nuclear weapons 
critically undermine the strategic-culture assumptions is not totally correct 
and deserves further investigation. 
For example, Colin Gray identified those elements that characterize 
the relationship between nuclear weapons and strategic culture. Rosita 
Dellios
156
 also tries to explain how to reconcile these two elements (nuclear 
weapons and strategic culture). Moreover, besides these methodological 
aspects, it is also important to state that even in the Chinese case it is 
already confirmed that the “no-first use” policy as well as the limited 
deterrence logic could respond to Chinese cultural assumptions.
157
 
Rosita Dellios also focused on the importance of the military doctrine 
and its relationship with the analysis of strategic culture. Her work tries to 
investigate how the doctrine of people‟s war still exerts a relevant role in 
today‟s Chinese strategic thinking. Her theoretical intuition is important and 
strengthens my theoretical assumptions about the centrality of people‟s war 
doctrine. First, she offers an important interpretation of the meaning of 
strategic culture, which, she states, “pertains to a people‟s distinctive style of 
dealing with an [sic] thinking about the problems of national security. The 
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intellectual „spiritual‟ modality of a living strategic culture may be found in its 
strategic philosophy. In Chinese strategic philosophy there are enduring 
elements, such as deterrence and psychological warfare, that are applicable 
across time and across cultures.”
158
 Since she emphasizes the relevance of 
Chinese philosophical assets, her theoretical design tries to advance the 
“view that there is a uniquely Chinese approach to strategy and that it 
remains even in an age when China has become a powerful nuclear-armed 
state.” This strategic uniqueness is expressed through a policy that  
 
“rests on the strategic doctrine of people’s war under modern 
conditions, and incorporates the specialist variant of local war 
doctrine, designed to deal with defence contingencies of limited 
scope on China‟s peripheries. Adopted at the onset of the post-
Mao era of reform under Deng Xiaoping, people’s war under 
modern conditions (abbreviated … to modern people’s war) 
was a development from the people‟s war doctrine (or 
traditional people’s war) of Communist China‟s founder, Mao 
Zedong. Modern people‟s war was a development in that it 
continued to rely on a victory-denial strategy utilizing China‟s 
large land mass, population, and fighting forces – calculated to 
deter an invader by rendering any hope of conquest futile – but 
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added to these traditional elements the need for meeting the 
„modern conditions‟ of late 20
th
 century warfare.”
159
 
 
Another important aspect of Dellios‟ argument is the way she 
reconciles the nuclear weapons logic – meaning the centrality of the hyper 
technological asset – with the logic of the cultural features shaping a state‟s 
use of a specific military doctrine. Chinese philosophical elements that 
emphasize the centrality of the human factor does not seem to be a principle 
that China will abandon soon. Therefore the combination of this important 
cultural feature with the implementation of nuclear weapons into the overall 
Chinese strategic calculation means that Chinese leaders “may well 
detonate tactical nuclear weapons in a guerrilla fighting mode which avoids 
confrontational counter-attacks. This inferred aspect of modern people‟s war 
I have termed guerrilla nuclear warfare (GNW) and defined it as „the use of 
guerrilla methods within a protracted nuclear war fought at the theatre 
level.‟”
160
  
The idea behind this doctrine represents the fundamental strategic 
thinking of Chinese way of war, that is, the principle of relying on “internal 
guidance for changing external conditions.” The establishment of nuclear 
weapons put an emphasis on the role of deterrence and how to make it 
credible. Deterrence, to be effective, needs to be able to communicate 
clearly the will to employ nuclear weapons. The credibility is the strength of 
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deterrence. Therefore “deterrence is psychological,” since it represents “the 
rational for having nuclear weapons: their „use‟ is in their „non-use.‟” China 
aligned itself into the theoretical building of an effective deterrence by “filling 
the gaps in the people‟s war deterrent caused by changes in modern 
warfare.” Therefore, the acquisition of nuclear weapons enhanced the 
people‟s war deterrent, rather than having created a separate one based on 
technology.”
161
  
Along this theoretical intuition which puts military doctrine at the 
center of any serious evaluation of a state‟s strategic culture, her model, 
however, does not go further than this, limiting herself to point out the 
emphasis on the defensive nature of Chinese strategic culture. This is a 
shortsighted evolution of the original theoretical asset which, after having 
started off in the right direction, relies on the common and superficial 
explanations of Chinese strategic culture which keep on trying to 
demonstrate the offensiveness or defensiveness of China‟s way of war. 
Something that Twomey rightly criticized as inconsistent, contributing to 
picture the strategic-culture paradigm as the tautological or too-vague 
explanatory model of a state‟s behavior.
162
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Finally, there are a few other major works that pursued the objective 
of indentifying Chinese strategic culture by looking at military doctrine and 
how it persisted throughout Chinese history. These works, at last, engaged 
with the real issues concerning the identification of a state‟s strategic culture: 
what was the main military doctrine which, in turn, reflected the overall 
state‟s strategic culture. I decided to label the group collecting these works 
as the fifth generation of scholars (with which I tend to identify myself) 
mainly for two reasons: one, even if the weaker of the two, is related to the 
timing of publication, while the second, much stronger, concerns the 
research objectives which are in line with the concept of strategic culture. 
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Within this group I decided to include four Chinese books and some Western 
works.  
The RAND project on China, Pattern’s in China’s Use of Force,
163
 
illustrates quite clearly that the Chinese government ideal is to maintaining 
the principles of people‟s war even by evolving it towards the third 
millennium in connection to the technological influence. The RAND‟s 
project‟s objective was to demonstrate that today we can still consider the 
fact that people‟s war concept is still kept in full consideration by the Chinese 
government, instead of being dismissed as inefficient due to the advent of 
the new technological era. 
This work also explores China leaders‟ concern with the 
implementation of tactics like: deception and surprise; psychological-political 
shock; and opportunistic timing. At the same time, the authors‟ objective, by 
relying on Johnston‟s theoretical model, is to demonstrate that China is 
acting offensively at the world stage or, at least, contrary to the wide 
literature on Chinese military behavior, not always defensively. One extra 
important argument is offered at chapter six, in which the authors explore 
the possible alternatives that China could employ in a future conflict against 
the US.
164
 
                                                          
163
 Mark Burles and Abram N Shulsky, Patterns In China's Use Of Force, 1st ed. 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000). 
164
 Andrew Scobell, "Is There A Chinese Way Of War?", Parameters (2005), p. 120 
107
 
 
The edited volume Chinese Warfighting: the PLA Experience Since 
1949
165
 emphasizes, contrary to other works, that Chinese leaders actually 
invested lots of energies for a careful implementation of operational details 
in combat operations. Moreover, the six cases analyzed point to the 
existence of a “distinct pattern of Chinese operational preferences. Chinese 
strategists and warfighters seeks to seize and maintain the operational 
initiative.” The authors‟ main argument is that, therefore, Chinese strategists 
are more inclined to use offensive operations. Besides the fact that I do not 
fully support this statement for the reason that it is difficult to demonstrate 
whether a state behaves offensively or defensively, one element, however, 
seems to be quite relevant: Chinese reliance on deception, surprise and 
operational flexibility. These specific tactical elements, moreover, put 
emphasis on another important asset: Chinese propensity towards the 
building of a “one-sided „battle of annihilation‟ where the PLA can 
concentrate superior force and firepower at the chosen point of attack.”
166
 
This aspect is well stated, because it highlights the Chinese peculiarity in 
war. And this is the field where any study on strategic culture should focus 
on.   
Edward Boylan‟s article The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare 
seeks to “provide some insight into what Chinese „style‟ of warfare may be 
discerned over the span of centuries.” The objective is to look at the 
“perspectives, outlooks, ways of formulating strategies, methods of attack, 
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etc., which occurred often in the national history and should, presumably, 
occur again if the nation were to go to war in the future.” In fact, he clearly 
explains that, notwithstanding the development of nuclear weapons, “if 
China were to go to war again, one should expect to see” many of the 
strategic traits that characterized Chinese way of warfare through the 
centuries, that is: “an emphasis on stratagem over brute force, attacks on 
purely military as opposed to economic targets, a willingness to end the 
conflict once its essential political goals had been met, and a reliance on 
men over machinery.”
167
 
This article goes, therefore, in the right direction. It provides a clear, 
detailed explanation of how Mao was influenced by the writing of Sun Tzu 
and other ancient Chinese scholars. Specifically it illustrates the relevance of 
ancient historical patterns of behavior which help explain today‟s Chinese 
attitudes towards strategy. For example, one crucial aspect should be 
highlighted. The author points out that some “ancient maxims can come 
down through the centuries to affect modern-day policies.” Three stand out: 
1) “yuan-chiao-ching-kung [远交近攻]: to cooperate with the far country and 
to strike at the near country; 2) i-i-chih-i [以夷制夷]: using a barbarian to 
check another barbarian; and 3) pi-shih-chi-shu [避实击虚]: to avoid strength 
and to attack weakness.” Even if the first two doctrinal elements clearly 
belong more to the conventional analysis of China‟s foreign policy, which 
refers more to the Chinese grand strategy, the third one is merely military 
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and found application since Sun Tzu‟s times. To give more credit to this last 
element, the author offers some clear examples, extrapolated from the 
ancient Chinese text, which illustrate the Chinese way in war and the correct 
use of stratagems. Specifically he describes how a battle between the forces 
of the Ch‟i State and those ones of the Wei State was conducted in 341 BC. 
In that specific military context, the use of camp fires over a period of days 
just before the actual battle engagement served the purpose of “confus[ing] 
the opponent and induce him to act rashly and leave most of this forces 
behind. In essence, P‟ang Chuan [Wei State leader] was manipulated, 
through a stratagem, to act against his best interests.”
168
    
When it comes to Chinese literature on strategic culture Chinese 
military doctrine four books stand out both for their academic value and 
depth of analysis. Three of them have been briefly discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. Some of them represent an attempt to delineate a 
historical trend characterizing the overall Chinese strategic culture. 
However, even if the attempt is to be appreciated for the energies and the 
passion, some of them fail to reach a scientific objective due to the main flaw 
that still affects – quite strongly – Chinese literature: party affiliation and 
party official propaganda. The first one, On People’s War (Renmin 
Zhanzheng Lun),
169
 the oldest of the five, tries to discuss historically the 
evolution of People‟s War. The book offers interesting elements, especially 
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when it comes to identification of the historical trajectory of the military 
doctrine. However, two problems emerge: one is related to the lack of a 
deep historical research. The book simply lists the most relevant cases 
where People‟s War occurred in Chinese history. Most of them are very 
simple explanations that lack historical details, let alone, accuracy. The 
second problem is the effect of the party propaganda. Throughout the book, 
in fact, one single narrative seems to be repeated over and over again: the 
idea that there is, in Chinese history, a constant frequency of events which 
see oppressed classes organize militarily in order to overthrow the tyranny. 
In other words, this book‟s overall argument seems to replicate continuously 
the Mao Zedong-Chang Kai-Shek military confrontation.  
The second book, Contemporary Strategy Of Using The Weak To 
Defeat The Strong (Xiandai Yi Lie Sheng You Zhanlue),
170
 published a 
couple of years afterwards, is related to a research that tried to investigate 
how relevant it was to apply the “using-the-weak-to-defeat-the-strong” 
strategy in Chinese history. Notwithstanding its ability to conceptualize in a 
more systematic way this doctrine, this work remains deeply affected by the 
party propaganda. 
The third one, The Overall War of People’s War (RenMin ZhanZheng 
ZhengTi Zhan),
171
 like the first one, is concerned with the study of People‟s 
War by setting the stage for a new discussion which advocates the 
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continuous centrality of the military doctrine in the new millennium. This 
work, while being, to a certain extent, a continuation of the first one fared 
even worse than the former. In fact, while the 1992 work had, at least, some 
historical frameworks that had been used for analytical purposes, the third 
work, on the other hand, simply represents a discursive attempt to justify 
specific military choices by the government and by constantly emphasizing 
the political-military struggle against the US that “a peace-loving country like 
China is forced to take into consideration.” In this context, unfortunately, 
there is not a scientific attempt to articulate a historical and analytical design 
which can illustrate the Chinese use and implementation of People‟s War. 
Nevertheless, even if these three works just mentioned failed to 
conceptualize historically and, therefore, scientifically, the nature of People‟s 
War in Chinese history, nevertheless one positive point emerges from this 
discussion: the centrality of People‟s War as a military doctrine. This is 
evident, because the Chinese government as well as scholars and military 
personnel are all trying to rely on a specific doctrine which critically 
characterized their strategic past, especially during the Maoist era. 
Therefore, this, actually, strengthens the argument because it shows how 
China is critically anchored to the People‟s War doctrine, since it 
represented and still represent a critical military and strategic tool of the 
Chinese strategic culture. 
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The fourth book, The Analysis of Chinese Strategic Culture 
(Zhongguo ZhanLüe WenHua JieXi )
172
 also published in the „90s, is a 
general attempt to articulate what the Chinese strategic culture really is and 
how it is composed. In general terms, the book does not offer any original 
analysis, since the author has mainly relied on Western works, therefore 
reproducing all the limitations and the shortcomings that we have already 
discussed at length.  
Two arguments stand out and that deserve some consideration. The 
first one is related to the emphasis, made by the author, that his objective is 
to structure “an analysis based on the contemporary issues,” avoiding the 
typical “appreciation for the ancient thinking (发思古之幽情).”173 While his 
approach is understandable, on the other it is not. If we are interested in the 
identification of a specific strategic culture, our duty is to focus on the past in 
order to understand how that reflects to the present, otherwise what would 
be the point to use the term “culture”? 
The second argument is important on one hand, but it fails 
scientifically on the other. The argument goes that it is important to highlight 
the distinctive elements of Chinese strategic culture because in so doing we 
can reduce the cultural misperception that the West has of China. This is 
valuable, however, aiming at creating an analysis on Chinese strategic 
culture only by looking at how the West perceives the East and how, 
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therefore, to change its perception would inevitably alter the methodological 
approach which would not tend to be objective, but it would inevitably be 
conditioned by the Western perception on China. Its implicit objective, 
therefore, would be to find a narrative that cools down the Western 
misperception. And this is exactly what happened. Gong‟s work, in fact, 
repeats all over again all the typical philosophical narratives that we have 
been used to read in other works. That is, that China will rise peacefully, that 
it will become a responsible state-actor and that the so-called “Chinese 
theory of deterrence (中国威胁论)” is based on a flawed western 
perception.
174
 
 The Western and the Chinese literatures presented offer important 
insights on the Chinese way of warfare and foreign policy attitude. However, 
the problem within both literatures is the fact that we could not reach 
valuable theoretical generalizations, that is, understanding what Chinese 
strategic culture really is. Political science works on Chinese strategic 
culture generally tend to focus on Chinese foreign policy posture or military 
strategy. When dealing with military strategy, however, the field of research 
mainly focuses on specific historical periods. A similar problem concerns 
those works on Chinese military history. They focus on specific historical 
periods or specific events through which it is difficult to extrapolate a 
normative asset which could highlight recurrent features of a Chinese way of 
war or military strategy. The next, final section will build a theoretical 
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framework which could bridge both methodologies, that is, historical depth 
with political science normative approach, in order to find a way that could 
establish a valid analysis of Chinese strategic culture expressed through the 
adoption of people‟s war doctrine. 
 
1.3 A New Approach to Chinese Strategic Culture 
 
In this section, my objective is to build a theoretical framework 
through which establish the normative asset for the analysis of Chinese 
strategic culture. First, I will define culture and strategy so as to understand 
how they are connected and what, therefore, strategic culture really means. 
Secondly, I will present the theoretical reasons which support my choice for 
people‟s war doctrine as the core of Chinese military strategy and therefore 
strategic culture. Thirdly, I will present the theoretical tools through which 
establishing a new way of measuring strategic culture. The final section will 
explain what historical periods I selected for the analysis of the validity of 
people‟s war in Chinese history, taking into consideration three factors: 
cultural change, cultural continuity, and external influence. The combination 
of cultural change and cultural continuity serves the purpose to explain how 
strategic culture persists in Chinese history even during particular 
transformative historical periods.   
As the previous sections demonstrated, the theoretical paradigm of 
strategic culture has witnessed a huge, and at times, hard debate over its 
definition and implementation, mainly for two reasons: first there is not an 
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agreed definition. Since it comprises two contested elements – “culture” and 
“strategy” – then scholars get quite nervous when dealing with this 
paradigm, because of this definitional problem which could trigger criticism 
from other scholars who are expert on their own field of research.  
The second problem, more relevant and also connected with the 
previous one, refers to the belief that strategic culture is too vague, therefore 
difficult to be operationalized. This explains why many scholars, while not 
losing the grip on strategic culture, still try to come up with some coherent 
frameworks that could explain it. In so doing, therefore, there have been so 
far several attempts to measure strategic culture by looking directly to the 
military organization, political leadership, bureaucracy, and so on, that is, all 
those variables that have been considered easier to identify and to measure. 
However, by reducing the scope, we cannot actually understand what 
a state‟s strategic culture really is, due to the too specific approaches 
employed. Strategic culture should be specific but also general. It should 
represent a good balance between specificity and generality. First of all, in 
order to proceed towards an identification of what strategic culture is, it is 
important to define culture and strategy.  
When it comes to the culture,
175
 one of the problems of culture is the 
idea that it carries with itself a plurality of meanings, such as: “inhabit, 
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cultivate, protect, honor with worship.”
176
 This consideration is quite 
important, because it illustrates the profound dynamics within culture and 
how extensive its profile could be. One of the most commonly used definition 
of culture belongs to Clifford Geertz, who defined it as: “an historically 
transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited 
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes 
toward life.”
177
 This definition, even if it helps understand what culture is, 
does not explain how culture is translated into actual behavior. And this has 
to do with the overall tendency, in anthropological studies, that symbols are 
playing a relevant role and that between culture and behavior there is not 
too much of a difference.
178
 While it is true that culture does not represent, in 
its immediacy, behavior, yet culture shapes behavioral principles:  
 
“culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for 
behavior, acquitted and transmitted by symbols, constituting the 
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distinctive achievement of human groups, including their 
embodiments in artifacts, the essential core of culture consists 
of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and 
especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the 
one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as 
conditioning elements of further action.”
179
 
 
The authors, however, carry on their reasoning by also stating something 
slightly different: 
 
“…culture is not behavior or the investigation of behavior in all 
its concrete completeness. Part of culture consists in norms for 
or standards of behavior. Still another part consists of 
ideologies justifying or rationalizing certain selected ways of 
behavior. Finally, every culture includes broad general 
principles of selectivity and ordering („highest common factors‟) 
in terms of which patterns of and for and about behavior in very 
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varied areas of culture content are reducible to parsimonious 
generalization.”
180
 
 
From these two definitions, both authors demonstrate the importance 
of culture in shaping the contours of behavior while at the same illustrating 
the ideological dimension of culture which is not directly related to behavior 
even if it deeply conditions it. However, one important element that runs 
through both definitions is related to the importance of culture in general, 
which “helps to explain the persistence of distinctive approaches in the face 
of disconfirming evidence as well as distinctive patterns of learning that are 
coloured by pre-existing institutions and ideas.”
181
 Building on these 
definitions and moving forward through a historical/political science point of 
view, we can state that “culture or cultures comprises the persisting (though 
not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, 
and preferred methods, of operation that are more or less specific to a 
particular geographically based security community that has had a 
necessarily unique historical experience.”
182
 Connecting these definitions to 
the understanding of strategic culture, as Gray himself suggested, we can 
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assume that it “provides the milieu within which strategic ideas and defense 
policy decisions are debated and decided.”
183
  
Moving to the definition of strategy, things are not that easy either. 
There is lots of disagreement over the right definition. However, one seems 
to be clearly enough to capture the essence of strategy, which is considered  
 
“as the instrumental link between military means and political 
ends. Strategy in other words is concerned with the process by 
which armed force is translated into intended political effects … 
by specifying armed force as the means available to strategy 
we avoid trespassing into the domain of grand strategy, an 
activity that is concerned with the application of the totality of 
national resources in the pursuit of political goals. A 
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consideration of these many resources would lead us into areas 
such as diplomacy, economics propaganda, thereby 
transcending the narrower concerns [on strategy].”
184
 
 
According to the definitions of culture and strategy we can therefore 
infer that in order to provide a coherent understanding of strategic culture we 
need to focus our attention on a specific military doctrine
185
 that would, in 
turn, reflect strategic culture, since “in an operational sense strategy is more 
nationalistic in its nature than most other aspects of social behavior.”
186
 
According to Bradley Klein (even if his objective was to demonstrate how the 
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US hegemony developed culturally) “the starting point [of investigation] is to 
treat military strategy as a cultural practice.” Therefore, since culture and 
strategy seem to be inevitably interconnected, we can think of strategic 
culture as a concept that “embodies the state‟s war-making style, 
understood in terms of its military institutions and its accumulated strategic 
traditions of air, land and naval power. But strategic culture is more than 
mere military style, for it emerges from an infrastructure of technology and 
an armaments sector.”
187
 Another important definition of strategic culture 
states that: 
 
“Strategic culture is that set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and 
modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and 
accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape 
collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which 
determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security 
objectives.”
188
 
    
Based on these new but also old interpretation-definitions of strategic 
culture, when it comes to the Chinese case, I have identified People‟s War 
to be the military doctrine that characterizes Chinese strategic culture. 
Relying on the analysis of a specific military doctrine is quite important, 
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because it not only helps military leaders and organizations define a state‟s 
way of warfare, but it is also “in its own way, a theory of war.” And this has to 
do with the idea that “war is best approached by some general observations 
about its conduct derived from experience, national belief systems and 
traditions.”
189
 The identification of this strategic doctrine, moreover, derived 
from the adoption of an inductive approach for the analysis of Chinese 
overall political and military history, through which I could then extrapolate 
the essential strategic elements of Chinese way of war. Why is People‟s War 
doctrine central to the overall analysis of Chinese strategic culture? 
 
1.3.1 Why People’s War? 
 
By looking at Chinese history from its origins to nowadays, I have 
identified several historical phases in which common strategic features 
tended to be regularly employed. In part, as other scholars‟ works have 
already pointed out, these features were, for example, the use of deception, 
stratagems, and flexibility. But these are not sufficient to express the 
centrality of People‟s War, since these elements characterized warfare in 
other civilizations and culture as well.
190
 Along with these common tactical 
elements, others stand out: civil-military interdependence; nationalism (with 
different levels of degree according to the different historical periods); 
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advocacy of military asymmetric strategy; centrality of the people with 
respect to technology; and finally the theorizing of active defense.
191
 
When it comes to deception, stratagem, and flexibility, flexibility, also 
known under the name of  quanbian 权变, is the fundamental element which 
deeply affects the other two. This is because under a coherent 
understanding of strategic flexibility we can comprehend China‟s use of 
deception and stratagems for its war efforts. This is because flexibility, here, 
is not only referred to the typical tactical flexibility in war, for example, the 
way troops are deployed or armed. It refers to strategic flexibility which puts 
a premium on the ability to quickly adapt to the changing circumstances. 
Therefore the idea of flexibility pervades the entire military spectrum and 
                                                                                                                                        
190
 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence In Greek Culture 
And Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
191
 The centrality of people‟s war is attested at this level of analysis, that is, military 
doctrine as a reflection of strategic culture. After building this model, it would be 
interesting to see how Chinese foreign policy, in terms of grand strategy, would 
respond according to this strategic-cultural elements. This second step is beyond the 
scope of this paper, however, I would like to point out a few signals that are moving 
towards this direction: first of all, Mao, the father of what is known in history as the 
Doctrine of People‟s War, adopted this strategic framework also “when surveying 
world scene.” That is, the idea that at the world level there was a third form of 
encirclement between the Chinese and the enemy, “namely the interrelation between 
the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet 
Union, France and Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we 
countercircle Germany, Japan and Italy with our front of peace.” Edward S. Boylan, 
"The Chinese Cultural Style Of Warfare", p. 357. The second example, instead, 
refers to contemporary issues and explains how China is trying to adopt a People‟s 
War at the international level as an expression of its rebellion against the Western 
world order. See: Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing The 
Revisionist State Back In", International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72; Rosita Dellios, 
"Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 2 - Virtue And Power", p. 7. 
124
 
 
really contributes to our understanding of the Chinese way of warfare within 
which flexibility represents an important operative principle. 
For what concerns the other elements, they deserve some 
explanations. Civil-military relationship represents one of the central features 
of Chinese military history. Better known as the wen-wu dichotomy, this 
relationship characterized almost all the delicate phases of Chinese 
domestic politics, especially at the strategic level. The objective, in Chinese 
history, has been to articulate ways to combine them in a dialectical form in 
order to make one the mirror image of the other. In ancient Chinese history, 
for example, this was commonly exemplified by the peasants who were also 
recruited as soldiers. This type of system found a progressive 
institutionalization into the form of the famous fubingzhi 府兵制, that is, “the 
system of government soldiers,” representing a specific civil-military 
establishment which combined the military as well as the civil duties for the 
empire; a crucial aspect of Chinese way of waging war that characterized 
Tang‟s dynasty, which will be explored in the third chapter.
192
  
This civil-military relationship, at the strategic level, was never kept 
the same, since there were important periods in which, for example, the 
civilian managed to exert the full control of the military. Notwithstanding this 
institutional fluctuation, the civil-military interpenetration persisted across 
centuries, to the extent that Chinese troops, after the end of major hostilities, 
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“were dismissed or sent to do civilian tasks. In some cases agricultural-
military communities were established near border areas, capable (it  was 
hoped) of repelling invaders during times of war, and surviving economically 
during peacetime.”
193
    
This system, besides the historical legacies, found another relevant 
theorization during the political transformation under Deng Xiaoping. He tried 
to develop a comprehensive national economy in order to avoid that it could 
function only as a defense industrial complex. “The aim was to diversify so 
that China‟s industrial and technological base was more balanced and could 
contribute not just to national defense but also to economic growth and 
civilian prosperitiy.” Deng‟s famous 16 characters were recognized as the 
guidance for this transformation: “integrating military and civilian production; 
but making sure to balance the military requirements; maintaining military 
capability; and using the civilian economy to serve military modernization 
(junmin jiehe; pingzhan jiehe; junpin youxian; yimin yangjun [军民结合; 
平战结合; 军品优先; 以民养军].”194    
According to this background, the civil-military relationship is still 
critically implemented nowadays in the form of the so-called junmin ronghe 
军民融合, that is, civil-military fusion. Through this system, the Chinese 
government is trying to create a flexible mechanism that could easily 
mobilize the entire population, therefore increasing the military potential, 
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while also strengthening the military spirit among the civilians who could also 
be employed for low-intensity military operations, such as cyber attacks.   
The following element, nationalism, is directly related to the civil-
military relationship. In different historical periods, nationalism, of course, 
was not identified in the way we think of it today. However, one common 
element survived through the centuries: loyalty to a specific moral and 
cultural system. In this case, Confucianism played a relevant role in shaping 
the Chinese mentality towards the social hierarchies as well as the principles 
of loyalties to the emperor and the preservation of the Chineseness.  
Another element that represented the Chinese way of warfare has 
been the advocacy of asymmetric strategy in war. This elements is 
interconnected with the overall mentality that promotes the use of deception 
and stratagems. In other words, while engaging war, asymmetry has 
represented one important element, which consisted in the ability to flexibly 
move the army in different directions with the final objective to attack the 
enemy by surprise. 
Surprise is not only an operational or technological objective. In 
order to be achieved, one important element is represented by the belief in 
the centrality of the people in war. This element has already been mentioned 
above, however, what concerns us here is to discuss its fundamental 
aspect. That is, that the centrality of the people has exerted in Chinese 
history such a profound influence not simply for moral or philosophical 
reasons, but also for material reasons. Since China has represented, 
historically, a civilization, the huge amounts of people that it could employ in 
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war has represented a valuable military means. Another important reason, 
often overlooked, is the power itself coming out of the people. Their huge 
numbers have often overthrown emperors and, in other instances, it has 
even established others. Therefore, emperors and the generals under their 
command had to conceive ways to mobilize but also to control people at the 
same time in order to keep alive the famous philosophical principle of the 
tianxia 天下(all under heaven). In Chinese language the word revolution 
geming 革命 literarily means “lifting the mandate of heaven,” meaning that 
people felt compelled to radically alter the established political order, in order 
to change the representative of the mandate of heaven, that is, the emperor. 
In so doing, therefore, Chinese people created chaos through insurrections 
with the objective to challenge the existing political harmony in order to 
recreate a new one. 
But the centrality of people is also attested by the Chinese theories 
of war which advocated the establishment of the so-called jingbing 精兵, that 
is, special troops which were not only well trained but had to perform 
asymmetric and special operations, ranging from sabotage to secret 
assassinations. In Chinese history as well as military tradition, therefore, “the 
concept of jingbing has occupied a very special place … ever since the 
Warring States Period and remains one of the basic tenets in today‟s PLA 
army building.” Another important element governing the Chinese 
organization of the military as well as the population has been the 
establishment of yixin 一心, that is, the principle of unity. Along these two 
principles, moreover, since ancient times, Chinese people “used to take 
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philosophy, politics and ethics as a closely interwoven system.” This 
condition expressed the centrality of people as attested by the philosophical 
assumption of yimin weiben 以民为本, that is, the idea that “people are the 
foundations of society.” It is not a coincidence that “in Xun Zi‟s well known 
metaphor, kings were likened to a ship and people to the water. It was the 
water that had the power to either support or sink the ship. The same 
concepts were expressed in military literature as well” as attested by Mao‟s 
famous dictum that people represented the sea into which soldiers should 
be able to swim. “Driven by these notions, the military thinkers take human 
beings as the key factor in war. they place a much higher priority on how to 
utilize human potential in fighting a war than upon how to invent new 
weapons to arm the people.”
195
  
This cultural element that has emphasized the centrality of the 
people, therefore, also influenced directly the relationship with technology. 
This does not mean that technology did not play a relevant role in Chinese 
strategic thinking, actually the opposite. But the fundamental idea that 
characterized the Chinese way of war has been to give technology only a 
limited, tactical profile, rather than being conceptualized as a strategic tool, 
as we used to do in the West. The excessive focus on technology derives 
from the “temptation, in a period of heady change, to overemphasize what is 
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apparently new and to overlook the continuities, and the roots in the past. 
Furthermore, even „new thinking‟ is done in a culturally distinctive 
fashion.”
196
  
In the Chinese case this is more evident, paradoxically, with the 
advent of nuclear weapons. In fact, China‟s acquisition of the atomic arsenal 
did not undermine the overall Chinese logic of deterrence. Actually, it 
“enhanced the people‟s war deterrent.” In fact, as it has been explained 
above, in China we can witness the possibility of the GNW, that is, Guerrilla 
Nuclear War. Since this research deals with the centrality of People‟s War, it 
is important to highlight how it survives and how it adapts to the nuclear 
technological development: 
 
Even if guerrilla nuclear war is a deterrent strategy which 
presupposed the failure of the overall Chinese deterrent, in that 
I cannot operate before China‟s territorial integrity is violated, 
yet what is created by the addition of GNW is a multi-layered 
deterrent, in which the failure of the first element is not … a 
terminal issue. If the Chinese can accept the costs of GNW to 
themselves then it seems certain that they can render the costs 
of GNW unacceptable to the enemy hence succeed in their 
objective. 
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Guerrilla nuclear warfare as the culmination of people‟s war 
under modern conditions, represents China‟s mastery of 
strategic-military survival in the twenty-first century. When a 
potential aggressor is deterred from provoking GNW it can be 
truly said that „a victorious army wins its victories before 
seeking battle‟ [Sun Zi]; but should GNW as a deterrent 
strategy fail, then it will prevail as an effective defence. An 
invader that „fights in the hope of winning‟, under these terms of 
protracted warfare, is „an army destined to defeat‟ [Sun Zi].”
197
 
 
In Chinese history, the essence of the character of war has never 
radically changed, with the human factor always at the center. Paradoxically, 
even in the West, through Clausewitz, we reached the same theoretical 
assumptions, however, for other historical and cultural reasons we tended to 
neglect this important evaluation. Even in the twenty-first century the 
Clausewitzian trinity seems to represent an important framework for the 
understanding of the role of technology, since the role of reason, passion, 
and chance – in order to reaffirm the logic of war as the continuation of 
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politics by other means – should “reflect why (rather than simply with what) 
we fight.”
198  
Therefore “technological superiority … mean[s] little without 
organizational superiority. And organizational superiority alone probably is 
worth more than superior platforms and weapons. It, not weapon‟s 
superiority, is the contemporary equivalent, at least to some degree, of the 
commander‟s operational art. Without this, superior weapons have only a 
tactical significance.”
199  
 
However, when we deal with the Chinese case, we can see a stark 
contrast between the Clausewitzian thought, which is more in line with the 
Western strategic thinking, and the Suntzunian approach to war, especially 
when referred to the use of force for achieving political objectives. The 
Suntzunian approach to war stated the famous expression: 
是故百战百胜，非善之善者也；不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也.200 “For to win 
one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To 
subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
201
 This contrasts with 
Clausewitz‟s thought which “ridiculed the idea of winning without fighting”:
202
 
“Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to 
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disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine 
this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy 
…”
203
  
Also other scholars pointed out the critical importance of strategy over 
technology, highlighting the fact that only “an enduring historical unity to 
strategic matters”
204
 can help explain specific outcomes: 
 
“Can modern policymakers really derive lessons from ancient 
warfare? … [T]he advent of modern technology has in no way 
lessened the strategist‟s need to adapt his military plan to social 
and political realities. The second half of the twentieth century 
has seen a series of starling defeats handed to great power by 
warriors whose strategic insight made up for their inferior 
weapons. Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan are cases in point. 
Evidently technology has not preplaced strategy as the 
determining factor in military strategy. We believe it is precisely 
the technologically low level of ancient warfare that makes it so 
valuable an object of modern study.”
205
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Finally, the last relevant element characterizing people‟s war is 
represented by the principle of active defense (jijifangyu 积极防御).206 This 
element is best remembered for its first complete theorization by Mao 
Zedong. However, as a principle of war, it has always existed. As the term 
itself describes, military actions, to be successful, have to have the yin and 
yang, which dialectically interact in order to produce a specific strategic 
outcome. And this is related to active (the yang) and the defense (the yin). In 
other words, the idea is to create a system which is defensive but that also 
applies active measures, meaning offensive ones. To use a rugby 
parallelism, the team to win has to advance forward, but the ball has to 
move backwards. This is what is happening in the Chinese strategic 
thinking. The idea is not that China really represents a peace-loving country 
(it does not even represent a war-loving one), or that it acts only defensively, 
but that it implements a combination of different operational elements in 
order to achieve its political aims. Therefore, in this specific case, active 
defense, I would argue, is the advocacy of a prudent offensive war. 
 
1.3.2 How to Measure Strategic Culture  
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One of the central criticisms addressed to the notion of strategic 
culture is its presumed superficiality in explaining social phenomena which 
require a more rigorous normative approach. This has been often 
encapsulated into methodologies, such as organizational culture theory, 
bureaucratic systems theory, etc. They have reached significant results, 
however, too much rigor –  that is, the lack of a more elastic approach to the 
analysis of specific military organizations which could take into consideration 
additional variables – did not help explain the fundamental research 
question that had initially encouraged them to go down that path: the study 
of a state‟s specific political/strategic behavior.  
Therefore, in order to explain what strategic culture really is, instead 
of discarding it altogether, as some have suggested, it is important to find a 
way that could balance generality and specificity.
207
 In my model, strategic 
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culture is defined by the simple presence of the People‟s War doctrine 
which, in turn, reflects Chinese strategic culture. Since People‟s War 
doctrine is a reflection of Chinese strategic culture, it is inevitable that culture 
and military doctrine are intertwined.  
Therefore, in order to analyze the existence of a specific Chinese 
way of war – as reflected in the application of the People‟s War Doctrine – I 
rely on a three-level analysis: civil-military relationship; strategic design; and 
tactical design.
208
 
                                                                                                                                        
threat assessment, since it can give nuance and insight into the way adversaries 
think and behave in both great and small issues.” 
208
 Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory Of Strategic Culture", Comparative Strategy, pp. 10-12, 
reached a similar conclusion. By arguing about the importance of strategy in setting 
the stage for a military doctrine that could integrate ends with means, he advocated 
the possibility to develop a paradigm of strategic culture mainly based on three levels 
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organization (including defence, force, and more directly, war, planning); military 
preparation and administration (including recruitment, training, and many aspects of 
armament); information and intelligence; strategic theory and doctrine; and 
technology. The final category, „War Proper,‟ groups: military operations; command 
(political and military); geography; friction (including chance and uncertainty); the 
adversary; and time.” Colin Gray, "Strategic Culture As Context: The First Generation 
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The first one concerns the fundamental aspect of People‟s War 
doctrine, that is, the fusion of the civil and military domains. However, I 
decided to include this aspect as a level on its own, because the civil-military 
relationship has often characterized states‟ strategic culture. Many works on 
this topic have been published, because of its relevance into the overall 
understanding of a state‟s way to strategy and military planning.
209
    
                                                                                                                                        
process. Finally, the starting point for a good definition of strategic culture is the 
identification of a specific strategic doctrine that in this case is lacking. 
In my case, I decided to rely on the Chinese philosophical structure, as illustrated by 
Yuen  Derek M. C. Yuen, "The System Of Chinese Strategic Thought", Comparative 
Strategy 29, no. 3 (2010): 245-259. According to the Chinese strategic thought, there 
is a horizontal and a vertical dimension. The horizontal one still exerts a deep 
influence on today‟s Chinese strategic thinking and it comprises the four schools of 
Chinese strategic thought, such as: the School of Strategy quanmou 权谋; the School 
of Operations and Tactics xingshi 形实; The School of Yin and Yang 阴阳; and finally 
the School of Technology shu 术.  These four schools of the horizontal dimension that 
create the foundation for the evolution of the Chinese strategic thought which goes 
through a vertical dimension composed of three levels: the first one is the Tao, the 
second is the Heaven and Earth, while the third is the Methods of Generalship. The 
level of the Tao, which started to be fully conceptualized during the Warring States 
Period represents the fundamental strategic vision of the political dimension. Then 
the Heaven and Earth level represents the combination and fusion of two antithetical 
concepts, like yin and yang, necessary for any military struggle. Finally the third level 
Methods of Generalship, refers to the actual tactical implementation of military 
dispositions. If we translate these three levels into contemporary concepts we can 
have: the level of strategy, the level of civil-military relationship, and finally the level 
of tactics. For a detailed philosophical analysis of Chinese philosophy at war, see: 
William H Mott and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy Of Chinese Military Culture, 1st 
ed. (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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The second level refers to the necessary strategic design that a 
state decides to pursue in order to achieve specific political objectives. This 
level is also particularly important because it highlights those cultural 
elements that are taken into account for the final strategic design. Since the 
strategy I am arguing that China has been mostly adopting in its history is 
People‟s War, then all its previous elements that I have listed and 
commented come back again in defining and strengthening the meaning of 
People‟s War and its overall significance for the Chinese strategic culture.  
Finally the third and final level of analysis, the tactical one, refers to 
the operational elements that characterize the implementation and execution 
of People‟s War. Every strategic culture, to be intelligently comprehended, 
must illustrate the tactical elements of the overarching strategy reflecting a 
state‟s strategic culture. Moreover, its importance is reflected not only on the 
basic fact that in so doing we understand how a specific strategy is 
implemented at the purely military level, but also on the assumption that this 
level clearly interconnects with the first one, creating a circle in which every 
level becomes inevitably interconnected to the other, since strategic culture, 
to be so, represents necessarily the mixture and interconnection of different 
elements that tend to influence one another without having, necessarily, a 
hierarchical order of importance. 
                                                                                                                                        
be detrimental for the strategic culture analysis. David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic 
Culture", in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, p. 42, highlighted how “Russia has always 
had a degree of civil-military integration unknown in the Western democracies, a fact 
sometimes ignored by students of the relations existing between the Soviet 
leadership and its military.”  
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In order to give substance to the three levels of analysis, I use both 
primary and secondary sources. The primary ones would be based on 
military texts, which “are essential sources of information on the values, 
identity, and acceptable methods of achieving security within a regime,”
210
 
imperial decrees, and philosophical analyses. While the latter would be 
based on history textbooks, especially the military history ones, which have 
already analyzed Chinese military history at length.        
 
1.3.3 People’s War in Chinese History 
 
Strategic culture “and national style have very deep roots with a 
particular stream of historical experience, as locally interpreted.”
211
 This 
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 Colin S Gray, Nuclear Strategy And National Style, p. 37. Other authors tried to 
investigate a state‟s strategic culture by looking at the depth of history, like the case 
of Iran for which Gregory Giles advocated the presence of strategic culture rooted in 
a 3000-year history.   Gregory Giles, "The Crucible Of Radical Islam: Iran's Leaders 
And Strategic Culture", in Know Thy Enemy: Profiles Of Adversary Leaders And 
Their Strategic Cultures, Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Posted. , 1st ed. 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2003). Another 
scholar also pointed out how the overall Iranian history should be used for strategic 
culture analysis: “Iranian history is, at first glance, fertile ground for a discussion of 
strategic culture … there is a continuity of human history in and around the Iranian 
plateau that extends from the emergence of Neolithic society and agriculture around 
8000BCE through to the present day. In order to capture such a broad sweep of 
history within the confines of „strategic culture,‟ it is important to begin with the 
question: to what end do we hope to apply our findings?” Willis Stanley, "The 
Strategic Culture Of The Islamic Republic Of Iran", Defence Threat Reduction 
Agency (2006), p. 3. This type of approach has also been attempted when dealing 
with the Indian way of war, specifically how the Chanakya, an ancient Indian military 
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therefore requires a deep historical investigation, even if its roots in Chinese 
history might be difficult to measure properly. That is, there might be too 
many variables to look at that could create a too general evaluation of the 
Chinese strategic culture. In order to contain such a problem, the three-level 
analysis explained above could provide some guidelines.  
Moreover, another element that could decrease the high volatility in 
the explanation of the Chinese strategic culture is the emphasis on the 
existence and permanence of People‟s War.
212
 This assumes  that “national 
patterns of thought and action … are likely to alter only very gradually, short 
of a new historical experience that undeniable warrants a historically 
discontinuous response.”
213
 This can be understood by looking at the inner 
                                                                                                                                        
text, still affected Indian modern war. P. K. Gautam, "Ways Of Warfare And Strategic 
Culture", p. 417. Another scholars tried to achieve the same results by investigating 
the importance of Kautilya in today‟s Indian strategic culture, Rashed Uz Zaman, 
"Kautilya: The Indian Strategic Thinker And Indian Strategic Culture", Comparative 
Strategy 25, no. 3 (2006): 231-247. 
212
 The emphasis that I put on the role played by People‟s War doctrine in Chinese 
history is referred to its overall ability to influence Chinese strategic thinking. I am 
aware of the fact that in Chinese history, in several occasions, the strategic thinking 
was not particularly congruent with the theoretical assumptions of People‟s War, 
however, it is important to highlight that even when states diverge from their primary 
strategic culture the secondary effect does not necessarily invalidate the primary 
structure of strategic culture, simply because the divergent behavior could occur 
under exceptional and indeed unique circumstances. For example, the case of Great 
Britain is quite relevant. The United Kingdom, in fact, “an overwhelmingly maritime 
strategic culture, [was] obliged [during World War I], to play an uncharacteristically 
major continual military role. However, the fact of the huge British continental 
commitment of 1914-18 did not alter the dominant British strategic culture, 
notwithstanding the infantry experience of whole generation of Britons. Colin Gray, 
"Strategic Culture As Context: The First Generation Of Theory Strikes Back", p. 59. 
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meaning of culture which has been used so far “to suggest that, once a 
distinctive approach to strategy takes hold, it tends to persist despite 
changes in the circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes of 
socialization and institutionalization and through the role of strategic 
concepts in legitimating these social arrangements.”
214
     
Therefore, strategic culture as such needs to be analyzed through a 
coherent historical perspective, since China is one of the few civilizations 
that could claim to have had a continuous, or as close as such, historical 
tradition. And “even when its door was forced open, China‟s civilisational 
continuity was not broken.”
215
  
Other works have tried to investigate strategic culture by looking at 
some specific historical periods. This type of mechanism is absolutely 
understandable, because it shrinks the amount of historical data to be 
analyzed and reduces the number of variables to be investigated. However, 
in so doing, it becomes difficult to actually claim to have found what really 
characterizes a state‟s strategic culture, since it inevitably represents a 
longer historical period, because of the presence of the “culture” variable.  
One of the most comprehensive attempts to classify a specific way 
of war by looking at the most important turning points in history without 
losing sight of the total complexity of the civilizational history has been Victor 
David Hanson, from whose work I took inspiration. In his Carnage and 
Culture he highlighted the fundamental aspects that shape the Western way 
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of war, which he identified in the peculiar nature of the civic militarism. For 
what concerns us here, it suffices to say that he embraced into his historical 
analysis the most important turning points of the Western civilization starting 
from Ancient Greek history until the 9/11 terrorist attacks of New York.
216
 
This example clearly shows how important it is to investigate a specific way 
of war by looking for trends throughout the entire history of the object under 
investigation. 
This historical approach, when applied to the Chinese case 
inevitably highlights the idea of Chineseness. This is well represented by the 
historical trajectory of Chinese culture and its relationship with whatever 
belongs to the external world, ranging from material elements to ideational 
systems. Since China developed this tendency which encourages to rely on 
domestic variables in order to respond to external conditions, “the aim is not 
to imitate that which is new or foreign, and thereby attempt to become it, but 
to incorporate or „civilize‟ it into an existing system. This is what happened to 
the Mongol and Manchu conquerors of China, and to concepts of 
Communism and Capitalism. The addition of the term „Chinese 
characteristics‟ signifies the age-old practice of sinicising that which is new 
and foreign. So too with matters pertaining to defence.”
217
  
However, strategic culture can change, even if slowly. The change 
that can be registered historically usually occurs through the presence of 
external shocks, which can “challenge existing beliefs and undermine past 
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historical narratives.”
218
 Therefore an external shock will represent “– in the 
form of wars, depression and revolutions – a necessary condition for radical 
change. Shocks of such a profound nature are widely seen as necessary to 
undermine the legitimacy of existing norms, shift power within communities, 
and enable cultural entrepreneurs to construct a new consensus around 
alternative norms”
219
  
According to this theoretical perspective, my attempt is to build a 
model that looks back at the fundamental historical passages that 
characterized Chinese history, in order to illustrate the four major steps of 
People‟s War doctrine, that is, its origin, organization, implementation, and 
evolution. These four stages correspond to four historical periods, which are: 
the Warring States period; the Tang Dynasty; the Maoist period (with a 
specific focus on the Chinese Civil War); and finally the last twenty years of 
Chinese military strategy, specifically starting from the effects of the First 
Gulf War on Chinese military thinking to the Xi Jinping‟s presidency.
220
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 This theoretical design, that is, analyzing a specific way of war by looking at 
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All these historical periods have been selected inductively, by 
looking at specific historical characteristics which were then pit against the 
basic assumptions of People‟s War. The first historical period is particularly 
relevant in itself because it represents one of the most important founding 
periods in Chinese history. Specifically, its political fragmentation, the 
warlike environment with the subsequent political chaos contributed to the 
creation of the most relevant strategic treatises, such as the famous Sun 
Tzu‟s The Art of War.
221
 Also at the political as well as at the philosophical 
level the Warring States era represented a turning point in China‟s history. 
Johnston, in his formulation of the historical origins of realpolitik, observed 
how the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods (770-221 B.C.) 
represented a formative period
222
 and “how the strategic wisdoms of the 
anarchical ancient Chinese Warring states system were passed down to 
future generations to constitute a warlike strategic „culture.‟”
223
 This explains 
                                                                                                                                        
engagements that occurred in Chinese history, specifically the Red Cliffs Campaign 
(208-209 CE), the Talas Battle (747-751 CE), and the Chosin Offensive in 1950. It 
seems to be a well structured book, however, in my opinion two relevant elements 
are missing: one is the strategic dimension while the other is the short number of 
cases under examination, especially when the objective is to inductively find the 
Chinese way of warfare in history. 
221
 Wei Tao [伟涛] Guo [郭], On People's War [Renmin Zhanzheng Lun - 
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222
 Alastair Ian Johnston, "Cultural Realism And Strategy In Maoist China", in The 
Culture Of National Security, Peter Katzenstein ed. , 1st ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 260 
223
 Jack Snyder, "Anarchy And Culture: Insights From The Anthropology Of War", p. 
10. 
144
 
 
why I decided to investigate the origin of People‟s War in this specific 
historical moment. 
I then decided to select the Tang Dynasty era as the second 
historical period to be investigated. Before the Tang there are for sure other 
dynasties which fit into the historical trajectory of People‟s War. However, 
the objective of the second period is to demonstrate one of its first 
applicability in terms of strategy and organization. That‟s why this second 
stage could be called the organization of People‟s War. The other relevant 
reasons that encouraged me to select this period instead of the others is 
because the Tang dynasty represents a turning point in Chinese history. In 
fact, China was at its highest splendor thanks to the territorial conquests in 
Central Asia, in the East and in the South. Moreover, its conquests shaped 
Chinese medieval history and most of the subsequent dynastic strategic 
policies. In addition to that, it should be pointed out that, since usually 
scholars and strategists advocate that people‟s war is a type of warfare 
employed by the weak, by illustrating Tang strategies I would like to highlight 
how People‟s War could be applied also in those cases in which the state is 
particularly powerful geopolitically and militarily. 
Besides its historical significance, I decided to select this period for two 
additional reasons: one has to do with the transmission process of strategic 
culture. It is already widely accepted that Mao, among all the different stimuli 
collected in his life, was also influenced by the famous Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms. This was a famous novel describing those years of the 
collapse of the Han Dynasty and the establishment of the Three Kingdoms, 
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which ruled the country. So I felt compelled to find new evidence that could 
link ancient Chinese history with the twentieth century military thought, 
especially when the topic under consideration is the analysis of People‟s 
War. The second reason has to do with the history of the establishment and 
decline of the Tang Dynasty. It represented, historically, a very unique case, 
since it was established by a form of people‟s war and was also brought 
down by the same strategic technique, making therefore people‟s war, 
again, particularly relevant. 
The third historical period under investigation is the Maoist period, 
the most symbolic period for the application of People‟s War. A lot has been 
already written on Mao, so the objective would be to present a new and 
fresh light on his thinking, this time structured along those three levels of 
analysis, something that has not been attempted before, and also on the 
specific Civil War period which is still quite important to analyze. 
Finally the fourth period is related to the last twenty years of Chinese 
politics. It starts with the shocking influence that the First Gulf War had on 
Chinese military thinking, especially for the technological variable, and 
culminates with the advent of the Xi Jinping presidency and the 
implementation of his strategic thinking which clearly resembles the 
reapplication of a new form of People‟s War. This historical period is very 
important for three major elements: the first one has to do with China itself. 
The country has been growing very fast in the last twenty years or so, 
becoming of the strongest states in the world. Therefore trying to understand 
how People‟s War might be applied is quite relevant. Secondly, in this 
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period, mainly characterized by the so-called RMA (Revolution in Military 
Affairs), it is crucial to test the applicability of People‟s War and how actually 
it has been extended to other branches of the military, such as the Navy and 
the Cyber domain. Thirdly, connected with the previous element, this period 
is also very important because allows us to test one of the central elements 
of People‟s War: the human value over the technological one. And, 
according to the evidence that I will provide, I will demonstrate that 
notwithstanding the role played by technology and external shocks (the First 
Gulf War), China still found a way to adapt the external variables to its own 
theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 2 
People‟s War at the time of the 
Warring States Period 
 
 
“the means by which a ruler encourages  
his people are offices and rank;  
the means by which a state arises 
 are agriculture and war.” 
 
Shang Jun shu 商君书224 
 
 
The Warring States Period represents one of the most important 
eras in Chinese history, mainly for two reasons: the first one is related to the 
enormous literary stimuli that that turbulent period had created.
225
 In fact, 
during the Warring States period, “the Zhou presided over an explosion in 
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 Yang [鞅] Shang [商, The Book Of Lord Shang [Shang Jun Shu - 商君书] With The 
Commentaries By Shi Lei 石磊, 1st ed. (Beijing [北京]: Chinese Bookstore [zhonghua 
shuju - 中华书局], 2012), chap. 3 Agriculture and Warfare (nong zhan 农战), p. 27 
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intellectual and artistic creativity that saw the composition of China‟s first 
classic texts and a transformation in society, government, statecraft and 
warfare.”
226
 Concerning the latter, many of the military treatises that are 
widely known today have been produced, in fact, in that historical context. 
The military confrontations that characterized this time in history made it one 
of the most bellicose in human history; “whereas the study accepted a list of 
eighty-nine wars involving the European „Great Powers‟ during the roughly 
four centuries prior to AD 1815, no less than 256 wars were individually 
identified for northern China‟s „Great Powers‟ during the roughly four 
centuries prior to 221 BC – and this after the exclusion of all purely civil 
conflicts and any of an external nature or involving nomadic peoples.”
227
    
 The second reason is related to the political as well as philosophical 
dynamics that critically characterized that historical period, paving the way 
for the so-called Chinese way of warfare as well as politics. In fact, just 
during the Warring States period, some of the most important works on 
philosophy had been created or at least widely circulated: on one hand, we 
remember Confucius‟s works – such as the Analects (Lunyu) and the Annals 
of the state of Lu (Chunqiu) which were written during the Spring and 
Autumn but that received wide popularity immediately afterwards – while on 
the other, it is important to remind the famous Yi Jing, or better known as the 
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Book of Changes for which, it is believed that also Confucius contributed to 
its creation.
228
  
Along with this book, which represented one of the fundamental 
sources for the philosophical study of the inner forces of nature, during the 
Warring States period another important school, among the Hundred 
schools, established its role within the overall philosophical spectrum: the 
so-called Naturalists. “This name refers to two early materialist concepts, the 
dualist theory of negative and positive principles – „yin‟ and „yang‟ – 
considered to be the fundamental source of all natural phenomena, and the 
theory of the Five Elements (wood, metal, fire, water and earth), seen as the 
essential mechanism of permutations in the world of nature and man.”
229
 For 
what concerns the first theory (the combination of two opposite forces), the 
Chinese philosophy put a lot of emphasis on this dialectical relationship, 
especially in warfare, as the following pages will try to demonstrate.   
At the political level, the idea as well as the process of state 
formation reached a successful stage; “the long Zhou centuries, paralleling 
those of ancient Greece, combine both a heroic age and classical age. In 
terms of China‟s civilization, they are seminal times.” As a further 
explanation of this peculiar historical period, during the Zhou dynastic control 
of the country, “dynasties like the seasons and the planets, conformed to a 
cyclical pattern, they ascended and declined at Heaven‟s cosmic behest.” In 
fact, precisely during the Zhou the famous Mandate of Heaven, also defined 
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 Mario Sabattini and Paolo Santangelo, Storia Della Cina, 1st ed. (Roma: Laterza, 
2005), pp. 100-107. 
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Heaven‟s Command (tian ming – 天命) found its fullest political meaning, 
that is, representing the tool par excellence “to the legitimacy of every 
subsequent dynasty,” to the extent that it has been defined as “the 
cornerstone of the Chinese Empire.”
230
  
Furthermore, these political aspects, which transformed the political 
landscape of China, set in motion an enduring legacy which had lasted for 
                                                                                                                                        
229
 Witold Rodzinski, The Walled Kingdom, p. 38 
230
 John Keay, China, pp. 51, 53; for a comprehensive analysis of the Chinese state 
formation, see: Herrlee Glessner Creel, The Origins Of Statecraft In China, 1st ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), see also Victoria Tin-bor Hui, State 
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rule … therefore in China the historical vision was often defined as cyclical-dynastic.” 
Through this definition of the relationship between the Mandate of Heaven and the 
idea of concept of continuity we can understand the importance of people and its 
direct military manifestation: people‟s war. This is referred to the idea that when a 
dynastic family proved to be unfit to continue the Heaven‟s Mandate, people could 
also be invoked to execute heaven‟s will. Historically, this manifested itself through 
revolutions, upheavals, and all types of asymmetric warfare, such as people‟s war. 
This aspect, in turn, explains what has been discussed in chapter one on the 
centrality of the people and their political-military power. Because of this institutional 
role, Chinese dynasties as well as contemporary leaders are often struggling to find 
a way to balance between mobilization of the people as well as its control.  
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most of the later dynasties. In fact, the Jin, Wei, Tang, Song, etc., “would 
look back to the Zhou and to the states they had unwittingly created as a 
prime source of legitimization.”
231
  
These elements, therefore, highlight the revolutionary nature of the 
Zhou Dynasty which started a pattern of radical change. The Warring States 
period, which represents the third phase of the Zhou Dynasty (after the 
establishment of the subsequent Western Zhou and the Spring and Autumn 
Period) constitutes the historical era in which military transformation 
achieved its highest manifestation. For what concerns us here, therefore, the 
objective is to deal with the strategic and operational context that created the 
origin of the People‟s War Doctrine.   
 However, before proceeding into this direction, it is important to 
illustrate the historical context which contributed to shape what has been 
recognized as the Warring States period. One point should be illustrated 
immediately, that is, that it is very important to understand that the Spring 
and Autumn period (722 B.C. – 481 B.C.) – the era preceding the Warring 
States one – strongly affected the policies created during the latter period. 
Emphasizing this small but significant aspect is crucial for the 
methodological objectives highlighted so far, since “many of the rulers and 
officials who have governed the land and its people have sought cultural 
precedents for their policies.” This is because China is one of the few 
civilizations that can rightly claim to have a very extended historical 
continuity to rely on for political analysis; an “unparalleled continuity,” which 
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“may be seen to have persisted from at least Spring and Autumn times 
onward.”
232
 Therefore, a closer examination of Chinese history must look at 
the “features of its ancient past,” since the historical continuity “constitutes 
one of the most outstanding characteristics of Chinese historical process, 
endowing it with a unique nature.”
233
    
The element of continuity should be considered by looking at two 
fundamental aspects: one is related to the historical process that 
characterized China in its objectivity; while the other refers to the “subjective 
consciousness of continuity,” which can be found in a vast historiographical 
production; “the widest a civilization in premodern times could have ever 
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 Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, The Cambridge History of Ancient 
China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 13. Moreover, Confucius‟s 
thought, even if developed during the Spring and Autumn, exerted a deep influence 
during the establishment of the Warring States‟ period, and mainly for two reasons: 
the first one is related to the creation of numerous schools that were established 
after his death, because his disciples felt the need to continue his ideas, especially 
since the Chinese world was about to be radically altered. The second reason, 
connected to the previous one is related to the concept of continuity and the need to 
emphasize it. The Spring and Autumn, while not being particularly pugnacious still 
set the political and military conditions for the subsequent epoch. Therefore, even 
during this apparently calm period, many scholars started to feel uncomfortable with 
the new political transformation. In this context, Confucius emphasized the need to 
reevaluate the ancient texts and ideas as the sources for moral stability. In fact, as 
he stated: “I transmit not create, I believe in the ancients and I love them.” Through 
this expression he manifested all his will to heavily rely on the traditions as the 
source of stability; “for Confucius, the Ancients represented the mirror in which the 
present should have reflected itself in order to find the dao. The dao … represented 
the basic principle of the universe: conforming oneself to the dao meant showing 
respect to the fundamental rules inherent to the natural process of the existence, 
both of humans and things.” Mario Sabattini and Paolo Santangelo, Storia Della 
Cina, p. 102; Witold Rodzinski, The Walled Kingdom, p. 33. 
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conceived.” This continuity can be intercepted also in the ideological as well 
as the institutional field, in which specific elements “periodically manifests 
themselves, without any apparent modifications.” It is undeniable, however, 
that certain aspects did change throughout history. However, the 
“consciousness of continuity,” which still represents the fundamental drive of 
Chinese political leadership, deeply affected the historical process, 
encouraging the adoption of a static vision of history.
234
   
In fact, “the force of such a view was of sufficient strength to color 
intellectual opinion, to affect the decisions of government, and to act as a 
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 Mario Sabattini and Paolo Santangelo, Storia Della Cina, pp. 8-9. Moreover, 
another important field in which we can find a clear manifestation of continuity is the 
Chinese language, specifically its writing, which “represents a unique phenomenon in 
the history of human civilization.” The Chinese writing, in, fact, has an uninterrupted 
history of a range between 3.500 and 7.500 years. Such a peculiarity is the result of 
a very unique historical development: Chinese writing is not an alphabetic language; 
it is based on characters each of which represents a specific meaning and a specific 
phonetic syllabic unit. In other words, since the writing  was mainly based on graphic 
representation, it developed independently with respect to the associated 
pronunciation. In so doing, characters could be pronounced in very different ways, 
but their meaning remains the same. “This type of nature of the Chinese language 
has influenced in a very decisive way the cultural unification process of the Empire: 
notwithstanding the numerous and deep dialectal and linguistic differences, the 
written language, after the unification of the country by the Qin Emperor in 221 BC, 
remained overall the same.” Through this process, therefore, we can understand the 
profound continuity of the Chinese history. The complete independence of the written 
language with respect to the phonetic part created the conditions for the 
development of a written continuity. Therefore successive generations did not need 
to possess a sophisticated knowledge of ancient Chinese, since the language itself 
allowed readers to capture its essence as well as all the meaningful implications. 
Moreover, this direct historical connection that readers started to develop towards 
the ancient texts helped create also a sort of sacred relationship, since readers 
understood the deep historical value as well as the characteristics of those texts. 
Ibid., pp. 15-17 
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fundamental obstacle to initiative.”
235
 Moreover, this continuity is profoundly 
attested by the fact that some of the military treatises, or other manuals, for 
example, “were the legacy of a tradition, rather than the work of an „author,‟ 
so it was conventional to add or modify materials in order to meet the needs 
of each new generation. Thus, the lack of firm dates is not a result of 
missing evidence but is inherent in the fluidity of the works themselves.”
236
  
Moreover, one additional aspect should be highlighted when dealing 
with such a particular historical period as the Warring States era. This has to 
do with the latest archeological findings. They illustrate a fundamental 
aspect that characterized this entire period and also the subsequent 
generations. That is, even if every single state cultivated its own political, 
military, and therefore cultural system, however, there was a proven 
“tendency towards a substantial cultural unity.” With the advent of the 
Eastern Zhou dynasty localized expression of politics emerged with strength. 
However, this did not lead to a “dismemberment of the Chinese world, but 
actually to an enrichment characterized by the introduction of new and 
diversified cultural contributions.” Therefore, even if diversity existed, it 
tended to recompose itself at a higher unity, since vaster and vaster 
population strata started to be widely affected.
237
  
Furthermore, “in addition to its evidence for institutional and cultural 
history, the Warring States period provides for the first time broad evidence 
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of the intellectual life of the time, at both the elite and popular levels … 
[historical experience that] has influenced all subsequent thought in 
China.”
238
 In fact, it is very important to emphasize that during this period we 
can find the most prolific production of military treatises; one above all 
stands out: Sun Tzu‟s The Art of War. This military book, among the others, 
represented the central paradigm of Chinese military thought, which found 
its application even during Mao‟s strategic planning against India during the 
1962 military campaign.
239
 In contradiction to what has been thought about 
this book, it is quite well historically attested that the most famous military 
treatise was written during the political and military turmoil of the Warring 
States period, rather than, as some other scholars suggested, during the 
Spring and Autumn era. 
According to this premise, the present chapter goes as follows: the 
first section will be dealing with a brief history of the Warring States period, 
in order to illustrate the major historical evolution of this era and its 
fundamental political and institutional aspects characterizing it. The second 
section, then, goes into detail by investigating the nature of People‟s War 
during this historical period. The investigation of its implementation follows 
the three-level analysis described in chapter one, that is, the civil-military 
relationship, the strategic dimension, and the tactical dimension. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude the analysis by summing up the major findings and the 
overall strategic consideration of this historical period. 
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2.1. The Warring States Period: A History 
 
The Warring States period belongs to the overall historical conquest 
of the Shang Dynasty by the Zhou, which, in fact, opened up a new historical 
period, symbolized by the Zhou Dynasty. During this dynastic control, the 
main historical phases have been the Western Zhou, followed later on by the 
Eastern Zhou, which, in turn, during its political representation included the 
Spring and Autumn period and, of course, the Warring States one.
240
 Since 
the latter had been the last stage of the overall Zhou Dynasty it is important 
to briefly highlight the preceding periods which then culminated into the 
Warring States era. 
We can start, therefore, by taking into consideration the military 
campaign of King Wu, conducted in 1053 BC, which was the clear 
manifestation of mobility and speed in military conduct. In fact, during that 
campaign which culminated in the famous battle of Muye, King Wu, by 
completing his father‟s (King Wen) plan to attack the Shang, managed quite 
easily to subdue the Shang capital‟s surrounding area. Then, King Wu, by 
employing deception in its military conduct, managed to destroy the Shang 
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dynasty and its capital, inaugurating a new military command in Northeast of 
China.
241
  
This very brief example is quite important because it highlights the 
beginning of the military revolution in China. However, since we are talking 
about the establishment of a new dynasty the military apparatus and policies 
were still rudimentary, since they followed necessarily the only military 
innovations introduced by the Shang dynasty, like the use of the chariot in 
battlefield, even if it is quite true that King Wen first and his son King Wu 
after started to apply new ways of dealing with warfare, such as increasing 
mobility and application of stratagems, like deception. 
The reign of the Zhou experienced, after the death of the King Wu, 
which occurred in 1043 BC, one of the most important periods in China‟s 
history, destined to last for many centuries afterwards, thanks to its highly 
symbolic value. King Wu‟s heir, the future King Cheng, “was deemed too 
young or inexperienced to assume the reins of power immediately. A 
regency council was therefore preferred, and the Duke of Zhou, a 
consummate leader as well as the brother of the deceased Wu, duly 
assumed its direction.” Political control that he then handed over in 1035 BC, 
“after seven years as de facto regent,” to the legitimate heir once the latter 
came of age and after having established an alternative capital near 
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Luoyang in Henan province; “this act would be seen as one of magnificent 
abnegation and is that for which the Duke is most revered.”
242
 
Things, however, did not play out very well for the successors of the 
dynasty. In fact, new threats arose, especially under the form of military 
activities, coming from the northwest. After the death of the new Zhou king 
Zhao, who found death on the battlefield, during the military confrontation 
with Chu, a “large tribute-paying but perhaps non-feudatory neighbour on 
Zhou‟s south-eastern border” in 957 BC, the King Mu had to face what 
would have represented, from that time onwards, the constant military and 
political anxiety in Chinese history: the nomadic tribes located in the north. In 
this specific case, King Mu had to face the invasion of the Chinese territory 
by the Quan Rong, a people from the northwest who did not manage to 
conquer China, but still managed to control most of the Zhou‟s vassal states 
located in the east.
243
 The role played by the northern nomadic tribes, 
especially at the military level, would deeply condition the Chinese way of 
warfare, even if, for the time being, these groups did not possess particular 
military skills. “Not much is known about these „barbarians.‟ However, since 
the Chinese would have confronted, centuries later, the warriors on 
horseback of the barbarous tribes of farmers and shepherds located in the 
steppes of the north, there was the tendency to attribute to the Rong and Di 
the same characteristics of the others.” But, it is more plausible that these 
tribes‟ warriors fought on foot. Notwithstanding their backward political and 
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social conditions, their political importance, however, cannot be 
underestimated. In fact, it has been proved, historically, that they held 
complex relationships with the Zhou to the extent that “it was one of the 
Rong‟s tribes, allied with the Chinese rebels, to have occupied, in 771 BC, 
Hao, the capital of the Western Zhou, forcing the dynasty, therefore, to move 
to the east.”
244
       
This situation encouraged also the Chu, which suffered from the 
heavy-handed Chinese intervention some decades earlier, to invade China. 
But it was the next ruler, King Xuan, who managed to regain territorial 
control by reestablishing trade relations with the Chu and reinstall Chinese 
control over the vassal state by repulsing another nomad people of the 
north; the Xianyun. However, the aggressiveness in foreign policy by King 
Xuan proved to be counterproductive, especially after the intervention in Lu, 
another Shandong state, which, in turned, encouraged, from this time on, 
many lords to rebel against the royal commands. 
King Xuan‟s successor, King You, who gained power in 781 BC, 
“was greeted by a cacophony of heavenly disgust, with a major earthquake, 
landslides and both a solar and lunar eclipse.” These heavenly messages 
plus his ill conceived way of administering power cost him the Mandate of 
Heaven. Soon, specifically, in 771 BC, the Xianyun attacked the kingdom 
which, now leaderless, was destroyed. This date is very important because it 
brought to an end the Western Zhou (c. 1045-771 BC), ushering in the new 
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dynasty: the Eastern Zhou (772-256 BC).
245
 Some historians define this new 
epoch not as a dynasty per se, but as “a dynastic hiatus. This hiatus, a 
recurrent phenomenon in Chinese history … is divided in two parts: the 
„Spring and Autumn‟ period and the „Warring States‟ Period.‟ Both terms 
derive from the titles of relevant historical texts, with the „Spring and Autumn‟ 
Annals (Chunqiu) covering the years 770-481 BC and the „Warring States‟ 
Annals (Zhanguoce) the years 481-221 BC.” These are the conventional 
dates, where the Warring States‟ period ends with the establishment of the 
first unified Chinese state in history.
246
 
The passage from the Spring and Autumn to the Warring States was 
immediate, at least historically speaking. However, the clear passage from 
one epoch to the other has been characterized by the partition of the state of 
Jin between three different states: Han, Wei, and Zhao.
247
 During the former, 
China witnessed the formation of hundreds of “semi-sovereign entities,” to 
the extent that the Zuozhuan, “a commentary on the „Spring and Autumn 
Annals” lists 148 of them. A sensitive reduction in number occurred during 
the Warring States, in which these entities condensed to less than ten. The 
number of wars activated by these contenders still represent one of the 
highest figures in human history and of the Zhou dynasty remained only the 
name. 
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During the Spring and Autumn period, the state of Qi, under the 
leadership of the Duke Huan, demonstrated to possess valuable political as 
well as military capabilities, thanks mainly to the minister Guan Zhong‟s 
policies. He, in fact, created important reforms both at the administrative and 
military level that gave Qi a powerful profile among the other contenders to 
the extent that the remaining political powers of the Zhou dynasty charged it 
with the task of setting a conference, held in 681 BC, in which the Duke 
Huan had to mediate between different pressures and other states‟ interests 
in order to find, on one hand, the appropriate measures of defense, while, on 
the other, guaranteeing the necessary political order the Zhou dynasty rulers 
strived for. The conference, therefore, empowered the state of Qi to 
intervene militarily in the Song territory in order to put down the internal 
conflicts. At the same time, it helped Yan, Wei, and Xing against the 
“barbarians,” and, in 656 BC, at the head of a coalition attacked the state of 
Chu, forcing it to pay tribute. These military and political successes paved 
the way for the establishment of another conference, this time held in 651 
BC at Kuiqiu, in which the Duke Huan received the title of Hegemon (ba). It 
was the first time, in Chinese history, that the institutional figure of the 
hegemon appeared on the stage. Its function was related to the changing 
perspectives on political power, which now was distributed among different 
actors.
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However, the title of hegemon did not last long. In fact, soon, the 
state of Qi found itself overwhelmed by internal conflicts that critically 
weakened it. Its political power was, then, transferred by the Zhou to the 
state of Jin which managed to defeat, in 632 BC, another powerful state 
located in the south – the state of Chu – which advanced, at the time, the 
desire to expand north. However, the death of the Duke Wen of the state of 
Jin, in 628 BC, put Jin and Chu basically on the same political level, 
reactivating their military confrontation. In the meantime, another actor, the 
state of Qin, grew in power and started to get involved between the two 
contenders, without success, however.  
In 597 BC the military balance changed again, with the state of Chu 
this time defeating the state of Jin. A subsequent conference, held in 546 
BC, acknowledged the new balance, establishing that the states of the 
Central Plains (just conquered by Chu) had to pay tribute both to Chu and 
Jin.
249
       
Along with the state of Qi, Qin, Jin, and Chu, other state-actors 
emerged within this political framework. In the near areas around the Yangzi 
the state of Wu and the state of Yue dominated the scene. The former, 
soon, decided to launch an offensive operation against the state of Chu in 
506 BC. The state of Chu would have witnessed defeat had two concomitant 
events not taken place: the first one was a surprise attack that the neighbor 
state of Yue decided to launch against Wu, therefore undermining its military 
power. While the second event was the military intervention by the state of 
184
 
 
Qin in support of Chu. This event led, in 473 BC to the annihilation of Wu 
and its annexation to the state of Yue. With the wars taking place during the 
fifth century BC, therefore in the second part of the Spring and Autumn 
period, the institution of the Hegemony lost its legitimacy and this was 
mainly related to the progressive revolution that was under way at the 
political as well as the military level: 
 
“The clashes of this period among the various principalities 
present a different character with respect to the previous epoch. 
The same intervention of the new southern powers, which were 
completely estranged from the political and ritual traditions of 
the Zhou, contributed to radicalize the contrasts between the 
various territories. Before, the conflicts developed by following 
specific rules and rituals: the declared objective was not the 
pure and simple annexation of another territory, but the 
strengthening of an order that was still formally based on the 
acknowledgement of the religious authority of the dynasty. 
From the fifth century, the situation witnessed a rapid evolution, 
also connected to profound economic, social, and institutional 
changes taking place in the principalities. The most powerful of 
which progressively developed into real states with complex 
apparatuses and structures of power that did not conform 
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anymore with the traditional hierarchical relationships based on 
the parenthood.”
250
 
  
This brings us to the formation of the Warring States period. The 
most important historical shift in Chinese history. As mentioned above, in 
453 BC, with the final split of the principality of Jin into three different states 
(Wei, Zhao, and Han), the so-called Warring States period finally began. The 
case in point, the partition of the state of Jin, demonstrated that now the 
legitimate aristocratic class was no longer able to deter other local parties to 
arm themselves and challenge the institutional power. The nature of the 
internal confrontations was also reflected at the external level. Now wars 
were conducted without any respect for ancient rituals. Therefore, “conflicts 
assumed now the character of total wars whose objectives were the self-
strengthening and the annihilation of the enemy.”
251
   
In this new political context, due to the fierce political-military 
competition, the total number of contenders critically reduced in number 
through dissolution or incorporation. The entire period, therefore, was 
represented by a total of seven states. The dissolution of the state of Jin, 
one of the most important, led to the formation of three distinctive entities: 
the state of Wei, Zhao, and Han. These three then had to face four other 
contenders, such as the state of Qin (which will be remembered in history for 
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its ultimate ability to unify the country and creating the first Chinese empire), 
the state of Qi, Yan, and Chu. “The ferocious fight to the death among the 
strongest of the remaining states makes for grim telling. Standing armies 
take the field for the first time, new methods of warfare swell the casualties, 
and statecraft becomes more ruthless.”
252
 
In this context, the state of Wei was recognized as the most 
powerful. However, later on, the state of Qin and the state of Chu managed 
to block its further expansion. One of the actions undertaken against the 
state of Wei occurred in 354 BC, when it invaded the state of Zhao. Qi 
intervened and managed to occupy Wei‟s capital, therefore forcing it to abort 
the expansionist campaign. But the suffering for Wei did not stop. The state 
of Qin, encouraged by the frequent attacks by the state of Qi that critically 
weakened the state of Wei, decided to follow the same pattern. In so doing, 
Qin defeated Wei, managing to set the new state frontier to the banks of the 
Yellow River. The increasing turbulence that characterized the vicissitudes 
of Wei culminated in a chronic weakness that progressively marginalized it 
from the overall territorial struggles. The list of contenders then reduced to 
three major actors: Qi, Qin, and Chu. 
 The state of Chu was the one to have experienced a different and 
peculiar political development. Located in the southeastern part of China, it 
came across many different peoples, the so-called Man, which were 
recognized as the non-Xia peoples, mainly inhabiting the southern part of 
China. The Chu, therefore, through different military campaigns managed to 
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subdue them, reaching therefore a huge territorial expansion. However, this 
military success led to other political problems, such as the lack of a formal 
cultural recognition by the other states which started to consider the state of 
Chu as a non-Chinese, due to its previous cultural contamination. Therefore 
one common element which ran across the entire political spectrum of the 
Warring States‟ period is the nature of war: “the state made war and war 
made the state.” This implied that states now followed one central military 
imperative: “mobilising all possible resources [which] clearly depended on 
civil reforms that strengthened the authority of the state.”
253
 
The principle of “mobilising the masses,” therefore, “was not a 
twentieth-century innovation.” Besides being applied by many of the Warring 
States, the principal state actor that developed this institutional thinking and 
its subsequent organization had been the state of Qin, that is, that actor 
which would later on unify the entire country. During its political evolution, 
the major political leaders set the stage for what would be later recognized 
as the Legalist School. Specifically, the minister of the Qin state, Shang 
Yang, has been credited by the historians as the main thinker of the 
implementation of this draconian framework. His institutional ideas were not 
only referred to the way of organizing the population for war, but they also 
referred to the transformation of the entire state system. He advocated the 
introduction of the county system of direct administration, units of measures 
were standardized, “trade heavily taxed, agriculture encouraged with 
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irrigation and colonization schemes, and the entire population registered, 
individually taxed and universally conscripted.”
254
 
These strict measures, while being very terrifying, managed to 
guarantee the Qin state the ability to pursue successful military campaigns 
as attested by the decisive victory it achieved over the state of Wei in 341 
BC. In addition to this military success, the Qin state also managed, in 316 
BC, to occupy the south of China, precisely in Sichuan, through which it 
“secured a vast new source of cereals and manpower plus some important 
strategic leverage over Chu.” This extraordinary power let Qin start “about 
forty of the sixty „great power wars‟ recorded for the period.” After 
establishing the new capital at a place called Xianyang in c. 263 BC, “Qin 
abandoned the traditional policy of alliances and adopted one of unilateral 
expansion through naked aggression.” Through this measure, Qin state 
conducted purely annihilation campaigns.”
255
 
These military operations, by the end of the Zhou dynastic historical 
development, bore fruit: “in a series of decisive campaigns accompanied by 
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just such slaughter, Qin decimated the forces of Han and Zhao between 262 
and 256 BC. The aging Zhou king, who had unwieldy thrown in his lot on the 
side of Zhao, was also forced to submit.” In so doing, the Zhou dynasty 
came to an end.” In 246 BC, once the Qin became officially the central state 
of the entire warring states system, “there succeeded to the Qin throne a 
thirteen-year-old boy „with arched nose and long eyes, the puffed out chest 
of a hawk, the voice of a jackal … and the heart of a tiger or a wolf.‟ At this 
stage he was known as King Zheng of Qin. A quarter of a century‟s ruthless 
campaigning would see the remaining „warring states‟ eliminated and the 
same King Zheng arrogate to himself the Zhou‟s Heavenly Mandate and 
assume the title of Shi Huangdi, „First Emperor.‟”
256
    
This brief historical description of the major political actors involved 
in the politico-military struggle for supremacy emphasizes the peculiarity of 
the Warring States period: theories and practices of statecraft, therefore, 
started to be theorized and then implemented. In this period different 
theorists from different Warring States emerged with their theories. 
Influenced by the writings of Confucius, many successive thinkers 
advocated specific institutional measures for the state as well as warfare 
planning. For example, in the state of Chu, one of the biggest at the time, 
Mozi (Master Mo, c. 480- c. 390 BC) emerged as a central figure on the 
philosophical field, by advocating moral principles for the right conduct of the 
state. In addition, he also advocated a form of pacifism which banned the 
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use of war as an instrument of politics. Mozi‟s disciples decided to 
implement his ideas. Therefore they organized themselves into a sect “ready 
to intervene every time it seemed to be necessary to avoid a conflict or to 
defend a city under attack.” Their philosophical principles led them, 
moreover, to develop an expertise on the art of war, especially on the 
defensive techniques, and to develop the art of oratory, in order to dissuade 
the rulers from embarking on military expeditions.
257
  
On the other hand, in the state of Wei, another scholar, Mengzi, 
advocated the respect for the Mandate of Heaven, “reduce punishments and 
taxes, and reinstate the „well field‟ system of land-holding; in an age of greed 
and violence only a ruler who abjured oppression, who cultivated virtue and 
consulted the welfare of the people, would be sure to triumph.” Mengzi‟s 
writings and political thought granted him respectability and a certain 
influence, to the extent that he became recognized as the “second sage” 
(after Confucius), being then recognized with the name of Mencius.
258
   
In the same state, moreover, on the political level, there had been 
advanced profound reforms with the objective to tackle the aristocratic 
privileges. In fact, in the second half of fifth century, Li Kui, the minister of 
Wei, encouraged the adoption of specific policies with the central idea that 
the prestigious roles within the state had to be assigned to those people who 
really deserved them through personal merits and not through familiar 
linkages. This is just one clear example of how things started to change. 
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Other states, like Chu and Qin adopted similar policies. These measures, 
therefore, reflected the political and military necessity of the time; that is, 
empowering any person who showed specific and valuable skills in the art of 
politics and war. 
These measures, moreover, clearly intertwined with what was 
happening at the technological level: the revolution of the use of the iron, 
that is, the introduction of new techniques which permitted workers to fuse 
the iron in order to have better products to be employed in different sectors 
of society. In fact, this revolutionary aspect had profound influences on the 
economic system and the society at large. For example, the creation of new 
and better irony instruments accelerated the agricultural production. An 
astonishing increase in this sector activated, in turn, other important 
infrastructural projects, like the creation of canals in order to easily transport 
the major rivers‟ water to the lands to be cultivated. Therefore, the major 
states, like the Qin which produced important land reforms, decided to 
reorganize the distribution of land recreating a new relationship between the 
state and the population at large, which now could possess a piece of land 
through which producing the necessary food for itself and also a means for 
paying taxes.
 259
    
This revolution, moreover, exerted a deep influence on trade 
system: the new techniques for working the iron activated a new economic 
system now based on metallic coins. In the Warring States there were 
already four types of them: those ones with a vang-like shape (bu), which 
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were mainly used in the states of Zhao, Wei, and Han; those ones with the 
knife-like shape (dao), used by the state of Qi and Yan; those coins with the 
shell-like shape, used in the state of Chu; and finally those with a circle 
shape with the hole in the middle, which circulated in the state of Qin. This 
last form of coin, with time, became the widely used coin.
260
  
It is precisely with the Warring States period that things started to 
sensitively change. After the intermediate period of the Spring and Autumn 
era, which had helped classify important written works, during the Warring 
States period, because of military necessities, the new rulers activated real 
military revolutions. The Warring States era, therefore, seems to have 
established reforms at two different levels: at the organizational level by 
instituting different political, military, and organizational systems that 
contributed to make the Warring States period “vastly different from earlier 
times,” since “it is from this time that we can say that military law really 
began to develop.” At the military level, “armies increased in size,”
261
 
therefore leading to two major revolutions that deserve particular attention: 
the promotion of a massed infantry, mainly based on peasants, which should 
have led to an increasing professionalization, and the creation of special 
units called “crack troops.”
262
  
                                                                                                                                        
259
 Mario Sabattini and Paolo Santangelo, Storia Della Cina, pp. 94-96 
260
 Ibid., pp. 98-99 
261
 Robin Yates, "Law And The Military In Early China", in Military Culture In Imperial 
China, Nicola Di Cosmo ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 29 
262
 Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, The Cambridge History of Ancient 
China, p. 616. 
193
 
 
For what concerns the first level of reform, the rulers, because of the 
military necessity to fight rival states, promoted legislations that required 
military conscription among the peasant households, “primarily for the sake 
of imposing universal military service.” Moreover, the idea behind the mass 
conscription of peasants was that in so doing “the mass peasant armies of 
the period entailed the emergence of military specialists who were masters 
of the theories and techniques of warfare.” Moreover, as a military policy, it 
would promote the creation of a diplomatic class able to produce “theorists 
of stratagem and persuasion.”
263
 Just during this period, in fact, “these arts 
of stratagem and manipulation, and the master of cunning wisdom who 
embodied them, figured prominently in Warring States literature and in later 
Chinese culture, and they derive from the military treatises and the 
handbooks of persuader/diplomats.”
264
 
At the military level, the increase of the number of conscripts, with 
its subsequent increase in size and power paved the way for the conduct of 
battles which are still studied for their details. For example, during the 
seventh century BC, the state of Jin, while being afflicted by internal 
struggles, managed to defeat “an invading army from Chu at a place called 
Chengpu. It was the first battle in Chinese history that was recorded in 
sufficient detail for modern military historians to produce a plan of 
engagement showing rectangular troops concentrations and arrowed lines of 
advance.” That historic victory has been saluted as the saving of China, 
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which, at that time was mentioned for the first time under the name of 
zhongguo, that is, the central kingdom.
265
 
All these major elements paved the way for an efficient infantry 
which “came to be the core of the army, eventually replacing the chariot as 
the main offensive weapon.”
266
 This military transformation both “in 
weaponry and military organization,” in turn, facilitated the execution of 
annihilation campaigns.
267
 Moreover, in addition to that, the adoption of the 
cavalry represented an important step, since it highlighted the importance of 
the tribal peoples in influencing the Chinese military conduct. Military power, 
therefore, became a major concern mainly because “the very physical 
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survival of the contending states depended on possessing a strong and 
effective military.”
268
   
 
2.2. People’s War during the Warring States Period 
 
2.2.1. First Level of Analysis: Civil-Military Design of People’s 
War 
 
As expressed at the beginning of this chapter, as well as in the first 
chapter while dealing with People‟s War, one of the central characteristics of 
this military doctrine is the establishment of political, military, and social 
measures with the specific intent of combining the civil with the military 
aspect of the state. In other words, the fundamental idea elaborated during 
the Warring States period, which would then exert a deep influence on the 
future of China‟s military strategy, was the ability of the ruler to unite – and 
sometimes to intertwine – the civil with the military.
269
 And this was also 
motivated by the fact that only by “integrating the civil and the martial could a 
state be assured of surviving in the tumultuous Warring States 
environment.
270
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In fact, the political units interacting during this period were called, 
quite intuitively, “warring states” because “devoted themselves to warfare.” 
Moreover, “they were created through the progressive extension of military 
service, and the registration and mobilization of their populations for battle 
remained fundamental to their existence as states.” Therefore, “with the rise 
of universal military service, warfare and the army became a mechanism for 
hierarchically organizing and controlling the entire population.” So, what had 
represented a “privilege of the urban aristocracy became the duty of the 
rural peasantry. This process culminated in universal military service and the 
complete identification of the people with the army.”
271
  
These major features characterizing the employment of the 
population at large in order to organize military and paramilitary activities not 
only played a relevant role in ancient China, as attested during both the 
Spring and Autumn and the Warring States, but paved the way for the 
exaltation of those organizational and operative elements that came to be 
recognized as the People‟s War Doctrine. And in order to make it 
operational, it became very important to move as close as possible the 
military to the civilian field. 
In this sense, “the process of expanding military service and 
indentifying the army with the people began with Guan Zhong and his policy 
of „lodging the army amidst the people‟ (yu bing yu min 寓兵於民)272 in Qi 
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state in the early seventh century,” therefore during the Spring and Autumn, 
that is, when Guan Zhong exercised his power as an advisor of the Lord 
Huan.
273
  
However, one historical consideration, that runs throughout this 
chapter, should be kept in mind. These policies, and their increasing 
importance, were not only confined to the Spring and Autumn, where 
actually they started to be theorized and partially implemented. Because of 
their social, political, and military functions, they actually fortified during the 
Warring States and beyond, persisting in their full application, since “all the 
records of these reforms date from the Warring States period.” The 
persistence of these policies can also be understood by considering that “the 
surviving records were at least based on older documents [from the Spring 
and Autumn], although they have doubtless been reworked to suit the needs 
and preconditions of Warring States redactors.”
 274
 These preconditions, for 
example, were concerned with the implementation of a clear objective: 
reforming the overall structure of the city in order to make military staff live 
among the population. 
But the population had to receive the priority in such a revolutionary 
period. And not all the advisors nor the rulers were able to understand what 
to do in order to receive from them the necessary loyalty for an efficient 
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military mobilization. In one historical passage, for example, it is well 
documented what the actions for gaining the benevolence from the people at 
large should be. In the Guoyu we can read one passage in which Lord Huan 
tried to appoint Baoshu as his senior official in order to implement the 
required measures for a successful political control of the population. 
However, as he measured himself with this task, he found out the complexity 
of the assignment, which forced him to decline the offer, paving the way, at 
the same time, for the emerge of the figure of Guan Zhong. He explained his 
refusal in the following terms:  
 
“if you [referring to Lord Huan] really want to control this 
state, then you should not choose me for the task. If there is a 
person that can really administer the state, then Guan Zhong is 
the one. In fact, I cannot compete with him on five major 
aspects: on being able to use widely generous and kind 
measures to appease the masses, I cannot compare with him; 
on not losing sight of the fundamental principles in order to 
govern the state, I cannot compare with him; on using loyalty 
and faith to gain people‟s trust, I cannot compare with him; 
setting ceremonies in accordance to All Under Heaven‟s law, I 
cannot compare with him; on making the people double their 
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courage when hearing the sound of drums signaling war before 
entering enemy’s army’s gate, I cannot compare with him.”
275
    
 
The people, their benevolence, and their trust represented the 
fundamental prerequisites for a coherent implementation of the martial laws, 
since “men in the Tao [of Heaven] are like fish in water. If they have water 
they will live; if not they will die. Thus the ruler must constantly be afraid and 
dare not lose the Tao.”
276
 This explains why the rulers, from the Spring and 
Autumn onwards, strived to create the necessary policies for a 
comprehensive social organization that reflected warfare needs: “the 
activities of warfare, deterrence armies [guanbing 观兵]277 as well as 
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in The Seven Military Classics Of Ancient China, p. 306. This is a very interesting 
parallelism. As it will be illustrated in chapter four, Mao‟s military doctrine of People‟s 
War advocated the use of the population as water where soldiers should swim like 
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 This military technique, that is, the use of deceptive methods, represents one of 
the central features of the entire Chinese history. In this specific case, as the Zuo 
Zhuan (左传) reports, the idea was to use the same technique that the barbarians 
living in the east employed in their encounters with the Chinese. This is one of the 
clearest cases in which the Chinese strengthened their way of fighting by absorbing 
other peoples‟ consolidated technique. In one specific passage where the use of 
these troops is contemplated, the Zuo Zhuan explains that during the fourth year of 
Lord Xi reign, the state of Chen, Zheng, and Qi had to face the barbarians of the 
East. Lord Huan of the state of Qi had already dispatched their troops between the 
state of Zheng and Chen.  Yuan Tao Tu, the advisor the Chen state, suggested Shen 
Hou, his homonymous at the service of the state of Zheng, to avoid sending both 
states‟ troops to the east, because encountering the eastern barbarians would have 
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coalition armies increased a lot, creating not only large amounts of 
casualties among the people, but also direct effects on their farming. They 
were increasingly forced to shoulder heavy burdens, such as providing by 
themselves military uniforms, grains, forages, and all other military 
materials.” This problem inevitably increased people‟s poverty due to the 
fact that they were forced to serve the army for a very long time. As a 
consequence, increasing poverty among the people affected the overall 
rulers‟ military power.  
Guan Zhong‟s policies, as explained above, were meant to find a 
solution in order to have constant military resources (men to be enlisted), 
while also not damaging the overall social structure. Therefore, one of the 
measures that would have represented, later on, the central framework for 
the Warring States period had been the establishment of a rigorous social 
structure, still divided into classes, composed of several types of people 
living together. One initial step was to make ordinary citizens suitable for the 
military service and making them live together with workers and merchants 
in specific district areas. They were not allowed to leave the areas assigned 
                                                                                                                                        
been very dangerous. It was better, instead, “to use Chen troops to make a show of 
force [guanbing 观兵], in order to secure a passage to the coast from which it would 
have been easier going back home.” Dan [丹] Guo [郭], XiaoQing [小青] Cheng [程] and 
BinYuan [彬源] Li [李], The Annals Of Zuo (Spring And Autumn Commentary) [Zuo 
Zhuan - 左传], 1st ed. (Beijing [北京]: Chinese Publishing House [zhonghua shuju –
中华书局], 2015), Fourth Year of Xi Lord, sec. 4.2, p. 334. 
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to them, and they were also requested to specialize into military affairs, 
passing down this expertise to future generations.
278
      
Specifically, it had been suggested, that the capital had to be divided 
into three areas, and each area divided into five districts. These, in turn, had 
to become the residential areas of the people, where they had to be left 
managing their own working specializations. These areas had to become 
also their graves. The same areas where the sage king, at last, “should 
carefully distribute on them his six sovereign prerogatives composed of life, 
death, poverty, richness, noble, and lowly.”  
Guan Zhong, because of the necessity to create a harmonious 
society where everybody had a role, suggested not only to divide the city 
into rigid residential areas, but he also suggested where to locate the people 
according to their working specializations. For example, he stated that: “the 
four categories of scholars, peasants, workers, and merchants should not be 
allowed to live in the same area, because doing so would generate language 
confusion while their professions would become chaotic and face 
vicissitudes … therefore the best way to locate them would be to settle 
scholars in quite areas, workers close to government quarters, merchants 
next to the marketplaces, and finally peasants next to the fields.”
279
 This 
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administrative technique was conceived also for strategic reasons: 
separating the masses into rigid areas allowed rulers to better control and, 
therefore, manipulate the population according to his needs. This satisfied 
the principle of “divide and rule” (fen er zhi zhi 分而治之) that characterized 
the Chinese rulership.
280
  
At the political level, instead, for what concerns the administration of 
the country, Guan Zhong advanced the design to divide the capital into 
twenty-one villages, distributed according to this principle: six had to be 
distributed between workers and merchants, while fifteen had to be shared 
among the political officers (junshi 军士), that is, among those people that 
were concerned with the administration of the legal and political affairs of the 
state when not enlisted in the army. Specifically, five villages had to be 
assigned to the governor, five to the governor‟s children, while the remaining 
five to the high officials of the state.
281
     
However, notwithstanding the wise political suggestions received by 
Guan Zhong, Lord Huan, thinking of ways to use the power of the military, 
often consulted him for political as well as military advice in order to 
formulate the appropriate strategy for becoming the hegemon (ba 霸) of the 
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ancient Chinese world.
282
 Guan Zhong spent most of his time trying to 
convince him of the importance of strengthening domestic politics before 
advancing any expansionist campaign. And in order to strengthen the 
internal affairs of his state, he clearly formulated the famous dictum 
“administer state‟s political affairs while making military commands reside 
within the government” (zuo neizheng er qi junling yan 作内政而寄军令焉): 
 
“Lord Huan asked: „I would like to pursue the Tao of hegemony, 
but if the troops dispatched are not just, can I do that?‟ Guan 
Zhong replied: „my Lord you cannot, the country is not stable 
yet.‟ So Lord Huan asked another question: „how can I make 
my country safe?‟ Guan Zhong replied: „first, my Lord, fix all 
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 Some Chinese rulers, especially during the Spring and Autumn, tried to plan a 
strategy for hegemony (tu ba zhanlue  图霸战略). The desire for hegemony, of course, 
continued without stop also, and above all, in the Warring States period. But an 
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齐桓公), Duke Wen of Jin (Jin Wengong 晋文公), King Zhuang of Chu (Chu 
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Discourses Of The States [Guoyu - 国语], p. 82 
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King Bai‟s laws [the previous King] and select those ones that 
are still valuable; moreover, show a lot of care for the people, 
bring relief to the poor, and deeply respect the government 
officials.‟ After stabilizing the country, Lord Huan asked again: 
„the country is stable now, can I move towards the Tao of 
hegemony?‟ But Guan Zhong replied: „my Lord you still cannot. 
In fact, if you put in order the army and build armors and 
weapons while also the other states are doing the same, it will 
be very hard for you to fulfill your wishes. If the weapons you 
will use to attack are like the defensive weapons that dukes of 
small states have employed, then you will also have a very hard 
time to fulfill your wishes. But if you would like to quickly fulfill 
your desire of becoming one of the dukes who managed to 
become the hegemon of all Under Heaven, then you should 
conceal your army, you should entrust it to the government.‟ 
Lord Huan asked: „how can I do that?‟ Guan Zhong replied: by 
administering the state‟s political affairs while also making the 
military commands reside within the government.‟”
283
 
 
These explanations also found further confirmation into one of the 
records of this historical period – the so-called Guanzi (管子) – which even if 
compiled during the Spring and Autumn, it was readapted for the political 
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and military needs of the Warring States, making it one of the best 
intellectual expressions of the Legalist School. It describes, again, some of 
the suggestions that Guan Zhong gave to Lord Huan for a better 
implementation of policies. However, the final message is slightly different : 
 
“„If my Lord desires to become the hegemon of All under 
Heaven, then your military affairs must be concealed and your 
government should find a way to lodge. 
[则事有所隐，而政有所寓].‟ Lord Huan asked: „how can I 
achieve this?‟ Guanzi replied:„ Set up regulations within the 
state and lodge within the government the military commands 
[作内政而寓军令焉]. Establish higher officials to administer the 
neighborhoods and other government officials to administer all 
the neighborhoods. Divide the country [Qi state] into three parts 
and make then three armies accordingly. Select worthy man 
and make them leaders of neighborhoods; let the districts 
organize commanders of squads made of five soldiers and put 
them in charge. Moreover, distribute the hunting as rewards 
and punishments, so that the masses will master military 
service.‟ „Good!‟ replied Lord Huan.
284
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section „rectification of the lord; the third register‟ [xiaokuang 小匡]. This passage is 
very important because it expresses also how the language had been readapted 
according to the new circumstances. The same Chinese phrase, attributed to Guan 
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Having laid down the basic principles governing the good 
administration of the people and their relationship with the army, in the 
famous work – Guanzi – we can also find additional detailed explanations on 
how to build an efficient army‟s organization in relation with the overall 
population, since it is important to underline the fact that with the advent of 
the Warring States period the physical separation of the capital from the 
countryside disappeared, paving the way for the total mobilization of the 
people for military purposes: 
  
Guan Zhong, therefore, organize the state‟s administrative 
system; five families formed a gui for which selecting a leader. 
Ten gui constituted a neighborhood, and within the 
neighborhood establish an officer. Four neighborhoods 
constituted a lian, and a lian established a leader. Ten lian 
formed a district, and a district established a senior official. He 
                                                                                                                                        
government‟s hands, here means something slightly different, carrying  deeper 
consequences for the historical period for which it had been used. The second 
phrase, in fact, expresses Guan Zhong‟s concept with the following words 
作内政而寓军令焉. As it can be understood, here the new character introduced into the 
sentence which substitute the previous one, is the word yu 寓 which means “to 
lodge,” “to live,” or “to imply/contain.” Therefore the underlining idea now is that the 
military orders should live inside the political administration, highlighting the 
existence of a deeper fusion of the two spheres of actions with respect to the 
previous historical period for which military orders had to be, somehow, 
“subordinated” – or entrusted – to the political administration, as the word ji 寄 
(shorter form of the verb jituo 寄托), used in the previous sentence, clearly 
demonstrated. 
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used this structure in order to make the military regulations. For 
this reason five families made a gui, and five men [one per 
family] constituted a military squad [in ancient China a squad 
was a group of five wu (伍) soldiers] commanded by the leader 
of the gui. Ten gui made a neighborhood, therefore fifty men 
made a small regiment commanded by the officer of the 
neighborhood. For neighborhoods made a lian, thus two 
hundred men formed an infantry, commanded by the lian 
leader. Ten lian made a district, therefore two thousand men 
formed a brigade, commanded by a senior official. Five districts 
then should be put under one commander, so that ten thousand 
men would make an army which should be commanded by a 
high ranking official … once this system is implemented within 
politics and people are assigned to their area, they are not 
allowed to leave it. Living close together should develop a 
harmonious social system, which will strengthen unity
285
 … so 
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 The members of each group were designed not only to occupy a specific area, 
but they were also “responsible for mutual surveillance. They were instructed both to 
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enabling the ruler to defend firmly or to attack courageously. If 
my Lord uses three thousand men of this kind [the country is 
divided into three areas, so allowing the creation of three 
armies] then enemies will not find a way to send punitive 
expedition … and under All Heaven no-one can oppose 
you.‟”
286
    
 
Administrative divisions such as the one just illustrated started to be 
employed a little bit earlier than the Warring States. The state of Jin, for 
example, had been one of the first states to advance these land 
subdivisions, encouraging the fusion between the capital (or major urban 
areas) of the state and the countryside. After the capture of its Lord Hui by 
the Qin forces in 645 BC, government officials initiated a series of reforms in 
order to secure the state and make sure that Lord Hui could return. The 
reforms focused on two subjects. One was the installation of the so-called 
yuan 爰 fields, that is, pieces of lands that would have been given to people 
deserving rewards. The second subject was, of course, the increase of the 
troops number and the consequent increase in mobilization forces. 
Therefore the state of Jin created the so-called zhou 州 troops, that is, 
troops extrapolated from the district areas, which before that moment only 
represented a residential area for the four Chinese classes of artisans, 
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peasants, scholars and merchants and not only. The zhou troops, in fact, 
had been recruited also from other peoples conquered in wars and resettled 
outside the capital. “Thus, the creation of zhou troops marked a major shift 
in the Chinese world. For the first time, in order to increase [their] military 
power, state[s] began to incorporate the subject peoples and farmers of the 
hinterland into the state structure by having them perform military service. In 
return these people probably received grants of state land.”
287
 
Similar reforms were quickly adopted by other states, such as Lu 
state. It introduced, between 594 and 590 BC, the “taxed fields” shui mu 
税亩288 while also creating the “armored troops” qiujia 丘甲.289 The qiu 
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 Dan Guo et al. The Annals Of Zuo (Spring And Autumn Commentary) [Zuo Zhuan 
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Zhuan - 左传], Lord Cheng‟s first year or reign, sec. 1.4, pp. 865-866. The first year 
tells that Lord Cheng of the state of Lu was strengthening its defensive position 
against the invasion of the state of Qi. The defensive measures required the 
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the well-field system, in which there were nine pieces of land, as the character 
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ultimately indicated a basic population unit which had to pay taxes for its 
land. This “indicates that the state had begun to allot land to individual 
households, which were then obliged to provide sums of grain or cash and 
perhaps military service.”
290
 Other states followed suit. The state of Zheng, 
for example, after reorganizing the state, proceeded to the creation and 
organization of a “qiu levy” which also reflected the implementation of the qiu 
troops. 
All these regulations and policies demonstrate how important the 
role of law had become. This paved the way for the legalist school which 
played a crucial role in establishing these policies, since laws and 
regulations became the decisive factors for a correct war planning. The 
Legalists advocated the centrality of the law in setting up the absolute 
sovereignty of the state. Therefore, reforms had to be carried out, with the 
sole objective of strengthening state‟s political as well as military policies for 
the centuries ahead, even at the cost of political tradition.
291
  
                                                                                                                                        
井illustrates, composed of eight private pieces and one public], four wells made a 
county, four counties made a hillock [qiu 丘], four hillocks made a suburb.” According 
to this system, every suburb, then, had to provide “one war chariot, four army horses, 
twenty cows, three armed soldiers and seventy-two infantrymen.” This represented 
the fixed amount of goods that qiu had to pay as part of the military taxation (jun 
fu军赋). 
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 Zhong [仲] Guan [管] and Shan [山] Li [李], The Annals Of Guanzi [Guanzi - 管子], 
section: laws and prohibitions fajin 法禁. In this section Guan Zhong clearly 
highlighted the importance of law, regulations and prohibitions. All these legal 
measures had to satisfy one specific objective: the creation of a highly legal state 
where political and military orders were combined together in order to avoid any type 
of internal disorder. Order was, therefore the key word for this political design. And 
the military field, more than any other, needed a good implementation of this legal 
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The famous administrative measures promoted and executed by the 
minister Shang Yang 商鞅 of the Qin state also represent another clear 
example. The revolution in military affairs with the newly heavy reliance on 
infantry with respect to chariots increased the need to find a way to combine 
the civil aspect of society with the military one. The population, in fact, went 
through a severe method of registration which was necessary in order to 
distribute the land and also collect taxes. Moreover, the people could, in the 
end, till the land only after a successful military performance.
292
 One of the 
processes Shang Yang activated in order to enlarge the number of soldiers 
to serve the state was, therefore, the incorporation of the rural population. 
These reforms had been carried out after 359 BC and shaped Qin state‟s 
power of mobilization as well as the other states‟ approach to warfare. In the 
famous historical work on Chinese historic records – the Shi ji 史记, 
compiled by Sima Qian – we can read a very interesting conversation 
between the Qin ruler (Duke Qin Xiao Qin Xiaogong 秦孝公) and Shang 
Yang over the state‟s organization between past, present, and future, which 
anticipate the overall political mentality of the warring states as well as the 
revolutionary aspect of the legalist school. After explain the Duke that “of All 
Under Heaven the methods for administering a state have always been 
different and also unconventional, with clear examples of rulers becoming 
kings after tearing apart the ancient laws as well as other leaders losing the 
                                                                                                                                        
system so as to obtain an equalized and harmonized population which would follow 
orders (yu qi ren zhi he tong yi ting ling ye欲其人之和同以听令也). 
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state even after following the classics” and after being nominated a member 
of the nobility, he issued the following regulations, which had characterized 
the civil-military relation not only in ancient China, but also in subsequent 
centuries: 
 
The new law ordered the organization of society into groups 
composed of five or ten households. They were also ordered to 
spy and supervise each other and if anyone failed to report the 
criminal activity committed by anyone he would be punished by 
being chopped in half at the waist [腰斩]. Instead, who reported 
it would receive the same reward as that one obtained for 
cutting enemy‟s head. Moreover, those who hide a criminal 
would receive the same punishment as that one inflicted for 
surrendering to the enemy. Those families having more than 
two adult males that did not divide the household would pay a 
double amount of taxes. Those who enjoyed success in the 
military field would be promoted to a higher rank. Those who 
having personal enmities engage in open fight would receive a 
punishment according to the severity of the circumstances. 
Those who devoted their energies to the fundamental 
enterprise, such as farming,
293
 and contributed with field 
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Commentaries By Shi Lei 石磊, chap. 3 Agriculture and Warfare (nong zhan 农战). 
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production or clothes can avoid extra labor, while those who 
engaged in trade and industry and those who became poor due 
to their laziness would become slaves. Those members of the 
royal family that did not obtain military success would not be 
listed in the registers of relatives. Moreover, titles and ranks 
should be respected and each one would receive land and 
dwellings in relation to his degree; and the clothes the male and 
female slaves had to wear should be related to the rank of the 
family. Those who achieved military success would receive 
glory and higher ranks, while those without any military 
success, even if rich, would not receive a position in society.
294
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
the people within the country all say that „one can still obtain office and rank by 
avoiding agriculture and war.‟ This would have as a consequence that all respectable 
men will change their occupations, such as devoting themselves to the study of the 
Odes and History along with improper standards. In so doing, they could obtain 
prominence and also office and rank. Those who desire wasting their own affairs will 
get involved with trade and will practice arts and crafts, all made to avoid agriculture 
and war. This condition prepares dangers for the state [具备，国之危也]. Where people 
use these teachings, their country will be destroyed [其国必削]. To well organize a 
state, even though the granaries are full, no robbery in the agriculture should be 
allowed [不偷于农].” In the "Wei Liao Zi [尉撩子]", in The Seven Military Classics Of 
Ancient China, we can also find a particularly detailed praise towards agriculture and 
how it should be preserved not only as the inevitable means for food production, but 
also as a moral discipline within the state along the practice of war. In fact, one of the 
central policies that he adopted targeted specifically any type of tendency that could 
be “inimical to agriculture and warfare, the twin foundation of the state.” 
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And Zhang Shoujie 张守节 (Tang Dynasty), 1st ed. (Beijing [北京]: Chinese Publishing 
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These were just some of the very strict reforms that transformed the 
ancient Chinese world and that allowed the “Qin government to achieve the 
total identity of civil administration and military organization.” Moreover, the 
“identification of the social order with the army was strengthened through the 
institution of ranks of military merits” and the institution of small units of 
military administration, called xian 县, which served also as the basis of local 
government. In other words, the xian, “as units of military recruitment and 
administration … [also] became the basic units of local, civil government.”  
The focus on these reforms is often based on the Qin state, because 
of its later historical role in unifying the country, however, also the other 
warring states pursued the implementation of the same reforms, which had 
become, historically, the “ideal [model] of legalist administrative theory.”
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Shang Yang, in fact, before being killed due to court affairs, 
completed other reforms, some of which had long-lasting effects. Along with 
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those ones on the equalization of the tax system and standardization of the 
measures units, in the land administration sector he opened the qian [阡] 
and mo [陌], that is, two types of lands divided only by small roads, which 
facilitated its cultivation, distribution, and sharing. This was part of his effort 
to reshape the countryside in order to make it an “extension of military 
service”, that is, the identification of social order with the army. This was 
related to Shang Yang‟s major idea which advocated the centrality of 
agriculture as the “basis of society and the root of all wealth,” in fact, “his 
ideal state was a land of small-scale farmers guided by a severe, detailed 
code of laws. In this way he was able to “allocate to each family sufficient 
land to be worked by a single adult male.” The state, then, “could obtain the 
maximum amount of land in cultivation and the highest possible number of 
adult males liable for military service and taxes.”
296
 In sum: 
 
“The reforms of Shang Yang marked the culmination of the 
process of breaking down the social and institutional barriers 
between city and hinterland through the extension of military 
service. The entire countryside was divided into a rectangular 
grid, the entire population into military units, the administration 
into military districts, and then the individual households of the 
population were „mapped‟ onto the grid in accord with merits 
earned in battle or through agriculture.”
297
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But two of his political ideas seem to stand out both for their 
sophistication and cruelty. The first is the “chaos opening” (kai sai 开塞) and 
the second is the war of agriculture (geng zhan 耕战). Lord Taishi, the new 
Qin ruler, described them as the works that explain why Shang Yang had 
been killed. The first one, in fact, referred to a way of implementing laws that 
fomented the use of both the army and the people to create chaos inside 
another state; a chaos that could destroy its communication system as well 
as its administrative sovereignty. The second policy consisted in adopting 
the peasants for the war struggle and the killing of the enemy.
298
 This 
directly reflected Shang Yang conception of warfare and agriculture as well 
as the political spirit of the Warring States period, which would have 
produced a crucial historical legacy for the centuries ahead. One of his 
famous assumptions, in fact, was that those who engaged in battle and 
those who distinguished themselves in the agriculture represented the same 
institutional figure, as attested in the famous section of the Shi ji dedicated to 
his political actions. In the Shang Jun Shu, which represents his historical 
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text, agriculture and warfare are completely intertwined both in concept and 
practice.
299
 
 The combination of these two elements also reflected other 
thinkers‟ thoughts. Hanfeizi, in fact, highlighted the centrality of those men 
engaged both in warfare and farming (geng zhan zhi shi 耕战之士),300 since, 
as attested by the historical records, the infantry armies “were formed largely 
through the recruitment of the peasantry.”
301
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A propos of agriculture, during the Qin the assignment of the land to 
the ordinary people who were also recruited for military duties was the direct 
outcome of the establishment of a new institutional framework through which 
banning the aristocratic lineages. In so doing, whenever a state subjugated 
another, the conquered land would have been distributed among the 
population in relation to their military service. This practice, which became 
particularly relevant, was defined as fen zu (分族) or mie zu (灭族).302 
The distribution of land with the associated destruction of the 
aristocratic lineages, in turn, created a new political system which, as 
explained above, was devoted, entirely, to the mobilization and the control of 
the people. It progressively emerged “a kin system based primarily on the 
individual household, which formed the fundamental unit for registration and 
the provision of labor services in the new state.” This system also envisaged 
the application of sanctioned violence in two ways: “the principle of collective 
punishment for families enshrined in the legal codes, and the moral 
obligation to vengeance for kin articulated in the Confucian ritual texts and 
commentaries.” This, in turn, created also a radical shift in the blood ties that 
characterized people‟s relationships, which, along with the covenants, 
started to be identified with “bonds” yue (约). This had to do with the 
modification of the political significance of the ruler‟s role in society, which 
started to be perceived as the major factor for mobilizing the people and 
therefore as a “position of unchallenged supremacy.” The pervasiveness of 
the ruler‟s power also paved the way for the “„sexualization‟ of the political in 
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Warring States China, in which the relation between the ruler and the 
minister was equated with that one between husband and wife.”
303
    
However, all this did not undermine the implementation of the 
covenants, which, during the passage from the Spring and Autumn to the 
Warring States contributed to create the idea of the state as we know it 
today. Covenants, specifically the blood ones, in fact, were also widely used 
“to secure the support or allegiance of the capital populace (guo ren 國人). 
The major difference of their actual employment in warfare concerned the 
role that the aristocracy still played throughout the Spring and Autumn 
period. In fact, the guo ren were first employed during the internal struggle 
for power occurring within the aristocratic world, so their employment still 
lacked the “national” character that would later characterize the Warring 
States period.  
The guo ren, moreover, “consisted of the lowest level of the nobility 
– the shi – as well as merchants and artisans. The former were a primary 
constituent of the army, and the entire population could expel the lord, 
overthrow the government and set up new rules.” Therefore this forced 
rulers to highly esteem the population‟s power and trying to avoid to outrage 
it. In so doing, “the capital‟s inhabitants thus came to play a decisive role in 
the internecine struggles between the various lineages of the nobility and 
often decided the succession to the throne, so ambitious men sought to win 
their favor through conspicuous exemplary conduct or public charity.” These 
blood covenants, therefore, became full “instruments of interstate 
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diplomacy,” providing the means “for organizing conspiracy, insurrection, 
and civil war.”
304
  
This “intimate” connection between the people and the ruler was 
also symptomatic of a new way of conceptualizing warfare. Since people 
could gain land to be cultivated after a successful military performance, also 
in the military field, higher rankings responded to great performance on the 
battlefield. Therefore, “a new form of military commander, a specialist who 
held office through mastery of military techniques,” appeared on the scene. 
This, in turn, stimulated also a wide production of intellectual writings which 
tried to describe and analyze “not only the procedures for commanding an 
army or defending a city, but also the principles of warfare and the relation of 
the army to civil society.” Widely conditioned by this new intellectual context, 
also nonmilitary texts tended to discuss the nature of warfare, making it, 
therefore, one of the central features of period. 
One of the elements widely discussed through most of the military 
writings was the rejection of “the martial ideals of the Spring and Autumn 
aristocracy” and the advocacy of a clear separation of “combat from the 
ancestral cult,” which, for a long time, have been interpreted as the two 
sides of the same coin,
 305
 paving the way for the subsequent manifestation 
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of the fusion of the military field with the civilian realm.
 
Now combat mainly 
represented “an intellectual discipline in which the powers of mind and 
textual mastery of the commander, along with the unthinking obedience and 
                                                                                                                                        
not uncommon for a hunt to turn into a campaign or a campaign in to a hunt.” 
Language also reflected this interchangeability for the words used in the military field, 
such as “military” or “martial,” respectively wu 武 and rong 戎, were also applied to 
hunting, and the word for hunting lie獵 (simplified version 猎) “could also describe an 
army‟s attack, and the same word huo 獲 [simplified form 获] applied to what was 
captured in battle or taken in the hunt. Collective oaths with the force of law were 
sworn at the beginning of a hunt just as before a battle, and misconduct during a 
hunt was punished according to military law.” Ibid., pp. 17-18. As the author himself 
refers to, the Zuo Zhuan critically analyzed the centrality of these political actions. 
While describing the thirteenth year of Lord Cheng‟s rule, the Commentary explains 
how a specific military action was performed: “Lord Lu Cheng and his Duke went to 
pay homage to the shrine of the King Zhou Jian, after having decided to follow Lord 
Liu Kang, Lord Cheng Su in their decision to join Lord Jin Li in attacking the state of 
Qin. However, when Lord Cheng Su received the sacrificial meat at the god‟s temple, 
he did not show respect.  So Lord Liu Kang said: „I have heard that common people 
were born from the spirit of the opposites of earth and heaven [ tiandi de zhonghe zhi 
qi天地的中和之气 – in ancient times it was believed that humanity was born from the 
combination and, therefore, condensation, of opposite forces governing the universe, 
such as the Yin (阴) and Yang (阳)] obtaining what is known as life. Therefore, the 
performance of this action [the sacrifice], according to the righteous and dignified 
norm, should be used for obtaining a fortunate and helpful mandate of heaven … the 
great affairs of the state are sacrifice and warfare. In the sacrifices one takes and 
distribute the meat from the sacrifices in the ancestral temple, while in warfare on 
receives the meat from the sacrifices. These are the great ceremonies of the spirits.‟” 
Dan [丹] Guo [郭], XiaoQing [小青] Cheng [程] and BinYuan [彬源] Li [李], The Annals Of 
Zuo (Spring And Autumn Commentary) [Zuo Zhuan - 左传], Thirteenth year of Lord 
Cheng, sec. 13.2, pp. 973-975. On the same line, also Confucius expressed a similar 
view, explaining how the combination of war and proper sacrifice rituals could lead to 
the achievement of the Dao: “When I engage in war I conquer, and when I sacrifice I 
obtain good fortune. This could be called obtaining the Way.” XiDan [希但] Sun [孙], 
The Collection Of The Book Of Rites [Li Ji Jijie - 礼记集解], 1st ed. (Shanghai [上海]: 
Commercial Affairs [shangwu – 商务], 1935), cited in Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned 
Violence In Early China, p. 19 
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uniform actions of the troops, guaranteed victory. It was no longer combat 
itself but the control of men and the manipulation of combat for higher ends 
that now constituted the essence of war.”
306
  
An essence which could have been reached, as explained above, 
by the edification of a coherent authority, also in the military field. The 
Warring States, in fact, revolutionized also the role and profile of the 
commander, making it an entirely Chinese product. This is because 
generalship could be rightly considered to be “a culturally based activity 
whose variations can tell us much about the society of a particular place and 
era, and the theory and practice of generalship is particularly revealing in a 
society like Warring States China, where the state had been created through 
military organization.”
307
 
In other words, the Warring States period, besides culminating into 
the fusion between the civil and the military, also cultivated a profound 
military specialization. This, in turn, paved the way for another feature: the 
idea that military service represented more of an art, a philosophy than a 
ritualistic practice. Therefore, as already mentioned in the sections above, 
during this period the production of military treatises flourished to the extent 
that they were recognized as divine tools for the good government and the 
good art of war.
308
 Battle, in fact, became “a form of wisdom or an art, a 
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mental skill that could be verbally formulated and taught,” that is, “the art of 
battle no longer consisted in the skills of driving a chariot or handling 
weapons, but in assessing the terrain and the enemy, organizing multitudes, 
and devising stratagems. As the master of texts and techniques, it was the 
commander who now determined the outcome of the battle.”
309
 
 
2.2.2. Second Level of Analysis: Strategic Design of People’s 
War 
 
                                                                                                                                        
Emperor and the Art of War of the Goddess [黄帝玄女战法]” we can find a mythical story 
about how the Yellow Emperor obtained invincibility in war: “The Yellow Emperor 
[黄帝] engaged in war with Chi You [蚩尤] nine times and for nine times he could not 
win. So he returned to Mountain Tai and for three days and three nights was 
shrouded by the darkness of a fog. There a woman, with the head of human and the 
body of a bird, appeared. The Yellow Emperor first bowed, not daring to get up. So 
the goddess said: „I am the goddess, what would like to ask?‟ the Yellow Emperor 
replied: „I desire invincibility.‟ So he obtained the Art of War [遂得战法焉].” This dialogue 
is relevant for the understanding of the importance and the precious value that rulers 
as well as scholars attributed to the military treatises. In fact, as this case shows, the 
Yellow Emperor had the chance to meet the so-called goddess of the nine days 
(jiutian xuannu九天玄女), which represented a woman expert in the art of war and 
military strategy. Fang [昉] Li [李], Imperial Records Of The Taiping Era [Taiping Yulan 
- 太平御览], Chapter 15, (Chinese Text Project 
http://ctext.org/text.pl?node=363096&if=en&remap=gb, n.d.).  
309
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As the first part explained, in this specific historical period, China 
moved towards a combination between the military (wu 武) and the civil 
(wen 文). This reflected not only the necessity to develop new policies for an 
efficient, lethal conduct of war, but it was also the result of the challenges 
posed by foreign enemies, like the northern tribes. The wen-wu relationship, 
in fact, had also been shaped by the influence of the Inner Asian tribes. It is 
often underestimated how important the Inner Asia was in influencing 
Chinese strategic culture. Some specific elements of Chinese use of military 
power are the direct result of this cultural exchange. In fact, the historical 
accounts of the “barbarians” often highlighted “their proclivity to war … The 
account of the Xiongnu in the Shi ji says that „they make war their business,‟ 
and indeed the topos of the northern nomads as a „martial race‟ runs 
through the whole length of Chinese traditional historiography.”
310
 This 
account, therefore, demonstrates that ancient China progressively absorbed 
some features of external actors‟ military culture; especially those ones that 
satisfied its needs: “being that frontier defense was so critical to the 
preservation of dynastic rule and territorial integrity, it is not surprising that 
an osmotic process of subtle absorption and assimilation of Inner Asia 
military culture took place.”
311
 This historical understanding illustrates the 
delicate balance between the civil institution and the military one, which in 
turn strongly affected the creation and implementation of foreign and 
strategic policies. 
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The sophisticated development of this dichotomous relationship had 
also direct effects on the military strategy. It, in fact, developed two 
substantial strategic directions that would have persisted throughout 
Chinese military history until nowadays. The first step of the civil-military 
relationship was the fluid combination of attack and defense. Both were not 
clearly separated, since one represented the mirror-image of the other. And 
the use of deception (as it will be illustrated in the pages below), combined 
with the use of normal and special military measures, paved the way for this 
strategic design. 
The second direction of the civil-military relationship, connected to 
the first one, was the elaboration of a strategic scheme through which 
agriculture became not only a means for food production, but also a hidden 
instrument of war. As illuminatingly described by the Tai Gong “the 
implements for offence and defense are fully found in ordinary human 
activity.” Responding to King Wu who was wondering how to maintain the 
“implements of war” in time of peace,
312
 Tai Gong replied:  
 
[in agriculture], “digging sticks serve as chevaux-de-
frise and caltrops. Oxen and horse-pulled wagons can be used 
in the encampment and as covering shields. The different hoes 
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can be used as spears and spear-tipped halberds. Raincoats of 
straw and large umbrellas serve as armor and protective 
shields. Large hoes, spades, axes, saws, mortars, and pestles 
are tools for attacking walls. Oxen and horses are the means to 
transport provisions. Chickens and dogs serve as lookouts. The 
cloth that women weave serves as flags and pennants.  
The method that the men use for leveling the fields is 
the same for attacking walls. The skill needed in spring to cut 
down grass and thickets is the same as needed for fighting 
against chariots and cavalry. The weeding methods used in 
summer are the same as used in battle against foot soldiers. 
The grain harvested and the firewood cut in the fall will be 
provisions for the military. In the winter well-filled granaries and 
storehouses will ensure a solid defense. 
The units of five found in the fields and villages will 
provide the tallies and good faith that bind the men together. 
The villages have officials and the offices have chiefs who can 
lead the army … The skills used in repairing the inner and outer 
walls in the spring and fall, in maintaining the moats and 
channels are used to build ramparts and fortifications. 
Thus the tools for employing the military are completely 
found in ordinary human activity. One who is good at governing 
a state will take them from ordinary human affairs … The 
husband has a  number of acres that he farms, the wife a 
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measured amount of material to weave – this is the Way to 
enrich the state and strengthen the army.
313
 
  
In the Warring States period, China‟s military planning and strategy 
as well as the influences coming from the external actors, put a premium on 
the application of subversive war, or generally speaking, of asymmetric 
warfare. This strategic condition, as already expressed above, facilitated the 
production of a vast literature on warfare; “in those days the strategies and 
methods of the famous tacticians were repeatedly tested and applied and 
were proven to have a timeless validity.”
314
 This was also related to the 
importance of warfare, not only because the Warring States period, as we 
know, represented a highly conflictual era of Chinese history (the Spring and 
Autumn historical records highlighted that war was also widely used at that 
time), but also because it represented an instrument of politics, its 
“continuation” as Clausewitz said many centuries later. In fact, The Art of 
War begins its discussion of the strategic and tactical elements to be 
implemented in war with the famous phrase: “War is a matter of vital 
importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road to survival or 
ruin; it is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied [bing zhe, guo zhi da shi, si 
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sheng zhi di, cun wang zhi dao, bu ke bu cha ye 
兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也].”315 
And at the strategic level, the civil-military relationship became even 
more prominent. The Tai Gong‟s Six Secret Teachings, for example, 
discussed at length the application of the so-called “civil offensive” which 
comprised a total of twelve measures to be adopted against the ruler of 
another state and whose final result could be compared to a real military 
operation, since those civil offensives were meant to disrupt the enemy‟s 
court and therefore the entire state.
316
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Besides this overarching strategic tendency, strategy was often 
contemplated during the martial prognostication in which priests had to 
interpret the right messages of the clouds in order to understand whether or 
not the army was about to face “brutal” enemies; “the category of „brutal‟ 
armies included rebellious troops, gangs of local brigands, various 
revolutionaries, steppe raiders, and segmented forces from field armies, all 
of whom might suddenly arise and unexpectedly appear.”
317
 The following 
represented one of the most famous passages for military prognostication, 
and the countermeasures to be adopted, especially when it came to the 
understanding of the manifestation of “brutal armies:” 
 
If black qi comes from the enemy‟s vicinity and 
overspreads our army, they want to launch a surprise attack. As 
they will surely come, it would be appropriate to prepare, but 
inappropriate to engage in battle. After the enemy turns about, 
                                                                                                                                        
everything. He will never imagine you might be in conflict with him. Our treacherous 
measures will then be settled. Fifth, treat his loyal officials very generously, but 
reduce the gifts you provide [to the ruler] … sixth, make secret alliances with his 
favored ministers, but visibly keep his less-favored outside official at a distance … 
seventh, if you want to bind his heart to you, you must offer generous presents … 
eighth, gift him with great treasures, and make plans with him … ninth, honor him 
with praise … tenth, be submissive so that he will trust you, and thereby learn about 
his true situation … eleventh, block up his access by means of the Tao … secretly 
express great respect toward [subordinates] … accumulate your own resources until 
they become very substantial, but manifest as external appearance of shortage … 
twelfth, support his dissolute officials in order to confuse him. Tai [太] Gong [公], "Tai 
Gong's Six Secret Teachings [Tai Gong Liu Tao - 太公六韬]", in The Seven Military 
Classics Of Ancient China, pp. 56-57. 
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you can gain a minor victory by following and suddenly striking 
them. 
If there are clouds resembling barbarians deployed into 
formation [for an attack]; white qi five or six chang wide that 
strikes Heaven in the east or west; clouds shaped like five or 
six panthers congregating together, or four of five dogs 
gathered together; or, although the four quarters are clear and 
bright, fulminating red clouds are seen, troops are about to rise. 
If there are clouds shaped like flags and pennants, 
brigands will explosively arise. 
Red clouds like fire indicate troops wherever they 
appear. 
When the qi of forces lying in ambush resembles a man 
bearing a sword and shield, or there are clods like a man with a 
red face sitting down, explosive forces will appear at any city or 
town they approach. 
If for no reason clouds shaped like a tiger move about a 
cloudy sky, brutal forces will come. 
If the cloud qi resembles chickens, pheasants, or 
running rabbits, brigands will come to attack your forces. You 
must urgently prepare.  
If red clouds resemble peoples in groups of two and 
three, some walking, some sitting, brutal forces will soon 
arrive.”
318
 
 
In this context of strategic planning, a military treatise like Sun Tzu‟s 
The Art of War became the masterpiece of this epoch. It codified a specific 
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way of reasoning about war and how to deal with it.
319
 In Sun Tzu‟s book we 
can find that one of the central themes is the concept of flexibility, which has 
been rendered through the term quanbian 权变. This overarching concept 
represented the pillar of strategic thinking that Sun Tzu remarked through 
the expression “let others assume specific forms, while I do not have any 
(xingren er wo wuxing 形人而我无形).320  
At the strategic level this concept found its application through the 
study of the enemy‟s behavior. In fact, because of the increasing importance 
of the military service, which went through a strict professionalization 
process, the typical strategic design, as Wuzi advocated, envisaged the 
necessity to target the enemy‟s commander. Studying and therefore 
knowing him allowed one actor to understand how the enemy‟s army would 
have behaved on the battlefield.
321
  
Sun Tzu also emphasized the importance of knowledge, highlighting 
the necessity to attack enemy‟s deliberations as well as the knowledge and 
plans of the commander. In the third chapter of his military treatise on 
“Offensive Strategy” he advised to “attack the enemy‟s strategy.” This meant 
building a coherent strategic plan which fully considered the enemy‟s 
psychology, military preparedness, and its population. After having gained 
                                                          
319
 Sunzi and Samuel B Griffith, The Art Of War. Recent historical findings 
demonstrated that this military treatise had been written during the Warring States 
period, rather than the Spring and Autumn one, as many others suggested so far.  
320
 Sunzi and Samuel B Griffith, The Art Of War, p. 100; for an overall evaluation of 
the philosophical elements characterizing this famous Sun Tzu‟s phrase see : 
François Jullien, Trattato Dell'efficacia, 1st ed. (Torino: Einaudi, 2004), p. 162.  
321
 Qi [起] Wu [吴], "Wuzi [吴子]", in The Seven Military Classics Of Ancient China. 
232
 
 
this information, then the skilled general plans accordingly with the final 
objective of “subduing the enemy without fighting” (bu zhan er qu ren zhi 
bing 不战而屈人之兵). This measure was conceptualized not only to try to 
save the states‟ resources for war, such as money and men, but also to try 
to capture the enemy‟s state and its army intact, because of the evident 
advantage of reusing them. However, Sun Tzu knew how important it was to 
conduct also actual military operations. Therefore the second best strategy 
should have been to attack the enemy‟s system of alliance; the third one to 
attack his army, and the final one, the worst option, to attack his cities.
322
 
This strategic principle is also elaborated by Wu Qi in his famous 
military treatise that got his name, the Wuzi. Recognized as the first great 
general in Chinese history (several historical accounts reported that he had 
never been defeated), Wu Qi argued that states could survive only through a 
military strength and sound government. In his treatise, written during the 
Warring States period, he also advocated Sun Tzu‟s assumption, that is, the 
ability to create a good strategy for victory with the least military 
engagement:  
 
“now being victorious in battles is easy, but preserving 
the results of victory is difficult. Thus it is said that among the 
states under Heaven that engage in warfare, those that garner 
five victories will meet with disaster; those with four victories will 
be exhausted; those with three victories will become 
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hegemons; those with two victories will be kings; and those with 
one victory will become emperors. For this reason those who 
have conquered the world through numerous victories are 
extremely rare, while those who thereby perished are many.”      
 
In addition to that, Wu Qi also explained what types of strategy a 
state should have implemented according to the circumstances. Specifically, 
the idea was to illustrate the concept that a strategy had to reflect 
necessarily the domestic as well as the foreign situations. In other words, 
bridging the military and politics according to the political changes. 
Therefore, he assumed that strategy should take into account the 
manifestation of five different types of armies: the righteous, the strong, the 
hard, the fierce, and the contrary. The first one should be employed when 
trying to rescue “the people from chaos.” When “relying on the strength of 
the masses to attack” then the strong army should be employed. The army 
that is mobilized out of anger is defined the hard. When seeking profit, the 
fierce should be used. And finally, when the country is “in turmoil and the 
people are exhausted, embarking on military campaigns and mobilizing the 
masses” leads to the implementation of a contrary army. Studying them is 
very important, since each has its own Tao.
323
  
Therefore, in order to reduce the number of military engagements so 
as to achieve victory in war without fighting, two directions should have been 
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followed: the first one was the ability to manipulate the enemy through 
deception, in order to make him dubious about one‟s own actual military 
potential. In other words, the idea was to invest on deterrence policies 
whose objective was to severely weaken the enemy‟s morale.
324
 The second 
direction, instead, looked more to the actual combat, that is, the tactical 
levels, in which flexibility in military operations and the planning of surprise 
attacks paved the way for the final victory. Therefore, if properly applied, the 
strategic design based on knowledge of the enemy‟s military status could 
lead to military success: “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred 
battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but 
know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both 
of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in 
peril.”
325
 
The acquisition of knowledge as well as its manipulation 
represented the key instrument of war. The manipulation had to occur 
through the application of deception (gui 诡), which constituted, in turn, the 
fundamental aspect governing the military realm and, consequently, the 
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military operations.
326
 Its importance, at the strategic level, is, once again, 
illustrated into one of the most famous passages of Sun Tzu: 
 
All warfare is based on deception [兵者，诡道也]. 
Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity 
[故能而示之不能];  
when active, inactivity [用而示之不用];  
When near, make it appear that you are far away 
[近而示之远];  
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when far away, that you are near [远而示之近]. 
Offer the enemy a bait to lure him [利而诱之];  
feign disorder and strike him [乱而取之].327 
When he concentrates, prepare against him [实而备之]; 
where he is strong, avoid him [强而避之]. 
Anger his general and confuse him [怒而挠之]. 
Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance 
[卑而骄之]. 
Keep him under a strain and wear him down 
[佚而劳之].328 
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When he is united, divide him [亲而离之]. 
Attack where he is unprepared [攻其无备]; 
sally out when he does not expect you [出其不意]. 
these are the strategist‟s key to victory [此兵家之胜]. 
It is not possible to discuss them beforehand 
[不可先传也].329 
   
Information and deception, then, were connected to an overarching 
strategic element that characterized the Chinese strategic thought: the 
exploitation of the shi 势. Besides its tactical significance, explained below, 
at the political level, shi was considered one of the three “cardinal precepts” 
of the Legalist school. Along with the words fa 法 (law), shu 术 (art or 
technique), shi described the existence of a “strategic advantage.” Therefore 
the word shi was born first within the political environment and then exported 
to the military one. Its importance does reside not only on its meaning, but 
also on the ultimate significance that it carries; by being both a political as 
well as a military instrument, shi represented the strategic element that 
connected politics with war, since it became necessary to design the right 
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strategy in order to exploit the manifestation of a specific “strategic 
advantage.”
330
 
Trying to connect these major ideas with the central principle of 
finding out the origin of the people‟s war doctrine, I can assume that this is 
already one important theoretical asset towards that direction. The people‟s 
war concept, in fact, heavily relies on flexibility, since it is a key strategic 
element which strongly characterizes Chinese strategic culture. The 
quanbian concept, therefore, brings us to a more coherent understanding of 
how China had waged war in history. This strategic concept, moreover, is far 
from the dichotomous relationship of defensive-offensive paradigm, which so 
far had played a significant role in the study of other countries‟ strategic 
culture.
331
 
In fact, these military strategies, during the Warring States period, 
made Chinese strategic culture a real strategic asset rather than a merely 
general strategic posture. Chinese way of warfare “is … a striking examplar 
of the new art of militant mobilization for defense.”
332
 Moreover, even if 
Fairbank fell into the defense-offense theoretical trap – that is, the 
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apparently Chinese tendency to prefer “defense [over] offense … [which, in 
turn,] stresse[d] the exhausting of an attacker or the pacification of a rebel as 
less costly than their extermination,” – at the same time his findings point to 
another direction, that is, that China has historically emphasized the 
application of “attritional warfare over offensive warfare with the goal of 
annihilating the enemy.”
333
  
Strategic asset which had also been applied in other military 
theaters, such as the maritime context, where China, while conducing 
military expeditions against pirates and other adversaries, applied the same 
strategic concept that shaped their land strategy: (jianbi qingye 坚壁清野), 
meaning “strengthen the walls and clear the fields;” that is, an attempt to 
concentrate all material resources, such as food, manpower, etc, inside the 
city walls in order to “starve out the attackers.”
334
  
 
2.2.3. Third Level of Analysis: Tactical Design of People’s War  
 
At the tactical level, the Warring States adopted a truly totalitarian 
mentality.
335
 The organization of the army, in fact, clearly reflected this new 
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tendency. Soldiers now had to perform military operations as a one body. In 
order to achieve this, the commander had to establish an intimate 
relationship with the soldiers. As briefly described in the civil-military section, 
one of those elements that had been used for such a purpose was the 
adoption of a “transformed sexual imagery of warfare, in which the 
celebration of masculine courage and strength was replaced by the model of 
feminine obedience and compliance.” In doing so, warfare had to become a 
fully “collective enterprise that aimed at forging large numbers of men into an 
integrated body in which each part was subservient to the whole, and the 
whole was immediately responsive to the commander‟s will.”
336
  
Sometimes, this psychological as well as military unity, that is, total 
submission to the general‟s will as well as denial of personal initiatives in 
war, was achieved through actual extreme military actions, that is, placing 
the troops “in a situation in which they had no choice but to fight or die.” In 
the Warring States period, in fact, there are several historical records that 
show how “commanders consciously employed stratagems, including 
maneuvering the army into positions where retreat was impossible, to elicit a 
psychology of desperation in which the troops had no choice but to fight.” 
This tactical measure illustrates the fact that sometimes the warring states 
were not able to implement the “one-mind policy,” however, at the same time 
it illustrates the centrality of the general as the supreme leader in war and 
the passive role of the soldiers.
337
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In the aftermath of the unification of the country by the Qin, there 
happened, for example, in 202 BC a famous battle in which this tactical 
maneuver was widely applied, becoming one of the paradigmatic symbols of 
the Warring States way of waging warfare. Specifically, general Han Xin 
(韩信), during the battle of Jingxing (井陉) decided to display his troops for 
war in a very dangerous position, that is, with their backs facing the river (bei 
shui chen 背水陈), therefore without any route to escape. Such a measure 
was seen by the opposing Zhao forces as an ill-conceived maneuver, 
therefore giving them the perception to be about to gain an easy victory over 
Han Xin. However, Han Xin‟s army, because of this weird condition, was 
encouraged to fight even harder, managing to stop Zhao‟s forces. Moreover, 
Han Xin proved to be a devoted military scholar by making the enemy 
advance while ordering his special troops (qi bing 奇兵), that is, a cavalry, to 
attack Zhao‟s rear, therefore delivering a fatal blow to Lord Cheng An who 
found death next to the banks of the river where his enemy had displayed 
his forces.  
This tactical measure, though very risky, represented the perfect 
application of the teachings of the military classics whose denial would lead 
to defeat. In fact, Lord Cheng An (成安君), in a previous encounter, refused 
to cut Han Xin supply lines (a measure that could have given Zhao an 
enormous military advantage) because, as reported in the Shi ji, he was a 
Confucian [ru zhi ye 儒者也], so he believed that a righteous army [yi bing 
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义兵] does not employ deceptive stratagems and irregular plans [zha mou qi 
ji 诈谋奇计]. 
After obtaining victory, many of the officials questioned Han Xin 
about the very unorthodox measures that he had adopted. And he clearly 
replied: “in the art of war does it not explicitly say „to entrap in a deadly 
position in order to live [chen zhi si di er hou sheng 陷之死地而后生], to set a 
dangerous situation in order to preserve life [zhi zhi wang di er hou cun 
置之亡地而后存]?338   
In addition to this type of troops mobilization and disposition, 
another central characteristic of the tactical planning envisaged the 
establishment of particular forms of armies enabled to perform “heavy” as 
well as “light” military actions. The heaviness referred to the ability to move a 
big army against specific enemy‟s targets, such as city walls. The lightness, 
instead, referred to the principle of flexibility (quanbian) illustrated above, 
whose objective was to scatter the army in smaller units, like the famous 
five-men squads (wu 伍), in order to swiftly attack the enemy through 
surprise attacks as well as subversive actions. 
The combination of these two opposing forces, as well as others, 
characterized the overall Chinese ancient military thinking as well as the 
contemporary. As Sun Tzu explained, they represented the intimate laws 
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governing warfare for which the commander, because of its “unchallenged 
and absolute” leadership in war, had to develop a sophisticated quan 权 – 
balancing – which referred to the commander‟s ability to balance his military 
decisions between all those dichotomies existing in nature. On this basis, 
other two bipolar combinations deserve a closer scrutiny; one is the 
relationship between “emptiness” and “fullness” (xu shi 虚实), while the 
other, even more important, is the “normative” and “extraordinary” binomial 
(zheng qi 正奇).339 
The first pair is well illustrated in the sixth chapter of Sun Tzu‟s work, 
often translated as “Weaknesses and Strengths.” The underlying 
assumption is that a commander should be able to understand when to 
attack the weak spots of the enemy‟s army and when defending against his 
strengths: “[be] certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the 
enemy does not protect. [Be] certain to hold what you defend is to defend a 
place the enemy does not attack.” But at the same time, the exploitation of 
these dichotomy refers to the ability of the commander to pursue a deceptive 
warfare, in order to confuse the enemy‟s plans, and leading him towards an 
assured defeat: “subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely 
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mysterious, he is inaudible. Thus he is master of his enemy‟s fate.”
340
 Only 
through swift maneuvers, a commander could “make the enemy see my 
strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths while I cause his 
strengths to become weaknesses and discover where is not strong … I 
conceal my tracks so that none can discern them; I keep silence so that 
none can hear me.”
341
 
In the history of the Warring States, among the several examples, 
two formidable cases, which describe the concrete application of deceptive 
methods, stand out. The first one is the combination of deception and 
tactical maneuvers that Tian Dan had employed, during the Warring States 
period, in order to defeat his opponent state of Yan, which was threatening 
the security of his state Qi. Tian Dan moved into two directions. The first one 
focused on spreading false news to induce his enemy to act in a way that 
would have damaged its military preparations.
342
 The second direction was 
                                                                                                                                        
factors, such as “„fear and shame‟ or „many and few,‟ that would affect the conduct of 
battle.” Ibid., p. 118 
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the actual tactical deployment that he created in order to face Yan‟s 
aggressive warfare. He, first of all, feigned surrender by hiding the troops 
and by putting all the children, women, and elders in front of the city gates. 
This inevitably increased the self-esteem of Yan troops, which then grew 
excessively confident about their imminent success. But Tian Dan, at the 
same time, was preparing the “oxen tactic.” That is, after collecting more 
than one thousand oxen from the people of the city, he decided to dress 
them with red clothes, to put blades on their horns, and  inflammable 
material on their tails, in order to throw them against the Yan troops which, 
caught unprepared, immediately scattered due to the feeling of fear that 
spread among the troops after encountering a thousand oxen with flames on 
their tails and blades on their horns. Then, in addition to that, five thousand 
men were sent to pursue the fleeing enemy. This historical account and 
                                                                                                                                        
organized the internal resistance of Qi against Yan in three steps. First of all, he 
asked his fellow citizens to make sacrifices for their ancestors with food in their 
courtyards in order to attract many birds. Their presence was then exploited by Tian 
Dan to acclaim that the city was full of birds because the spirits came to support the 
city. Secondly, he started to spread the news that the state of Yan had ordered to cut 
the nose of every Qi citizen that fell prisoner and show it to everybody in order to 
intimidate them and therefore capture the city. This news on one hand encouraged 
Yan to do so (believing that such a behavior could really lead to the conquest of the 
city), while on the other it enraged the people of Qi, which now called for revenge. 
The same happened with the third misinformation, through which Tian Dan spread 
the news that the state of Yan was about to open the graves of Qi‟s ancestors so as 
to destroy Qi‟s citizens. Yan promptly did so, still believing that this could be a 
valuable tactic, however, their action ended up enforcing Qi citizens‟ hate and anger. 
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Yan‟s defeat due to deceptive measures cost it the hegemony of the area, 
with several cities under its control revolting against its rule.
343
 
But what is quite relevant about this historical event is the 
commentary that the historian Sima Qian provided at the end of the chapter:  
 
Normal soldiers should be used for the initial 
engagement with the enemy, but achieving victory resides only 
on the use of special troops [yi qi sheng 以奇胜]. Those skilled 
in the use of the military set out the implementation of the 
extraordinary in endless ways [chu qi wuqiong 出奇无穷]. The 
normal and the extraordinary mutually transform in a circular 
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way [qi zheng hai xiangsheng 奇正还相生], like a ring which has 
no beginning nor end. When you start, be like a young girl, 
leaving the house doors wide open to the enemy; afterwards, 
be like a rabbit that escapes very fast, so that the enemy 
cannot chase: this is what Tian Dan taught us!
344
    
 
The second historical example also tried to employ camouflage 
during night military engagements. As illustrated in the first chapter, this 
historical case refers to the military confrontation between the state of Qi 
and state of Wei in 341BC. Qi‟s leader, Sun Bin, tried to win over the state of 
Wei by using the same misinformation that had previously damaged the 
image of the state of Qi. In other words, among the Warring States, it was 
believed that Qi was a coward state that always shied away from battle. Sun 
Bin, then, was determined to use this misinformation in order to lure Wei into 
a false military maneuver. Therefore Sun Bin “ordered that when the Ch‟i 
army crossed the borders and entered Wei, they should on the first night 
build one hundred thousand kitchen fires, on the following night fifty 
thousand, and on the third thirty thousand. P‟ang Chuan [Wei State 
commander] marched for three days and, greatly pleased, said: „I have 
always been certain that the troops of Ch‟i were cowards. They have been in 
my country for only three days and more than half of their officers and 
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soldiers have deserted!‟” Through this stratagem Sun Bin was able to 
deceive P‟ang Chuan who decided to attack his enemy without the heavy 
infantry, meeting with a sound defeat.
345
 
The second dichotomy referred to the combination of the normative 
with the extraordinary (or indirect approach). The application of these 
opposing forces represents one of the fundamental pillars of Chinese way of 
warfare. Specifically, it focused on the ability to combine normal or regular 
troops with the special ones according to the different military 
circumstances. The combination of the two, moreover, has been widely 
conceptualized in order to increase the level of expertise but also the level of 
flexibility. With the normal troops, according to Sun Tzu‟s suggestions, a 
commander should engage in battle. With the extraordinary, instead, the 
commander should employ special troops with the objective to attack his 
flanks and take him by surprise. 
 
Generally in battle use the normal force to engage; use 
the extraordinary to win.  
Now the resources of those skilled in the use of 
extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth; as 
inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers. 
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For they end and recommence; cyclical, as are the 
movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are 
reborn; recurrent, as are the passing seasons. 
The musical notes are only five in number but their 
melodies are so numerous that one cannot hear them all. 
The primary colors are only five in number but their 
combinations are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all. 
The flavours are only five in number but their blends 
are so various that one cannot taste them all. 
In battle there are only the normal and extrordinary [sic] 
forces, but their combinations are limitless; non can 
comprehend them all. 
For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their 
interaction as endless as that of interlocked rings. Who can 
determine where one ends and the other begins?  
 
One of the direct application of this combination concerned the use 
of light troops as well as horsemen to attack the enemy where he least 
expected it, such as, for example, the flanks and the rears: “for if he 
prepares to the front his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be 
fragile. If he prepares to the left, his right will be vulnerable and if to the right, 
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there will be few on his left. And when he prepares everywhere he will be 
weak everywhere.”
346
  
These military recommendations found, practically, an operational 
revolution, which occurred in the actual process of military organization, with 
the establishment of the crack troops. “These served as the core of the Qi 
army, though supplemented by peasant levies in the event of major 
campaigns.”
347
 The crack troops were very small and elitist groups of 
warriors employed for lots of different purposes; that is, from special 
operations to simple bodyguard activities. They became, in other words, the 
specialized group of warriors that had to perform those military operations 
which, during the Spring and Autumn period, were the major objective of 
infantry, which was composed mainly by lower population and peasants. 
During that period, in fact, infantry had been employed, besides pitched 
battles of course, for “skirmishes, storming cities, night battles, or battles 
against non-Hua peoples who often fought on foot in mountainous or watery 
terrain.”
348
 Moreover, the creation of this elitist group went along with the 
introduction of cavalry for special operations as well; “under constant 
pressure from mounted steppe horsemen, various perceptive commander 
and rulers realized the need to develop their own cavalry.”
349
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Its military performance consisted of executing attacks on 
“undefended spots, pursuing fleeing soldiers, cutting supply lines, destroying 
bridges or ferries, ambushing unprepared troops, taking the enemy by 
surprise, burning stores and pillaging markets, and disturbing agriculture or 
kidnapping peasants. In short, cavalry were employed in skirmish, 
reconnaissance, ambush, and pillage, but they were of no use in pitched 
battles against a prepared enemy force or defensive position.”
350
  
Moreover, in addition to the crack troops and the cavalry, where the 
latter was introduced into the Chinese warfare system because of the 
influence of Inner Asian peoples, the Chinese, still for the same imitative 
reasons, introduced also the crossbow, during the fourth century BC.  
These important tactical innovations stimulated several thinkers to 
evaluate the correct approaches to warfare. However, the necessity to reach 
flexibility during the campaign, flexibility that these tactical means further 
enhanced, made other important military thinkers reach the same tactical 
evaluations of Sun Tzu‟s. The Sima Fa
351
, for example, advocated that “all 
war is expedient assessment,” while the Sun Bin Bingfa
352
 emphasized that 
“the way of military action had four aspects: formations, power of 
circumstances, changes, and expedient assessment.” The Wei Liaozi
353
 also 
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articulated the importance of the expedient assessments to be included in 
the attack, defense, and warfare in general. 
 In order to emphasize the centrality of the quan and its associated 
concept of flexibility, in several Warring States texts, such as the Heguanzi, 
armies are described as “arrows, thunder, lighting, or flowing water.”
354
 The 
same occurs also in the Wei Liaozi, in which the army is conceived both as a 
heavy instrument, to act like a mountain, or a light one like a flame
355
: “it 
crushes the foe like a stone wall or swirls over him like clouds; it moves like 
wind and rain, like an arrow shot from a crossbow, or like a whirlwind.”
356
 
The comparison of the army with water, which has been used to emphasize 
flexibility, is, therefore, a recurring theme among several texts. 
For example, Sun Tzu very often highlighted the importance of 
moving armies like water. And to be like water, shi 势is the means to 
achieve the form of fluidity; a form that could even carry off rocks: 
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The ultimate in disposing one‟s troops is to be without 
ascertainable shape [gu xing bing zhi ji, zhiyu wuxing 
故形兵之极，至于无形]. Then the most penetrating spies 
cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you. 
It is according to the shape that I lay the plans for 
victory, but the multitude does not comprehend this. Although 
everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands the 
way in which I have created victory. Therefore, when I have 
won a victory I do not repeat my tactics but respond to 
circumstances in an infinite variety of ways [gu qi zhan sheng 
bu fu, er ying xing yu wuqiong 故其战胜不复，而应形于无穷].  
Now the army may be linked to water [bing xing xiang 
shui 兵形象水], for just as flowing water avoids the heights and 
hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes 
weakness. 
And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the 
ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the 
situation of the enemy.  
And as water has no constant form, there are in war no 
constant conditions [gu bing wu chang shi, shui bu chang xing 
故兵无常势，水不常形]. 
Thus one able to gain victory by modifying his tactics in 
accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine. 
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Of the five elements [water, fire, wood, metal, and 
earth]
357
, none is always predominant; of the four seasons, 
none lasts forever; of days, some are long and some short, and 
the moon waxes and wanes.
358
 
 
The metaphor of water, moreover, expressed the importance of 
dynamism and flexibility in war. In fact, among the recurrent themes of most 
of the military treatises, the word shi is the one that had been widely used for 
the meaning it carried. In fact, it represented, besides its strategic 
significance illustrated above, an important tactical asset. It referred to 
military circumstances “in a dynamic sense. It indicated not a static 
arrangement or scene, but a fluid, dynamic configuration and its inherent 
tendency or inertia. In the military context shi referred to the power imparted 
to an army by the circumstances of the campaign: the lay of the land, the 
spirit of the troops, the condition of the enemy, and the dispositions of the 
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two armies.”
359
 Sun Tzu, in fact, illustrates the peculiarity of the application 
of shi in the following terms: 
 
Apparent confusion is a product of good order; 
apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of 
strength. Order or disorder depends on organization; courage 
or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on 
dispositions. 
Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do so by 
creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him 
with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible 
profit they await in strength. 
Therefore a skilled commander seeks victory from the 
situation [qiu zhi yu shi 求之于势] and does not demand it of his 
subordinates. He selects his men and they exploit the situation 
[gu neng ze ren ren shi 故能择人任势].360 
  
But it is the Huainanzi that fully explains the different patterns of shi 
and how it should be interpreted and therefore exploited: 
 
In military preparations there are three types of 
strategic advantages and two kinds of authority. There is the 
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advantage of morale, the advantage of terrain, and the 
advantage of opportunity. When the general is full of courage 
and shows contempt for the enemy, when his troops are full of 
courage and excited for war, when the multitude of his army is 
countless in number and its determination reaches the clouds, 
when its  morale is like a wind of storm and its battle cries 
sound like thunder, when sincerely throw themselves against 
the enemy with all their power, that this is recognized as a 
morale advantage (qi shi 气势). Precipitous passes, narrows, 
high mountains, known strategic locations, spiraling 
approaches, basins, snaking roadways, bottlenecks, places 
where one man could defend a strategic pass and a thousand 
enemy would not there crossing, that is called a terrain 
advantage (di shi 地势). Taking advantage of the enemy‟s 
fatigue, their negligence and disorder, their hunger and thirst as 
well as the cold and the heat, moving forward to shake them 
and pressing them on their weaknesses, that is called an 
opportunity advantage (yin shi 因势).361 
 
According to this crucial element, in one of the most famous pages 
of Sun Tzu, for example, we can find a clear and meticulous description of 
how to plan and execute a tactical disposition (in fact his chapter‟s title is 
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“Dispositions”)
362
 and in which the metaphor of water becomes again a 
central paradigm of the tactical realm: 
 
Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao and preserve the 
laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies … 
Now the elements of the art of war are first, measurement of 
space; second, estimation of quantities; third, calculations; 
fourth, comparisons; and fifth, chances of victory.  
Measurements of space are derived from the ground. 
Quantities derive from measurement, figures from 
quantities, comparisons from figures, and victory from 
comparisons.  
Ho Yen-hsi: „Ground includes both distances and type 
of terrain; „measurement‟ is calculation. Before the army is 
dispatched, calculations are made respecting the degree of 
difficulty of the enemy‟s land; the directness and deviousness of 
its roads; the number of his troops; the quantity of his war 
equipment and the state of his morale. Calculations are made 
to see if the enemy can be attacked and only after this is the 
population mobilized and troops raised.    
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Thus a victorious army is as a hundredweight balanced 
against a grain; a defeated army as a grain balanced against a 
hundredweight. 
It is because of disposition that a victorious general is 
able to make his people fight with the effect of pent-up waters 
which suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss. 
Chang Yu: the nature of water is that it avoids heights 
and hastens to the lowlands. When a dam is broken, the water 
cascades with irresistible force. Now the shape of an army 
resembles water. Take advantage of the enemy‟s 
unpreparedness; attack him when he does not expect it; avoid 
his strength and strike his emptiness, and like water, non can 
oppose you.
363
  
 
These tactical preparations constituted the foundations for a 
successful warfare. This is because victory, as Sun Tzu explained, can be 
known but it cannot be created (sheng ke zhi, er bu ke wei 
胜可知，而不可为). Therefore a good commander, after making all the 
necessary calculations, had to put his army in “a position in which he cannot 
be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy.” This means 
that for a general, to be defined a skilled commander, it is not sufficient to 
accomplish easy tasks, such as defeating those ones that can be easily 
conquered. The ultimate ability is to set up the conditions for gaining victory 
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before the actual military clash has begun: “a victorious army wins its 
victories before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope 
of winning.”
364
 Such a tactical measure that could lead to victory without 
fighting, besides its strategic level, consists of establishing an impenetrable 
defense and a powerful attack, that is, through calculation and maneuver, to 
the extent that combat becomes “the working out of forces and processes 
already thought through in the mind of the commander”
365
; measures that, if 
not properly convincing the enemy to surrender, could have instilled on him 
the fear about the final war outcome to the extent that he could then be 
defeated.  
Specifically, this superior tactical position could have been gained if 
the commander demonstrated an ability to identify the “pivots” (ji 机). That is, 
those specific tactical mechanisms through which the commander could 
exploit immediately the appearance of a new situation, a moment of change, 
“or more precisely the moment just before a new development or a shift in 
direction became visible.” The commander, therefore, had to demonstrate 
his ability to feel the presence of these “pivots” right just before they actually 
manifested themselves. This, in turn, favored the ability to conduct flexible 
military operations which could have led to the conquest of the enemy 
without spilling blood.
366
 Sun Tzu himself elaborated even further this 
approach when stating that  
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“When torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of 
its momentum [shi ye 势也].  
When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it 
is because of timing [jie ye 节也].  
Thus the momentum of one skilled in war is 
overwhelming, and his attack precisely regulated. 
His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow [shi ru 
zhang nu 势如张弩]; his timing, the release of the trigger [jie ru 
ji 节如机].”367 
 
Having set the fundamental analogies between the army, its 
commander‟s military vision, and natural phenomena, Sun Tzu explains, 
then, how an army should behave – tactically – in order to get the full 
advantages the ji provides: 
 
“war is based on deception. Move when it is 
advantageous and create changes in he situation by dispersal 
and concentration of forces.  
When campaigning, be swift as the wind; in leisurely 
march, majestic as the forest; in raiding and plundering, like 
fire; in standing, firm as the mountains. As unfathomable, as the 
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clouds, move like a thunderbolt … weigh the situation then 
move. He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect 
approach will be victorious. Such is the art of maneuvering. 
In good order they await a disorderly enemy; in 
serenity, a clamorous one. This is control of the mental factor. 
Close to the field of battle, they await an enemy coming 
from afar; at rest, an exhausted enemy; with well-fed troops, 
hungry ones. This is control of the physical factor. 
The do not engage an enemy advancing with well-
ordered banners or one whose formations are in impressive 
array. This is control of the factor of changing circumstances. 
Therefore, the art of employing troops is that when the 
enemy occupies high ground, do not confront him; with his back 
resting on hills, do no [sic] oppose him.”
368
 
 
The ji, therefore, represented the key aspect of the tactical scenario 
that could not have been underestimated. It became crucial, therefore, “to 
recognize the pivots of imminent change, to seize the moment of 
opportunity, and thereby to avail oneself of the natural flow or dynamic of 
any situation.” In an important passage of the Guanzi, we can also find an 
additional explanation of how the ji works and how it should be exploited: 
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“He who listens to the most subtle will be able to hear 
that which has not yet reached the limit. He who looks at the 
newest will be able to see that which has no form. He who 
thinks of the most profound will be able to know that which has 
not yet begun. If you attack when men are frightened, they will 
be unable to measure you strength. If you move when you are 
in the ascendant, then you will gain their treasures.”
369
 
 
All these elements, therefore, illustrated the importance of flexibility, 
knowledge and, above all, the supreme role of the commander, who was 
fully responsible for the execution of the proper plans for war and therefore 
for the victory or defeat of his army: “just as his regulations and commands 
forged the army into a collective body wherein each part was subservient to 
the pattern of the whole, so his powers of calculation and assessment 
allowed him to discover the meaningful pattern or order … of the 
campaign.”
370
 
One final military example from the history of the Warring States 
illustrates how most of the above mentioned tactical elements found their 
condensation during the famous battle of Guiling, fought in 352 BC. King Hui 
of the state of Wei decided to advance militarily against the state of Qin, in 
order to recover the lost territories. So Wei‟s army decided to first attack the 
state of Zhao in the north. The latter, then, decided to ask Qi for help, 
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because, it was believed that in so doing Wei would find very difficult to fight 
a two-front war. However, Sun Bin, who was Qi‟s strategist at the time 
“advised waiting for the two antagonists to exhaust themselves, thereby 
ensuring maximum gain with minimum risk and effort.” According to this 
strategic plan “Qi mobilized an army to effect an indirect strike at Wei 
homeland … in accord with the principles of „first seize what they love,‟ 
„attack vacuity,‟ and „strike where undefended.‟” 
In the meantime, the state of Wei after reporting several victories 
over Zhao, decided to move against Qi as the latter expected. “[Qi] feigned 
concern and withdrew to its chosen battlefield to await the Wei army, 
thereby following a number of basic tactical principles from Sun-tzu and Sun 
[Bin], such as „with ease await the tired.‟ From its fortified positions and high 
terrain [Qi] was able to quickly defeat the exhausted Wei army, inflicting 
severe casualties at minimal cost.”
371
   
 
Conclusions 
 
The present chapter illustrated the major elements characterizing 
the implementation of People‟s War Doctrine. As already explained, we have 
to wait for the Maoist period in order to read its actual name. However, even 
if not mentioned, people‟s war was already active during the Warring States 
period. The passage from the Spring and Autumn to the Warring States 
264
 
 
symbolizes this paradigmatic shift. In the former period, in fact, warfare was 
an elitist practice which served the major objective to emasculate the 
aristocracy, while in the Warring States it completely changed its shape. 
  In opposition to the masculinization, the process of warfare now 
encouraged the feminization of the military practice, meaning that soldiers 
had to thoroughly obey general‟s orders without question, just as the women 
fully obeyed their husbands‟ orders. This, in other words, could be defined 
as an embryonic form of nationalism that shaped people‟s engagement to 
warfare. But the transformative process of warfare critically affected the civil-
military relationship, creating a mixture of the two spheres in which one 
became the mirror image of the other. Peasants had to cultivate their lands, 
but at the same they had to serve the army and the military cause. This, 
therefore opened up a new perspective on the mobilization policies which 
were meant to create, on one hand, an oppressive system for the population 
control, while on the other they were also trying to promote the virtuous 
behaviors, such as dedication to agriculture and to all those practices that 
represented the benefit for the state. 
Along with the civil-military fusion, the Warring States period is 
characteristic both for its strategic as well as tactical development. When it 
comes to strategy, it became a common practice to theorize a way that 
could guarantee both offense and defense. At the same time, the emphasis 
was on deception, since knowledge became the most important element in 
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war; knowledge on both one‟s own enemy and on oneself. After gaining the 
right information, one state could search for domination over others through 
simple deception and deterrent policies that would have reduced the number 
of military engagements.  
At the tactical level, following the previous two sections, the armies 
were based on deception, flexibility, and irregularity. Through deception, it 
became a common practice to move the army in different places, even by 
dividing it into smaller units in order to deceive the enemy. In terms of 
flexibility, the armies of the Warring States period were mainly based on 
infantry and cavalry, that is, two very flexible deployments of war. And 
finally, with the irregularity, the emphasis was on the ability to combine 
normal military operations with the special ones. The normal were based on 
the use of infantry for frontal assaults, while the special troops were 
employed for surprise and night attacks, raiding, and throwing chaos among 
the enemy‟s troops.     
Therefore, all these elements, civil-military relation, strategic 
flexibility, and tactical deception and irregularity increased the lethality of the 
Warring States period, which, in turn, because of its fundamental historical 
importance, set the stage of what would be later recognized as the People‟s 
War Doctrine. 
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Chapter Three 
People‟s War during the Tang 
Dynasty 
 
 
 
“Sun Tzu‟s method  
cannot be eliminated  
for ten thousand generations.” 
 
Li Jing 李靖 (571-649 AD)372 
 
 
 
 
The second historical case study under examination refers to the 
Tang dynasty (618-907 AD). From the Warring States period to the Tang 
many other dynasties succeeded in Chinese history. After the capitulation of 
the Qin, which created the first Chinese empire in 221 BC, another important 
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dynasty that led the country towards an era of prosperity and territorial 
expansion was the Han dynasty, which, ironically, was founded through a 
clear application of a people‟s war operation.
373
 The military figure of Liu 
Bang, in fact, has represented in Chinese history a central figure in the 
overall Chinese revolutionary philosophy.
374
  
However, the dynasties coming out of the end of the establishment 
of the first Chinese empire heavily relied on the military principles elaborated 
during the Warring States; “the mighty empire of Han had relied on the 
administrative structures, legal constraints, mobilisational capability and 
awesome reputation generated by the Qin First Emperor.”
375
 
Also the military thinking had been critically affected by the important 
Chinese heritage. For example, during the Tang, it was Sunzi bingfa the 
most respected military text among the relevant Chinese military treatises 
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that had been transmitted in the successive generations; “when the histories 
of the period portray statesmen or generals as quoting from „military science‟ 
(bingfa), their words are found more often than not to have been borrowed 
from Sunzi bingfa.” However, it should be pointed out that also the other six 
military treatises played a significant influence on the Tang‟s military 
thinking, since those six classics could be regarded as a “single, coherent 
tradition of military thought” of China. Among the Chinese military classics, 
for example, it had been widely emphasized the importance of “calculation 
before battle, the uses of stratagem, surprise, and trickery, the employment 
of psychological devises to manipulate the soldiery.” However, the role 
played by other ancient texts played a relevant influence, such as, for 
example, the Zuo Zhuan (already cited and analyzed in the previous 
chapter). One military case described in the Zuo Zhuan deserves to be 
mentioned: in 511 BC the strategist Wu Zixu advised King Helü of the state 
of Wu on how to defeat the state of Chu by advancing the proposition that 
“When they come forth, then [we should] withdraw; when they withdraw, [we 
should] then go forth.” As it will be explained in the next chapter when 
dealing with Mao Zedong‟s military teaching, it is important to highlight how 
“this advice continued to influence Chinese guerrilla warriors in the twentieth 
century.”
376
 
After having examined the entire Chinese history, I decided, then, 
that the Tang dynasty represented a better historical case to test the 
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assumptions of the People‟s War Doctrine for two major reasons: first of all 
the Tang, more than others, can be regarded as a real turning point in 
Chinese history. It created, in fact, a stable and prosperous country whose 
institutional structure, economic model, and for what concerns us here, 
military strategy would have deeply influenced the successive dynasties, 
including even the Ming, which historically speaking, has been often 
associated with China‟s entrance to modernity, like it was for the Western 
civilization the discovery of the American continent in 1492 AD, which 
symbolized the beginning of the modern era in Europe.
377
 This, then, 
demonstrates how the Tang dynasty represented a pivotal historical turn in 
Chinese history, therefore worth considering for our analysis. 
Just to give an example, the famous Ming system of civil 
examination that had created the modern concept of bureaucracy was not a 
purely Ming invention. But it was shaped, even if at its embryonic form, 
during the Sui dynasty, perfected later one with the Tang, and culminating in 
its highest performance during the Ming.
378
 The Tang administration 
became, therefore, “the basic pattern to be followed by all dynasties up to 
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the twentieth century.”
379
 This transformation was further strengthened by 
the replacement of the old aristocracy with a bureaucracy mainly based on 
“merit rather than birth,” making the civil service examination system the key 
to such a development.
380
 
And not only that. During the Tang territorial expansion, the Tang 
model, specifically its political institutions, started to be emulated by other 
peoples, such as the Koreans, the Japanese, Tibetans, and the Eastern 
Turks.
381
 
Moreover, part of its importance belongs also to the cultural 
transformation that was under process during the Tang. First of all, at the 
political level, during the Tang “the idea of the integrity of China as a unified 
empire was firmly established for all posterity.”
382
   
This idea, however, was the result of two strong and mutually 
supporting elements: on one hand, the huge migration of people shifting 
from north to south started to settle around the Yangzi area, therefore 
exploiting, for the first time, the natural resources through an intensive 
process. On the other, the new technological innovations adopted for the 
cultivation of rice “would have determined a further expansion of the 
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economy of the area,” becoming in a short period of time, the empire‟s 
granary and its economic center.
383
   
But the evolution of culture was also the direct result of the seventh 
century political as well as technological transformations. At the 
technological level, for example, the Tang period represented the invention 
of the paper and the printing, even if the “the large-scale printing of books 
was to wait for the [Song] era.” All these inventions, then, started to be 
spread westward. In addition to that, the Tang dynasty represented the most 
important period for the evolution of the poetry, which was considered “the 
most outstanding achievement of these three centuries.”
384
 
On the other hand, technological innovation affected also other 
fields, such as the invention of the gunpowder, which then started to be 
implemented into the military field. Its invention was the direct result of the 
alchemist experiments carried out by the Taoists in order to find the elixir of 
immortality. By the end of the Tang era, in fact, we can find the application of 
the huoyao in the military sector, commonly known as the “medicine of fire,” 
which referred specifically to the implementation of gunpowder on the 
arrows.
385
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At the cultural level, moreover, the progress also concerned another 
fundamental aspect of the Chinese civilization and its political development: 
the creation of a more organized and sophisticated historiography codified 
into the establishment of the Historical Office, whose “task was to undertake 
to record the history of the five preceding dynasties and to gather materials 
for the future writing of the history of the reigning house.” This made it, 
therefore, a sophisticated governmental tool for the record of historical and 
political events. The historical writing, however, never lost the Confucian 
principle, that is, that of making the past being studied “not only for its own 
sake, but also for didactic purposes, to serve as a mirror for the present 
which would aid, above all, in the achievement of a well-ordered 
government.”
386
   
On the other side, at the political level, the seventh century 
represented the beginning of the Islamic revolution in the Middle East and all 
the subsequent cultural and religious exchanges with the Tang dynasty and 
with Asia in general. The same applies also to Buddhism. During the Tang, 
in fact, we can also acknowledge the precious account of Xuanzang, a 
Chinese monk, who travelled around Central Asia, exploring different 
cultures and gaining also a higher expertise on Buddhism, making it an even 
more sophisticated religious doctrine. Because of his astonishing travels and 
political influence, Xuanzang managed to become, during the final years of 
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emperor Tang Taizong, “his spiritual adviser.” This honor was confirmed 
also by Taizong‟s successor Gaozong who considered Xuanzang “the jewel 
of the empire.” Xuanzang, therefore, became one of the most influential 
religious and intellectual figures of China and of the Buddhist world; “his 
works on Buddhist logic and epistemology added a new dimension to the 
intellectual life of China.” And not only that. For example, he is also 
remembered for another work which was destined to influence Chinese 
novels: The Journey to the West which represented an allegorical tale that 
described all the travels and the adventures that he undertook in his travels 
around Asia.
387
   
The same also applies to the military field. During the Sui and then 
the Tang, China experimented the first naval expeditions that would have 
had for the centuries ahead a profound influence on the Chinese way of 
planning and implementing naval warfare on the far seas, even if, it should 
be pointed out, the Chinese empire “in this period had no need for a 
standing navy and did not bother to maintain one.”
388
 During this period for 
these evident military as well as commercial needs China invented “the 
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magnetic compass, the sternpost rudder and watertight bulkheads,” which 
were used for increasing the level of accuracy in navigation.
389
 
Along with the technological innovations, at the military level, the 
Tang dynasty also symbolized the further development of the fortress and 
siege warfare that had characterized the medieval period both in China and 
in other areas around the world. Even if some historical accounts are not 
complete, however, the way these military campaigns had been conducted 
demonstrate that military sieges constituted an essential, inevitable part of 
the overall strategic calculation. During the Tang, therefore, siege warfare 
became one of the new elements of the dynasty‟s military calculation, 
representing the foundation of the subsequent sophisticated siege warfare 
elaborated during the Song dynasty and widely applied in other dynasties as 
well.
390
 
This, therefore, explains why applying western historical paradigms 
to explain Chinese history does not produce the best results and that a new 
historical reconsideration should be adopted when dealing with the 
complexities of Chinese history. In fact, going a step further, after the major 
evolution of the political and military institutions of the Warring States, Tang 
dynasty really symbolized a shift in Chinese history, a shift worth studying in 
order to understand whether People‟s War Doctrine still maintained its basic 
principles or if they progressively altered until becoming something else.  
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Part of this institutional shift also derived from the influence of the 
external actors that managed to conquer, as never before, some areas of 
the country after the collapse of the Han dynasty, creating a “mixed-blood 
elite that combined the martial prowess of the steppe warrior with Han 
Chinese traditions of literacy and statecraft.”
391
 These actors would then 
form the ruling group “that reunited north and south under the authority of 
the Sui dynasty,” whose members would then constitute part of the Tang 
establishment.
392
 In 534, in fact, during the political turmoil surrounding the 
demise of the Han dynasty, two small regimes took place: one was the 
Northern Qi (551-77), founded by a Chinese warlord Gao Huan, while the 
other was the Northern Zhou (557-81), founded by Yuwen Tai, of Xianbei 
descent, that is, a proto-Mongol tribe that was located in the northeast, 
therefore a non-Han political group. But it was the latter “the weaker of the 
two, [which] proved the more innovative and dynamic.” In fact, according to 
the historical sources surrounding the fate of these short-lived kingdoms, 
“this largely non-Han regime, headed by a Xianbei elite many of whom 
spoke non Chinese at all, „was the anvil on which were forged the structures 
of power – the economic, political and military institutions – upon which [the 
Sui-Tang] monolith grew.‟”
393
 
At the military level, it had been very significant the way Chinese 
elite decided to respond, and to a certain extent adapt, to the external 
influences. In general there had been two major responses, one symmetric, 
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while the other asymmetric. The former referred to the desire to “imitate the 
effective tactics and techniques of the nomads,” such as learning to be 
professional mounted archers. While the latter referred to Chinese attempt 
to exploit its superior “strengths in engineering, social organization, and 
human numbers,” which translated into the construction of fortifications and 
walls.
394
  
At the very beginning of his reign, and perfectly in line with the idea 
and the spirit of continuity that had characterized Chinese history, he 
decided to reinstall the ancient principles of Confucianism that were 
developed during the Spring and Autumn period and partly during the 
Warring States era, however, without success. This was further confirmed 
by the fact that during the Tang, notwithstanding the important innovations 
introduced in this period, there still was “a long inheritance from the Legalist 
statesmen of the Qin dynasty.”
395
 The elements of innovation that he 
introduced in China and that would later affect the Sui and the Tang dynasty 
mainly affected the military field. First of all, in line with his cultural tradition, 
he “mastered an effective but not numerous cavalry.” And in order to contain 
the external attacks he needed “to organize local recruitment, enlist the 
loyalty of various rural militia, and raise both the standing of military men and 
the standard of military training.” The military policies proved to be 
successful to the extent that Emperor Wu of Northern Zhou managed to 
raise “Twenty-four Armies” through which he achieved the almost complete 
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unification of the north of China. According to the historical records, he 
controlled an army of 570,000 soldiers that he used against the Northern Qi 
in 577 AD.     
But the great result of the mobilization and of the recruitment 
process was achieved through a fundamental policy that characterized not 
only his short regime, but also the Sui and Tang military policy: the 
introduction of the fubing 府兵institution, that is, a particular military system 
based on the militia forces. Part of its nature is also to be ascribed to the fact 
that the steppes warfare required the adoption of another type of warfare.
396
 
Besides its technical and tactical assets that will be discussed in the third 
section of the second part of this chapter, it is important to immediately 
highlight that this system had become “the backbone of the Sui and Tang 
armies.”
397
 For instance, it is believed that through this system, the Sui 
managed in 612 to call up 1,133,800 soldiers during the expedition against 
Koguryo.
398
 
At the time of Yuwen Tai, it seems that the fubing system was 
mainly based on infantry rather than cavalry even if the latter constituted a 
fundamental part of the army. Moreover, this system was also related to an 
overall tendency to increase “military professionalism and a martial culture.” 
And last but not the least, during this period we can see the development of 
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a proper navy for war purposes; a condition that would directly influence the 
successive dynasties. Generally speaking, it was natural to develop this 
military system because of the highly fragmented Chinese political scenario. 
However, this policy proved to be persistent even in times of prosperity and 
internal stability as illustrated by the history of the Tang dynasty.
399
   
This is also related to second fundamental aspect for why I have 
decided to study the Tang dynasty, that is, Tang economic and institutional 
development. In strategic studies, it is often demonstrated that economic 
prosperity had historically run counter to the application of people‟s war, 
since the latter has often symbolized the only available military means of the 
weak. On one hand, this is true. For example, when dealing with the Maoist 
era, people‟s war, besides being the fundamental strategic asset of Chinese 
strategic culture (a key research aspect of the present work), also 
represented the only asset that Mao could employ, since he lacked a proper 
army with a proper equipment. In the Chinese case, the first case study (the 
Warring States) demonstrated not only that people‟s war was widely 
conceptualized according to the Chinese way of thinking of war, but that it 
had also come out of necessity, because of the highly conflictual 
environment. However, as it will be explained in detail in the following pages, 
the Tang dynasty demonstrated the opposite, that is, that even a wealthy 
country with sophisticated military and political institutions could still use an 
asymmetric instrument of war, such as the People‟s War Doctrine, 
strengthening at the same time the concept that this military strategy really 
                                                          
399
 John Keay, China, p. 221. 
287
 
 
represented the key strategic cornerstone of Chinese strategic culture, even 
in times of profound political transformation. On the same theoretical line, 
also chapter five follows the same approach, since, with the advent of the 
twenty-first century, China has increased its military and economic potential, 
paving the way for a “different” China, much stronger, with many other 
military options, but still relying on the people‟s war doctrinal framework.  
Nevertheless, it is important not to forget that during the Tang there 
were not professional military schools that could have elaborated a proper 
military doctrine going under the label of people‟s war. There were ideas, 
military thoughts, and strategic visions that then were applied in different 
military circumstances, to the extent that we can trace some important 
features of the overall Chinese way of warfare responding to the principles 
of people‟s war. In fact, when talking about Chinese strategic culture and 
how people‟s war played a major role in Chinese military history, I refer to 
the Tang period as the “organizational era” within the evolutionary spectrum 
of this military doctrine – with respect to the “origin era” of the Warring 
States period. This aspect is further demonstrated by the fact that during 
China‟s middle ages, when dealing with history records and the analysis of 
military decision-making, the narrative relied on the use of previous 
important writings and military treatises, in order to increase the “textual 
authority.”
400
  
 
3.1. Tang Dynasty: A History 
288
 
 
 
The Tang dynasty ruled over China from 618 to 907 AD. But it is 
undeniable that part of its success had derived from the previous institutional 
settlements of the Sui dynasty.
401
 In fact, the passage from the latter to the 
former was so immediate that the beginning of  the Tang dynasty reign is 
referred to as Sui-Tang period. The importance of the Sui in shaping the 
next dynasty cannot be, therefore, underestimated. The Sui, first under the 
rule of Wendi and then his son, Yangdi, managed to conquer most of the 
south and part of the north of China. 
Territorial aggrandizement represented one of the central aims of 
the Sui dynasty; “the expansionist policies of the Sui were aimed in many 
directions.” Some of them did end with a clear military victory, others 
unfortunately were so ruinously conducted to the extent of undermining the 
entire institutional solidity of the dynasty, paving the way for its ultimate 
destruction.
402
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Another great section of its political performance resides into the 
infrastructural projects, which set the stage for the modern China as we 
came to know it. First of all, Sui Yangdi decided to boost the construction of 
the Great Wall, an enormous infrastructural project that had been started 
centuries before, but never fully completed until the arrival of the Ming 
dynasty.
403
 The motivation behind this project resided on its northern 
excursion, in 607 AD, through which he attacked the Ordos, by extending 
Chinese control well beyond the northern frontier. Through this military 
expansion he tried to “emulate the Qin and Han in respect of frontier 
management and wall-building.” However, notwithstanding his commitment 
to this project, the wall as a defense fortification proved insufficient as in the 
past, making the Sui dynasty commit its human and economic resources to 
the construction of a useless project.
404
  
Another infrastructure, however, did not prove so expensive and 
ineffective. Sui Yangdi, in fact, financed, at the same time, the construction 
of a canal with the objective to connect the major rivers, lakes, and other 
preexisting water means of transportation in order to interconnect the vast 
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Chinese territory. This infrastructural project came to be known later on with 
the name of Grand Canal, which represented “without doubt, the grandest 
navigation system ever undertaken by a single sovereign in pre-modern 
history.” At the time of the Sui dynasty, the transportation of agricultural 
products represented the fundamental element of the economic 
development, but also the “strategic necessity for provisioning frontier 
garrisons and supporting military adventures beyond.” Therefore the Grand 
Canal had undertaken the fundamental role of supporting the overall 
economic growth, but also of further uniting the country, leveling political and 
cultural differences:  
 
The Grand Canal, linking the Yangzi region with its rise 
surplus to the heavily populated and famine-prone northern 
plains, thus had a similar effect to the first transcontinental 
railroads in North America. It made China‟s economic 
integration feasible. Disparities of climate, terrain, produce and 
demographic distribution were suddenly converted into assets. 
Granaries – which were less mud-built silos than vast 
installations, walled and guarded, like oil-storage depots – were 
strategically located along the canal … Along the route, 
irrigation schemes fed off the canal to increase crop yields, so 
boosting population figures, tax yields and corvée numbers.
405
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But unfortunately this project brought with itself also several 
problems that Yangdi was not able to solve, leading to escalation of 
rebellions and political turmoil. The major obstacles to this project concerned 
its limited ability to manage the output and the stability of the canal. In fact, 
the “canal system could distribute only what the farmer could produce.” And 
in case of floods, things became even worse. To aggravate things even 
more, Yangdi also set up military expeditions against Koguryo, “a reluctant 
tributary state occupying much of Manchuria and northern Korea.” These 
conditions led to the revolts in 616 AD and the beginning of that political 
process which led to the establishment of the Tang dynasty.
406
  
In the last moments of life, “the people swarmed like bees,” with 
rebellions breaking out throughout the country, but especially in its northern 
part: “the majority of the insurgents were peasants and their numerous 
armed bands grew greatly in strength to become merged into two armies, 
one operating in [Hebei], and the second attacking [Luoyang].”
407
  
After Yangdi decided to flee and find refuge in the south, one of his 
commanders, Li Yuan, duke of Tang, marched with his men towards the city 
of Chang‟an, taking it with no effective resistance. In 618 he proclaimed the 
establishment of the Tang dynasty. During his short reign (618-626), he 
devoted most of his energies to quell opposition and trying to put together a 
fragmented country. At the political level, he “would then adopt, with only 
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minor adjustments, the entire Sui fiscal, military administrative and legal 
framework.”
408
  
 Li Yuan took the name of Tang Gaozu, which meant “Great 
Progenitor” and governed the newly born Tang dynasty by trying to unite the 
country. His son, instead, Tang Taizong, became the illustrious emperor 
who the Tang dynasty became associated with.  During his power, China 
prospered in all fields, from politics and economy to foreign trade and 
military capacity:  
 
“contact with maritime Asia through the seaports of the 
south, which were now restored to the empire, was about to be 
completed by throwing wide the western „Jade Gate‟ into 
central Asia. Turkmenistan, Tibet, and Persia, no less than 
Vietnam, Korea and Japan, would fall within the Tang 
perspective and loom large in imperial policy-making. Still 
farther afield in India and the Byzantine empire, the political, 
cultural and productive preeminence of Tang China gained 
widespread acceptance. Its tolerance of alien belief systems 
and its enthusiasm for foreign craftsmanship and performances 
brought a cosmopolitan dimension to urban life … There was 
now substance to the concept of „All-under-Heaven‟ looking up 
to the Celestial Emperor. It was as if the world had so tilted on 
its axis as to leave the „Middle Kingdom‟ at last in the middle. 
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The period from c. 650 to c. 750 would be the first and most 
convincing „China century.‟”
409
      
 
 Along with these cultural developments, under the guidance of the 
emperor Taizong, Tang dynasty pursued also a military expansion abroad, 
which, except for a few shortcomings, proved to be “infinitely more 
successful than the Sui, and the consequence was not disaster, but the 
creation of an empire still larger than the Han.”
410
 His first military 
expeditions were directed against Koguryo (today‟s Korea). In 645 “Taizong 
launched a massive assault across the Liao River supported by a naval 
attack from Shandong. Unusually the emperor led his forces in person, such 
was the importance he attached to the campaign. Not unusually, „the whole 
expedition ended in disaster.‟” He tried to plan a second and then a third 
campaign, but his death, in 649, put an end to his military designs.
411
 
Things went much better in Taizong‟s military planning against the 
Turks, the Tibetans, and India. When it came to the first one, specifically the 
Eastern Turks, Taizong managed to subdue them by using a combination of 
force and deception, obliging them to recognize Tang dynasty suzerainty. 
With the northern frontier now secure, Taizong planned his next military 
moves against the Western Turks. By applying the same “mix of intrigue and 
force” he managed to submit them to Tang suzerainty. These proved to be 
real military successes, since previous Sui rulers, including also his father, 
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did not manage to subdue them. Thanks to these wide military 
accomplishments, Taizong added to his political figure, then, also the title of 
“Heavenly Qaghan.”
412
 
On the other strategic front, the emperor managed to reach 
simultaneously success in the Indian subcontinent and in Tibet, by exploiting 
the positive circumstances that presented themselves from 648 onwards. 
First of all, Taizong managed to gain favorable diplomatic agreements with 
the Tibetan regime. This particular case was represented by the rare 
circumstance in which the Tibetans were fighting Chinese forces not to keep 
them out of their territory, but to “secure closer relations with them, or rather 
to secure parity of treatment with that extended by Chang‟an to their local 
rivals.” And this, in effect, led to the “peace-through-kinship” treaty between 
China and Tibet in 641, which even if cooled their diplomatic relationship, at 
the same time created a dangerous misunderstanding, since the subsequent 
diplomatic exchanges were recognized by the Tibetans as “evidence of 
Tang vassalage and [by the] Tang as evidence of Tibetan vassalage.”
413
  
Nevertheless, this did not stop both actors to join their forces and 
move against what was, at the time, their common enemy: India. The latter 
had managed to attract both Chinese and Tibetans enmity due to its 
opposition to Buddhist political actions, which had been previously promoted 
by a Chinese monk, Xuanzang, who had been traveling around Central and 
South Asia. Harsha-vardhana of Kanauj, who reached imperial control over 
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the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of north India had died, leaving the country in 
the hands of a Brahminical opposition which threw itself against the Buddhist 
community. Chinese emissary, Wang Xuance, that traveled to India for 
diplomatic reasons, almost found death. As a consequence, China and Tibet 
retaliated, creating a “joint Sino-Tibetan force that in 649, probably by way of 
the Chumbi pass between Sikkim and Nepal, crossed the Great Himalaya 
and inflicted a heavy defeat on Harsha‟s successors.”
414
 Despite the 
superiority of Chinese forces, and the apparently easy access to the Indian 
subcontinent, this military action against India was the last one. In fact, we 
can register the successive Sino-Indian conflict many centuries afterwards, 
that is, during the famous 1962 Sino-Indian war. 
With Taizong, China in general and the Tang dynasty in particular 
witnessed a great development, both at the economic, political, and military 
level. During his reign, in fact, the “granaries filled, famine relief was 
available, and destitution-driven banditry declined, making travel less 
hazardous.” At the political-military level, he “reorganized the fubing militias, 
embarked on a new legal codification that was again supposed to be more 
lenient and rational than its predecessors.” During his reign he, moreover, 
appointed scribes to write a huge historiographical work, which had to record 
the major events shaping the dynasty and also the preceding periods. This 
represented an important shift in the historical writing process, since 
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previous accounts like the Shi ji, for example, it should be remembered, 
were written by private families or individuals.  
After Taizong, the dynasty control was passed on to the ninth of his 
fourteen sons, Tang Gaozong (649-83). He reigned the country without any 
success of notice, except for his ability to extend Tang‟s power westward 
over the Western Turks. After his death the reign was then distributed to his 
two heirs, Zhongzong and Ruizong. If it were not for the simple 
“chronological interest” these two political figures would have been 
completely forgotten due to their absolute lack of influence. In this period, 
with no particularly strong historical figures, the political control of the 
country was actually in the hands of “one who might have ranked among 
China‟s most outstanding rulers but for the handicap of gender”: the 
overambitious and unscrupulous empress Wu Zetian, consort of Gaozong 
and mother of the last short-lived reigns of Zhongzong and Ruizong. During 
this familiar ineptitude to governance, she managed to preserve the internal 
peace while also keep alive the huge territorial expansions that had been 
acquired by Taizong. Besides maintaining the control over the Inner Asian 
territories, actually extending them even further, she also managed, in 668, 
to conquer, even if for a short period of time (that is, until 672), the kingdom 
of Koguryo, the territory on the northeast that had represented for the 
previous emperors an insurmountable task. After withdrawing from the 
Korean peninsula, she managed, nevertheless, to fully incorporate the 
northeastern part of the subcontinent, what would be later on recognized as 
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the Liaoning province.
415
 With the full control of these territories Tang China 
was indeed “the greatest power in Asia at this time.”
416
 
Notwithstanding her own military success, Tang dynasty was soon 
challenged by the ascendance of the Tibetan kingdom and a would-be 
empire. Soon, after the defeat of the common enemy, Tibet started to 
develop its own military, administrative and cultural system which 
symbolized its progressive independence from the Chinese influence. As a 
result of this expansion, in 660s the Tibetans “pushed outwards, reclaiming 
the Tuyuhun lands in Qinghai and penetrating into both Sichuan and 
Xinjiang.” By the 670, the Tibetans managed to virtually eliminate “the 
Chinese presence throughout western Xinjiang and the Pamirs. Chinese 
troops were frequently dispatched to regain control of the territories, 
managing to reconquer them only in 692. 
Once her political control drew to a close, the reign passed on to 
Tang Xuanzong, “the dynasty roi soleil. Another colossus whose long and 
mostly glorious reign (715-56) would gild the heights of Tang civilization.” 
Under his rule, the political, economic, and military status of Tang China 
reached very high standards, to the extent that, thanks to his institutional 
reforms, China witnessed one of its most prestigious periods in history. In 
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fact, historically speaking, the end of Xuanzong‟s reign was later on 
associated with the end of the so-called High Tang.
417
   
Even if his reign proved to be one of the most prosperous, however, 
after a couple of decades of his political control, his empire was directly 
challenged by another formidable foe: the Arabs and their Islamic 
expansion. In few decades after the Prophet‟s death Islam had easily 
reached central Asia. This created a strategic problem for China which, even 
if encouraging its “Western Turk jimi [control by loose rein] to resist the 
newcomers,” could not stop Islamic territorial advance. This therefore 
culminated in the famous Battle of Talas River in 751 between Tang troops 
and the Arabs, which ended with the defeat of the Chinese troops. However, 
the Arabs failed to capitalize on this victory, failing to conquer significant 
Chinese territories.
418
 
The military confrontation with the Abbasid Caliphate, motivated by 
the new religion, was not the only problem that Tang China under Xuanzong 
had to face. In fact, soon, another challenge, this time coming from within, 
would have seriously damaged the country: the An Lushan Rebellion. The 
reasons explaining this event are multifold, preventing a clear-cut definition 
of the causes. But the fact that it erupted right at the end of Zuanzong‟s 
reign is not a coincidence. In fact, the emperor, now old, could not properly 
rule the country, paving the way for internal problems that could not be 
solved. And they were directly related to military affairs: “as the rebellion was 
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essentially factional and military, with neither the credentials of a peasants‟ 
revolt nor the dynamic of a messianic movement, its immediate causes may 
be sought within the mutinous armies of the north-east and the troubled 
mind of their commander, the redoubtable An Lushan.”
419
 
An Lushan was a general of both Sogdian and Turkic descent 
serving the Tang army in the 740s, especially in the frontier areas. Li Linfu, 
an aristocrat of the Tang court, taking advantage of the precarious physical 
and mental conditions of the emperor, decided to reorganize the frontier 
troops according to his own plans and wishes. In fact, he “strengthened the 
frontier armies still further,” to the extent that most of the 600,000 troops 
found themselves located in the frontier areas. His plan, moreover, tried to 
“nullify the challenge to his own ascendancy from those who „went out 
generals and came in chancellors.‟” In order to reach this second objective 
he replaced the senior military commanders with generals of non-Han origin. 
And the explanation for this choice was that “they made batter fighters, and 
being unacquainted with court intrigue, posed less of a threat to the 
government.” Within this reorganization process, An Lushan emerged. He 
was later on appointed as military governor of Pinglu, an area between 
Manchuria and Korea. During his control, he achieved significant results, 
especially at the organizational level, through which “he enjoyed the 
devotion of his troops. They were better supplied than their counterparts 
farther west thanks to the Grand Canal‟s north-eastern extension, and they 
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may even have brought a measure of prosperity to the otherwise neglected 
north-east.” 
The military and the organizational achievements gave An Lushan 
the possibility to enjoy the acknowledgment by the emperor who allowed him 
to enter the court and gave him also a further military promotion that 
required from him the ability to control the Gansu region where most of the 
farms were located. This new appointment put An Lushan in a very powerful 
position, since he “now controlled the vital supply of cavalry mounts.” In the 
meantime, within the emperor‟s palace, a new minister Yang Guozhong, 
started to become quite relevant within the dynasty administrative affairs. 
Fearing the growing popularity of the general at court and also the 
eventuality that he could gain prestigious political positions inside the 
palace, in 754, Yang Guozhong “purged the general‟s agents at court, 
dismissed potential supporters and floated rumors of rebellion.” The year 
after, in 755, An Lushan, without hesitation, marched with his army towards 
the capital, which fell quickly since “the new recruits proved no match for the 
general‟s veteran jian’er and his Manchurian – largely Khitan – auxiliaries.” 
The emperor, due to this delicate situation recalled most of the 
frontier armies in order to oppose An Lushan‟s advance. The year after, in 
756, some of the loyalist troops managed to regain Hebei. At this stage, An 
Lushan decided even to create his own dynasty; “it was to be called Great 
Yan, Yan being the age-old name for the north-east, where the rebels 
enjoyed the widest support. The emperor called for a counteroffensive, but 
were defeated, leaving the capital undefended. On the way to Chengdu, and 
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with the minister already dead, the emperor was now completely powerless, 
while the Tang dynasty was moving towards its progressive decline.
420
    
Notwithstanding the great achievements of the An Lushan rebellion, 
the overall Tang political structure remained still intact, however. The 
rebellion represented a big shock. In fact, during this period, which lasted 
until 763, Tang dynasty had to recall most of its troops from the outer posts, 
therefore giving the other peoples the opportunity to reconquer the lost 
territories. The dynasty remained strong and prosperous, trade with the 
western regions remained highly appreciated, even if some of the key 
territories had been lost (or not fully in control by the central government), 
including also the northeast, where the rebellion had started. And this did not 
represent the only problem. Part of the beginning of the decline came from 
within, that is, from the other generals who desired more prestige for having 
raised arms against the An Lushan rebellion. Therefore, “the Tang 
restoration was thus offset by a much-diminished authority throughout the 
remaining empire. Supremacy had become contingent on concessions to 
the provinces and exploiting the rivalries of their mostly military 
governors.”
421
   
In this period of political uncertainties, the reign was handed in to 
Xuanzong‟s successor, Tang Suzong (756-762) who had been challenged 
by old foreign enemies which tried to get advantage of the Tang 
weaknesses, in order to regain past territories. One of the first actors to 
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attack the Tang was the kingdom of Nanzhao, located in the southwest, 
which managed in a few years to occupy most of today‟s Yunnan. From that 
time onwards, it would represent a constant military problem, due also to its 
political ties with the northern part of Vietnam, which would have found in the 
Nanzhao kingdom the necessary ally for revolting against Chinese rule. 
On the western front, the situation proved to be also quite dramatic, 
with the Tibetan empire challenging the Chinese rule over the western lands; 
territories like the Xinjiang, Shaanxi and Gansu soon fell into the hands of 
the Tibetan expansion, which also managed to threaten and subsequently 
occupy, in 763, the capital Chang‟an. The new emperor, Tang Daizong (762-
79), “thus began with another ignominious flight from the capital.” Even if 
internal problems caused the collapse of the Tibetan empire, its military 
actions, nevertheless, marked “the end of Chinese administration in Eastern 
Turkestan [Xinjiang] for almost a thousand years.”
422
 
The other major problem came, a couple of years afterwards, from 
those territories of the northeast that remained occupied after the An Lushan 
rebellion. The successive emperor, Tang Dezong (779-805) proved unable 
to exert a full political control over those territories. The curiosity surrounding 
the political faith of the northeastern territories was their fascination and 
subsequent reinstatement of the Warring States period‟s political and 
military practices. In fact, according to this reinvigorated historical spirit, their 
leaders “would compare Tang demands for their submission with those of 
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the Qin First Emperor when conducing China‟s first unification.” Tang‟s 
objective towards these territories remained that one of “sweep clear Hebei,” 
however, without success. Hebei‟s generals, in fact, confident of their 
political independence, decided to appoint themselves as “kings” and 
“named their dynasties Qi, Zhao, Wei and Jin in accordance with Warring 
States practice.”
423
 
But this practice was not only confined to the Hebei province area. 
Also the loyalists, who controlled the capital, started to advocate a return to 
the ancient practices, since the Tang dynasty, because of its embryonic 
fragmentation, seemed to have started an unrecoverable decadent path. In 
a short period of time, in fact, Du You, an intellectual of the legalist school, 
started to theorize a return to the totalitarian organization of the state 
according to the Qin political institutions, since the fear of a progressive 
decentralization proved not to be unfounded. In a few years‟ time, now under 
the rule of emperor Tang Xianzong (805-820), the central government 
decided to change policy, by appointing civilian rule in the rebellious regions. 
This measure, however, despite the initial success, proved ineffective, 
increasing even more the fragmentation process. 
After the death of Tang Xianzong in 820, the country was, again, 
overwhelmed by several “agrarian and military uprisings, mysterious acts of 
terrorism and organized smuggling by large gangs.” In the second half of the 
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ninth century, other bandit groups, such as one created in the Zhejiang 
region, repeatedly defeated the Tang forces that had been sent to suppress 
the revolt. Immediately afterwards, the south “was transformed … from one 
of the most stable regions into one of the most volatile.”
424
  
And these events, connected to other crucial upheavals, paved the 
way for the final destruction of the dynasty. One of the insurgencies that 
critically weakened Tang and which was encouraged by the previous actions 
was the Huang Chao‟s movement that spread around China in 870s. Huang 
Chao, a man with intellectual ability (since we know from his biography that 
he competed in the jinshi examination), originally from Shandong, joined the 
local bandit groups, becoming ultimately their leader. His military actions 
immediately targeted Luoyang. The Tang army reported a victory in 878, 
forcing the rebels‟ leader to undertake “one of the most outrageous 
peregrinations in history.” After the military engagement he led his men 
south, until reaching the area of Guangzhou (Canton), that he captured. In 
879, he moved again north. These long marches allowed him to swiftly move 
around the country, managing in the end to capture Chang‟an. The 
successive emperors proved to be completely impotent and their political 
power declined very fast until 907, the year in which a new dynasty was 
announced: the establishment of the Liang dynasty.
425
    
 
3.2. People’s War During the Tang Dynasty 
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3.2.1. First Level of Analysis: Civil-Military Design of People’s 
War 
 
During the Tang, notwithstanding the profound reforms at both the 
political and military level, the civil-military relationship proved to be, again, a 
central framework for the execution of the right military strategy, even if in 
specific periods of imperial history, like for example, during the Eastern Han, 
there had been “a clear separation of soldier and civilian.”
426
 The 
combination of the civil with the military did even take place during the 
military campaign, conducted in 617 by Li Yuan, which led to the 
establishment of the Tang dynasty.
427
 
Moreover, throughout the early Tang aristocratic ideal “was to 
possess both the military skills of the warrior [wu] and the literary skills of the 
civil official [wen], and, on the basis of those skills, to be able to serve as 
either a general in the field or a minister at court [chu jiang ru xiang].”
428
 For 
example, when the passage was from the military sphere to the civil one, the 
most common position occupied by the military men was that of prefect 
(cishi), “governor of the largest regular unit of territorial administration.” Vice 
versa, when the passage was from the civil to the military, those men 
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involved in this new position usually “offered strategic advice, drafted 
documents, and performed essential administrative tasks.” In other words, 
even if they were directly involved with the military sphere, they usually 
“continued to be associated with administrative responsibilities rather than 
military command.” And this aspect was also evident when dealing with the 
office of xingjun sima, which referred to the “high-level administrator of the 
armies in the field.”
429
  
 During the Tang, we can distinguish two specific transformations of 
the civil-military relationship which occurred respectively before and after the 
mid-eighth century. Specifically, the military leadership of the early Tang 
period was characterized “by an omnicompetent aristocratic elite whose 
members moved easily back and forth between civil and military posts.” 
However, by the middle of the eighth century this leadership had been 
replaced “by military specialists of humble and often obscure origin,” that is, 
professional commanders.
430
 Concerning this second transformation, in 747, 
Li Linfu, the chief minister, proposed to substitute the civil staff in charge of 
military positions with foreign people with military skills. The idea behind this 
advice was that barbarians were more “courageous and adept at fighting” 
while the civil-bureaucrats were not able to undertake military actions.
431
 
Two figures clearly illustrate this transformation: the first one was Li Shimin, 
the second Tang emperor who encapsulated both the civil and military role. 
The second was An Lushan, the leader of the 755 rebellion, named after 
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him, who, because of his martial skills, distinguished himself as a military 
leader and “in contrast to Li Shimin he was an outsider, half Sogdian and 
half Turk, who made his career entirely within the military establishment and 
was almost certainly illiterate.”
432
     
The military prowess of the non-Chinese has also been considered 
as the element that favored the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion. 
However, even if it is true that non-Chinese introduced new military 
techniques into the overall Chinese military system, at the same time it 
should be pointed out that these non-Chinese commanders were widely 
sinicized, to the extent that they “strived to accept the codes, culture and 
value of Confucianism.”
433
 For example, Li Yuan, the founder of the Tang 
dynasty and descendent of inner Asian culture, followed the Confucian 
pattern in establishing the new dynasty. Therefore, following the same line, 
“had An Lushan replicated Li Yuan‟s feat and initiated a long-lived dynasty 
after rebelling, An would have been celebrated as a great emperor because 
dynastic founders conventionally are lionized in traditional Chinese 
histories.”
434
    
Nevertheless, during and right after the An Lushan rebellion, the 
military provinces increased in number. The staff in charge held both the civil 
as well as the military power. The jiedushi – the military governors – “held 
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concurrent authority as civil governors (guanchashi), others by civil 
governors who also held local military authority as „chief commissioner for 
military training‟ or „chief defense commissioner.‟ In almost all of the 
provinces, both civil and military authority resided in the same individual.”
435
  
The Confucian doctrine, elaborated in the period between the Spring 
and Autumn and the Warring States, which advocated the civil control of the 
military, still exerted some influence, at least at the institutional level. As 
described in the second chapter in the corresponding section, between the 
Guoyu (Discourses of the States) and the Guanzi (The Annals of Guanzi) we 
can find the same phrase, but with two slightly different structures, with 
profound consequences, however. In fact, in the Guoyu, it was emphasized 
the idea that military commands should reside within the government, 
implying the idea of a subordination of the military to the civilian. While in the 
Guanzi, written during the Warring States, the same phrase was readapted 
in order to emphasize the idea that military commands should be lodged 
within the government, implying the interpenetration between the civil and 
the military.
436
 
The advocacy of a civil control of the military became even more 
prominent after the end of the An Lushan rebellion. Even if soldiers enjoyed 
a better remuneration, at the same time “suffered from decreasing social 
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status.”
437
 The anti-militarist attitude had, as a direct effect, a paradoxical 
result: by praising the superiority of the civil over the military, late Tang 
dynasty‟s policy actually moved the civil closer to the military, making them 
even more intertwined. In the late Tang, for example, there are many 
biographies of bureaucrat-generals “dismissed by the purely military types 
as mere scholars [shushing] who nevertheless succeeded in teaching the 
soldiers a thing or two.” One case in point is offered by the case of the 
prefect of Huzhou (in today‟s Zhejiang province), Xin Mi. In 807 he was 
appointed to put down the rebellion of Li Qi. At the very beginning he was 
underestimated, since he was a civil bureaucrat. However, the execution of 
a  surprise attack on his opponent made him be considered as a valuable 
general.
438
 
 During the Tang, the civil-military affairs reflected the same pattern 
of philosophical and doctrinal adjustments that had been witnessed during 
the highly revolutionary historical period of the Warring States, specifically 
the focus on the “institution of universal military service” and the “Warring 
States‟ identification of the farming population as essentially coterminous 
with the state‟s reservoir of military manpower.” Specifically, this institutional 
dependence between the civil and the military derives from two aspects of 
the tradition of Chinese statecraft: the first element referred to the idea that 
the military establishment “should be largely self-supporting, with soldiers 
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responsible for their own sustenance when not on active duty in the field.” 
The second aspect focused on the assumption that the “military service was 
no more than a specialized form of the corvée labor duty that was incumbent 
on most of the adult male taxpayers.”
439
  
The general idea of the civil control over the military affairs “was one 
of the features that distinguished China‟s culture from that of its nomadic 
neighbors.”
440
 However, even if this might hold true in general, at least at the 
doctrinal and pragmatic level, things were not that clear-cut, since an actual 
symbiosis of the two spheres really existed even during the Tang dynasty, 
which was characterized by a lesser militaristic environment, at least when 
compared to the Warring States. 
 As a clear manifestation of this intimate relationship, during the reign 
of Tang Taizong – who has been recognized as one of the most competent 
ruler of Chinese history, whose model would have been imitated by later 
generations of rulers as well as by external actors like Japan – the civil 
virtues (wen) and the military power (wu) were intimately intertwined in a 
“perfect equilibrium.” This was the result of the way Taizong conducted his 
foreign policy, which resulted in a balanced combination of diplomacy and 
the use of military force.
441
 
 This combination of the civil with the military was emphasized, 
furthermore, in the seventh military classic, in which Li Jing, when replying to 
the questions of Taizong, explained that the ancient system of people and 
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army administration had to be applied again: “I observe that the Yellow 
Emperor governed the army according to the methods by which he first 
established the „village and well‟ system.” This system, as briefly explained 
in chapter two, consisted of creating a “well” (jing 井) that would have been 
divided into nine pieces of land through the drawing of four roads (this is 
what the Chinese character symbolizes), with eight families cultivating the 
outer eight squares and with the central one left to the general. The same 
structure had to be adopted at the military level. By following the same 
pattern, it was advised, that five squares should have been used for 
“formations,” (four squares to the army and the fifth, the central one, 
assigned to the general) while leaving the other four – corresponding to the 
four corners – empty. This, in terms of military dispositions, meant displaying 
the army according to the “well” structure.
442
     
At the societal level, the civil-military system focused on how 
common people had to perform both civilian and martial roles; “troops, 
whether conscripts or fubing (territorial militias), should be farmers-on-
horseback and peasants-with-crossbows; generals should be, and usually 
were, bureaucrats-in-uniform.”
443
 This also intertwined with the historical 
Chinese view of warfare, which came to be recognized as a corrective 
means, “an extension of the penal code from the recalcitrant individual … to 
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all those who dared defy the Heaven-ordained ruler, whether from within the 
frontier as „bandits‟ (that is rebels) or from outside it as „barbarians‟ (that is 
aliens).”
444
 Notwithstanding this civil-military relationship, the fact that the 
fubing system came to be recognized as a militia system does not 
necessarily mean that these troops were of low quality. They actually 
represented “a special type of professional soldier.”
445
  
Moreover, like in the Warring States period, military performance 
was highly appreciated, and often regarded as a means to gain higher 
bureaucratic positions. In fact, during this period, there was a recurring term 
used to describe those men that went through this social transformation 
thanks to their personal military achievements: “went out a general and 
came in a chancellor” (chu jiang ru xiang 出将入相).446 It is not a coincidence 
that the book-learning through the bureaucracy was considered to be the 
key for military success, to the extent that “the military command at the 
highest levels can be successfully exercised by scholars with no skill at arms 
and no practical experience in warfare.”
447
 
 These institutional aspects were not only the Chinese product, but 
also the direct result of the influence of the nomads‟ way of waging warfare 
that slowly affected the Chinese way. In fact, one of the major skills that the 
nomads possessed and that allowed them to conquer China in the future 
were mainly based the ability “at combining their initial capacity for attack 
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with a subsequent capacity for powerholding. This was an achievement not 
only on the military level but even more on the level of political organization.” 
The Chinese rulers absorbed this practice and progressively made it their 
own, to the extent that future dynasties would take full example from these 
cases, especially after the direct conquest of China by the Mongols and the 
Manchus that created respectively the famous Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) 
and finally the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). Therefore, the barbarians‟ 
contribution proved to be very important in the consolidation phase of the 
Chinese civil-military relations; “certainly they contributed in large part to the 
military component of the empire both in their persons and perhaps even 
more in their influence upon military institutions.”
448
 
 Along with the nomadic tribes influence, the Tang dynasty inherited 
this fusion of the civil with the military field also from the Sui dynasty. The 
Sui, in fact, had to find solutions to solve the problematic political and social 
fragmentation that had been created after the collapse of the Han dynasty. 
One of the reforms that the Sui adopted and which had been inherited from 
the Tuoba Wei and then from the Sui‟s immediate predecessors such as 
Northern Zhou and Northern Qi, was the introduction of the land equalization 
system, which consisted of allocating “even greater amounts of land to the 
peasants, in order to bring about an increase in agricultural production which 
would guarantee a permanent flow of greater revenue and the achievement 
of a stabilization of social conditions.” This measure was also further 
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elaborated by the Tang dynasty, because there was “now a great quantity of 
abandoned land,” due to the political transformation of the period which saw 
many leaving the north for the south. Moreover, another fundamental reason 
behind the implementation of this policy was because Tang rulers “were fully 
conscious of the fact that the principal cause of their predecessor‟s collapse 
had been peasant discontent.” Therefore, it was during the Tang that the 
equalization policy was implemented “on a larger scale than ever before.”
449
 
This system was significant for the Tang dynasty. In fact, part of its 
collapse can be explained by the subsequent “diminution in the size of the 
peasants‟ holdings,” which caused, first, a progressive deterioration of the 
economic conditions for both the state and the peasants. The tax-paying 
peasants, in fact, decreased dramatically: “according to the 754 census, 
there were only 7.6 million tax-payers out of a total population of 52.8 
million.” This inevitably affected also the military system, which later on 
suffered a dramatic reduction in number, forcing the dynasty, at the certain 
stage, to recruit a mercenary professional army. By 742, for example, “this 
force, in which the number of nomads auxiliaries increased steadily, 
numbered 574,000, of which 490,000 were stationed on the frontiers.”
450
 
 The equalization system (juntianzhi 均田制) was based, as the word 
itself describes, on the equal distribution of land. This system became the 
central component of the agricultural structure of the entire society. In so 
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doing, the Tang guaranteed a piece of land to every able-man, in exchange 
for taxes and registration of the population. Through this system, moreover, 
the dynasty tried to underline the state control of the land, therefore no-one 
could possess a piece of land without the necessary authorization. The 
equal distribution was also part of an overall plan which tried to avoid 
excessive accumulation of lands by the feudal lords, therefore guaranteeing 
a stable fiscal foundation, while also lowering the conditions of social 
instabilities. Therefore, it was strongly believed that state control of the land 
and the population allowed dynasty rulers to keep the order. And not only 
that: these two measures, in fact, made possible the incredible economic 
and territorial expansion of the Tang dynasty.
451
 
But the agricultural production combined with social stability were 
not the only concerns of the dynasty. The military thinking, intimately 
associated with the civilian field of action, represented also one of the 
central elements encouraging the development of this policy. In fact, through 
this new land redistribution program, it became possible “to continue to base 
the state‟s armed forces on the militia system, of which the peasantry 
remained the backbone.”  
Hence, one of the clearest manifestations of the unification of the 
civil with the military was the fubing system (fubing zhi 府兵制) firstly 
                                                          
451
 Mario Sabattini and Paolo Santangelo, Storia Della Cina, p. 307. This territorial 
expansion was also possible thanks to the adoption of new technical innovations. 
One of the first to be adopted had been the curved pole plow, which eased the labor 
on the field. The second innovation referred to the technique used to store natural 
316
 
 
implemented at the time of the Sui dynasty, even if it had not represented 
the .
 452
 It represented the “best trained, most highly skilled and „professional‟ 
Chinese fighting men of this period.”
453
 It first appeared, on paper, on 16 
June 590, after Emperor Wen issued a decree, which emphasized the 
importance of territorial and military reorganization of the empire, as a 
means to solve the violent conflicts that had occurred during the Sui 
dynasty. This system of “territorial soldiery” – also translated as “soldiers of 
the headquarters” or “regimental soldiery”
454
 – which derived its structure 
from the Twenty-four Armies that had been employed in the conquest of 
Northern Qi by Zhou in 576, during the Sui dynasty, was based on the xiang 
bing or local troops, even if it is not excluded that also farmers were 
included.
455
 Since it is likely that both types of troops were employed, during 
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the Sui dynasty “a clear distinction was made between rural residence units 
of territorial soldiers (xiang tuan) and those based within walled cities (jun 
fang).”
456
 
The first normative action of the 590 decree towards the creation of 
this new system was the abolition of the distinction between the “military 
families” and the “civilian families,” since the entire system was extended to 
the entire population. Moreover, it was clearly stated that “all military men 
[junren] shall be subordinated to the prefectures and counties. Their 
cultivation of the land and household registration shall be the same as for 
ordinary subjects [min].”
457
 
During the Sui, soldiers had to perform a rotational service in the 
capital. This service was based on the consolidated corvée labor, “under 
which adult male peasants were required to perform approximately one 
month of service each year on a rotational basis.”
458
 
During the Tang, the soldiers that had to serve into the militia 
system were selected according to their physical characteristics and had to 
be trained in specific garrisons called fu (府), which in turn assigned them, 
through a rotation system, to twelve defense corps, that represented the 
permanent army of the empire. Each defense corps  was commanded by 
one Marshal (dajiangjun 大将军) and two Generals (jiangjun 将军) and also 
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provided the men for the palace guards (qinwei 亲卫) and the troops to be 
employed on the actual battlefield.
459
 
When it comes to its structure, during the Tang the fubing system 
was slightly modified. Now the policy envisaged that for every six families 
there should have been one adult male, at least 21 years old of age, to be 
enlisted into the army for a total of a forty-year service, gaining the “military 
status (jun ming), though they and their families continued to be listed in the 
household registers kept by the local civil authorities.”
460
 They, then, were 
sent to different garrisons (657 in total), where each one was composed of a 
number of soldiers comprised between the 800 and 1,200 units. These 
soldiers had to commit themselves to both the military service and the 
cultivation of land. At the same time these soldiers were also dispatched to 
different garrisons, including the capital,
461
 according to a rotation process. 
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When serving in the capital, their service lasted one month; in the frontier 
areas the term of service was extended, instead, to a total of three years.
462
  
However, the fubing system reached its peak throughout the 
seventh century, since from the eighth onwards, that is, during the reign of 
Xuanzong, it started to decline. There has been a big debate about the 
actual reasons behind its collapse. However, the most accredited 
explanation, even if not the most convincing, is related to the changes 
occurred within the equal field system: “the collapse of the equal field 
system, the impoverishment and migration of the peasants certainly 
provided the economic grounds that undermined the dominant position of 
the compulsory service system and of the fubing system.”
463
 
When it comes to its distribution, however, the majority of the 
regiments were located in areas around the capital, “while vast stretches of 
central, eastern, and southern China were almost entirely without regimental 
headquarters.” Nevertheless, only in those highly militarized prefectures it 
was likely that “almost every able-bodied adult male was a soldier.”
464
 
Fubing soldiers, when not performing their military duties, “were expected to 
support themselves through farming.” They had to supply their own 
provisions as an exchange for “limited exemption from taxes and corvée.”
465
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In addition to that, when fubing soldiers distinguished themselves in the 
battlefield, they could be entitled to hold “more „land in perpetuity‟ (yong ye 
tian) than would otherwise gave [sic] been allowed under the equal field 
system.”
466
 
The overall pervasive fubing system was then implemented in all 
corners of the empire. In 640, for example, while the Tang was extending its 
reach into the Ordos region as well as the Inner Mongolia, including also 
Xinjiang – penetration into foreign lands that was still achieved through the 
application of subtle strategic means – Taizong decided to install in these 
regions the General Protectorate for the Pacification of the West (anxi 
duhufu 安西都护府), which was a mixed civil-military administration, under 
whose rule the Tang secured its control over those lands.
467
  
Slightly similar policies would have been adopted also by Wu Zetian. 
After she managed to conquer Koguryo, she immediately confronted herself 
with a heavy military dilemma: “if the number of troops [sent to Korea] was 
small, China would be unable to exert enough force to retain control, but if 
the number was large, China would be exhausted trying to supply that 
force.” Therefore, after conquest, Koreans were enlisted into the imperial 
forces, “while large numbers of Koguryo‟s farmers were transplanted west of 
the Yalu River into Manchuria and Hubei.”
468
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During the Tang, when it was required to set campaign armies, 
generals usually relied on the “expeditionary armies” (xingjun), which were 
assembled from local regiments. The size of the expeditionary armies varied 
widely according to the needs. In general terms, these armies were 
composed of regiments with each one with its own “expeditionary army 
commander” (xingjun zongguan).  In turn, among these commanders, one of 
them would be chosen as “expeditionary army commander-in-chief” (xingjun 
da zongguan), with the authority to “coordinate the operations of his fellows.” 
For what concerns the use of soldiers, most of them were selected from 
different sources. The fubing was one of those, even if it was not widely 
used lest disrupt the rotational system, depriving crucial areas of important 
soldiers. For this reason, along the fubing, it was important to rely on short-
term conscripts known as “conscript-recruits” (bingmu). In this way,  the 
recruiting system was supposed to “spread the burden of military service a 
little more evenly among the population.” Another important source from 
which recruiting soldiers was represented by the tribal allies and 
auxiliaries.
469
 At the same time, in terms of short-term conscripts, during the 
Tang the fubing “served alongside fangding, „defense conscripts‟ drafted for 
a one-year term with no continuing military obligation thereafter.”
470
 
However, the expeditionary armies started to decline once it became 
evident that they could not be employed for carrying out decisive attacks on 
China‟s enemies and then “return home within a reasonable period of time.” 
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This created a counterproductive effect which manifested itself in the 
establishment of “static encampments which gradually evolved into 
permanent garrisons.” In order to keep these army garrisons operative, the 
Tang dynasty, around the end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth, 
decided to rely on the fubing system. However, in so doing, the rotational 
system had to stop working. The presence of soldiers in frontier areas far 
away from home and the progressive decline of the “equal-field system” of 
land redistribution – which was originally implemented in order to allow 
soldiers to be farmers at the same time – effected inevitably the workability 
of the fubing system, which reached its ultimate fate in 749 – “the year in 
which the dispatch … to the various regiments was halted on the grounds 
that there were no longer any troops available for service.”
471
 
To solve the problem of the shortage of manpower, from 737 the 
government tried to recruit frontier soldiers who had to serve in the army for 
longer periods of time. Those who accepted were labeled as jian’er, that is, 
“sturdy lads.” Moreover, these newly recruited soldiers would have received 
benefits from the government. By the middle of the eighth century the jian’er 
“were the most common characteristic element of the frontier armies.”
472
 
These “valiant fighters,” therefore, became the crucial military asset in the 
early Tang, “second only to the territorial soldiers (fubing).”
473
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Along with the fubing system, during the Tang there had been 
implemented another collateral system which served the political as well as 
military administration of the empire. This was called the jimi system (jimi zhi 
羁縻制), which meant “control by loose rein.” It was used to describe the 
political and the military functions performed by far-flung protectorates:  
 
“subordinate but autonomous, jimi territories were designated to 
fit within a military and administrative framework that satisfied 
imperial criteria, yet they were otherwise barely distinguishable 
from the political entities they replaced. The jimi prefects and 
commandants were themselves often non-Han, typically former 
rulers of the regions they controlled who had tendered their 
submission in return for recognition; their staff and military 
establishments were also substantially non-Han. They could be 
called on to assist in frontier defence, to dispatch or accompany 
tribute missions to the capital annually, and to lodge their sons 
there as security for their loyalty. The tribute might include 
some element of tax revenue, especially in respect of the 
settled and easily assessable oasis-states of Xinjiang. In return 
the jimi prefects enjoyed hereditary tenure and might receive 
titles, brides, revenue grants and food subventions from the 
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imperial government, plus presents of greater value than those 
tendered as tribute.”
474
  
 
The combination of the fubing system along with the jimi one did not 
prove to be particularly effective in the long term for the defense of the 
frontiers. During the reign of Xuanzong, and specifically during the years 
710-711, along with an ongoing process of military transformation, new 
reforms of the military system had been adopted throughout the country. 
Now the objective became the pacification of the empire‟s furthest areas 
through the use and therefore mobilization of the direct military force, rather 
than the militia. The emperor, then, nominated permanent military governors 
(jiedushi) to be assigned to all the areas where their presence was required, 
the so-called military regions (fangzhen).  At the beginning their task was of 
a simple military nature, which translated itself into the creation of the 
defensive force against enemies‟ attacks. The civil rule resided in the court‟s 
hands, however, with the practice of time, the civil-military fusion occurred 
again; “gradually, the military governor ended up handling simultaneously 
also the civilian tasks.” Specifically, he started to perform also the civil rule 
that normally would have been the general governor‟s duty. Therefore the 
military governors became also the territorial prefect.
475
    
In what then came to be known as the third phase of the Xuanzong‟s 
reign, things, at the military level, changed again. The system of the military 
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governors became very consolidated to the extent that now the armies were 
completely controlled by those people in charge in the frontier areas. This 
demonstrated the progressive weakness of the Tang centralized power. In 
fact, at this stage, the central government did not have anymore its own 
army. Subsequently, an edict, issued in 737, “established that all the frontier 
region‟s soldiers should have been enlisted permanently among those who 
were suitable and that accepted to serve the empire. The institution of the 
voluntary service, and therefore of permanent professional armies, 
established the almost definitive end of the militia system (fubing).”
476
 
One case in point of this transformation, especially in the late Tang, 
referred to the creation of two forces: the conventional army and the reserve 
forces. The former was called changing jian’er (guanjian), while the latter 
tuanjie. Besides their different status (the conventional army was properly 
fed and clothed, while the reserve one had the same treatment only during 
fighting operations) their territorial distribution was also significantly different. 
Guanjian “outnumbered tuanjie in the military districts in the north and 
Central plains, while tuanjie outnumbered guanjian in the south.” The 
reasons behind this choice were motivated by the fact that the northern 
frontier needed a stronger conventional army due to the frequent military 
threats, while in the south, the fewer wars necessarily required less 
conventional troops. However, the problems arising in the south in the late 
Tang forced the dynasty to create new forces, “among which the most 
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influential were xiangbing (local troops) and tutuan (civil troops). With 
respect to the tuanjie troops – which were determined by the central 
government –, the xiangbing and the tutuan, instead, “were temporary forces 
established in need by local governments and were excluded from official 
military status.”
477
    
Xuanzong, moreover, promoted the establishment of the kuoqi troops 
(palace guards). Their objective was to serve as a “permanent palace 
guard.” In the Xin Tangshu it is reported that in 723 “fubing and commoners 
from the capital and other places were selected to reinforce the troops of 
long-term conscripts (changcong bing).”
478
 
Hence, after the An Lushan rebellion the fubing system had 
progressively eroded, paving the way for the military professionalization. 
However, along this military transformation – mainly promoted for specific 
campaigns – it was still very important to rely on local militia. In fact, the 
institutionalization of the professional army did not play a crucial role. When 
the government‟s troops found themselves, in the early ninth century, 
committed to fight Huai Xi, a rebellious province which, encouraged by the 
An Lushan rebellion, advocated for itself a political autonomy, the heavy 
reliance on the local militia became the crucial aspect. Because of the 
particular geopolitical circumstances, in fact, “it was feasible, and probably 
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imperative, to draw heavily on local militia,” which represented the key 
component of the overall regular army.
479
 In practice, this military aspect 
illustrates how the Chinese military tradition transcended the normative one, 
making strategic culture even more compelling. 
While it is undeniable that the application of this new military system 
responded to the administrative necessities of the empire, it should be 
pointed out, however, that it also paved the way for the internal collapse. 
The growing political and military strength of the regional military governors 
created the condition for the internal revolts that would have undermined the 
entire political power of the dynasty. One case, destined to change the entire 
political spectrum of the Tang, had been the An Lushan rebellion in 755, 
which had been nurtured by the application of this military system.
480
    
In the later stage of the Tang dynasty, a new group of special agents 
had also been created: the court eunuchs. In a specific historical 
circumstance, that is, during the exile of the period 756-763, they also 
became a powerful palace army, constituting “the backbone of the imperial 
troops.” Afterwards, especially under the rule of Tang Xianzong, they 
became an indispensible asset of strategy and warfare, since they acted as 
informants and spies: some of them “had acquired an education; others 
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demonstrated military aptitude; all were credited with a genius for 
intrigue.”
481
 
During the declining period of the dynasty, their function became 
crucial, since the emperor and his political authority weakened dramatically. 
At the end of the eighth century, “numbering around 4000, they became the 
strongest faction in the central government, having acquired ever greater 
control over the armed forces.” And, thanks to the newly acquired strategic 
positions, “they were also in charge of an effective secret police.”
482
 
Along with the eunuchs, the Tang dynasty, in the last century of its 
reign, because of the inevitable decline in the number of peasants and 
therefore militia to be used in combat, started to promote the use of 
mercenaries. And they proved to be extremely valuable in at least two 
circumstances: first of all, when the Tang was facing the attack from the 
Tibetan empire, the Uighurs proved to be a fundamental component of the 
professional army in the defensive operations, allowing the army to survive. 
The second circumstance was related to the Huang Chao rebellion. The 
Tang army was powerless when confronting this threat, therefore completely 
unable to stop the revolt. It was “[Sha Tuo], reputedly the bravest of the 
brave of the Turkish tribes, called in to aid the faltering Tang government,” to 
reach a definitive victory over the rebels: 
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Their talented commander, [Li Keyong], known as the 
„One-Eyed Dragon‟, assembled a 40,000-strong cavalry force of 
his tribesmen; dressed all in black, and known as Li‟s Black 
Crows, they were to become a terror to all Chinese. Li‟s army 
was able to drive out Huang Chao, aided in this by defections in 
the latter‟s ranks, including that of [Zhu Wen], one of his chief 
generals. In 884, after his still sizable army was defeated in 
Honan, Huang Ch‟ao fled with a thousand men to his native 
Shandong to meet his death there, probably by his own hand. 
The great rebellion was over; the Tang emperor returned to 
desolated and deserted Chang‟an … Although it was still to 
linger on borrowed time for two more decades, the Tang 
dynasty had, in reality, received its deathblow. All power now 
fell into the hands of the provincial warlords, among whom the 
main contenders were [Li Keyong] and [Zhu Wen], the future 
founder of the Later Liang.”
483
    
 
However, all these military systems, throughout the Sui-Tang dynasty, 
that is, during the reconstruction of the centralized empire, had to be based 
on a state ideology in order to work efficiently. So, during the Tang it 
became very important to elaborate an ideological model that was 
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necessary to mobilize the people for the military service. Gaining their 
political loyalty became a central component.  
This necessity came out of the Sui-Tang period in which religions, old 
and new, started to be recognized as fully organized entities with their own 
consolidated doctrine and a structure which was “separated from that one of 
the state.” During the Sui, the first attempt to create a state ideology was 
related to the revival of Confucianism, since it had historically represented 
the ideological legitimacy of the idea itself of the empire. For example, it 
became central to emphasize the role played by the filial piety, xiao. As the 
emperor Yang Jian sustained: “the reading of the „Classics of the filial piety‟ 
(Xiaojing) would have been sufficient for governing the state.”
484
  
However, with the spread of Buddhism, emperors also tried to 
incorporate this ideology into their political calculation, since unlike 
Confucianism, Buddhism represented “a religion that was largely popular in 
all social strata both in the North and in the South” and that allowed 
emperors to build a more sophisticated image of their political as well as 
spiritual power. During the Sui, in fact, Yang Jian tried to be portrayed as the 
Cakravartin, that is, “the universal king that governs through the wheel 
(cakra), which represented the symbol of persuasion.” Spiritual labels, 
however, did not stop there. In 585 he also went a step further claiming for 
himself the title of the “Son of the Heaven.” In 594, in the official documents, 
he referred to himself as “the disciple of Buddha.”
485
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On the same line operated the Tang dynasty. After its 
establishment, its emperors also adopted a syncretistic approach, what 
could be labeled as ideological syncretism, through which they consolidated 
the sanjiao 三教, that is, the “Three Doctrines” of Confucianism, Buddhism, 
and Taoism.
486
 
However, it was the Confucian ideology and its tradition that the 
Tang exploited in order to strengthen its political ideology, to the extent of 
giving birth to the neoconfucianism, which encapsulated the old tradition into 
a “new totalizing and organic vision” of the world, in which all the elements 
were not distinct and diversified, but integral parts of a single conception.”
487
 
And this was obtained through the creation of the Historiographical Office 
(shiguan 史官) whose objective was to create the histories of the previous 
dynasties, including the current one, in order to create a historical 
attachment to the previous moral and political virtues of the Chinese past. 
The reason behind this practice was the relevance of history as an 
instrument of legitimization that the Confucian traditions encouraged to 
undertake. This office obviously exerted a very powerful power (it became 
the central bureaucratic organ for the dynasties from this time onwards), 
because its scope was not only to record Chinese history in a 
comprehensive way, but also to create the necessary historical connections 
that gave the dynasties the “constitutional” legitimacy they were striving to 
find. Legitimacy that, on the other hand, helped dynasties in their daily 
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administration along with the ability to mobilize people and soldiers when 
waging military campaigns.  
Therefore, during the Tang, even if there was some religious 
tolerance for other beliefs, Confucianism returned to its highest stage, 
mainly because of the values it carried with itself. The campaign against 
Buddhism, in fact, besides the mere economic reasons that motivated this 
religious intolerance, was also motivated by moral and ideological reasons. 
Buddhism had to be abolished because it represented a “barbarian” belief 
that was undermining the foundations of society: “if a man did not cultivate 
the land, others would suffer hunger; and if a woman did not weave, others 
would have suffered cold, but the monasteries, in a countless quantity, 
matched even the imperial palaces in terms of beauty, even if they 
depended on agriculture for the food and weaving for the clothes. It had 
been Buddhism to provoke the weakening of the previous dynasties.”
488
  
Besides religion per se, the attempt by the Tang dynasty to create a 
state ideology in order to gain people‟s loyalty became an indispensible 
asset for a correct politico-military strategy. For example, General Gao 
Xianzhi, despite his incredible military achievements during the Pamirs 
Expedition (748-751), failed miserably at the political level, that is, after 
having been appointed military governor of the Tarim Basin area. He 
immediately established his own warlordism, which manifested itself in his 
“heavy-handed approach to governorship of his tributary kingdoms,” which 
cost him the ability to gain the loyalty of the newly established city-states, 
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“who were clearly waiting to see which of the powers would become the 
region‟s hegemon.”
489
 
Moreover, in the ninth century, during the rebellion of the province of 
Huai Xi, the imperial troops found it very difficult to fight such a tiny 
administrative area, which defended itself egregiously, mainly because of its 
ability to create “loyalty and at least tacit support of both the army and the 
populace” to the extent that “no cases of defection were reported.” Of 
course, this popular support was the result not only of ideology but also of 
the extraordinary ability of this small province “to sustain itself materially 
over the course of [campaigning years]. The effectiveness of the defense 
and the adequacy of supplies were mutually supportive.”
490
    
From 817 onwards, the imperial army, under the command of Li Su, 
learning from its own mistakes, undertook a comprehensive program to 
reform the army, in order to acquire what was missing: the loyalty and the 
high morale of the army. He developed this reform through several steps, 
one of which, the most important, consisted of restoring the army to its 
“fighting condition.” Objective that was obtained by “relieving [soldiers] of 
any fear they might have of suddenly being thrown into an offensive by an 
ambitious new leader.” Along with this practice, he undertook other social 
measures which were meant to increase the confidence between the troops. 
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This type of psychological transformation proved to be essential in securing 
the final victory of the imperial army over the rebellious province of Huai Xi. 
During the ninth century, it had become central, more than ever 
before, to strengthen army‟s martial spirit, due to the increasing 
strengthening of the cities‟ fortifications, which made them real defensive 
outposts. During the late Tang, specifically in the second part of its history, 
that is, after the An Lushan rebellion, towns‟ fortifications became the central 
political step of the administrative bodies along with the purely military one. 
Therefore, the scope of this system of fortifications consisted of making 
towns function “militarily as fortresses.”
491
 And this would have represented 
an important asset for the future development of military as well as political 
organization of the Chinese territory; contrary to the European history, in 
China, the castle, as it had been conceptualized in Western history, did not 
materialize: “the military and economic role of the castle (for exploiting and 
controlling the surrounding peasantry) was, in China performed by towns.”
492
   
Hence, having towns heavily fortified could pave the way for the 
accumulation of power within one general‟s hands. This, therefore, made the 
distribution of power an important asset both for political and military control 
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over the population and the commanders.
493
 This policy of power distribution 
became central also within the rebel provinces, since the towns fortifications, 
because of their high efficiency could encourage single commanders to take 
the lead even within one small province. In 812, in one famous statement to 
the emperor, Li Jiang described how the distribution of power became a 
sensitive topic, even within the rebel provinces, including also the province 
under examination, Huai Xi, towards which the imperial armies would wage 
war:  
 
“Your servant has observed that the lawbreaking 
governors of [Hebei] and [Henan] do not entrust their military 
power to any single man but rather distribute it among several. 
It is their fear that power accumulated in the hands of one man 
would lead him to revolt which lies behind this practice. Since 
power is evenly distributed among all the commanders, they 
exert a mutual control over each other. Should they wish to 
combine [to increase their strength], they would risk 
encountering those not of like mind who would reveal the 
conspiracy. But, should any revolt entirely on his own, his 
strength would not suffice and he would most certainly fail … as 
a result, the military commanders can only look at each other in 
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impotence, and non dare take the first step. It is on this that the 
rebel governors count.”
494
  
 
3.2.2. Second Level of Analysis: The Strategic Design of 
People’s War 
 
The strategic outcome of this profound civil-military integration was, 
again, the use of deception in order to defeat the enemy even before actual 
military confrontations had started. This implied the use of stratagems in 
order to weaken the enemy psychologically, paving the way for a 
subsequent military defeat. From this time onwards, since China was more 
actively involved in wars with external actors, the centuries-old consolidated 
strategic plan of deception (at least since the era of Western Han) was 
implanted: “using barbarians to control barbarians.”
495
  
The Sui already provided one of its clearest application. During the 
sixth century, for example, the Sui had to face a new steppe confederation, 
the Tujue, which had Turkic origins. In order to control their expansion and 
their offensive policy against the Sui, Yang Jian (Sui Wendi) “undertook a 
skilled diplomatic plan with the aim of exploiting their internal contradictions 
in order to weaken it and therefore impose his own supremacy.” His plan 
became feasible thanks also to some revolts against the Eastern Turks, 
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conducted by the Western Turks‟ leader, Tardu, who undermined their 
political unity after “usurping the title of Qaghan, which had been reserved 
for the Eastern Turks. Without using arms, and with the simple use of 
political intrigue, the Sui managed to undermine the power of the Eastern 
Turks while also getting rid of the Western Turks‟ threat.”
496
   
During the Tang, the use of this deceptive means became more 
widespread. It had been significant the way Chinese rulers used the Uighurs 
in order to spread discord among the Turkic tribes, culminating into the Tang 
victory over them in 630. This victory let the Tang annex the Eastern Turkish 
empire, the Ordos region, and most of East Mongolia. The Uighurs proved, 
again, extremely valuable, two decades afterwards, in those military 
operations that targeted the Western Turks, bringing them to a defeat that 
made China the ruler also of this area.
497
  
This strategic doctrine often led astray many scholars who saw in 
this strategic implementation the actual application of a “defensive 
mindedness,” clearly represented by the creation – accompanied in 
subsequent centuries by the consolidation – of the huge defensive project 
known as the Great Wall, when, in reality, it had almost no military 
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 Witold Rodziński, The Walled Kingdom, p. 95-96; see also Xu [昫] Liu [劉], The Old 
Tang Book [Jiu Tang Shu - 舊唐書], Chap. 67, 1st ed. (Beijing [北京]: Chinese Press 
[Zhonghua shu ju - 中华书局], 1975). 
338
 
 
significance during the Tang.
498
 However, this does not hold true, since “it 
was not a question of „Confucian passivity,‟ nor, though the peoples of the 
steppe often interpreted it that way, of a sedentary and agrarian lifestyle 
being inimical to martial prowess.”
499
 
During the Tang as well as the successive dynasties, military 
discipline was strict as well as the tactical design. The focal point of this 
particular behavior resides on twofold reasons: the specific strategic design 
that a particular geography demanded from China along with the historical 
consolidation of its strategic mentality which, from the Warring States 
onwards, was continuously strengthened and revisited. In fact, at the 
strategic level, as the famous Military Classic text – Questions and Replies 
Between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong – explains, the art of war constantly 
requires the combination of the orthodox and unorthodox methods during all 
the strategic phases, such as the defense, offense, and also retreat from the 
battlefield.
500
     
When it comes to the first reason of this type of strategic approach 
to warfare, China had interacted with the area of Inner Asia in a manner 
which was quite different when compared to the relationship that other 
civilizations had with their respective areas of influence and/or confrontation. 
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And the factors explaining this assumption belong to the particular 
geography of the Inner Asia itself and the cultural interaction between China 
and the other peoples of the same area. The geography of the Central Asia 
represents a unique topography. Due to its steppes, grasslands, and deserts 
it has been very often compared to the same strategic value that the 
Mediterranean had for the Roman empire as well as other civilizations, that 
is, an area particularly vast that not only made unfeasible any serious 
attempt at conquest, but it also allowed the northern tribes to apply swift 
maneuvers that could create serious damages to the Chinese armies that, 
even if quite mobile and flexible, had to cope with the fundamental asset 
required in any military campaign: the logistical problem. The second factor 
of the major reason that explains the peculiar Chinese military strategy 
against the northern tribes resides on the historical aspect that had 
characterized the cultural and political relationship between China and the 
other barbarian confederations. The Chinese clearly understood that “the 
nomad problem had persisted … since at least the fourth century B.C. when 
the putative ancestors of the Huns, the Hsiung-nu tribes on the border of 
North China, had first begun to raid the settled farmlands to the south.” 
According to this constant frontier problem, therefore, direct military 
confrontation became superfluous when actually other means could be 
employed to reach the same strategic objectives. Therefore, the Chinese 
had constantly adopted deceptive measures which could guarantee the 
ability to outperform the enemy in several aspects, especially at the political 
and geographical level. In fact, it was not uncommon to see the Chinese 
340
 
 
ruling elite planning a way to incorporate parts of Inner Asia into the overall 
Chinese peripheral areas, through which it could have been possible to raise 
bandits, armies and also peasant rebels. And at the cultural level, “the 
imperial Confucian institutions of Chinese dynasties were stretched and 
adapted to accommodate these non-Chinese peoples of Inner Asia. In the 
end the Chinese empire became in the military-strategic sense the empire of 
all East Asia.”  
According to this reason, we can explain the birth of the tribute 
system, through which subjugated actors had to acknowledge the moral, 
spiritual, and political superiority of the Chinese civilization in exchange of 
goods. Hence, this explains that in Chinese history, relations with the Inner 
Asia “were less „foreign‟ than one might think because Inner Asia was from 
early times for military purposes a constituent sector of the Chinese military 
scene, even if peripheral.” This, in turn, explains why in China “no Chinese 
Cato could succeed with a simply coercive policy of „Mongolia delenda est.‟ 
More subtle and complex means were needed, on all the levels of 
statecraft.”
501
    
As a direct example of this practice, Tang Taizong, when planning 
his campaign against Turkic peoples, “had patently positioned himself 
beneath the Turk qaghanates and then in the 630s shaken their easternmost 
branch with a lunge into Mongolia and well-directed prods at the oasis-cities 
long the silk routes.” Specifically, Taizong managed to subdue these people 
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by playing one against the other: “the various Turkic-speaking peoples who 
had comprised the Western Turk qaghanate succumbed … during the 640s 
to fratricidal strike exacerbated by what one of their inscriptions describes as 
„the cunning and deceitfulness of the Chinese.‟”
502
 
When actually dealing with the proper use of force, Tang dynasty 
showed a deep propensity to apply the other side of deception: the surprise 
strategy. One historical case clearly exemplifies the Chinese sophistication 
in the use of this strategic design: Gao Xianzhi‟s Pamirs Expedition against 
the Tibetan empire (748-751). He coupled this approach with the 
psychological strategy by bringing a large military force across the Pamirs 
against the “unsuspecting Tibetan forces … One can imagine the surprise 
and horror of the Tibetan defenders at Sarhad as they witnessed 10,000 
Chinese infantry and cavalry converging on their position from three 
avenues of approach.” This had to do with the harsh passes and 
geographical features that the Pamirs presented and that made Tibetans in 
Gilgit think that there were  
 
“no reason to prepare for any Chinese military reaction to their 
activities south of the Pamirs. Judging by Gao‟s rapid conquest 
of the Oxus valley, Gilgit, and Kashmir, it is clear that the 
Tibetans were taken fully by surprise in this Chinese invasion. 
Being so psychologically rattled and physically unprepared to 
defend, the Tibetans were quickly defeated in a single 
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campaign season at little cost to the Chinese expeditionary 
force. Gao‟s brilliant planning and the sheer audacity of this 
operation contributed significantly to the success of the 
campaign.”
503
  
 
  Gao‟s overall operational strategy proved to be, therefore, “not 
attritional or positional warfare,” but a “phased operation” strategy, which 
“focused on the achievement of operationally significant intermediate 
objectives that were integrated into a focused and synchronized campaign 
plan.”
504
  
The deceptive strategy was also central in the second part of the 
Tang dynasty and not necessarily in the foreign affairs realm. Due to the 
increasing internal weaknesses, the Tang dynasty had to suppress those 
provinces that desired to obtain political independence. In one famous 
battle, for example, the campaign against the province of Huai Xi was a case 
in point. During the military preparation, two autonomous regions Ping Lu 
and Cheng Te believed to be the next target of the imperial forces. Ping Lu 
deceptively sent 3,000 troops to join the court army in the campaign against 
Huai Xi, turning, then, into marauding and disruptive activities, explicated 
through sabotage and harassment, against the imperial army. Even if easily 
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defeated, they managed to confuse the opponent‟s plans gaining some 
military advantage.
505
  
Even the imperial army, though superior militarily, adopted the 
typical strategies that have characterized the theoretical continuum of the 
Chinese way of warfare in history. The central government, in fact, could 
have easily adopted a frontal assault against the Huai Xi‟s troops, not matter 
if the latter were adopting a defensive position, which would have inevitably 
increased the casualties among the imperial army. Instead, the government 
adopted a military strategy which was based on “encirclement and steady, 
ubiquitous pressure” with the objective of “choking off the province in 
material terms; it was probably also conceived as a means of containing 
counterthrusts by the mobile Huai Xi army.” This strategy was well 
conceived, but poorly executed, therefore leading the imperial army to 
unsuccessful results.
506
   
The imperial army had to wait for the arrival of a new commander, Li 
Su, who, along with the tactical readjustments of the army, decided also to 
strengthen Tang‟s overall strategic design, which tried to strangle the 
rebellious province. Specifically, he emphasized diplomacy and 
accommodation, in order to “thin enemy ranks through defections, 
particularly when the defector was sufficiently important to bring a garrison 
or location over with him.” This strategic design played also an important 
role, because in so doing, the imperial army, thanks to the potential 
                                                          
505
 Charles Peterson, "Regional Defense Against The Central Powers: The Huai-Hsi 
Campaign, 815-817", in Chinese Ways In Warfare, p. 135 
344
 
 
defections, was able to increase the sources of intelligence by gaining the 
valuable information necessary for the proper execution of military 
operations. In fact, in a short period of time, the government obtained an 
enormous strategic advantage: “the defection of the commander of the Wen 
Cheng fortress together with its 3,000-man garrison.”   
Fighting the rebels by using their own strategic design proved to be 
very productive, since defections now turned the loyalty problem to the 
rebels rather than the government troops. This explains why the latter easily 
regained control over Yan Cheng, delivering a “serious blow to the rebels.” 
Li Su proved to be a very skilled general when he took into 
consideration also the weather conditions for his overall strategic planning. 
In fact, he initially thought of waiting for the Huai Xi‟s self-destruction, 
however, the heavy rain at the time of strategic planning made him think of 
delivering a surprise attack, instead; “the wet weather continued for the 
following three months, so that the move could finally be made only in the 
autumn.” In 817 Li Su stroke his surprise blow: moving from the recently 
regained territory of Wen Cheng, he formed a fragmented army with the 
objective of acquiring speed and flexibility. During the march the weather 
also had a role; a snowstorm, in fact, first created panic among the troops 
but then it became a valuable means to conceal their position to the enemy. 
In fact, he and his army swiftly moved against Cai Zhou (the major 
headquarter of Huai Xi), capturing the area in a very short period of time. 
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According to this historical case, we can clearly understand how 
these generals, for better or for worse, interiorized Sun Tzu‟s teachings: Li 
Su, in fact, understood the value of the speed in military operations, 
confirming Sun Tzu‟s assumption of “rapidity is the essence of war.” 
Moreover, the surprise attack put an emphasis on two extra crucial strategic 
principles: one referred to “the advantage of the enemy‟s unreadiness,” 
which also meant attacking “unguarded spots,” while the second concerned 
the ability to move the army through “unexpected routes.”
507
    
According to the historical record of this military campaign as well as 
the overall Tang approach to military strategy, it becomes quite clear that 
even when planning defensive strategies, China relied on a strategic system 
that resembled, once again, Sun Tzu‟s approach to strategy as well as what 
would be recognized, later on, as the Maoist strategic principles, therefore 
creating an important and continuous strategic approach that ultimately 
define Chinese strategic culture, that is, the strategic design of active 
defense, which represents one of the crucial military aspects of the overall 
doctrine of People‟s War. Active defense, in line with the theoretical 
assumptions amply illustrated in the preceding chapters, relies on the 
combination of defense and offense for the definitive execution of the 
military strategy; that is, in other words, the combination of the opposite, like 
yin and yang, or orthodox and unorthodox.  
In the case at hand, that is, during the military campaign against the 
rebellious province of Huai Xi, the extensive use of fortifications by its 
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leaders did not simply signify that the province was devoted to defensive 
strategy, that is, a strategic design based on “a passive nature of a defense 
based on such fixed, heavily fortified positions.” In fact, they served also 
other purposes: they were not mere “obstacles to the enemy‟s advance or 
occupation but as centers of tactical operations against him.” This therefore 
explains that “the effectiveness of Huai Xi‟s defense was due in part 
precisely to its ability to use its defensive positions in this active fashion.”
508
 
Peterson concludes his examination of this important military 
campaign against Huai Xi advocating that this type of warfare waged by the 
rebellious province could be defined as “position defense” and he provides 
the following definition for this strategic design: 
 
[position defense is] the type of defense in which the 
bulk of the defending force is disposed in selected tactical 
localities where the decisive battle is to be fought. Principle 
reliance is placed on the ability of the forces in the defended 
localities to maintain their positions and to control the terrain 
between them. The reserve I used to add depth, to block or 
restore the battle position by counterattack.”
509
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3.2.3. Third Level of Analysis: The Tactical Design of People’s 
War 
 
According to the way the army was created and implemented into 
the overall Chinese strategic design, military maneuvers “were ideally held 
during the slack season of the agricultural year, campaigns were kept to a 
matter of months, and expeditions were launched on a there-and-back basis 
with objectives clearly specified and minimal discretion allowed to the 
commander in the field.”
510
 
This approach had a direct effect also on the logistical aspect of 
campaigns during the Tang era. During the transition from the Sui to the 
Tang and also during the Tang, the idea was to increase army‟s flexibility by 
encouraging a “live off the land” approach to expedition. While this method 
was perceived a manifestation of weakness rather than strength, at the 
same time it was conceived as an instrument to compensate for possible 
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logistical overextensions during specific military campaigns, such as the 
Tang expeditions against Koguryo. In fact, because of the importance of 
logistics, “one of Li Shimin‟s favorite maneuvers was to disrupt the supply 
lines of his adversaries.”
511
 
This clearly responded to the flexibility concept that has been widely 
analyzed in the previous chapter. That is, the idea that armies represented 
more a deceptive means, as Sun Tzu defined, than an actual material 
capability to destroy the enemy. And this was necessarily related to the fact 
that “Sui and Tang military forces consisted of crossbowmen, cavalry, and 
infantrymen,” with the chariot now having no military significance. 
Concerning the crossbowmen, due to the heavy influence of the steppe 
people, Chinese army adopted two types of bows: the foot archers used the 
sangzhe, which was mainly implemented for close combat operations; the 
second type was the jiao gong, or “horn bow,” which was mainly used by the 
mounted archers. This second type, which was a composite bow, “had been 
used by pastoral peoples of the Eurasian steppes since ancient times.”
512
  
Concerning the adoption of tactical measures through which the 
army could be employed as a deceptive means, it is significant to analyze 
how the army had been deployed during the battle of Huo-i, which occurred 
in 617, marking the transition from the Sui to the Tang dynasty. Sung Lao-
sheng, the commander of the Sui army was conducting operations within a 
stronghold, while Li Yuan was trying to implement deceptive means to 
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encourage him to fight outside of the walls. In order to achieve this goal, Li 
Yuan first deployed his cavalry in front of the walls, with the infantry behind, 
moving it to front in a second phase. “The sight of this approaching infantry 
column apparently convinced Sung Lao-sheng to send the bulk of his army 
out through the south and east gates of Huo-i.” Li Yuan, however, used 
another stratagem to “to lure him forward.” Li Yuan divided his cavalry into 
two wings and ordered them to withdraw from the battlefield, so as to 
perform a feigned retreat. This naturally “emboldened the Sui commander to 
move farther forward to a point more than one-third mile east of the town” to 
the extent that he had been caught by surprise. A final stratagem adopted 
during the engagement concerned the spread of the false information that 
Sung Lao-sheng had been killed in order to lower Sui troops‟ morale.
513
 
As the Huo-i battle account demonstrates, in Chinese medieval 
military history psychology and morale, tricks and stratagems, and finally the 
qi strength greatly mattered in war. The first aspect is connected to the 
ability to mentally destroy the enemy in order to reach victory without too 
much effort. Secondly, tricks and stratagems also played a relevant role in 
subduing the enemy in the fastest possible way. And finally, the qi strength, 
which refers to the “special” or “unorthodox” element in war, describes the 
ability to outperform the enemy by using special means, operations, or 
agents in order to be successful in war; that is, “to throw the enemy off 
balance.” In the Tang case, it is undeniable that the qi element was 
represented by the cavalry. At Huo-i most of the Tang maneuvers “were 
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carried out by cavalry, from the initial flouting of the defenders to the feigned 
retreat to the surprise rush that sealed off the gates.”
514
        
The tactical sophistication of the Sui-Tang period is also quite 
significant for what concerns the cavalry. During the Sui dynastic control, the 
heavy cavalry represented the crucial component of the army, especially 
during the campaign against the Korean kingdom of Koguryo. However, the 
military defeats the Sui encountered in the Korean territory paved the way 
for the adoption of the light cavalry (qing ji). The explanation for this change 
is not entirely related to the military defeats. It is actually more likely “related 
to the origin of the army of the newly risen Tang dynasty as a frontier once 
engaged in fighting the highly mobile Eastern Turks.”
515
   
During the Sui, the dynasty on which the Tang would finally emerge, 
additional suntzunian principles had been applied. For example, in 618, 
during the confrontation between Li Mi (warlord rebel) and Wang Shichong 
(imperial general), the former tried to avoid battle, while the latter needed to 
engage his enemy, mainly due to the fact that he was experiencing a 
shortage of supplies. However, in order to make sure that his army would 
reach success, he “had gotten himself into a situation from which he could 
not retreat.” Li Mi, on the other side, tried to deploy his troops in a “inverted 
„L‟” formation which relied on the use of mountains for mainly defensive 
operations. By relying on swift maneuvers and flexibility through the use of 
cavalry Wang managed to attack by surprise Li who did underestimate his 
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enemy. First of all, he quickly moved his troops across a river and very close 
to Li‟s camp, attacking him by surprise. At the same time, he ordered his 
cavalry to attack Li‟s rear position.
516
  
After the establishment of the Tang dynasty, Li Shimin confronted 
militarily, in 621, Hebei warlord Dou Jiande by applying the same Chinese 
military tradition, which is mainly based on avoiding “a general engagement 
by occupying a strong defensive position or fortified camp, while sending out 
smaller detachments to harass the enemy forces or raid their supply 
lines.”
517
 
Li Shimin‟s tactics, in fact, followed a specific pattern. It “involved the 
use of preliminary infantry or cavalry attacks to engage and pin down 
sections of the enemy battleline, preparing the way for the main assault – a 
cavalry charge that aimed at cutting through the line on a relatively narrow 
front, then hitting it from behind to cause the complete collapse of the enemy 
formation.”
518
 In other words, his technique relied on attacking “a critical 
weak point in the enemy line at the head of his elite cavalry” after having 
weakened the enemy through the use of other charging methods. In so 
doing, instead of relying on the use of his entire army, Li‟s main idea, in line 
with the Chinese tradition, was to “send out a relatively small detachment to 
attack a selected portion of the line in the hope of breaking through, creating 
a panic, or otherwise causing the hostile formation to come undone.” 
Moreover, during the Tang, it became quite common to use the following 
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stratagem: deploying a force “of obviously weak troops in plain view of the 
enemy as a decoy while better quality troops were placed in ambush 
positions nearby.” For example, this is what had happened in 616 when 
General Li Yuan faced Wang Mantian and his bandit army. He decided to 
deploy his weak troops so as to invite bandits‟ military response. Once this 
had been achieved, Li Yuan counterattacked with the higher quality troops, 
which were represented by the elite cavalry, rightly “concealed on both 
flanks.”
519
 
Li‟s operations proved to be a tactical masterpiece while also 
following Chinese military traditions. Dou tried to advance toward the capital 
Luoyang and was met by Li‟s troops at the strategic pass of Hulao, near the 
capital. The geographical features and the overall military setting 
encouraged a Western sinologist to label it the “Chinese Thermopylae.”
520
 
During the operations, Li put his army in a defensive position on a 
hilltop, waiting for the enemy to move first. However, the latter stretched his 
line of communications too thin, giving Li the possibility to attack, spreading 
chaos among the enemy‟s ranks. After this, Li ordered his cavalry “to move 
south and then east in order to turn the enemy‟s left flank.” Dou responded 
by moving his army to a more defensive position, disrupting “his army‟s 
linear formation.” The move Li was waiting for. The Tang prince, hence, led 
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a light cavalry attack in order to “cut into the retreating troops” with the rest 
of the army following behind him.
521
  
While campaigns were necessarily conducted, however, the 
fundamental tactical principle was to build an army which responded to the 
strategic dictum of subduing the enemy without fighting. A strategic principle 
that could be accomplished by the simultaneous use of deception and 
flexible maneuvers, where the latter became possible “due to the large 
number of smaller, locally based units that could be called on for a major 
campaign.” This tactical principle was widely internalized throughout the 
Tang dynasty during both its period of political strength and institutional 
weakness. At the height of its power, for example, the Tang implemented 
important tactical maneuvers that resembled the classic tactical teachings of 
Chinese history, that emphasized “speed and mobility, and flanking and 
other indirect maneuvers [which] received preference over brute shock 
action.”
522
 This overall tactical approach, that is, the division into multiple 
echelons, “meant that a part of the army would be ready to respond to 
sudden contingencies or reversals while others were already engaged.” This 
method allowed the army to constantly bring new and fresh troops to the 
battlefield, especially “when fighting against a more numerous enemy.”
523
 At 
the same time, the “subdue the enemy without fighting” principle was also 
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implemented during the confrontation with the steppe armies. In those 
occasions, the Tang frequently implemented the “scorched earth” policy, 
which was aimed at weakening the enemies, bringing them to collapse by 
impeding the use of local resources for supplying the army.
524
 
At the theoretical level, in fact, this flexible principle was conceived 
through the design of the classic “well system,” which according to its 
structure, would have displayed the so-called five formations and eight 
directions. The five formations referred to the disposition of the army along 
the four central squares of the well system, with the fifth, the central one, 
occupied by the general. The remaining four should have been left empty, in 
order to allow the preceding four military companies to interconnect each 
other so as to give form to the eight directions. Therefore, the tactical 
assumption was that the army should start its formation with five 
components and ending, ultimately, with eight according to the 
circumstances. In so doing, the army  
 
“can take the front to be the rear, the rear to be the 
front. When advancing they do not run quickly; when 
withdrawing, they do not race off. There are four heads, eight 
tails. Wherever they are struck is made the head. If the enemy 
attacks the middle, the [adjoining] two heads will both come to 
the rescue. The numbers begin with five and end with eight … 
as for the changes and transformations to control the enemy: 
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Intermixed and turbulent, their fighting [appeared] chaotic, but 
their method was not disordered. Nebulous an varying, their 
deployment was circular, but their strategic power [shih] was 
not dispersed. This is what is meant by „they disperse and 
become eight, reunite and again become one.‟”
525
    
 
In Li Jing‟s explanations of tactics to Taizong, it is illustrated another 
important theoretical assumption that emphasizes even more the importance 
of flexibility and deception, this time in relation to the frontier strategy. When 
Taizong informed him that he guaranteed the frontier tribes, recently 
conquered, the establishment of the Han (that is, Chinese) bureaucratic 
administration in order to keep them at bay and that he wished to find a way 
to preserve peace between the barbarians and the Han Chinese who lived 
also in those regions, Li Jing – a Tang general who would have become 
popular later on for being one of the protagonists of one of the Seven 
Military Classics – replied: 
 
“your Majesty has ordered the establishment of sixty-six 
relay stations from the Tujue to the Huihuo [Uighers] to connect 
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the forward observation posts. This step already implements 
the necessary measures. However, I foolishly believe it is 
appropriate for the Han [defensive] forces to have one method 
of training and the barbarians another. Since their instruction 
and training are separate, do not allow them to be intermixed 
and treated the same. If we encounter the incursion of some 
other group, then at that moment you can secretly order the 
generals to change their insignia and exchange their uniforms, 
and employ unorthodox methods to attack them … this is the 
technique referred to as „manifesting many methods to cause 
misperception.‟ If you have the barbarians appear as Han 
Chinese, and Han Chinese masquerade as barbarians, the 
[enemy] will not know the distinction between barbarians and 
Chinese. Then no one will be able to fathom our plans for 
attack and defense. One who excels at employing an army first 
strives not the fathomable, for then the enemy be confused 
wherever he goes.”
526
  
 
At the practical level, in one famous case, for example, in the first 
half of the seventh century, Li Jing conducted a sophisticated military 
operation against the Turks, after the latter‟s revolt against the Chinese rule. 
In 629, Li Jing moved three thousand crack cavalry through the Eyang 
Mountains. This operation astonished the Great Qaghan Xieli, who could not 
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believe that Li Jing could accomplish this task. Along with the application of 
swift moves through the mountains, Li Jing, moreover, ordered his agents to 
“sow discord among the Qaghan‟s trusted confidants.” Once the enemy was 
internally weakened, he launched a night surprise attack, destroying 
Qaghan‟s troops and forcing him to flee.
527
       
In terms of flexibility, under the reign of Taizong, the emperor 
decided to adopt a new strategy against Koguryo, after collecting a number 
of military setbacks in the first half of the seventh century. This new military 
approach concerned “sending generals with small, mobile forces to make 
harassing attacks on the Koguryo frontier, with the aim of wearing down the 
enemy by forcing them to maintain strong defenses and a high level of 
vigilance at all times.” This type of military approach allowed the Tang army 
to achieve success in 647. A new military expedition was planned for the 
year after, but it was rejected after the death of Taizong.
528
 
In another famous case, another general, Gao Xianzhi, 
distinguished himself for the right and efficacious military planning. In the 
preceding stages of the Battle of Talas, which occurred in 751 and 
represented the first direct military encounter between the Tang and the 
Arab army, the imperial forces had moved swiftly against the Tibetan army 
which was also involved in the geopolitical confrontation between the two 
contending powers by allying itself with the Arab Caliphate. Known as the 
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Pamirs Expedition, this military campaign, which lasted four years (748-751), 
was meant to quickly subdue the Tibetan forces in order to regain part of the 
lost territory while also preventing a possible unified attack of the Tibetan-
Arab forces against the Tang troops.  
This expedition is particularly relevant not only for the tactics 
employed, but also for the military achievements that those tactics granted, 
especially when applied into some very difficult geographical terrains. In fact, 
the expedition, after leaving from Anxi –which was the locality of the frontier 
region of the Tarim Basin, that is, a territory located in the northwestern part 
of China in today‟s Xinjiang – reached the Pamirs, a region full of high 
mountains that lies in today‟s Central Asia (Tajikistan) and connects 
Kyrgyzstan with China, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Gao Xianzhi, who was 
the general appointed for this expedition, led ten thousand men, composed 
of cavalry and infantry, first through the Taklamakan desert and Kashgar (in 
today‟s Xinjiang), that were reached in thirty-five days, and then through the 
mountains of Pamirs, which had been reached in another twenty days. 
Ultimately, after additional forty days, he reached the Oxus River, that is, 
nearby the place of the collision between Chinese forces and the Arab army. 
He accomplished this long tactical maneuver in less than three months; a 
logistical result quite astonishing for the epoch. This speed was achieved 
thanks to two factors: the military genius of Gao Xianzhi combined with the 
specific tactical dispositions, such as his decision to break the army into 
smaller columns. Stein, one important geographer, so described Gao‟s 
incredible tactical result: 
359
 
 
 
The marching distance here indicated agrees well with the 
time which large caravans of men and transport animals would 
at present need to cover the same ground.  But how the 
Chinese general managed to feed so large a force after once it 
had entered the tortuous gorges and barren high valleys 
beyond the outlying oases of the present Kashgar and 
Yangihissar districts is a problem which might look formidable, 
indeed, to any modern commander...The crossing of the Pamirs 
by a force which in its total strength amounted to ten thousand 
men is so remarkable a military achievement that the measures 
which alone probably made it possible deserve some closer 
examination, however succinct the Chinese record is upon 
which we have to base it.
529
        
 
After bringing his army to the place where the Tang was supposed to 
fight in order to gain control over the territory of Central Asia, Gao Xianzhi 
decided again to divide his army into three columns and move directly 
against the Tibetans who had been caught by surprise. “Maneuvering to his 
enemy‟s flank, Gao achieved a tactical envelopment, in which he gained the 
key high ground on the battlefield and was able to penetrate the Tibetan 
defenses and destroy the enemy line in detail,” gaining full control of the 
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Oxus Valley. In so doing, the Tang managed to extinguish the Tibetan 
threat, while also cutting Tibet‟s lines of communications with the Arab 
forces.
530
 Such astonishing military success must be remembered not only 
for its clear military sophistication (which in itself represents a key asset), but 
also because it represented “the first, and perhaps the last, time [in which a 
general] led an organized army right across the Pamirs and successfully 
pierced the great mountain rampart that defends Yasin-Gilgit and with it the 
Indus valley against invasion from the north.”
531
 
This campaign plan, therefore, “revealed much about Gao‟s 
understanding of complex operational considerations in warfare, such as the 
proper execution of key logistical tasks associated with force projection over 
such a distance, the sequencing of lines of operation, control of the tempo of 
the campaign, and most significantly, the focus on campaign endstates.” 
Moreover, this also illustrates that his tactical design was mainly based on a 
sequence approach, that is, the ability to connect one tactical victory with the 
others, resulting in an interconnected sequence of military actions. 
 
“The maneuver of this army was organized into distinct, 
sequential phases. Each phase oriented  on strategic endstates 
and built on the successful accomplishment of the previous 
phase. Gao‟s first march objective was to achieve the crossing 
of the Pamirs with his force intact. This required the movement 
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of this force from its start point in Anxi, through the desert to the 
oasis city of Kashgar, across the initial mountain passes to the 
frontier outpost at Tashkurgan, and finally, the most difficult 
movement across the peak and into the Oxus River valley via 
multiple mountain passes. His next phase was to initiate 
combat operations against the Tibetans down the Oxus River 
valley to the mountain stronghold at Sarhad. In this phase, Gao 
maneuvered his force in tactical formations, enabling a 
coordinated convergence at Sarhad from three directions. The 
final phase involved the movement of the force southwards into 
Gilgit, the pacification of that kingdom, and the establishment of 
permanent frontier bases from which to launch future offensive 
operations into Transoxania. These effective operational 
maneuvers accomplished two important strategic tasks, the 
isolation of Gilgit and the severing of the line of communication 
between the Tibetans and the Arabs.”
532
  
 
Gao‟s success is also directly related to the supporting logistical plan 
that strongly paved the way for the successful execution of the tactical 
design. During the expedition, in fact, “his traversing of the mountain passes 
in multiple columns suggests a very well-ordered logistical plan.” Moreover, 
he also decided to move his force “through multiple avenues of approach, 
speeding the movement of the force and maximizing available outpost 
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supplies and local provisions until the army descended into the more fertile 
Oxus River valley.”
533
 
Despite the incredible military performance during the Pamirs 
Expedition, Gao Xianzhi and his army were ruinously defeated in 751 during 
the famous Battle of Talas against the Arab forces that intervened to help 
Central Asian tribes which begged for help against the Chinese forces. 
Therefore, one immediately wonders: “How can a commander who 
accomplished so extraordinary a task, one that has never before or since 
been duplicated by a Chinese Army, be utterly defeated in a single battle 
only three years later?” Besides the mere tactical problem related to the 
defection of the Qarluk Turks who, during the battle, switched side, there are 
other important considerations to keep in mind.  First of all at the institutional 
level. After the Pamirs Expedition‟s incredible success, Gao Xianzhi was 
promoted as regional military governor; something that would have affected 
his subsequent military performance. In fact, in the role as commander of 
the Pamirs Expedition, “Gao demonstrated exceptional audacity and a 
masterful understanding of the art and science of warfare at the campaign 
level. His movements were well-planned and orchestrated, demonstrating 
his unmatched expertise in strategic logistics,” besides for his proved 
expertise on “the operational art, linking and integrating the tactical tasks of 
the mission together to achieve his operational objectives.” Moreover, part of 
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his success was also related to his clear understanding of the strategic 
objectives of the dynasty for which he was working.
534
     
However, after he had been appointed military governor, he “devolved 
from military commander to regional warlord.” This new position altered his 
military skills to the extent that his behavior was “inconsistent with his 
previous record.  His operational military actions were reckless and 
impatient. In a short period of time, therefore, “he stopped working in support 
of his empire‟s strategic objectives and began operating in support of his 
own,” culminating into a sound military defeat.
535
 
At the operational level, Gao seemed to have neglected the 
fundamental principles of war. First of all he did not set up an operational 
reserve in the region under his control: “an experienced campaign 
commander such as Gao should have known the importance of operational 
reserves, which can be committed into battle to exploit successes or to 
reinforced weaknesses.” Moreover, he seems to not have fully studied the 
opponent, therefore lacking “any form of counter-reconnaissance to provide 
early warning of enemy movement in his area of operations.”
536
 Therefore 
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his defeat can also be explained by the fact that his military response was 
planned without taking into consideration the basic Suntzunian principles 
like: employing the necessary defensive measures and obtaining the vital 
information surrounding the enemy‟s tactical and strategic disposition. 
People‟s War tactical principles, besides being employed by the Tang, 
had also been employed – inevitably – by Huang Chao‟s insurgent 
movement. And Tang‟s response, even if managed in the end to defeat the 
insurrectionist movement, could not prevent its dramatic consequences. 
Huang Chao‟s tactics would have represented, centuries afterwards, the key 
military tactical masterpiece of Chinese military  campaigns. In this specific 
case, Huang Chao, while confronting Tang troops in 878, reporting a defeat 
in the north, decided to swiftly move south, pushing his men to embrace 
“one of the most outrageous peregrinations in history.” Once he moved 
south, he and his army went through “some of the most difficult terrain in the 
country,” managing to occupy other port cities, such as Fuzhou and 
Guangzhou. After that he decided to move again northward, in order to 
attack the capital by fast maneuvers;  “anticipating the long marches of the 
Taiping rebels in 1851-53 and of the communists in 1934-1935, he looped 
west through Guizhou before regaining the middle Yangzi.” These 
movements were based on a specific tactical method: “like Mao Zedong, 
Huang Chao was turning tactical retreat into political triumph. The 
government had interpreted his southern excursion as a retreat; indeed, in 
the course of his thirty months on the move (as against Mao‟s thirteen), 
Huang Chao repeatedly sought a favorable amnesty,” after whose denial, 
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decided to quickly move against the capital. “After nearly three years and 
4,800 kilometers on the march, they stormed into the Wei valley to capture 
Chang‟an.”
537
   
Still in the ninth century, during the famous Huai Xi campaign, other 
surrounding autonomous provinces tried to intervene militarily against the 
imperial forces. Besides adopting a deceptive strategy (explained above), at 
the tactical level, for example, Ping Lu adopted a flexible tactical disposition, 
by letting troops conduct marauding activities to the extent that the 
surrounding area of the capital Luoyang also suffered deep wounds: “in the 
fourth month of the same year [815] Ping Lu inflicted its heaviest damage 
when its agents destroyed by fire the huge tax entrepot at Ho-yin (near 
Luoyang). Losses here in silk, grain, and cash ran into the hundreds of 
thousands of items. In the sixth month Ping Lu committed one of the 
outrages of the age, dispatching assassins to murder a prowar chief minister 
at Chang An. Later in the summer, however, its attempt at guerrilla action in 
Luoyang was frustrated.”
538
 
The first part of the Huai Xi campaign ended with the victory of the 
rebellious province over the central government. Part of this success can 
also be ascribed to its tactical disposition. In fact, besides the evident 
problem of cohesion affecting the imperial troops and the individual ability of 
Huai Xi‟s commanders, the source of the province‟s strength was based on 
two crucial elements: on one hand, the ability to be on the defensive, 
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therefore operating along interior lines, while the second element resided on 
the province‟s ability to raise infantry and cavalry. Specifically, this province 
developed an extensive horse production, also attested by its trade 
specialization which was mainly based on the leather goods. “Consequently, 
the physical isolation and numerical inferiority under which it suffered were 
for at least some time offset by these specific military advantages,”
539
 
creating the typical case often illustrated in Chinese war manuals.
540
 
While preparing for conflict, Huai Xi‟s troops were mainly based on a 
combination of infantry and cavalry in order to gain the maximum level of 
mobility. Within the mounted force, “an elite corps commanded by [Tong 
Zhongzhi] was held in particular fear … This unit was called the „Mule Corps‟ 
(luozijun, luo zitu)” and its units were soldiers mounted on mules. These 
tactical measures assured the rebellious province a concrete military 
success.
541
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But the emperor realized that part of the defeat could have been 
explained by the lack of morale and proper discipline. At the tactical level, 
he, then, decided to adjust the structure of his troops by appointing Li Su. 
He, along with the measures adopted to increase the troops‟ morale, issued 
the order to acquire 2,000 northwestern cavalrymen, which included also 
Turks: “this was to strengthen [the army] not only quantitatively but 
qualitatively as well. Li also made good use in his operations of local recruits 
for whose recruitment of acquisition he may also have been responsible.” 
And one final measure he adopted consisted of developing “an elite body of 
assault troops [tujiang],” made of cavalry. This special force accompanied 
the already existent Li‟s elite guard unit, the “Six Sections of Foot and Horse 
(liu bu bing ma 六部兵马).”542 
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These measures helped increase the overall military preparation to 
the extent that Li Su, through a surprise attack explained above, reported a 
full victory over Huai Xi. At the tactical level, besides the transformation that 
he had advanced, the army had been further adjusted in order to deliver the 
fatal blow. In order to increase flexibility and speed, he fragmented the army 
into three bodies composed of 3,000 men each: “in the vanguard, heavy 
cavalry under the command of the key ex Huai Xi general, Li Yu; in the 
center Li Su, probably at the head of his elite „Six Sections‟; in the rear, a 
mixed cavalry-foot unit.”  
Moreover, another important tactical aspect was Li Su‟s decision to 
keep the troops ignorant about his real intentions. At the beginning of the 
operations, the troops occupied one of the rebel‟s position at Zhang Zhai: 
“this they seized by surprise, slaughtering the garrison and immediately 
assigning contingents to cut the principle communication routes.” After this 
operation, with no possibility to flee the military position Li Su informed the 
troops that the final military objective was the capture of Cai Zhou. This 
tactical aspect is quite important, because it illustrates how Sun Tzu‟s 
principles still proved applicable even if many centuries afterwards. In fact, 
by informing the troops too late, which was one of the tactical objectives, he 
created the conditions for the inevitability of the military engagement. 
Because, as Sun Tzu advocated, soldiers fight much harder, therefore, with 
more success, if they are put in a position from which they cannot but fight: 
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“at the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed 
up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men 
deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.”
543
  
Notwithstanding the fact that Huai Xi had been definitely defeated, 
nevertheless, its defensive system was really efficient, and not simply 
because it acted in a defensive manner, which always carries with itself a 
tactical advantage. In fact, besides its external fortification, which, of course 
represented an efficient means of defense, Huai Xi developed, at the same 
time “a large number of secondary defense positions” with the effect of 
gaining “a considerable degree of mobility.”  
The structure of these fortifications consisted of the presence of an 
outer wall (yang ma cheng) along with an earthwork, which was located 
outside of the city walls: “this served both as an initial but expendable line of 
defense and as a staging area for operations outside the fortress or town 
proper.” The peculiarity of this period, moreover, was the presence of extra 
lines of defense to the extent that assailing and conquering the outer walls 
did not guarantee victory. In fact, inside the city there was frequently an 
inner fortress (zicheng) “probably not unlike the keep of Western castles.” 
This system represented “a fortress within a fortress.” Moreover, some other 
cities, especially provincial capitals, for a further degree of security “had an 
even smaller enclosure (yacheng) which held the residence and 
administrative remises of the provincial governor or other senior official. This 
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enclosure seems to have been entirely for his personal safety and probably 
served no serious military function in the defense of the town.”
544
   
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that at the geographical level, 
the different towns or fortifications, except for their own actual perimeter of 
defense, did not have lines of protection between the different military posts. 
Therefore, during the Tang, it became important to connect these 
fortifications, in order to create an extensive defensive network. These 
secondary defensive positions, “mostly called cha,” referred to many 
different types of defensive infrastructures located around the country. They 
were used as a form of “palisade” or as a “field-fort”, where the latter 
became a permanent military outpost, sometimes hosting up to 3,000 
soldiers in permanent duty. They were, therefore, disseminated throughout 
the country, creating a zone-type, rather than a line-type, defensive 
configuration.
545
    
And completing the overall tactical logic, after the establishment of 
fortifications around the country, it became important, from the ninth century 
onwards, to secure the defense and the control of the countryside, that is, of 
all the surrounding area of the fortified town. In order to secure the 
application of this system, a “scorched earth” tactic had been widely 
employed for two major reasons: on one hand, the idea was to deprive the 
enemy of everything “which could be of potential value,” transporting it inside 
the city walls. On the other, this principle was conceived “to deny the enemy 
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cover for ambushes and to provide the defenders with an unobstructed 
glacis.”
546
  
 
3.3. Conclusions 
 
 As this chapter illustrated, the Tang dynasty represented an 
important turning point in Chinese history, more than other periods or 
dynasties. It opened up new political, social, and military perspectives that 
would have exerted profound influences on the subsequent dynasties and 
historical processes to the extent that “the notion that the Tang-Song divide 
was a turning point in this regard seems somewhat overdrawn.” And this is 
also further demonstrated at the military level: in the Tang-Song transition, 
“the most important development in military technology, the introduction of 
gunpowder weapons, appears to have had very little impact on strategy and 
the basic patterns of warfare.” The other relevant military institutions of early 
Chinese history – such as households registration, militia institutions, “the 
assignment of scholars and civil officials to military command,” and “the 
militarization of rural society in response to the breakdown of central 
authority” – still played a major role even after the Tang-Song divide; a deep 
behavioral pattern that “can be seen from antiquity through to the early 
twentieth century.” The use of these institutions until the Ming era facilitated 
the increasing mobilization of people for military service; the number of 
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soldiers enlisted for military affairs, therefore, increased exponentially in 
future generations – reaching several millions of soldiers – to the extent that 
it was more the result of “China‟s population growth” rather than some sort 
of “military revolution.”
547
 In other words, even during the Song dynasty, the 
attempt to “construct a new order was just to extend the late Tang‟s old 
order.”
548
 According to these reasons, the Tang dynasty symbolized a 
fundamental historical case against which testing the validity of the People‟s 
War Doctrine. 
 As these pages have demonstrated, People‟s War, again, found a 
complete application in its major social, strategic, and tactical elements. The 
fubing system, in line with the Chinese military tradition, intimately combined 
the civil with the military and it served indirectly the function of controlling the 
population, while directly mobilizing it. This system represented one of the 
most important military policy adopted during the Tang dynasty (even if it 
was abolished in the second part of the dynasty). 
Also the Song dynasty, once obtained the political power, followed 
some of the typical social policies implemented by the Tang. For example, 
for what concerns the registration of households and the associated 
surveillance policies the Song installed the baojia system (baojia zhidu 
保甲制度) which consisted in a specific program of people‟s mobilization as 
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well as mutual surveillance, based again on households, like it had been the 
case for the Warring States period and the Qin empire.
549
  
Even if the Tang still exerted a profound influence over the Song, it 
is important to highlight how the spreading warlordism during the Tang 
contributed to create a deep sense of anti-militarism during the Song, 
assuring that the civil authority could be firmly reestablished over the military 
sphere, to the extent that “it became quite common for civil officials to be 
entrusted with important military commands.” This, in turn, affected Song‟s 
military professionalism, impeding it to reconquer the northern provinces.
550
 
The profound influence of the Tang institutions for the subsequent 
dynasties is nevertheless attested by the way military provinces were 
administered. For example, in order to keep political centralization, Later 
Tang instituted in 926 the “Emperor‟s Army.” It was mainly “patterned after 
the elite headquarters force of a Tang military governor but on a much larger 
scale, it provided the ruler with a powerful force to keep his military 
governors in line.”
551
    
At the strategic level, along with deception and flexibility, and also 
thanks to the technological innovations, like the gunpowder, the combination 
of the opposites created a strategic logic that would have been defined, 
centuries afterwards, as the active defense, since both defense and offense 
had to be intermixed in order to increase the strategic potential. Specifically, 
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it became central to find ways to undermine from within the enemy in order 
to create the preconditions for its capitulation. This strategy, often defined as 
“using barbarians against barbarians” heavily relied on deception and 
psychological warfare. 
And finally, at the tactical level, flexibility in the military disposition 
was highly emphasized for both surprise attacks – with its inevitable 
psychological effects leading to the realization of the strategic principle of 
subduing the enemy without fighting – and the associated capacity to swiftly 
move along the lines of communication that, during the Tang, became very 
long, due to the vast empire. 
At the tactical level, moreover, the newly introduced technological 
innovations also paved the way for a new, but also, traditional way of 
engaging warfare. During this period, in fact, the country witnessed a 
profound transformation of the urbanization, with the creation of fortifications 
around the empire. This, in turn, paved the way for the tactical organization 
of the siege warfare and military outposts that would have found a further 
theoretical and practical development during the Song dynasty, in which new 
technical instruments like the composite crossbow, seven lever and 
whirlwind catapults, and cloud ladder were introduced into the overall 
military calculation.         
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Chapter 4 
Chinese People‟s War 
Doctrine at the time of Mao 
Zedong 
 
 
 
guerrilla warfare had stepped out of the bounds of tactics  
and now knocked at the door of strategy,  
demanding [to] be considered from a strategic viewpoint.
552
 
 
 
 
Chinese history from the end of the Tang dynasty to the 
establishment of the republic in the twentieth century had gone through 
many dynasties, which followed the political path set up by the Tang. 
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Historical evolution and other relevant changes had occurred; significant in 
this case, just to cite an example, had been the maritime transformation the 
Song Dynasty had set up for future generations: “naval fleets began to nose 
forth from the rivers, mercantile shipping to wing across the high seas.” This 
would have set the stage for the Chinese maritime evolution, and 
consequent exploration, that had characterized the Ming Dynasty. Its 
importance is also reflected by the fact that “rarely had the coastline featured 
in Chinese strategic calculations as a frontier, or the sea in cosmic theory as 
an „All-under-Heaven‟ element. Their utility lay almost entirely in the fish, salt 
and tributary bounty.”
553
 Notwithstanding the inevitable changes that time 
had brought in Chinese history, the central tenets remained the same, such 
as the organization of society, conceptualization of politics and geopolitics, 
and the consideration on warfare.
554
  
For example, the Ming Dynasty, established after the collapse of the 
Yuan Dynasty (which represented a foreign one), very often had 
demonstrated its willingness to “piously restoring the institutions and rituals 
of the Tang and the Song.”
555
 Yongle emperor, for example, while 
undertaking his territorial expansion, was determined to “surpass the Han 
and the Tang” in terms of aggrandizement and prestige. In fact, as part of 
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his overall desire to pursue the “proof of Heaven‟s approval and his own 
legitimacy,” he decided to recreate the greatest Chinese empires of the past. 
As a consequence, since the Han and the Tang empire “had embraced the 
Red River flood plain and extended down Annam‟s coastal panhandle, so 
must his.”
556
 
After a long decaying process, mainly characterized by internal 
problems and rebellions, the final battle, in 1644, near Shanhaiguan (not far 
away from Beijing), a gateway to the Great Wall, signed the official collapse 
of the Ming dynasty and the beginning of that political process that had led 
to the establishment of the new Qing dynasty. Affected by decades of 
agricultural problems, Li Zicheng soon became a leading rebellious figure 
against the Ming. Leading a powerful army in 1644 he engaged with the 
Ming army in Beijing, while the new Mongol confederation of the Jurchen-
Manchu was pressing from the east, specifically from the Liaodong area. 
However, the fact that the capital was about to succumb pressed Ming 
general, Wu Sangui, to swiftly move towards Beijing, even asking the 
Jurchen-Manchu for help. Once reached Beijing and managing to defeat Li 
Zicheng, he and the entire Ming elites witnessed the arrival of the Jurchen-
Manchu and their subsequent control of the city, paving the way for the 
transfer of the Mandate of Heaven. “Thus the first major battle in defence of 
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the Great Wall was fought not against alien attackers from without but 
against Chinese attackers from within.”
557
 
The distinctive military character of the Manchus, whose rule would 
then establish the new Qing Dynasty, was the use of distinctive flags with 
different colors. This structure, then, was used as a recruiting system among 
the different tribes. These flags and the associated troops, which came to be 
recognized as the “Banners” experienced a social organization to the extent 
that each of them “identified with specific ethno-social groups, formed the 
basic military units into which the people of the north-east, whether Jurchen, 
Mongol or Han, were being steadily absorbed as Nurhaci extended his 
sway.”
558 
Specifically, these banners, called gusai, were based on the 
traditional Manchu system of companies niru. Each niru comprised a total of 
300 people and they focused on economic, political, and social functions, 
ranging from the salt production to border defense. Five of them composed 
a section, jiala. Finally each banner was composed of five jiala, that is, 7,500 
men.
559
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However, this “institutional revolution” would not have been possible, 
had it not been for the previous coexistence between the Manchu social 
system and the Chinese military defensive system of weisuo 卫所, adopted 
during the Ming dynasty, and which had been influenced by the previous 
foreign occupation of Yuan dynasty.
560
 These Bannermen would then 
constitute “the Manchu striking force in China and the privileged backbone of 
Manchu society throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”
561
 
Notwithstanding their importance and centrality, the bannermen 
nevertheless would have been accompanied in military expeditions, 
specifically in Central Asia, by the green banners – luying – which were 
composed by Chinese soldiers, whose initial duty was to undertake local 
police activities while also keeping ready as reserve troops. However, by the 
end of the dynasty, it became more and more frequent to let local governors 
set up local militias, xiangyong.
562
 These characterized the progressive 
development of the Banners‟ composition, whose structure now “included far 
more Han Chinese, both long-serving farmer-soldiers from Liaodong and 
more recent recruits from south of the Great Wall, than native Jurchen and 
Mongols.”
563
  
However, the internal transformation soon had to cope with the 
external ones; specifically the transformation of the international system and 
the first real institutional challenges arising from outside, which would have 
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set the pace for a slow but inevitable collapse of the Qing Dynasty: the 
Dutch, Portuguese, and finally Russians made their way to China. In a short 
period of time, the new dynasty had to think of how to handle these new 
types of diplomatic interactions. The Russian diplomatic challenge, for 
example, concerning the Russian progressive expansion in the northern part 
of China, led to the signing of the Nerchinsk Treaty, in 1689, which 
represented one of the first “unequal treaty” that China had to recognize as a 
piece of diplomatic work. The sign of the treaty, moreover, was historically 
significant, since, for the first time, it acknowledged the existence of another 
sovereign state – “so contradicting the traditional concept of the universal 
Mandate that underlay all those peace-through-kinship and trade-as-tribute 
agreements.”
564
   
However, before the advent of the nineteenth century – that is, the 
turbulent, crucial period of Chinese history – between 1690 and 1760, the 
Three Emperors (Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong) “conducted against the 
Zunghar Mongols a devastatingly long, if intermittent, war of attrition.” The 
campaign proved to be tough but highly rewarding. The campaign, in fact, 
concerned far-flung territories, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, western 
Mongolia, and eastern Kazakhstan, proving that the military expedition was 
“a logistical triumph in itself.” When the war ended in 1759, Zungharia, which 
comprised “western Mongolia, the northern Urumqi area of Xinjiang and the 
neighbouring district of Kazakhstan,” was finally absorbed by the Qing 
dynasty. The territory became “a blank social space, to be filled by a state-
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sponsored settlement movement of millions of Han Chinese peasants, 
Manchu Bannermen, Turkestani oasis settlers, Hui [Chinese muslims] and 
others.”  Moreover, those military expeditions allowed the Qing territory to 
double, making the configuration of today‟s China‟s territory.
565
   
These territorial annexations, according to many historians, 
responded to the overall desire to emulate the Han and the Tang dynasty, 
since they had represented the last clear examples of the Chinese control 
over that vast territory today known as China. Through this politico-military 
effort, China seemed to have acquired a “manifest destiny,” which granted it 
the “proportions of a subcontinent; zhongguo had reached its „natural‟ 
frontiers.” However, the historical roots of the Qing did also play a relevant 
role, to the extent that this territorial expansion also responded to the legacy 
of Chinggis Khan. Hence, while the Qing, it is undeniable, “had inherited the 
universalist claims of Heaven‟s Son … as the Jurchen, a people whose Jin 
empire had been an early casualty of Mongol expansion, they had assumed 
the „world ruling‟ rights of the Great Khan.”
566
 
These new territories were administered by relying on the previous 
Chinese systems of territorial control, especially the Ming, even if the Qing 
had introduced some important modifications in order to preserve the 
Manchu supremacy. The area of what would be later on recognized as 
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Manchuria, as well as the western territories like Xinjiang, had been divided, 
and therefore administered, into military governorships.
567
 
For what concerned the domestic front, the Qing dynasty social 
system was based on the same “mutual surveillance” type of control. Having 
represented the crucial social system of control for many centuries, it 
became now again the central element of the new dynasty. Referring 
specifically to the Song baojia system, the Qing “grouped households into 
decimal units of a thousand (bao-) and a hundred (-jia), the latter being 
composed of ten groupings of ten households and each unit having its own 
headman.”
568
 
The Qing, however, and China in general, had to face the crucial 
turning point in history of the two Opium Wars, occurred in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, which paved the way for the future collapse of the entire 
dynastic system and the advent of a socio-political transformation. This 
reflected also the new political situations that China had to face: Chinese 
elite hoped to appease foreign invaders like it used to be with the invaders 
from Central Asia, “but it became clear that this tactic underestimated the 
fundamentally different nature of the new threat. The imperialists sought to 
occupy not just land, but minds,” as attested by the prolific missionary 
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activities that had started to spread all over the country, with their direct 
consequences, as the Taiping Rebellion clearly had demonstrated.
569
 
 In the nineteenth century new schools of thought started to flourish, 
which encouraged the adoption of new systems of thinking in order to make 
China stand the Western military and political superiority. For instance, 
within one specific school, the “Gongyang school” (Gongyangxue), 
established earlier than the outbreak of the two Opium Wars, one of its 
scholars, Wei Yuan, wrote in 1842 the Haiguo tuzhi which, besides 
describing the overseas countries, reformulated the Chinese historical 
theory of “using the barbarians against barbarians” (以夷制夷) in order to 
resist foreign pressure.
570
     
This very delicate context, in line with the overall Chinese historical 
continuities, gave rise to the outbreak of internal insurgencies which proved 
particularly destabilizing for the Qing dynasty. Paradoxically, the foreign 
countries which were spending energies to subjugate China were now the 
ones to safeguard the existence of the dynasty against the internal revolts. 
From the end of the eighteenth century onwards, there were many regional 
uprisings, also helped by the Chinese secret societies that had played a 
central role in Chinese history,
571
 however, one became particularly relevant 
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for both its nature and the consequences that came out of it: the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850-1864), whose name derived from the slogan taiping tianguo, 
that is, the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace, which represented the 
ultimate goal that Chinese society had to strive to achieve and which 
consisted in destroying all those internal enemies that contaminated 
Chinese society, including the Manchu dynasty. Part of its strength also 
derived from the pervasive Christian teachings that some converted fully 
embraced, such as the case of Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the movement. 
For its intensity and political strength, the revolt had been recognized as 
“one of the great pivotal events of Chinese history,” “the greatest revolution 
the world has ever seen,”
572
 or even the “greatest civil war that China, and 
perhaps the world, has ever seen.”
573
 Besides evaluating whether these 
comments are correct or not, one thing stands clear: “the Taiping movement 
spans the insurrectionist watershed between the dynastic challengers of the 
past and the ideological engineers of the future.” And this had to do with the 
fact that the movement demonstrated to be “an Asian peasants‟ revolt 
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 Ssu-yü Teng , The Taiping Rebellion And The Western Powers (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971), pp. 1-3 
573
 Rana Mitter, China's War With Japan, 1937-1945, p. 21 
390
 
 
flavoured by Judaeo-Christian messianism,”
574
 with its own members 
enlisted into “paramilitary organizations that reflected the millennial Chinese 
tradition, with military, religious, and administrative functions.”
575
 
At the same time, the Taiping demonstrated to be a proper 
revolution, not only because it established a new state, the Heavenly 
Kingdom of Great Peace already mentioned above, but also because it 
created (or it would have reestablished) the ancient Chinese political and 
administrative principles. For example, the movement created a radical 
agrarian reform, relying on the jingtian system. Moreover, in accordance to 
the previous methods of social surveillance, the Taiping also set up the 
organization of families according to a specific system – the ku – which 
comprised twenty-five families. This system was also based on a “structure 
that was simultaneously religious, administrative, military, and productive.”
576
   
The combination of these aspects made it a very unique politico-
theological movement. Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the movement, 
professed to be the new son of God and started to practice a new religion in 
China, targeting Buddhism and Confucianism as the negative aspects of 
China‟s society. At the same time, the movement, once becoming an armed 
one, relied on ancient Chinese texts, in order to find more inspiration for its 
military organization. The key text had been the Zhouli (the Rites of Zhou), 
thought to be, for centuries, the “fundamentalist text” for bringing order into 
the overall Chinese society. It was also believed, moreover, that only at that 
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time China “had been the recipient of the „original doctrine of the Heavenly 
Father.‟”
577
 
The importance of the Taiping rebellion can also be ascribed to its 
contribution to the establishment of a contemporary form of Chinese 
nationalism. In fact, most of the ideals that characterized the movement, 
such as “antipathy to Qing imperialism … authenticity through alignment with 
an impeccably organized agrarian society, insistence of China‟s centrality … 
a yearning of social justice and gender equality, and the espousal of a 
common Han Chinese identity based on place, race and culture rather than 
dynastic mandates and historiographic sanction,” would have been 
recollected and implemented in the next manifestations of Chinese 
nationalism.
578
 
The nineteenth century, characterized by vast internal problems and 
foreign occupation, paved the way for what would have become a 
devastating civil war, which ended with the final victory of the Communists 
over the Nationalists and the establishment of the People‟s Republic of 
China in 1949.  
From a historical point of view, the twentieth century had represented, per 
se, the most crucial period of world history. It had set the stage for the most 
transforming and radical revolutions, which were destined to play a profound 
influence on world politics, paving the way for the contemporary political, 
social, economic, and, above all, military status. These revolutionary ideals 
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“were often imports from abroad, filtered through images of one‟s country‟s 
past and one‟s personal experiences.”
579
 For example, Sun Yat-sen, the 
father of the foundation of the Chinese Republic after the 1911 revolution, 
created years before, in Japan, the Tongmenghui – the League – whose 
ultimate scope was to set up an uprising against the Qing, which had not 
materialized. Nevertheless, “his patriotic credentials and charismatic 
presence inspired many Chinese nationalists.”
580
  
The same Chinese nationalists, moreover, also found inspiration 
from the activities of the Russian nihilists and terrorists, embedded of “their 
anarchic philosophy.”
581
 This revolutionary condition that paved the way for 
the 1917 October Revolution, coupled, then, with the communist 
revolutionary ideology, would strengthen the overall Chinese way of 
conducting warfare and revolution.
582
 In other words, the culmination of the 
application of the People‟s War Doctrine could be reached because the 
Russian revolutionary ideology boosted what had represented, in Chinese 
history, a strategic attitude within the overall Chinese strategic culture. And 
this was later on confirmed by the Soviet military advice to the Chinese 
revolutionaries who based in Huangpu (the Chinese military academy also 
known as Whampoa) their “nerve centre”: “for both the Nationalists and the 
Communists, the experience of working with the Soviets between 1923 and 
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1927 on the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was crucial” (NRA being 
the newly established army of the Guomindang).
583
 However, the Soviet 
influence did not fully determine the course of the overall Chinese strategic 
thought, since it served as a means to awake the Chinese culture and 
tradition in warfare. For example, Mao‟s “reliance on peasants as a source 
of revolutionary energy ran counter to orthodox Marxist ideology that viewed 
the urban industrial worker as the key element in a communist revolution.”
584
   
The Soviet influence would have accompanied the entire 
Communist warfare experience, especially from the early „40s onwards: “the 
Sovietization of the CCP in the 1940s was, alongside its militarization, the 
most important change to the party during the civil war.” Specifically, at the 
military level, Soviet influence became more important in 1947, in a period in 
which the CCP, through the PLA, was moving successful counteroffensive 
operations against the KMT: “much of what the PLA learned about logistics, 
battle formations, and armored warfare during the Northeastern campaigns 
seems to have come from Soviet sources.”
585
 
The revolutionary asset became even more prominent between mid-
1946 to mid-1948, a period in which Chinese cadres promoted a radical 
revolution of the way of living in the countryside. This revolution, defined as 
fanshen – which meant “overturning” –  referred to the CCP‟s desire to get 
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rid of “century-old patterns of life” that characterized peasants‟ life and 
introducing, in its stead, “a new, permanent order.” However, even if the 
ideological aspect of the revolution advocated this type of transformation, on 
the other, the “exigencies of war, the faith in studying local conditions, and 
Soviet pressure for gradualism” called for a more cautious revolution.
586
  
Hence, for the Chinese people, the beginning of the twentieth 
century, with all the revolutionary wind that it carried with itself, represented 
the crucial turning point of their personal and political lives. After the 
outbreak of the uprising in the Wuchang city in the Wuhan region in 1911 the 
Qing dynasty was finally brought to an end: “a local uprising quickly ignited 
and was sufficient to bring the whole system down.”
587
 
 These revolutionary impulses found a first, clear expression during 
the May 4
th
 1919 movement, which gathered in Tiananmen square to protest 
against the outcome of the Versailles Treaty signed at the end of the First 
World War. It was not a simple protest movement, but it represented the 
ongoing revolutionary development of the Chinese political consciousness. It 
had, in fact, been labeled as the Second Revolution (after the first one had 
taken place in 1911). Through this movement the Chinese youth started to 
consider as universal – rather than merely Western – the values expressed 
in Russia after the October Revolution, to the extent that for the Chinese 
intellectuals “Marxism came to be acknowledged as a „global‟ response to 
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their political, social, and cultural needs in a period of general crisis and 
breakdown of all values.”
588
   
China had been affected by these transformations more than others, 
since during the second half of the nineteenth century it witnessed what 
would have been later on recognized as the century of humiliation, which 
lasted until 1949, that is, the year of the end of the civil war and the 
establishment of the communist China. Therefore, the mid twentieth century, 
with its associated civil war, represented the fundamental turning point in 
Chinese history. A turning point which was also shaped and conditioned by 
one of the most important figures of Chinese and also world history (at least 
for what concerned the debate on the exportation of the revolution ideology 
and the political competition with the USSR on the communism leadership): 
his name was Mao Zedong. 
Mao also distinguished himself, and above all, at the military level. 
Labeled as “the new Clausewitz,”
589
 he represented the founding father of 
what today has been recognized as the Chinese People‟s War doctrine. He 
“was the first to envision political power as the key to insurgency.”
590
 He, in 
fact, studied Clausewitz thoroughly to the extent that he also recognized the 
centrality of politics in war: “War cannot for a single moment be separated 
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from politics … politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with 
bloodshed.”
591
 
Elaborated during the Chinese political turmoil, that is, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, People‟s War Doctrine became the 
strategic framework for Chinese communist army in order to defeat the 
nationalist party and the Japanese occupier. According to the Chinese 
Military Encyclopedia: “People‟s War is to seek the liberation of class or 
against foreign aggression, and organize and arm the masses for war. The 
People‟s War is in accordance with the fundamental interests of the 
oppressed classes and the oppressed nations.”
592
 Nevertheless, People‟s 
War doctrine central tenets are: “mobilizing the massive Chinese populace 
to achieve a political goal and to defeat a militarily superior opponent despite 
military inferiority.”
593
   
Mao borrowed most of his ideas from ancient Chinese military 
writings – such as Sun Tzu‟s The Art of War – to the extent that Sun Tzu‟s 
influence can also be intercepted at lower military levels, such as combat 
operations and not simply the strategic attitude, representing, therefore, “the 
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spirit, if not the letter, of guidance.”
594
 Furthermore, Dr. Tan Yiqing, a 
researcher in the Chinese Academy of Military Science, said that: 
 
The primary source of Mao Zedong‟s military thought 
was the practical experience of the Chinese revolutionary war 
… [but he] also drew upon China‟s splendid ancient military 
heritage, most notably the essence of Sunzi‟s The Art of War. If 
one does not understand what Mao Zedong‟s military thought 
inherited from Sunzi‟s The Art of War, it will be impossible to 
understand its deep grounding in history, and it will also be very 
hard to explain the unique Chinese characteristics inherent in 
Mao‟s strategy and tactics. 
Mao Zedong not only put Sunzi‟s theories about war 
into practice, he used the fine quintessence of Sunzi‟s thought 
to create strategic theories that fit the specific conditions of 
China‟s revolutionary war, pushing Sunzi into a new age.
595
 
  
However, Mao did not simply copy and paste Sun Tzu‟s thought. He 
read voraciously and learnt extensively from other Chinese ancient writings, 
even including novels, mainly based on rebellion, insurgency, and 
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revolution. For example, the 1930s Long March – the communist movement 
from the cities to the northwestern countryside in order to escape from the 
Nationalist extermination military campaign – was planned and took 
inspiration after the famous book Water Margin, written by Lao Guanzhong 
around the 13
th
 century A.D. The book narrated the story of Chinese bandits 
who decided to gather in the countryside, in order to organize a military 
resistance against the then Song dynasty which ruled the country.
596
  
However, Mao also read Clausewitz and, specifically, his analysis of 
people‟s war, which he called “people in arms.” Clausewitz developed his 
concept by listing the five key elements necessary to develop a people‟s 
war: 
 
1.  “The war must be fought in the interior of the country. 
2. It must not be decided by a single stroke. 
3. The theater of operations must be fairly large. 
4. The national character must be suited to that type of war. 
5. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, 
or forests, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation.”
597
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Clausewitz‟s analysis still offers an important scheme, even if, 
however, something seems to be still missing. This might be because he 
“could not yet intuit the degree of totality that goes without saying for the 
revolutionary wars of the communist Chinese.”
598
 Therefore, I would suggest 
that Clausewitz‟s analysis should include two additional elements 
extrapolated from Elliott-Bateman‟s model of people‟s war, which are: 1) 
“support of the people has been achieved; 2) the philosophy of co-ordinated 
action in all the battlefronts has been developed.”
599
 These two elements are 
important, because people‟s war, in order to be effective needs to move 
from the political to the military level and, at the beginning of this process, 
the support of the population becomes crucial. Even Confucius recognized 
this when he stated that the key elements for a successful war were: “1) the 
support of the people; 2) arms; and 3) food.”
600
 Furthermore, when Mao 
declared that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” he wanted to 
emphasize not only the importance of the interconnection between military 
power and political legitimacy, but also “the basic elements of Chinese 
communist revolutionary ardor and messiansim [sic].”
601
  Therefore, 
throughout the civil war, and even in the immediate aftermath, he appointed 
the PLA to mere political and institutional roles at the regional level.
602
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Having set the general idea of People‟s War, the present chapter will 
analyze it by illustrating three major processes that intimately structure 
People‟s War in light of Chinese strategic culture: civil-military relationship 
and the mobilization of the people as the institutional background; strategic 
asset of the doctrine; and, finally, tactical considerations. However, before 
engaging with this analysis, the next section would first briefly sketch the 
history of China‟s twentieth century. 
 
4.1. The Chinese Turbulent Twentieth Century 
 
 At the political, social, economic, and military level, China‟s 
twentieth century represented one of the most crucial periods in China‟s 
history.
603
 It made China transit rapidly and revolutionarily from a pretty 
much feudal system to an industrial one. This radical transformation 
happened through important steps, which can be summarized in three 
historical phases: the first period started in the nineteenth century, through 
the so-called Opium Wars, in which China met several military defeats by 
the hand of the Western powers eager to get control of the trade and parts 
of the territories of the mainland. After several diplomatic setbacks, attested 
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by the infamous unequal treaties, and after the outbreak of internal 
revolutions, in 1911 the dynastic system, which had characterized China‟s 
history for millennia, was finally brought to an end. The second phase, 
starting from 1911, is mainly concerned with the establishment of the new 
political context in which the Chinese domestic political system was 
fermenting very fast, with the emergence of the first political parties with 
opposing ideologies, which contended for the control of the country. This 
had not come without bloody consequences, as attested by the outbreak of 
the Chinese civil war, which soon intermingled with the outbreak of the 
Second World War. This second phase finally culminated with the 
establishment of the People‟s Republic of China in 1949 by the communist 
forces led by Mao. Finally, the third phase of Chinese twentieth century 
started right after the final victory of the Communists over the Nationalists 
and we can assume it ended with the advent of the president Xi Jinping, 
whose political and ideological design clearly made China transit from one 
era to the next.   
For what concerns the first phase of the Chinese twentieth century, 
that is, the major events shaping the nineteenth century, China went across 
two mutually reinforcing phenomena that would have finally attested the 
collapse of the Qing dynasty: internal turmoil and external invasion. These 
two phenomena intervened into the historical process by undermining Qing 
authority in two fundamental aspects: the internal upheavals would have 
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disrupted Qing‟s dynastic authority, while the external invasions would have 
crippled the empire. 
The Opium Wars – the first one occurred between 1839-42, while 
the second between 1856-60 – represented the two dramatic events 
characterizing Chinese diplomatic relations with foreign powers. There had 
been previous relationships, for sure, since the time Marco Polo reached 
China, however, these two events had clearly represented the two cases 
that revolutionized the entire Chinese political, economic, and social system. 
The context leading to the outbreak of the first Opium War was 
mainly shaped by the economic and trade imbalance that characterized the 
Sino-British relationship. Tea, a Chinese product, was in a high demand 
from English merchants, which was bought with silver. English adventurers 
tried to compensate this drain of silver by offering barter, “but other British 
exports enjoyed little demand in China.” This trade imbalance was partly 
mitigated by the triangular trade relationship that the British managed 
successfully, that is, Indian products were sold in the south-east Asia in 
exchange for spices and other products that were then sold to China. This 
context, that connected India with China via the south-east Asia, paved the 
way for the introduction of a new good, which immediately started to be 
particularly relevant: the opium. The trade of this drug had started since the 
late eighteenth century, but with a not particularly high volume of exchange. 
The Chinese dynasty, under the rule of Qing Yongzheng and, afterwards, 
Qing Qianlong, introduced the first bans against the use and trade of this 
commodity. However, the British merchants found ways to elude the imperial 
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control, to the extent that by 1836, “total imports came to $18 million, making 
it the world‟s most valuable single commodity trade of the nineteenth 
century.”
604
 
By this huge increase in commerce, opium became the central good 
the British were selling to China in exchange for tea. According to this 
system, “silver no longer flowed into China; it flowed out.” This therefore had 
the effect to reverse the balance of trade. The drain of silver, however, did 
not occur without consequences; “reduced growth, unemployment and 
urban unrest” could directly be “attributable to the sudden impact of this 
dramatic and disastrous shift in the balance of payments.”
605
 
The emperor tried to solve the problem by appointing Lin Zexu as 
the commissioner in charge of solving this issue, with the final objective to 
destroy the opium trade. After several fruitless attempts, the conflict seemed 
imminent and, in fact, it erupted in late 1839, with gunfire exchanges 
between Lin and the British Captain Charles Elliot, nominated 
superintendent for the Asian affairs. At the very beginning Lin reported 
several victories, but Elliot managed to get the support of the crown. So in 
1840 “a large naval and military force set sail from India.” The objective of 
this fleet was to “blockade Chinese ports, detain Chinese vessels and take 
possession „of some convenient part of the Chinese territory,‟” which was 
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identified in Hong Kong. The British naval operations, highly underestimated, 
first bombarded the city of Zhejiang, and then moved northward, specifically 
toward the mouth of the Beihe river, which connects to the city of Beijing. At 
that moment, with the capital undefended and with the fear of a possible 
invasion, the Chinese authorities decided to come to terms with the British. 
The agreement was reached in 1841 in Guangzhou, which consisted in 
granting the British “access to Qing officials, Hong Kong was to be handed 
over, a $6 million indemnity paid, and trade to be reopened.” However, quite 
surprisingly, this agreement was repudiated by both parties (the Chinese 
emperor thought that the concessions were too humiliating, while British 
Prime Minister Palmerstone complained about the lack of a reimbursement 
for the opium lost and the overall meager objectives reached after the deal). 
Therefore, in 1841 the war resumed. At the maritime level, 
notwithstanding the fact that in general terms the Qing navy was not that 
backward, the British could easily reach important results. On land, however, 
the Chinese proved more proficient, especially if we consider the longer 
legacy of the strategy of people‟s war in its both cultural and operational 
level: “troops had been sent to Guangzhou and local militias raised there.” 
Among them, many local people decided to embrace arms against the 
invader and decided to challenge it through asymmetric military operations. 
In the Chinese collective memory, for example, the battle of Sanyuanli 
represented the valuable symbol of the overall Chinese resistance, being 
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portrayed as the “first triumph of popular resistance against the foreigner.” In 
that case, the Chinese people managed to defeat an Indo-British infantry. 
The Sanyuanli case would have soon stimulated “a bewildering upsurge of 
other irregular bands and secret societies operating independently of the 
Qing authorities and often in defiance of them.” These movements started 
not only to target the foreign invader but also the Qing dynasty for its 
impotence. Therefore, along with the battle against the British, an anti-
Manchu sentiment started to spread, paving the way for the “cataclysmic 
Taiping Rebellion.”
606
 
The war dragged on for another year, until, in 1842 both parties 
decided to sign the infamous Nanjing Treaty, this time approved by both 
parties (even if, of course, China was forced to accept it), through which 
Great Britain gained even more indemnities ($21 million), plus important 
territorial concessions, such as Hong Kong, and the opening of new ports, 
such as Shanghai. In the meantime, other foreign powers started to 
penetrate Chinese political and territorial space, giving birth to the so-called 
“Treaty System” which represented a “collaborative and progressive 
exercise in the diminution of China‟s sovereignty through the appropriation 
of large sectors of its economy, its foreign relations, its society and its 
territories.” In other words, this treaty represented the first step towards the 
                                                                                                                                        
459 
606
 John Keay, China, pp. 464-465 
406
 
 
manifestation of what would have been later on recognized as the “century 
of humiliation,” which lasted until 1949.
607
 
The Taiping Rebellion tried to overturn these humiliating conditions 
by promoting a nationwide revolution. Having set their fundamental 
revolutionary principles, the movement soon became a crusade and spread 
all over China. In two years (1851-1853), it undertook the “Long March” 
which “took them from the obscurity of Guiping to centre stage in Nanjing,” 
conquering several cities along the path, which increased its manpower and 
military supplies. However, the military campaign had to stop around Tianjin 
due to weather conditions and lack of a proper military preparation; a 
condition that allowed Qing troops to retaliate.  
The context of the Taiping, moreover, intertwined with the overall 
confrontation between the Qing dynasty and the foreign powers, such as 
British and French forces, to the extent that while trying to quell the 
insurgency, the Qing dynasty found itself involved in the so-called Arrow 
War (1856-186), named after the Arrow, the Chinese freighter based in 
Hong Kong and suspected of piracy by the British. The war against the 
Anglo-French forces became also known as the second Opium War, which 
culminated in the signing of the punitive treaty of Tianjin. The gravity behind 
this additional treaty port was the role played by Russia, which managed to 
gain a treaty that “opened the entire northern frontier of the Qing empire, 
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from Manchuria to Xinjiang, to Russia‟s political and commercial 
influence.”
608
 
Foreign powers, now satisfied with the new acquisitions obtained 
from the new treaty ports, needed to secure their new possessions by 
challenging the Taiping insurgency. Therefore, paradoxically, it was now the 
time to provide Qing army with the necessary military equipment in order to 
defeat the common enemy. Moreover, now volunteer units “composed 
mainly of Chinese irregulars but equipped, drilled and officered by French, 
Americans and British fought alongside the Qing troops.” In few years‟ time, 
the Chinese forces, supported by the Western contingents, managed to 
defeat the overall insurrectionist movement. However, the defeat of the 
Taping threat did not stabilize the country, since the end of the nineteenth 
century would have brought new challenges to the point of disintegrating the 
empire first and the dynasty after.    
After the two Opium Wars, in fact, Russia, having already 
established a favorable diplomatic position in northern China, managed to 
occupy the Ili region in northern Xinjiang. A territorial seizure that reminded 
the British occupation of Hong Kong in 1841: “foreign encroachment across 
China‟s interminable land borders often bore an uncanny resemblance to 
that on the coast.”
609
  
But the challenge had not come only from Russia. Other powers 
were directly challenging China‟s role in East Asia. France was pressing in 
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the south in order to gain control over Vietnam, while Japan was also 
pressing on the east in order to control the Korean peninsula. Both 
circumstances culminated into two short wars that China had to fight against 
respectively France and Japan. But it was the war against the latter that 
forced China on its knees. The Japanese territorial expansion, in fact, did 
not stop in the Korean peninsula. Soon, the Japanese troops would have 
crossed the Yalu river and threaten Chinese capital directly. In order to avoid 
being fully conquered by Japanese troops, the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
“the most humiliating in modern Chinese history,”
610
 forced China to accept 
severe conditions, among which stood: the concession of Taiwan, 
Pescadores and Liaodong islands to Japan, the recognition of the full 
independence of Korea, open four new treaty ports and a disproportionate 
war indemnity.  
The end of the nineteenth century, therefore, represented for China 
not only a devastating military setback but also an internal political collapse. 
In fact, right after the end of the Second Opium War and the beginning of the 
new military attacks at the end of the century, in China a new political 
movement had been established: the Self-Strengthening (ziqiang) 
movement, first labeled by Feng Guifen (1809-74), mathematician and 
cartographer. The idea behind it had been to tackle Chinese endemic 
weaknesses by adopting western technology and science in order to 
compete at the international level. The underpinning idea was to critically 
use the western means as a defensive method against foreign aggression 
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while preserving Chinese traditions and culture. In so doing the ideology of 
the state and society remained Confucianism under the formula “the 
Western knowledge as a means, Chinese knowledge as a foundation” (xixue 
wei yong, zhongxue wei ti).
611
   
At the military level, this movement became particularly relevant 
when looking at the provincial governors-general who started to establish 
their own professional armies, instead of relying “on the decrepit Banners or 
the gentry-led militias,” in order to defeat the major insurrections occurring at 
the time.
 612 
While at the social level, the movement
 
enforced the classic 
Chinese collective responsibility systems of baojia and lijia.
613
 
However, the internal contradictions of the movement condemned it 
to a final collapse. It became evident that China was facing not only a violent 
political crisis, but also a profound cultural crisis. The latter emerged even 
more clearly when, after Japan‟s victory over Russia in 1905, Tokyo – the 
archenemy – became a source of aspiration for political transformation: “as 
close as lips and teeth,” it was argued, was the Sino-Japanese 
relationship.
614
 In relation to this, “it was not a coincidence that in 1905 the 
father of the Chinese republic, Sun Yat-sen, founded in Japan the League 
(tongmenghui) and formulated the theory of the „three principles of the 
people,‟ sanminzhuyi,” which referred to nationalism, democracy, and 
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wealth. In line with the overall idea of transforming Chinese society by 
infusing western means in harmony with the Chinese tradition and culture, 
the “three principles of the people” were then associated with the “five 
powers, which, besides the traditional western division of powers (executive, 
legislative, and judiciary), it also included the traditional Chinese institutions, 
such as: the exam and the collective surveillance systems.”
 615
  
The internal crisis had also been conditioned by the continuous military 
defeats that had occurred at the end of the century, paving the way for 
another devastating blow to China‟s internal stability: the 1899 Boxer 
Rebellion.   
The movement started off in the Shandong region, spreading very 
quickly to other areas as far as Beijing and Tianjin. Their origin resided on 
the “rural distress” that affected most of the Chinese society. Moreover, their 
peculiarity laid on the reliance on the “tradition of secret societies that had 
simmered among the rural masses throughout China‟s history, from the Red 
Eyebrows and the Yellow Turbans to the White Lotus Society of Macartney‟s 
time and the Red Turbans of the Taiping era.” During their tactical 
operations, they mainly targeted Christians, foreigners, and all those 
symbols (mainly new infrastructural means, such as railways and telegraph 
lines) that were perceived as impure. In fact, they were moved ideologically 
on the “Support the Qing, Destroy the Foreigner” slogan, through which they 
conducted killings in Beijing without the opposition of the Qing army.
616
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It was foreign intervention once again to stop the insurrectionist 
movement. This, in turn, paved the way for the near collapse of the entire 
Qing dynasty, led, this time, by the Empress Cixi who was forced to flee 
from the capital. However, the foreign powers still needed some form of 
Chinese government, though weak, to extract as many concessions as 
possible. Therefore, they allowed Cixi to regain control of the capital. During 
this period, she adopted some important political reforms both meant to 
modernize the country and undermining the revolutionaries‟ attempt to claim 
to be the “do-gooding „natural foot‟ societies.”
617
 Therefore, on one hand she 
abolished, in 1905, the examination system, while on the other, in 1909, she 
established the first provincial assemblies. The abolishment of the 
examination system, while representing an attempt at modernization, had 
also side effects, such as the progressive cultural detachment between the 
elite and the population at large – especially the countryside – since the 
exams “guaranteed the cultural homogeneity of the bureaucracy and the 
local notables” thanks to the Confucian culture that they had to study in 
order to exercise power.
618
 
At the grassroots level, “attempts were made to graft some form of 
local representation on to the baojia groupings or replace them with self-
governing units.” At the military level, she also established the creation of a 
“New Army” which would have been deployed in order to strengthen the 
recentralization effort on one hand, while also trying to offset the local 
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military forces on the other.
619
 The military reform, however, failed miserably, 
as the institutional reforms instead of bringing a new setting ended up 
reinforcing the regional armies, as attested by the case of the Northern Army 
of Yuan Shikai. As a consequence, the entire national defensive system 
proved to be weak, to the extent that this paved the way for the advent of the 
“warlords,” that is, army generals that controlled vast regional areas.
620
     
Notwithstanding this reformist attempt, the dynasty was about to 
reach its final collapse, due to the empress‟s death along with the 
designated heir Guangxu, leaving Guangxu‟s nephew, Pu yi, as the only 
successor to the throne. Being, at that time, only two years old, therefore 
unable to govern, he would have been known in history as the “Last 
Emperor.” 
The reforms, nevertheless, started to be connected with the new 
ideas coming from the West, especially ideological and political doctrines 
such as socialism, Darwinism, Marxism, and anarchism. The new ideological 
context paved the way for the establishment of political movements later on 
consolidating into proper parties. One of the first movements to embrace 
these new ideas was represented by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen‟s Revolutionary 
Alliance. 
The chronic problems of the dynasty and the pressing foreign 
presence made conditions ripe for the outbreak of the Chinese revolution, 
which erupted in the Wuchang city of the Wuhan region in 1911 thanks also 
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to the support of the members of the New Army. Yuan Shikai, one of the 
military governors operating during the Qing dynasty, quickly became the 
strong political leader of the new institutional framework, becoming, in 
November of the same year of the outbreak of the revolution, the newly 
elected prime minister. The new Republic was officially operating from 1 
January 1912 while the Qing dynasty officially stopped to exist along with its 
more-than-two-millennia-old dynastic system.    
Far from stable, the new system had ushered in a new period made 
of a constant status of belligerence between the different factions: “the 
chaos that ensued mirrored that of the fourth-century Three Kingdoms. From 
1911 to 1950 the fighting never really stopped; revolution became civil war, 
became revolution, became civil war, became foreign invasion, became 
freedom struggle, became civil war, became revolution.”
621
 
The life of the newly established republic proved to be very weak. 
Sun Yat-sen‟s Revolutionary Alliance, now renamed Guomindang won the 
first national elections in 1913. However, the political rivalry between Sun 
and Yuan Shikai, one of the governors of the north, soon escalated to the 
point in which Yuan decided to usurp power, declaring himself the dictator of 
the republic (until 1916, the year of his death), and forcing Sun to exile. 
The end of the First World War opened up new political scenarios. 
The Paris treaty, signed in 1919, proved to be detrimental to the Chinese 
sovereignty, since it consolidated the Japanese territorial acquisitions in 
China. On May 4
th
 1919, protesters gathered in Tiananmen against this 
414
 
 
treaty outcome, “a date ever after identified with national outrage and 
reawakening.” 
The May 4
th
 movement did not only represent a protest movement 
against the international agreements which undermined Chinese 
sovereignty. It also sparked a new political activism, which would have had 
enduring effects on the Chinese political system. In this period, in fact, social 
mobilization, political activism, and therefore “mass action took on new 
dimensions.” At the same time, “ a new generation of leaders, among them 
the young Mao Zedong … and Zhou Enlai gained their first experience of 
political activism.”
622
 
Soon, this situation would have consolidated into a political 
confrontation between the Guomindang on one side and the Communist 
party on the other, founded in 1921. The internal weaknesses, coupled with 
the foreign occupation, accelerated the political agreement between the 
GMD and the CCP. Both parties, in fact, agreed, in 1922, “on a joint 
programme to reunite the country and attain full independence.” Chiang Kai-
shek, the new leader of the GMD, along with the Communist party, 
established in 1926 the Northern Expedition, whose objective was to 
reconquer the lost territories. The expedition, which set off from the south, 
around the area of Guangdong, was divided into three armies, one directed 
towards Nanjing, the second heading towards Fujian and Hangzhou, and the 
third moving towards Wuhan. Soon the expedition managed to gain control 
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of those areas with Chiang‟s army moving swiftly towards Shanghai in order 
to consolidate the territorial control, in 1927. 
Once arrived in Shanghai, in order to become the central power of 
the entire country, the Nationalists decided to move against the communists 
who, in the meantime, were conducting strikes which paralyzed the city. In 
1927 the communists were caught by surprise and, outnumbered and 
militarily weak, left the city for the countryside, where to find refuge and 
political reorganization. The Shanghai strikes and their failure highlighted 
how the “CCP‟s hopes for a Marxist revolution based on the seizure of the 
means of production by the industrial proletariat” was destined to fail. The 
same also concerned the other plan of “using the Guomindang to turbo-
charge a communist grab for power.” Therefore, after setting off the Long 
March, from 1928 onwards, “Nationalist and communists were locked into a 
disastrous pattern of ideological detestation and military confrontation.”
623
  
The Nationalists, in the meantime, settled their capital in Nanjing, 
downgrading Beijing, now renamed Beiping (the Northern Peace). During 
what would have been recognized as the Nanjing decade (1927-1937), 
Chiang Kai-shek instituted a centralized government along with the 
promotion of a Confucianist ideology to support the political struggle. The 
centralization was conceived as an overall project to gain international 
respectability in order to renegotiate the unequal treaties of the nineteenth 
century. However, in 1932 China found itself again involved into territorial 
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scrambles after the Japanese invasion, and then occupation, of Manchuria, 
which occurred on September 18
th
 1931.  
The Japanese invasion, and the associated political problems, gave 
the Communists the right opportunity to breathe from the Nationalist 
extermination campaign. However, the 1933 truce between the Nationalists 
and the Japanese allowed Chiang to redirect its military effort against the 
communists. The latter, now settled in the hills of Jiangxi, had to confront 
with Chiang‟s military expedition. In 1934, to avoid total defeat, the 
Communists decided to flee, embarking on that huge journey recorded in 
history as the Long March.
624
   
In 1936, however, a good opportunity presented for the 
Communists. Chiang‟s abduction in Xi‟an, while he was trying to convince 
the local warlord to ally with him, granted the Communists the political 
acknowledgement in the overall Chinese military situation. In fact, Zhang 
Xueliang, son of Zhang Zuolin – Xi‟an warlord – decided to capture Chiang 
while on visit with the intention to force him to accept the alliance with the 
Communists against the bigger threats that all Chinese people were facing: 
the Japanese. The Generalissimo (a nickname used for Chiang Kai-shek) 
accepted the offer in order to be released. The second united front was then 
established. Thanks to this opportunity, “Mao and CCP gained the breathing 
space to embark on rural mobilization, and all parties braced themselves for 
the Japanese onslaught.”
625
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The second united front, in fact, was immediately tested by the July 
7
th
 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident, which symbolized the beginning of the 
second Sino-Japanese war (after the 1894-95 confrontation) and, to some 
extent, had also represented the early stage of the Second World War. 
Chiang decided to set Shanghai as the battlefront against the Japanese. 
However, his military incompetence proved destructive to the point that the 
Nationalists “began their own Long March”
626
 which forced them to abandon 
Shanghai, then Nanjing –which fell in December 1937 and where the 
Japanese committed their worst atrocities in what had been recorded in 
history as the Nanjing Massacre – Wuhan, which fell in 1938, and finally 
Chongqing, where the GMD established the new government until the end of 
the Second World War.  
However, notwithstanding these critical military setbacks, the first 
part of the Sino-Japanese confrontation (1937-1938) reported one 
astonishing victory of the Nationalists over the Japanese at the battle of 
Taierzhuang. Things did not play well during the second part of the conflict, 
that is, from 1939 onwards. This context was mainly characterized by a 
military stasis, except for the Japanese offensive of 1944. The second 
period, in fact, witnessed the creation, by the Japanese, of a new political 
entity in 1940, guided by Chiang‟s enemy within the Guomindang, Wang 
Jingwei, who controlled it in Nanjing under the supervision of Japan. 
Moreover, Chiang himself was committed to the maintenance of the status 
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quo, waiting for the world conflict, and specifically US‟s intervention in China, 
to bring defeat upon the Japanese.
627
 
This was also motivated by the Nationalists‟ delicate position, which 
made them unable to use the coastal provinces, now under Japanese 
control. The only alternative was the use of the Burma Road which allowed 
the Nationalists to gain resources coming from India and passing through 
Yunnan. The military setbacks suffered by both the Nationalists and 
Communists extended, almost uninterruptedly, until 1945 with the final 
collapse of the Japanese empire. 
In this context, the Communists were also pursuing the same 
objective, that is, political stability. Located in the North, the red army 
managed to move among enemy lines, mainly conducting guerrilla 
operations, while also organizing a vast mobilization campaign coupled with 
political reforms. These politico-military measures proved to be effective for 
the Communists.
628
 
The end of the Second World War, however, ushered in another 
turbulent period: the final confrontation between the Nationalists and the 
Communists through a violent civil war which would have ended in 1949 with 
the final victory of the Communists and the fleeing of the Nationalists to the 
island of Taiwan. The confrontation between the two factions developed 
immediately after the war due to the always ill-accepted status of equal 
partner in the overall military struggle against Japan of the Communists by 
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the Nationalists and also because of the importance, for the Nationalists, to 
gain full control of the country after the collapse of the dynasty and the 
political fragmentation that had developed right afterwards. A situation that 
even Marshall‟s mission in China in 1946 to settle peace between the two 
factions could not solve. 
One of the first maneuvers of the Nationalists concerned the 
reoccupation of Manchuria, now left heavily industrialized by the Japanese 
and representing, therefore, “the greatest prize.” However, the Nationalists 
were slowed down by Russians in their advance towards north, while the 
Communists, already in the north, made Harbin the “first city run by the 
CCP,” where Lin Biao “reorganized his forces as the People‟s Liberation 
Army (PLA)” before planning, in 1946, a push southward. The first year of 
the war ( July 1946-June 1947) was mainly characterized by the Nationalist 
advance in the North, occupying also CCP‟s capital of Yan‟an, and the 
progressive communist strategic retreat. The ensuing military confrontation, 
coupled with internal problems, such as a rampant inflation, famine, and 
social unrest, critically undermined the Nationalist military capabilities, to the 
extent that “by the end of 1948 most of China north of the Yangzi was in 
communist hands,” as attested by the famous 1948 Manchuria battle, also 
known as the LiaoShen Campagin.
629
  
Once having gained control of Manchuria, the CCP went through 
additional two important campaigns that would have finally brought the 
Communists to power: the Bei-Jin campaign, aimed at capturing Beijing and 
420
 
 
the surrounding area, and the HuaiHai campaign, which allowed the 
Communists to control the northern part of China up to the Yangzi river.  The 
campaigns conducted between the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949, 
finally, culminated into the founding of the Chinese People‟s Republic of 
China (PRC) on October 1
st
 1949. However, not all territories were officially 
under the control of the communist regime and “the People‟s Liberation 
Army had much liberating still to do.” The areas of Tibet and Xinjiang, for 
example, were pushing for independence; the south was still out of reach; 
Hong Kong was firmly in the British hands; and, finally, Taiwan was now 
occupied by the defeated Nationalists.
630
 
Therefore from 1949 onwards, the PRC had been committed in 
regaining control of the territory. Slowly all of them, except for Taiwan, would 
have returned, in one form or another, to the mainland, leaving Beijing, up to 
today, with a very thorny and delicate issue represented by the “riotous 
Island.” The outbreak of the Korean war the year after and the developing 
mechanisms of the Cold War left China “as firmly closed to the world‟s 
maritime trade as imperial China before the Opium Wars.”
631
 It became 
central for Beijing, then, to develop internally. During the „50s and „60s, in 
fact, Mao adopted the most controversial economic and political plans for 
the modernization of the state – such as the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution – with devastating consequences for the entire society. 
Nevertheless, the first bricks were set for the subsequent development of 
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the country which arrived at the end of the century with a great internal 
potential to be exploited for the aggrandizement of the country‟s power.    
The transition from the Maoist era to the new millennium (the topic 
of the next chapter) has been led by the next CCP leaders, such as Deng 
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, who, then, became then the 
interpreters of the new social, political, and military strengths rising within the 
country. Deng distinguished himself for his “liberal” policies, which 
unleashed all the entrepreneurial instincts of society for the economic 
development of the country. Jiang Zemin, on the other hand, became the 
interceptor of the digital and information revolution in warfare, to the extent 
that during his presidency China started to take into consideration how to 
develop militarily so as to absorb the new technological transformation into a 
coherent set of guidelines and operational principals. Finally, Hu Jintao 
followed the political pattern set up by his predecessors in order to 
strengthen the country and lead it towards the new millennium.  
However, after the election of the fifth generation of leaders, whose 
major representative has been president Xi Jinping, China has officially 
entered into a new epoch, which will carry with itself important and lasting 
effects on the overall Chinese political and military development. Since the 
election of Xi Jinping in 2012, China has transformed its institutional asset. 
At the political level, president Xi has been accumulating an enormous 
amount of power, to the extent that his political profile resembles the 
centrality of Chairman Mao right after the end of the Civil War. According to 
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this amount of power, he has also undertaken a vast program of military 
reforms, trying to expand the areas of Chinese military intervention, while 
also modernizing the army by relying on the everlasting doctrinal principles 
of Chinese military thought. One of the clearest manifestation of this 
transformation concerns the OBOR system – a vast infrastructural system 
that connects Beijing to Europe and Africa passing through Central Asia – 
which has been used as an economic tool coupled with military and cultural 
objectives, such as the recreation of the ancient Chinese geopolitical 
centrality. And finally, at the economic level, Xi Jinping is trying to strengthen 
the overall economic infrastructure so as to increase people‟s welfare and 
the overall innovative spirit of the country, making China transit from a purely 
productive economy (the factory of the world) to an innovative system of 
growth, mainly based on innovation and development.    
 
4.2. People’s War Doctrine at the time of Mao  
 
4.2.1. First Process of People’s War: Civil-Military Integration 
and People’s Mobilization 
 
The mobilization issue represented the key component of the war 
effort (in both the Sino-Japanese War and the Civil War) for both the 
Nationalists and the Communists, to the extent that “mass mobilization 
would become the norm.” Moreover, the bellicose period China found itself 
423
 
 
into “also provided an opportunity for successful mobilization of society at a 
level that had not previously seemed possible in China.”
632
 
Chiang Kai-shek managed, especially until 1945, that is, after the 
end of the double military effort of the Sino-Japanese war and the Second 
World War, to mobilize the people and gain therefore ample popular support: 
“the key point of the war is whether we can master the masses,” declared in 
1938.
633
 For example, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 
1937, Chiang manifested a total commitment to the war effort, symbolized 
by his assumption that “in a revolutionary war, the invaders will lose. The 
Japanese can see only materiel and troops; they can‟t see the spiritual 
aspect.” This, then, reflected the assumption that even for Chiang the Sino-
Japanese war responded more to the revolutionary principles China had set 
off in 1911, therefore making resistance to Japanese occupation his 
ideological motif. A resistance – Kangzhan daodi “resistance to the end” as 
he called it – served also the purpose to emphasize its national character, 
with respect to the deep political fragmentation China had been affected by. 
For this specific end, for example, he had constantly advanced the 
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importance of setting a “wartime educational strategy” as well as a “national 
mobilization plan,” through which emphasizing the “revolutionary spirit” of 
the Kuomintang.
634
 This effort was partially fulfilled by the Sanqingtuan, an 
organization of young people, controlled by the party, whose objective was 
to spread propaganda among the people in the urban areas, which were the 
focus of the Chiang‟s military struggles due to supply and communication 
routes that passed through them. In the countryside, instead, the KMT 
propaganda mainly focused on stability, when, in fact, the social and 
economic situation in the countryside strived for change.
635
  
However, his mobilization techniques suffered from one major issue: 
his spasmodic desire to get the US involved into the overall war struggle, to 
the extent that he lost sight of the population at large
636
 that could have 
played a decisive role in his next campaign against the Communists. In fact, 
when the civil war broke out, instead of exploiting Soviet ambiguities towards 
the CCP, he ended up being sucked into the Cold War framework, 
supporting finally the United States
637
 while conducting against the CCP 
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simple bandits eradication campaigns.
638
 Therefore, even if Chiang won the 
Second World War, he definitely lost his country.
639
   
Only at the end very end of the Civil War he realized how important 
it was to regain possession of the population and to advance mobilization 
policies. In the very last phase of the Civil War, especially right before the 
HuaiHai campaign, at the Nanjing conference held in August 1948, the 
Nationalist cadres recognized this fundamental problem and how the CCP 
demonstrated to be in a more advantageous position thanks to the right 
implementation of the mobilization policies. The conference “concluded with 
a call to coordinate work across the full spectrum of military, governmental, 
economic, political, educational, and cultural activities,” in order to integrate 
the political and military spheres. The fundamental idea was to “completely 
mobilize all human materiel resources and unleash what they called the 
power of total war.”
640
  
On the other hand, for what concerns Mao Zedong, “the war with 
Japan was the making of a leader,” since he had been committed at creating 
the vastest possible popular support in those areas under the control of the 
Communist Party.
641
 A technique that he developed during the first alliance 
with the KMT, that is, “a much larger party base which he could use to plan 
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radical revolution.” In 1925, for example, he also became the director of the 
propaganda, “providing a chance for him to hone his techniques of rhetoric 
and mass mobilization which would prove so vital in the decades to 
come.”
642
 
However, it should be pointed out that Maoist propaganda, 
necessary for the creation of base areas in the countryside and 
consequently peasants mobilization, became attractive especially in those 
areas where the brutal Japanese behavior contributed to create a more 
favorable environment. This historical fact encouraged important historians, 
such as Chalmers Johnson, to even question the overall Communist ability 
to create base areas and mobilize the peasants; the Communists, then, 
“were the beneficiaries and not the main source of this mobilization.” 
Therefore, as a consequence, “the Communists were not able to establish 
guerrilla bases in regions that had no direct experience with the Japanese 
Army.”
643
    
Mao stated that “the army and the people are the foundation of 
victory.”
644
 This represents one of the key elements characterizing Chinese 
People‟s War and the overall Chinese strategic culture. This initial stage is 
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especially relevant, since it illustrates how the people constitute “the whole 
basis” of the Chinese, but also of other revolutionary movements.
645
 
Maoist thought became evident when administering the Manchurian 
villages. Here, the CCP was trying to establish its own version of political 
order. The same order that was necessary to gain popular support in order 
“to penetrate the region as a whole.” The political work, therefore, became 
central for providing the PLA the population support required for the war 
effort. “The Communist advance teams, a mix of guerrillas and political 
cadres that operated beyond the military front lines, bore the brunt of this 
effort and paid a high price.”
646
 In other words, during their political 
struggles, the Communists realized that “cities, towns, and other specific 
positions could be given up and regained later,” however, the loss of rural 
areas would have left them “with nothing.” The Nationalists, at least at the 
very beginning of the Civil War, demonstrated to be also concerned by this 
factor, to the extent that they tried to “set up local government and an 
intelligence network” in order to gain popular support, “or at least to 
politically isolate the Communist armies and the Communist Party 
organizations from the people, denying the Communists the mass support 
on which they relied for intelligence, logistical support, and supplies.”
647
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Ancient Chinese writers – such as Sun Tzu, for example, unlike 
western scholars dealing with China
648
 – treated the art of military campaign 
as an inseparable part of the more general art of statecraft. Wen (the art of 
politics) and wu (the art of warfare) are, in fact, intimately interconnected in 
Chinese history and, therefore, strategic culture.
649
 In fact, at the very 
beginning of the Art of War, Sun Tzu stated: 
兵者，国之大事。死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也 (War is a matter of vital 
importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or 
ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.)
650
  
An interconnection, that one between wen and wu, Chinese leaders 
found themselves embedded into to the extent that it continued to be applied 
even in peacetime. For example, right at the end of the Civil War, the war 
experience along with the historical legacies of Chinese strategic culture 
encouraged CCP leadership to carry on with the militarist policies: “they 
believed that the methods of war were the party‟s best choice in promoting 
reform, even in peacetime, because these methods were what the party was 
good at and what had brought it its victories in the revolutionary struggle.” 
And this tendency has gone through many phases of Chinese history, “from 
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the Qin emperor twenty-two hundred years ago to Mao Zedong and his 
revolution.”
651
  
Mao started to implement the progressive militarization of society 
during the Sino-Japanese War. On 6 September 1937, for example, he gave 
birth to the ShaanGanNing (SGN) Border Region government,
 652
 with its 
headquarters at Yan‟an: “this was the key base area where Mao would 
spend the war and create a new vision of society, what a classic later 
analysis would call „the Yenan [Yan‟an] Way].”‟ Here Mao not only focused 
on the land reforms, but also on the creation of local militias, which “divided 
their time between normal agricultural activity and military service.”
 653
 This 
was possible because the organization of the Communist armed forces was 
composed of a nucleus of regular troops “supplemented by local units of 
militia mobilized for particular operations,” therefore allowing the latter to 
focus on sowing and harvest times when not required for warfare 
operations.
654
  
This type of social organization was also possible thanks to the 
implementation of political commissars, whose role proved to be very 
important. They distinguished themselves among the KMT ranks during the 
Northern Expedition, which “had gradually transformed powerful KMT Party 
representatives into lower-level „political instructors.‟” Their major task 
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represented the transmission belt between the civilian and the military world; 
at the political level, it concerned the assistance of local CCP organs and the 
organization of the civilian support for the army, that is, its overall 
mobilization. Their task also concerned “consoling the wounded, 
indoctrinating prisoners of war, explaining the political purpose of a particular 
battle, providing recreation, [and] giving lectures on political objectives.” At 
the military level, instead, their task consisted of “generally assisting the 
commander in his operational role,”
655
 while also helping them “address the 
civil considerations factor when doing a mission, enemy, terrain and 
weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil 
considerations (METT-TC) analysis.”
656
 
His political product soon spread also in Central China through the 
creation of other base areas, leading also to an important military success 
over the Japanese Fifth Division in September 1937 at Pingxingguan, 
obtained through the implementation of ambush operations by the Eighth 
Route Army and local troops.
657
 
However, the complete transformation of society towards that goal 
only happened during the Civil War. The constant defeats accumulated by 
the CCP between 1945-46 forced Mao to rethink a way to combine the civil 
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and the military by advancing a “complete militarization of the CCP-held 
areas, accompanied by a reorganization of its forces that tied them closer to 
the political regions they were supposed to represent.” The objective was to 
reach total mobilization, hence nullifying the distinction between combatants 
and noncombatants. One immediate instrument that had been used for this 
goal was represented by the PLA, which “symbolized this mass 
militarization.”
658
 
Moreover, the mass militarization obtained through “the 
interrelatedness of military and political affairs,” coupled with the “tactical 
abilities of PLA commanders,” allowed the CCP to survive in the Northeast, 
especially during 1946-1947 campaign which almost disintegrated the 
CCP.
659
  Part of this tactical success resided on the Communist plan to 
absorb captured Nationalist troops into CCP‟s ranks. Adopting the so-called 
practice of lifu lipu – “immediately upon capture, immediately fill in” – the 
Communists turned Nationalist soldiers into PLA ones. This moreover, also 
responded to Sun Tzu‟s strategic teachings that envisaged the importance 
of capturing the enemy‟s army intact so as to use it for future military 
operations.
660
 
 The ancient understanding of how to integrate civil affairs with the 
military realm, as already explained, not only exerted a considerable 
influence over the study of Mao‟s elaboration of People‟s War, but it also 
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emphasized the role of the peasants. In fact, “according to ancient Chinese 
works on warfare, the scale of peasant uprising and peasant war in Chinese 
history had been extremely large and virtually unmatched in the rest of the 
world.” This explains as well the importance of the peasants in Chinese 
history and especially during the application of People‟s War to the extent 
that Mao theorized that “the armed struggle of the Chinese Communist Party 
is peasant war under the leadership of the proletariat.”
661
 And that “the battle 
for China is a battle for the hearts and minds of the peasants.”
662
 
In late „20s of the twentieth century, Mao elaborated his initial 
political thought which emphasized the need for a peasant revolution rather 
than an urban one. The latter represented the Soviet model, which the 
Communists had mistakenly applied in the first phase of their revolutionary, 
as attested by the communist attempt to foment an uprising in Shanghai with 
its subsequent suppression by the Nationalists in 1927. During that urban 
struggle, Mao was located in the countryside “doing Marxist analysis of the 
rural class structure.”
663
  In the same year, for example, Mao wrote a famous 
political work, “A Report on the Peasant Situation in Hunan,” “which 
described the ways through which the CCP “had managed to foment a 
genuine class war in the rural areas of Mao‟s home province.” In that 
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circumstance, the Hunan Peasant Provincial Association mobilized the poor 
peasants, arming them against the richer landlords.
664
 
Once in Jiangxi, after the urban defeat in Shanghai which forced the 
Communists to leave the cities, Mao thought that revolution had to go 
through a radical land reform. During the Jiangxi years, he adopted the land 
redistribution policy that transferred the land from the richer peasants to the 
poorer.
665
 However, this policy immediately backfired, since party leaders 
“realized that gaining the support of local elites was necessary for mobilizing 
the wider population.” Mao‟s initial land-reform policy “alienated many 
middle-level peasants who were condemned as rich even though they 
sometimes had only marginally more than those defined as „poor.‟”
666
 
The land reform did play a relevant role in the overall Communist 
approach to warfare and revolution. In fact, during the Yan‟an period, Mao 
decided to change some of the political pillars of his revolutionary 
movement: now the objective was to distribute “land to landless peasants.” 
In order to realize this objective and avoid the shortcomings of the previous 
radical reforms adopted before the outbreak of the civil war, Liu Shaoqi and 
Ren Bishi – “one of the main Marxist theoreticians in the party” – had set up 
the Central Committees May Fourth 1946 Directive whose major objective 
was to take care of the land reform. Partially in line with the previous policy, 
the new political guidelines emphasized the importance of downgrading 
landholders by depriving them of their power while favoring the redistribution 
                                                          
664
 Rana Mitter, China's War With Japan, 1937-1945, p. 39-40 
665
 Lionel Max Chassin, The Communist Conquest Of China, pp. 37-38 
434
 
 
policy. In so doing, the objective was to create “allies (and enemies) in the 
social landscape of the Chinese countryside that, over time, tied some 
groups of peasants to the Communist cause.”
667
 
 However, the simple theoretical civil-military integration is not 
sufficient to achieve the establishment of People‟s War. Mao had, in fact, 
realized that People‟s War would work only with the mobilization of the 
people:
668
 “mobilization of the masses, total militarization, and harnessing of 
the people‟s will to defeat the enemy were the goals of People‟s War.”
669
 In 
fact, as Mao stated: 
 
“What does political mobilization mean? First, it means 
telling the army and the people about the political aim of the 
war … Secondly … the steps and policies for its attainment 
must also be given, that is, there must be a political programme 
… Without a clear-cut, concrete political programme it is 
impossible to mobilize all the armed forces and the whole 
people … Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of 
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mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and 
pamphlets, through schools, through the mass organizations 
and through our cadres … Fourthly … Our job is not to recite 
our political programme to the people, for nobody will listen to 
such recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the 
war with developments in the war and with the life of the 
soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement.”
 
670
 
 
In order to achieve this political objective, Mao moved into two 
complementary directions: one political, while the other military. At the 
political level he established several organizational settings for the 
mobilization process, such as: a grass-root infrastructure “in all segments of 
society,” specifically in those areas “of minimum government control.” In this 
political infrastructure there were: “a) revolutionary cadres who buil[t] the 
organization in selected areas; b) the cell system of guerrilla fighters; c) 
circuit organizations for intelligence, escape routes etc.; d) a vertical system 
of committees for political control; and e) a horizontal structure of 
committees and organizations … covering all trades, professions, religions, 
youth and women‟s activities, and recreational pursuits.”
671
 
Concerning the last political infrastructure, the CCP became 
particularly active during the first year of the Civil War.  The objective was to 
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understand “how the alliance policies [the United Front with the KMT] of the 
CCP could be used to offset some of the party‟s military setbacks.” Since the 
KMT, right after the Second World War, found itself in a delicate political 
position, with the Democratic League and the students movement protesting 
against its political role, the CCP tried to find ways to manipulate and 
influence those opposition movements. The party‟s United Front department 
set up a group of young intellectuals whose major activities were 
“propaganda, undercover work, and different forms of intelligence activities.” 
This constant infiltration proved to be successful “as the urban public‟s 
disenchantment with GMD grew.” Zhou Enlai‟s tactical skills, associated with 
“his tremendous ability for deception,” helped the CCP gain the popular 
support their were looking for in the urban areas.
672
  
A second organizational step was the establishment of a “high-level 
intelligence organization in all organs of society.”
673
 Mao‟s implementation of 
these elements clearly highlights the influence of Sun Tzu and his analysis 
of the use of intelligence and subversion. According to Sun Tzu, in fact, it is 
vitally important to acquire “foreknowledge [which] cannot be elicited from 
spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from 
calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy 
situation.”
674
 However, this intelligence organization, to be successful, had to 
be “interlocked with the organizations at all levels which can make the 
immediate response – i.e. take the necessary armed action.” In other words, 
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a networked system should be highly preferred with respect to the typical 
centralized system of the traditional military organization.
675
  
The third organizational design required the establishment of a 
“revolutionary institutions with a legal base.” Mao successfully implemented 
this step to the extent that we can talk today of the existence of a “Chinese 
model.” This model, in fact, relied on the establishment and dissemination of 
“revolutionary institutions in remote parts of the country where the 
government writ [was] weak.” This approach, merely political, had great 
advantages, such as: “a) being more closely in accord with the cultural, 
social and political realities of the struggle of the country in question; b) 
enhancing the possible development of an indigenous military arm; and c) 
providing a better basis of legality if connected with the international scene.” 
However, this system brought with itself also some side effects, such as: a) 
the development of a peasant culture that would have progressively 
distanced itself from the political life in the cities; b) the increasing 
“antagonism between rural and urban revolutionary guerrilla movements; c) 
immediate difficulties against advanced counter-insurgent movements aimed 
at the instant destruction of any such rural foci.”
676
    
The fourth organizational requirement was the “high-grade 
propaganda system which can disseminate accurate information through 
many media sufficiently rapidly to interpret, and so take advantage of the 
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acceleration of events. This is vital to the „life‟ of the political programme.”
677
 
In order to strengthen the political ties with the masses, Mao, moreover, 
issued for the Eighth Route Army the so-called Three Rules and Eight 
Remarks; a necessary step to gain popular support and cement a unity of 
spirit between troops and local inhabitants. These were very basic and 
elementary principles that, however, in war, constituted vital tenets to be 
observed: 
 
Rules: 
1. All actions are subject to command. 
2. Do not steal from the people. 
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust. 
 
Remarks: 
1. Replace the door when you leave the house. 
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. 
3. Be courteous. 
4. Be honest in your transactions. 
5. Return what you borrow. 
6. Replace what you break. 
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 
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8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you 
arrest.
678
   
 
These elements further explain the reason why Mao encouraged to 
see the people as the sea where the guerrilla forces could swim.
679
 This 
metaphor is crucial in understanding Chinese strategic culture. In fact, in 
1938, during the battle of Taierzhuang which saw the confrontation between 
the Nationalists and the Japanese during the first phase of the Sino-
Japanese War, Du Zhongyuan, a journalist, “in a language that echoed the 
way the Communist armies presented their troops to the public,” described 
General Li Zongren‟s military instructions in the following terms: 
 
The most important point in the people‟s war is that … 
troops do not harass the people of the country. If the people are 
the water, soldiers are the fish, and if you have fish with no 
water, inevitably they‟re going to choke; worse still is to use our 
water to nurture the enemy‟s fish – that really is comparably 
stupid.
680
 
  
This politico-metaphorical image played an important role for the 
acquisition of intelligence from the people and finally its complete 
mobilization, leading to the fifth fundamental organizational setting of “a 
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politicized military force that can at least contain opposing military action 
sufficiently for offensives in the cultural, social-economic, political and 
international battlefronts.”
681
    
Finally the sixth and the seventh requirements of organization were 
respectively: “the development of an educational system, in order to educate 
the “people in the revolutionary interpretations of the past, present and 
future [by providing] meaning to, and direction for, the cultural-spiritual 
upsurge;” and the development of international connections, which helped 
the revolutionary forces to conduct successfully their military operations.
682
 It 
is significant that in order to fully engage with the educational development 
of the people to the Communist ideology, Mao had set in February 1942 the 
so-called: “Rectification Movement.” The objective was to set “a thorough 
reinvention of Chinese society.” Among the ideological transformations there 
was the “intense devotion to the study of Mao‟s works” along with the an 
“almost religious commitment to the goals of the Chinese Communist 
Party.”
683
 
An ideological transformation that Mao had to apply also among his 
own troops in order to build a cohesive and fully indoctrinated military body 
so as to facilitate the transition from a guerrilla-type movement to a 
conventional army. During the summer 1948, CCP set up the Speak 
Bitterness Movement (also adopted during the land reform in „30s), whose 
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objective was to increase morale and professionalization within the army. In 
other words, through this technique, the army was supposed to “create a 
sense of shared identity between the soldiers from poor farmer and worker 
backgrounds while forcing those of other class backgrounds to abandon 
their class and stand with the farmers and workers.” However, for those who 
did not comply with this indoctrination program, the CCP adopted the “Three 
Inspections and Three Rectifications” movement (“inspecting class, 
inspecting work, inspecting fighting spirit, rectifying discipline, rectifying 
work-style, rectifying systems”), which could proceed to purge those who 
showed an unsubmissive behavior.
684
 
Having set this political infrastructure, Mao also involved the military 
into the process of gaining popular support and masses mobilization through 
another more invasive tool: the use of massive terror campaigns,
685
 in order 
to force the people to embrace the communist revolutionary agenda. 
Specifically, the use of terror was often applied during the phase of land 
reform. Mao supported it “as an instrument of revolutionary terror.”
686
 The 
peculiarity behind this method is also attested by the actual implementation 
of proper counterinsurgency campaigns, conducted by the PLA, to fight 
against bandits that controlled vast territories in Manchuria and that, besides 
being hostile at both CCP and KMT, were known for using the same guerrilla 
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techniques that the Communists had been recognized for.
687
 Furthermore, 
the PLA‟s counterinsurgency operations targeted exactly what the CCP was 
striving for: people‟s support. The major objective in fighting bandits was to 
“attack [their] relationships with the people.”
688
 However, it should be pointed 
out that terror was selectively employed, because Mao recognized its 
counterproductive effect, that is, alienation of the masses.
689
  
Nevertheless, historically speaking, terrorism had played a 
significant role in the accomplishment of the mobilization objective not only 
for Mao, but also for Chiang. Concerning the latter, his loss of popular 
support during the Sino-Japanese War was also the direct effect of his 
application of state terror.
690
 In the middle of the war against Japan as well 
as a worsening of the economic conditions, Chiang availed himself of a 
“shadowy figure,” who was “in charge of a security apparatus empowered to 
enforce the will of the state through psychological pressures and to use 
torture on those who refused to obey.”
691
 
Notwithstanding this peculiar task that both the Communists and the 
Nationalists asked the military to perform, the army, moreover, served the 
political purpose of the mobilization of the masses through the “three 
combinations of forces. The first combination is that of the main troops with 
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local troops; the second is the regular army with the guerrilla army; and the 
third is armed masses with non-armed masses.”
692
 
 
4.2.2. Second Process of People’s War: Strategic Design 
 
For what concerns the CCP, during the Sino-Japanese War Mao 
highlighted the guidelines for the strategic asset that the Party should have 
adopted in order to finally achieve victory and therefore set the stage for the 
radical transformation of the country. A description that it is necessary to 
provide at length: 
 
What are the characteristics of China‟s revolutionary war? I 
think there are four principle ones. The first is that China is a 
vast, semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed 
politically and economically and which has gone through the 
revolution of 1924-27 … China is a vast country … Hence one 
need not worry about lack of room for manoeuvre.  
China has gone through a great revolution – this has provided 
the seeds from which the Red Army has grown, provided the 
leader of the Red Army, namely, the Chinese Communist Party, 
and provided the masses with experience of participation in a 
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revolution … this characteristic basically determines out military 
strategy and tactics as well as our political strategy and tactics.  
The second characteristic is that our enemy is big and powerful 
… the third characteristic is that the Red Army is small and 
weak. The Chinese Red Army, starting as guerrilla units, came 
into being after the defeat of the First Great Revolution …. This 
characteristic presents a sharp contrast to the preceding one. 
From this sharp contrast have arisen the strategy and tactics of 
the Red Army. The fourth characteristic is Communist Party 
leadership and the agrarian revolution. 
It follows from the first and fourth characteristics that it is 
possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its 
enemy. It follows from the second and third characteristics that 
it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly 
or defeat its enemy quickly, in other words, the war will be 
protracted and may even be lost if it is mishandled. 
[According to these factors] it is clear that we must correctly 
settle all the following matters of principle: 
Determine our strategic orientation correctly, oppose 
adventurism when on the offensive, oppose conservatism when 
on the defensive, and oppose flightism when shifting from one 
place to another. 
 Oppose guerrilla-ism in the Red Army, while recognizing the 
guerrilla character of its operations. 
445
 
 
Oppose protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, 
and uphold the strategy of protracted war and campaigns of 
quick decision. 
Oppose fixed battle lines and positional warfare, and favour 
fluid battle lines and mobile warfare. 
Oppose fighting merely to rout the enemy, and uphold fighting 
to annihilate the enemy. 
Oppose the strategy of striking with two “fists” in two directions 
at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one 
“fist” in one direction at one time. 
Oppose the principle of maintaining a large rear service 
organization, and uphold the principle of small ones. 
Oppose an absolutely centralized command, and favour a 
relatively centralized command. 
Oppose the purely military viewpoint and the ways of roving 
rebels, and recognize that the Red Amy is a propagandist and 
organizer of the Chinese revolution. 
Oppose bandit ways, and uphold strict political discipline. 
Oppose warlord ways, and favour both democracy within 
proper limits and an authoritative discipline in the army. 
Oppose an incorrect, sectarian policy on cadres, and uphold 
the correct policy on cadres. 
Oppose the policy of isolation, and affirm the policy of winning 
over all possible allies. 
446
 
 
Oppose keeping the Red Army at its old stage, and strive to 
develop it to a new stage.
693
 
 
All these elements, which paved the way for the acquisition of the 
necessary political infrastructure and the definition of the political objectives 
of war, greatly contributed to the establishment of Mao‟s People‟s War 
doctrine and its associated strategy. This has been recognized in the design 
and implementation of active defense (积极防御).694 During the Jiangxi 
period he, in fact, studied the nature of military strategy and tactics, by 
relying on “old warlord soldiers who had joined his forces and from Chinese 
military classics, and the transformation of peasant discontent into class 
warfare.”
695
   
This strategy further strengthens the presence of a strong Chinese 
strategic culture, since active defense (not the exact terminology but the 
same idea) had been already discussed at length by Sun Tzu. The latter, in 
fact, argued that in war the necessity relies on pre-emption: “Generally, he 
who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy will be at ease; he 
who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary. And 
therefore those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are 
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not brought there by him.”
696
 Mao has described active defense in the 
following terms: 
 
“While the enemy ruled the whole country, we had only 
small armed forces; consequently, from the very beginning we 
have had to wage a bitter struggle against his „encirclement and 
suppression‟ campaigns. Active defence is also known as 
offensive defence, or defence through decisive engagements. 
Passive defence is also known as purely defensive defence or 
pure defence. Passive defence is actually a spurious kind of 
defence, and the only real defence is active defence, defence 
for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive … 
our warfare consists of the alternate use of the defensive and 
the offensive … The counter-offensive is a long process, the 
most fascinating, the most dynamic, and also the final stage of 
a defensive campaign.”
697
 
 
According to this strategy, Chinese forces “were to conduct 
offensive operations within a defensive strategy.” The idea was to move 
swiftly against the enemy in order to counterattack, instead of passively 
waiting his actions. Mao‟s main fear, in fact, was that by employing passive 
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defense, the army would have found itself bogged down into an endless war 
of attrition. Active defense, then, placed “utmost emphasis on gaining and 
retaining the initiative. Searching for the initiative gave, as a result, 
advantages in terms of flexibility during the “employment of forces.”
698
 
Even Chiang Kai-shek had demonstrated to possess the same 
strategic willingness as attested by the Burma campaign that he conducted 
with the support of the American General Joseph Stilwell. Specifically, the 
American objective was to face directly the Japanese troops in Burma in 
order to protect the access to India (still a British colony) and the road that 
connected Burma to the south of China through which Chiang could get the 
American military supplies. However, while Stilwell was confident of a frontal 
attack against the Japanese, especially after the latter‟s ability to surround 
the city of Toungoo where the Sino-American troops were located, Chiang 
demonstrated to be more cautious, advocating a defensive posture, that is, 
withdrawing, until the opportunity for counterattack would have materialized. 
Unfortunately for Chiang, Stilwell did not share his strategic posture, to the 
extent that the joint Sino-American expedition found defeat. Nevertheless, 
according to Stilwell, Chiang‟s meddling, and not his strategy, proved to be 
the decisive effect of defeat. Moreover, he “described Chinese politics and 
military strategy as „twisting, indirect, and undercover.‟”
699
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However, Mao, by applying active defense, distinguished between 
“strategic attrition and operational annihilation.” With the first one, he argued 
about the possibility to weaken and slow down the enemy in military 
operations, while with the second element he advocated, at the operational 
level, “„quick decision‟ engagements to „annihilate‟ enemy units.”
700
 
The two elements just listed refer to the essence of the active 
defense strategy: protracted warfare (持久战).701 Protracted war symbolized, 
for Mao, the military nature of active defense and it was articulated into three 
distinct phases: strategic defense; strategic stalemate; and finally, strategic 
counteroffensive.
702
 The first phase, strategic defense, is based on the 
mobilization of the people, in order to gain popular support, while also trying 
to disrupt the enemy‟s army through small and quick military operations. 
These operations relied on the principle of “luring the enemy in the deep” ( 
you ji shenru), which meant the application of a strategic retreat along the 
interior lines and therefore closer to the army “supporting base areas.” The 
enemy, on the other hand, being on the offensive on the exterior lines, 
“would be moving further from [its] logistical support bases.” This strategic 
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interaction would have facilitated the communist objective of conducting 
battles of annihilation.
703
 
The second phase, strategic stalemate, would focus on the ability to 
disrupt the enemy attempt to consolidate his position. The communist forces 
“would use this period to prepare for their strategic counteroffensive.” In this 
phase, therefore, the consolidation attempt “would trap the enemy forces in 
their garrisons and Mao‟s forces would continue the process of attrition with 
attacks on enemy strongholds and logistical lines of support.”
704
 
Finally, the third phase, counteroffensive, would start only when 
communist forces had achieved “parity or superiority to the enemy.” 
Moreover, “the adversary‟s decision to consolidate his position would grant 
Mao‟s commander the initiative, allowing them to dominate the battlefield 
through freedom of movement.”
705
 
This three-stage strategy had been applied several times during the 
Chinese Civil War, even including the period of the Sino-Japanese War. For 
example, after the collapse of the resistance in the city of Taiyuan at the 
beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in the fall of 1937, Mao realized how 
relevant it was for the CCP to “making fuller use of guerrilla combat that 
could excite the Chinese people,” since “resistance by the government and 
the army alone can never defeat Japanese imperialism.” The communist 
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forces were therefore the necessary instrument to fulfill this task: “A guerrilla 
war should be mainly in the enemy‟s flanks and rear.”
706
   
These strategic assumptions were further confirmed when the civil 
war erupted. In the summer of 1946 Mao, along with Lin Biao, Chen Yi, and 
He Long, elaborated a strategy whose purpose was to “extend the CCP 
strongholds in Manchuria, defend the party‟s positions in North China, and 
withdraw from indefensible areas in Central and South China.” These 
objectives would have been accomplished by relying on mobile warfare and 
the extension of rural bases.
707
 Commonly known as the “7-7 Resolution” 
(because it had been established on 7 July), this document highlighted what 
the strategic asset of the CCP troops should be, after the military failures in 
Manchuria throughout the 1946 operations. The agreement emphasized the 
centrality of building base areas in Manchuria, send party cadres into the 
countryside, establish a land reform, strengthen the army, and “use the 
principles of mobile warfare to annihilate the enemy in deep, wait until the 
enemy is dispersed, and use superior numbers to annihilate the enemy.”
708
 
Specifically, these new strategic settings responded to the strategic 
vision that the CCP had decided to adopt the year before, in 1945. It had 
illustrated how the Red Army had to engage militarily in the Northeast. Liu 
Shaoqi and the Politburo decided that the Communists‟ objective was now to 
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“march on the north, defend in the south.” In other words, the CCP had to 
extend as farther as possible its own base areas, by moving in troops and 
cadres, while retreating in the south, defending the key territories under 
Communist control. It is clear that this symbolized the desire – too 
premature – to move from a guerrilla-type of warfare to a more conventional, 
mobile one.
709
 
In addition to that, the strategy also reflected another important 
change: the CCP had now to focus on dispersing their forces “in the medium 
and small cities and rural areas, concentrate on building base areas, and 
prepare for a protracted struggle and eventual victory.” This strategic outline 
highlighted the necessity to abandon the previous strategic design which 
had been based on the “Three Big Cities” objectives, that is, the importance 
of capturing Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin. However, in Manchuria, 
Mao‟s strategy of “surround the cities from the countryside” was actually the 
other way round, with the cities that had first been occupied.
710
 
However the Nationalists demonstrated to have, at the very 
beginning of the conflict, a better sense of mobile warfare, to the extent that 
Chiang managed to move swiftly to the west, that is, the mountain region 
between Hubei and Anhui close to Yan‟an, and then immediately to the east, 
that is, in northern Jiangsu, which was under the control of the Communist 
general Chen Yi. Here, Chen tried to apply the “lure the enemy in the deep” 
strategic logic, “lulling Li‟s forces [Guomindang general Li Mi] into a false 
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sense of security. Then he struck furiously into southern Jiangsu, broke 
through the nationalist lines, and inflicted heavy casualties on the GMD 
units.” However, this bold action was not enough to avoid defeat by the hand 
of the Guomindang, to the extent that Chen Yi was forced to leave the 
region. Things were not going well either for the Communist forces in 
Manchuria, which were forced to flee in the fall of 1946. While retreating, 
their major purpose was to “set up local guerrilla groups in the 
mountains.”
711
 
Moreover, Chiang‟s strategic design for the Manchurian theatre of 
operation focused on the “first south, then north” assumption. The idea was 
to secure the southern part of Manchuria in order to disrupt communications 
between the Communist troops in north Manchuria and the base areas in 
North China, specifically the Bei-Ning railway line, which connected 
Shenyang to Shanhaiguan. Once the southern part could be secured, then 
Du Yuming would immediately march towards north, bringing down the 
entire Communist military infrastructure.
712
 
Nevertheless, protracted warfare logic still governed CCP‟s way of 
thinking about war. In the fall 1946, after military setbacks, he argued that 
CCP counterattack in the Northeast “would have to be conducted according 
to the principles of conventional warfare, rather than the highly mobile tactics 
used in the defense of CCP positions in the South.” However, Lin Biao had a 
different idea, which was still based on the small-scale operations. The 1946 
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winter campaign proved to be a “compromise between these two 
approaches.” On one hand, it consisted of conducting sabotage operations, 
such as disrupting enemy communications, while on the other it had also to 
directly face Nationalist forces, in order to “test out GMD strength.”
713
   
Concerning the former, the CCP was beginning to see the results of 
its guerrilla campaigns. On one hand, they made sure that Communist 
regular forces remained intact, while on the other, “by severing 
communications, [they were] separating the cities from the countryside and 
slowly driving the government into an economic crisis.”
714
 
In general terms, after the 1946 July 7 Resolution, it seemed clear 
how Lin Biao was committed to the application of the active defense 
strategy. In what has been recognized as the period of Three Expeditions 
and the Four Defenses – conducted between the end of 1946 and the 
beginning of 1947 – Lin Biao fully exploited the active defense strategy “by 
conducting an „offensive-defensive campaign.‟”
715
  
However, the active defense was not simply Mao‟s strategic 
approach to the Civil War. Even Jiang adopted a strategic outlook that 
reflected the active defense. During the execution of Lin Biao‟s Winter 
Offensive between 1947-48, Chiang commanded his subordinate Chen 
Cheng, who asked for more troops, to still conduct offensive operations, 
while being “on the strategic defensive.”
716
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Moreover, during the HuaiHai campaign, Nationalist Defense 
Minister He Yingqin and General Gu Zhutong agreed to adopt an active 
defense approach around the city of Xuzhou. The idea was to withdraw from 
other nearby areas in order to consolidate the major KMT forces on the 
western part of Xuzhou for offensive operations, while maintaining “an area 
defense to the east of Xuzhou along the Long-Hai railroad between Xuzhou 
and Haizhou to block an ECFA penetration into north Jiangsu.”
717
 
 
4.2.3. Third Process of People’s War: Tactical Design 
 
The tactical asset of the Maoist way of warfare had been confirmed, 
officially, during the Zunyi Conference, held in Guizhou province in 1935, 
which “endorsed his tactics of mobile warfare and moved the party away 
from the conventional warfare strategies supported by the Comintern.”
718
 
This aspect is crucial in understanding how, notwithstanding the important 
Soviet influence on the overall Chinese way of conducting warfare, it was 
necessary to readapt those tactical conditions to the Chinese unique social 
and cultural spectrum. For instance, during the first military encounters of 
the Civil War, Lin Biao, one of the central strategist of the communist 
struggle and Mao‟s most trusted commander, advocated the employment of 
Soviet battle plans, that he had personally studied during his stay in 
                                                          
717
 Gary J Bjorge, Moving The Enemy, p. 88 
718
 Rana Mitter, China's War With Japan, 1937-1945, p. 187; Gary J Bjorge, Moving 
The Enemy, p. 19 
456
 
 
Moscow. However, for Mao, the Soviet tactics were “dangerous aberrations 
from the principles of people‟s war.”
719
 
For Mao, at least for what concerns his 1930s‟ writings, and in 
relation with the ongoing war against Japan, guerrilla tactics strongly 
reminded Sun Tzu‟s Art of War. Mao focused on the idea that guerrilla 
operations occurred in a “fluid fashion, in which there are no front lines.” 
Moreover, the use of guerrilla emphasized the role played by speed, 
deception, alertness, high mobility, and flexibility, where the latter played a 
decisive role in shaping the military effort according to “any given situation.” 
This, in turn, meant that Chinese troops should focus more on large scale 
mobile warfare, rather than positional warfare.
720
  
The readaptation of war tactics to the Chinese unique conditions 
had also been highlighted by an American intelligence report, which stated 
that: 
 
It is argued that the CCP units are successful in only 
two types of warfare which they are now carrying on in Jehol 
[Rehe]; that when they attempt position defense, they are 
unable to stand against the KMT. The earlier effectiveness of 
the CCP in such fighting in Manchuria does not confirm this 
opinion. Nor does the fact that the CCP units in Jehol have 
confined their operations to sporadic raids against the railroads 
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mean that they are incapable of larger-scale and more 
sustained operations. Rather, they are carrying out the tactics 
most suited to the situation in which they find themselves, and 
their refusal to adopt any other kind of warfare is a tribute to 
their sagacity rather than an adverse commentary on their lack 
of training for other than guerrilla action.
721
 
 
This assumption had been further implemented right during the war 
against Japan. As the KMT found defeat by the Japanese hand, “Communist 
guerrillas would infiltrate behind the lines of the advancing Japanese, 
organize resistance, and take over the administration of these „liberated‟ 
areas.”
722
 The increasing reliance on asymmetric techniques of warfare by 
the Communists forced the Japanese to use counter-insurgency actions 
which were distinctive for their cruelty: “they moved farmers into protected 
villages in order to deprive the Communist guerrillas of popular support and 
inflicted heavy casualties on the resistance forces.” For example, one of the 
most brutal campaign took place in 1941 in Manchuria, the so-called “three 
alls”: “Kill all, burn all, destroy all.” The campaign targeted the crucial 
element of the Communist guerrillas: “the rural agricultural economy and 
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communities on which Communist guerrilla forces relied for intelligence, 
logistical support, recruits, and supplies.”
723
 
Chinese tactical asset, especially the Maoist one, therefore, 
reflected not only the assumptions of the contingent People‟s War Doctrine, 
but also those of the Chinese strategic culture per se. Specifically, the main 
component was the use of deceptive means of war, among which stood the 
creation of units made of urban dwellers who left the city to join the CCP in 
its rural areas, which were then used as agents for underground activities in 
their cities of origin, such as political work and sabotage. This group of 
secret agents had been known as the Underground Party (dixia dang) and 
had to follow Zhou‟s dicta: the Three Diligences (sanqin) – “in studies, 
careers, and making friends” -  and the Three Processes (sanhua) – “be 
professional, fit in, and stay legitimate whenever possible.”
724
  
These activities were crucial for the CCP not only as disrupting 
activity towards KMT‟s government. They also fulfilled a precious 
intelligence service. For example, in one famous instance, Xiong Xianghui, a 
spy for the CCP, while serving KMT‟s general Hu Zongnan in 1945-1946, 
had collected information about KMT‟s plan to occupy Yan‟an during the 
campaign in winter 1946-47. Information that the Communist spy 
immediately transferred to the Party, preventing a more devastating 
defeat.
725
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The tactical objectives associated with this underground activity 
were not only to confuse enemy‟s plans, but also to increase military 
flexibility.
726
 This feature is particularly important for the understanding of 
Chinese strategic culture, since it was also shared even by Chiang Kai-shek 
especially during the Sino-Japanese War; “his tactics could lead him to 
adopt intricate and often deceptive strategies: he was a master at playing off 
his colleagues against one another.” Chiang, for example, after the 
Manchuria Incident of September 18
th
 1931 decided to play this deceptive 
element when he offered Japan a compromise, “but in private, he 
encouraged the Chinese 19
th
 Route Army to fight back.”
727
  
Once Mao managed to mobilize the people, and therefore create the 
strategy of active defense according to the Chinese geopolitical features, it 
was important to understand what tactics could satisfy the strategic design, 
whose purpose was to translate military successes into clear political 
objectives. By the time the civil war erupted, it became central for Mao and 
the Communists to understand how to block the Nationalists‟ advance in the 
Northeast. For the entire duration of the civil war, Lin Biao distinguished 
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himself for his “remarkable gifts as a military leader – first and foremost his 
ability to quickly grasp the strategic disposition of his enemies and to 
mislead them with regard to his own.” This allowed him to conduct, very 
often, surprise attacks on the enemy forces when the opportunity came.
728
 
The same can also be said of Chen Yi, the commander of the New Fourth 
Army, whose reputation of being “a master in the art of prompt retreats and 
unexpected reappearances” found confirmation throughout the war.
729
  
The logic of maneuvers that both the KMT and the CCP were trying 
to implement reflected the same tactical maneuvers applied in the “bygone 
days of ancient Chou [Zhou] and T‟ang [Tang] dynasties.” That is, it became 
an historical constant that those kingdoms based in Shanxi “always 
attempted to apply what the classics call the „horizontal plan.‟” It consisted in 
the occupation of those territories that followed the course of the Yellow 
River, connecting the westward region to the sea by moving eastward. On 
the other hand, those states located in the south “always sought to apply the 
„vertical plan,‟ which called for the formation of a north-south bulwark 
capable of confining their enemies to the west.”
730
 Therefore, historically 
speaking, even according to the historian C. P. Fitzgerald, in contemporary 
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China “the „horizontal‟ and the „vertical‟ plans of the ancient Chou [Zhou] 
strategists reappear in all essentials unchanged.”
731
  
According to the Chinese military tradition, it is also possible to 
distinguish the way the Nationalists were conducting their military 
operations, especially during the Civil War. For example, when dealing with 
the Taiping and Nian Rebellions of the mid nineteenth century, the Qing‟s 
tactical design focused on the ability to secure one sector after another, 
“slowly and methodically drawing the circle ever tighter around the enemy.” 
Chiang ended up relying on the same tactical design when targeting 
warlords first, and Communist base areas afterwards.
732
   
In addition to that, at the tactical level, army organization 
represented another daunting challenge. In 1946 Lin had to find a way to 
integrate into a coherent military force the many bandits, former Manchurian 
warlords, brigands, and other various groups of fighters that wanted to join 
the Northeast People‟s Liberation Army. In order to increase the military 
effectiveness of this heterodox mass of people, Lin relied on a rigorous 
military training. Moreover, he also “placed a strong emphasis on teaching 
his men the military methods developed in the Soviet Union and in the 
command areas of North China during the last years of the anti-Japanese 
war.” These methods, contrary to the CCP military habit – which was mainly 
based on “guerrilla-style „people‟s war‟” – were more conventional means of 
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warfare. However, the centrality of this new type of training remained “speed 
– the ability to move fast across the great Manchurian Plain, surprise the 
enemy, and defeat their strategies.”
733
    
 Mao subsequently issued the famous “Ten Principles of 
Operations,” which clarified the employment of tactics according to the 
different circumstances.
734
 Active defense, and its essence of protracted 
war, as has been previously stated, relied on the implementation of three 
strategic phases necessary for the accomplishment of political objectives. At 
the tactical level, in fact, the theory envisaged the application, first of all, of 
strategic defense, followed by strategic stalemate, and concluded by the 
strategic counteroffensive. The first phase objective – “luring the enemy in 
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ﬁghting – courage in battle, no fear of sacriﬁce, no fear of fatigue, and continuous 
ﬁghting. (7) Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move. At the same time, 
pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortiﬁed points and 
cities. (8) Concerning attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and 
cities that are weakly defended. (9) Replenish our strength with all the arms and 
most of the personnel captured from the enemy. (10) Make good use of the intervals 
between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops … our strategy and 
tactics are based on a People‟s War; no army opposed to the people can use our 
strategy and tactics. Mao Zedong, “The Present Situation and Our Tasks,” (25 
December 1947), in Selected Military Writings   
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deep” – was to trade space for time:
735
 “Both Mao and Chiang were familiar 
with the practice of falling back before a superior enemy, giving up space in 
order to gain time for a long war of attrition in which the enemy‟s need to 
administer and defend his newly acquired territory and its hostile population 
would weaken him in the long term.”
736
  
These basic guerrilla tactics, moreover, highlight the connection with 
Sun Tzu‟s military thought, especially when it comes to the search for 
flexibility, high mobility, and, above all, speed, as Lin Biao clearly 
demonstrated.
737
 Sun Tzu‟s words, for example, can be found in the 
following Maoist tactical assumptions:  
 
敵進我退(di jin wo tui) The enemy advances, we retreat; 
敵駐我擾(di jiu, wo rao) The enemy camps, we harass; 
敵疲我打(di pi, wo da) The enemy tires, we attack; 
敵退我追(di tui, wo zhui) The enemy retreats, we pursue.738 
 
One of the clearest application of this tactic had occurred during the 
communist evacuation of Yan‟an, after the nationalist winter offensive 
campaign of 1946-47. The Communist strategic retreat would have lasted 
                                                          
735
 J. L. S Girling, People's War (New York, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1969), pp. 79-82; Samuel B Griffith, Biao Lin and Ruiqing Luo, Peking And People's 
Wars (London: Pall Mall P., 1966), p. 33. 
736
 Harold Miles Tanner, The Battle For Manchuria And The Fate Of China, p. 11 
737
 Harold Miles Tanner, Where Chiang Kai-Shek Lost China, p. 19 
464
 
 
until mid 1948, a period in which the Communists “had made something of a 
specialty of drawing Nationalist troops out into the field, identifying weak 
points, and attacking them mercilessly.”
739
 After that, Mao and the CCP 
establishment decided that it was important to progressively move the army 
towards a conventional way of fighting. In the meantime, the constant 
Nationalist advance, in purely Clausewitizian terms, had reached the so-
called “culminating point of the attack,” after which logistics and political 
factors proved to be untenable.
740
  
Most of the Nationalist leadership, except Chiang, was aware of 
what was going on in Manchuria; the easy victories that the KMT had 
achieved, including the capture of Yan‟an, responded more to the 
Communist strategy of luring the enemy in deep rather than the mere 
superior Nationalist strength, which played, nevertheless, an important role. 
This explains why Chiang‟s advisor, Chen Lifu, notwithstanding the 
Nationalist victories in Manchuria, “urged the Generalissimo to abandon [it] 
for the time being and focus his military efforts to North China.” And this was 
motivated mainly by the fact that KMT‟s armies had not been able to 
“outflank, pin down and annihilate Communist armies.” But Chiang was still 
heavily  concerned with the total annihilation of the Communists.
741
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Thanks also to the intelligence information the CCP managed to 
acquire – specifically the spying activities of Xiong Xianghui, mentioned 
earlier, who communicated to Mao important information on KMT‟s general 
Hu Zongnan‟s military expedition – Mao and Lin made KMT‟s Manchuria 
offensive Jiang‟s “strategic trap.” In fact, the Communists moved into two 
directions: on one hand, once they understood that the Nationalists “had 
made the strategic error of committing considerable force to the sterile 
conquest of Yenan [Yan‟an], they decided to build in Shanxi their own base 
of maneuver.
742
 On the other, for the first five months of 1947 before leaving 
Yan‟an, Lin had conducted several offensives over the Sungari River which 
became the front of the military operations in northern Manchuria. The fifth 
of these offensives, conducted on 10
th
 May, proved particularly successful: 
Lin Biao divided his forces into four groups – one of which was composed of 
Mongolian cavalry and Red guerrillas – and located them in different 
locations, with the objective to swiftly encircle and finally occupy Nationalist 
posts, with a clear focus on Mukden, which was soon under siege. This 
movement obliged KMT‟s troops to temporarily abandon Shandong and 
concentrate its main military effort in Mukden which was desperately 
defended. In this operational scenario, even if the Communist forces were 
not able to stand the superior Nationalist materiel and troops, they still 
“showed a degree of mobility and flexibility which enabled them to evade 
most of the blows leveled against them.”
743
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At the propaganda level, to justify the military setback of Yan‟an 
while also keep troops‟ morale high, CCP‟s strategic retreat had also been 
described as a voluntary action Mao had undertaken in order to “expose 
southern Shaanxi to Communist attacks.”  In military terms – thanks to the 
intelligence information received from spies – the Chairman‟s military 
response was mainly based on his previous experience from the 1930s and 
the Long March, which focused on “ambushes, high mobility, and targets 
selected to achieve the maximum element of surprise to the enemy.”
744
   
Notwithstanding their military superiority, the Nationalists had to 
constantly face this type of warfare during the initial phase of the Civil War. 
After the KMT troops managed to occupy a major city on their way to 
Yan‟an, the context was very often the same: the occupied target was 
emptied by the Communists, leaving the Nationalists with nothing to hold. 
Therefore, the Nationalists faced a dilemma which would accompany them 
throughout the war: “they had either to mass their forces, in order to push 
the Reds back and seize the cities – a ponderous solution incapable of 
bringing the elusive enemy to decisive battle; or they could scatter out to 
clear the countryside – a hazardous solution which ran the risk of exposing 
thinly deployed forces to defeat in detail.”
745
 
A version of “luring the enemy in deep,” even if merely applied to 
fulfill the associated objective of trading space for time and also in relation to 
the totalizing nature of war that Chinese troops were facing, had been 
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applied by Chiang right after the battle of Taierzhuang against the Japanese 
in April 1938. Specifically, after acknowledging the advance of Japanese 
troops towards the city of Wuhan, Chiang had decided that it would have 
been better “to use water instead of soldiers [yi shui dai bing],” which meant 
destroying the dykes of the Yellow River, whose river‟s water power would 
have severely slowed down Japanese advance. This, in turn, would have 
unleashed “incalculable suffering on those who lived nearby,” however, it 
seemed a cost that the Nationalists were willing to bear.
746
 This tactical 
approach had been later on reconfirmed during the civil war in the fall of 
1946. In order to separate the Communist forces between Shandong and 
Hebei, the Nationalists decided, again, to use the Yellow River as a weapon. 
The objective this time was to deviate it by bringing it to its old course: “this 
would flood Anhwei [Anhui] and Kiangsu [Jiangsu], dry the former river bed 
into a mud flat at best, isolate Hopeh [Hebei] from Shantung [Shandong], 
and make the movement of Red troops exceedingly difficult.”
747
       
However, during the Sino-Japanese war, this action proved tactically 
costly to the extent that on 25 November 1938 Chiang held in the mountain 
retreat at Nanyue in Hunan a conference on the tactics failings and the 
inevitable readjustments to be employed for what they thought would have 
been the second phase of the Sino-Japanese War. During this conference 
Chiang heavily relied on China‟s history for tactical models to be followed. 
One of the first teachings came from Sun Tzu, and specifically the 
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assumption that “if the enemy comes to us we can take advantage of him,” 
meaning in other words, the centrality of defensive measures which 
according to Sun Tzu gave the defender the upper hand in a conflict. And 
Chiang, without surprise, found more convenient to base his tactical 
assumptions on the rich Chinese historical traditions in military affairs.
748
 
It had not been too long before this strategic approach could finally 
be implemented. And this happened in September 1939, when the 
Japanese Imperial Army had sent more than 100,000 troops to take control 
of the city of Changsha. However, the Cantonese general Xue Yue 
“defended the city brilliantly, using a combination of formal field warfare 
along with guerrilla tactics to lure the Japanese into ambushes and prevent 
them from resupplying themselves.”
749
  
The second phase of protracted warfare, “strategic stalemate” relied 
on the extensive application of guerrilla tactics, by disposing the troops 
“without ascertainable shape.”
750
 Here, additional similarities with Sun Tzu 
emerge, since he recognized that during an attritional phase the army had to 
rely on the “combination of the cheng (regular) and qi (special/irregular) 
forces.”
751
 Specifically, the Red Army‟s irregular units were of two types: the 
minbing, that is, militia, was in charge of “local defense and support of the 
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regular forces.” Mainly composed of peasants, they were “poorly armed but 
capable of reinforcing the regulars when needed.” Their military equipment 
was very old-fashioned and included: “medieval scythes and bills, hand 
grenades stuffed with nails, wooden cannon firing stones or shrapnel balls, 
old muskets daring back to the T‟ai-p‟ing [Taiping] Rebellion.” The second 
type of irregular unit concerned the guerrilla groups. Their objective was to 
directly attack Nationalist troops, disrupt communications, and conducting an 
intensive propaganda work.
752
 
This led to two “effects” of People‟s War tactics: the “swarm effect,” 
which referred to the exploitation of the superior quantity of manpower in 
order to exhaust the enemy, and the “sting effect,” which relied on the use of 
mobile weaponry “to sneak up on the enemy.”
753
 
During the operations of the Civil War, the second phase proved 
decisive for slowing down Nationalist advance in the Northeast. Before the 
collapse of Yan‟an, the Communist forces, led by Mao and Zhu De, decided 
to make a new redisposition of the Red forces. Specifically, in the Shandong 
area, “Red guerrillas, militiamen, and newly formed regular columns were 
left with the task of spreading confusion throughout the enemy‟s rears areas 
and harassing the … railroads.”
754
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In the third phase, “strategic counteroffensive,” Mao could plan the 
disintegration of the enemy‟s forces, simply by exploiting enemy‟s 
weaknesses which gave the communist army the military initiative, thanks to 
the wide application of guerrilla tactics, “mobile warfare, … offensive 
[actions], quick decisions, and [operations] on exterior lines in campaigns 
and battles,” which allowed China to gain the initiative.
755
 General Su Yu, 
when planning the last military campaign against the Nationalists, 
highlighted, in full Sunzian fashion, how important it was for the CCP troops 
to avoid getting involved in “fighting that would slow their advance but to 
keep their forces flowing forward.”
756
 At the end of the struggle, therefore, 
“mobile warfare (yudong zhan), positional warfare (zhendi zhan), and 
guerrilla warfare (youji zhan)” represented the three basic tactics of People‟s 
War doctrine in order to gain the military initiative.
757
  
At the same time, for the third phase to work properly, Mao 
advocated the constant reliance on misconceptions in order to, then, deliver 
surprise attacks upon the enemy as attested by his reliance on the ancient 
Chinese proverb of “there can never be too much deception in war [bing bu 
yan zha].”
758
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The third phase, moreover, put greater emphasis on the exploitation 
of the enemy‟s contradictions,
759
 expressed in the three weaknesses that 
Mao intercepted during the conflict against Japanese invasion: “their 
shortage of troops [first weakness], fighting on foreign soil [second 
weakness], and their stupidities in command [third weakness].”
760
 However, 
it should be pointed out that Mao considered the third phase as an optional 
step, since the war must be won, and clearly set up in the second phase.
761
 
It was Lin Biao‟s task to make sure that Mao‟s overall vision of war 
could be translated into a proper tactical design. In order to achieve this 
objective, he created the so-called “Six Principles of Combat,” which had 
been developed, however, in progressive steps, that is, as a reflection of the 
overall evolution of the Civil War. For example, already in 1945, Lin Biao, 
after the CCP had been defeated in the Laoxi Campaign,  articulated a new 
tactical doctrine for the Red Army, the so-called “One Point, Two Flanks.” 
His overall idea was to concentrate the maneuver effort against the enemy‟s 
key weak point while also using the rest of the army against other tactical 
spots of the enemy “both in order to prevent the enemy from understanding 
where the main point of attack really was and to either envelop, cut off, or 
pin down enemy forces.” Along with this doctrine, Lin also had elaborated 
the “three-three system.” According to this tactical design, each squad would 
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be divided into three teams each composed of three to four men. The 
squad‟s objective, during war operations, would have been to advance in a 
triangular formation, instead of a linear one, in order to reduce the number of 
soldiers that could have become easy target for the enemy‟s fire.
762
  
Later on, during the Three Expeditions/Four Defenses campaign, he 
added two extra tactical guidelines: the “four teams, one unit” and the “four 
fast, one slow.” With the first one, Lin desired to divide a company into four 
combat teams: “a firepower team, a strike team, a demolition team, and a 
reserve team.” The second guideline, instead, focused on the actual military 
operation. Lin‟s objective was to create a “fast” attack on the enemy with a 
“slow” preparation, that is, the need “for commander to take the time to 
understand the enemy‟s situation and the terrain and to get all their troops 
and artillery prepared and in place before attacking an enemy position.” 
Therefore, the idea behind this second guideline referred to the need for a 
ponderous tactical calculation of any military scenario, rather than an 
actually slow operation.
763
  
Finally, in the summer 1948, during an extensive military training 
whose objective was to produce a more professional army which could 
undertake more conventional operations, Lin Biao adopted the last two 
tactical principles: “the three ferocities” and the “three types of situation, 
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three types of fighting.” The first one, as the name itself suggests, advocated 
the use of ferocity when attacking, fighting, and pursuing the enemy, while 
the second emphasized the importance of studying the context and various 
war situations in order to better understand when and how to better perform 
the army‟s actions.
764
 
Nevertheless, Lin‟s techniques required time before they could be 
properly mastered by the army. As a consequence, in specific military 
circumstances, Mao seemed to not have fully grasped the timing of the third 
phase, ending up in sounding military defeats between 1945 and 1947. For 
example, in the spring of 1946, Mao became obsessed with the idea that 
Communist troops had to settle the civil war against the Nationalist army 
through a “decisive battle.” The place was found in the city of Siping. The 
ensuing battle represented for Mao the crucial engagement that would have 
decided the faith of both contenders. This romantic vision of warfare was 
also motivated by the myth surrounding the Battle of Madrid, fought ten 
years before in Spain during another bloody civil war, in which the leftist 
Republicans bravely defended the city against Franco‟s Nationalists. 
Unfortunately, the Second Battle of Siping, from March to May 1946, 
represented the constant confrontation between Lin Biao‟s and Mao‟s 
tactical visions, with the former emphasizing mobility, flexibility, and 
asymmetry, while the latter was more concerned to confront directly 
Nationalist troops. In fact, while for Mao Siping had to resemble the new 
Madrid, for Lin, Siping, as well as the rest of the Chinese military 
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involvement in Manchuria, had to recall, instead, Russian military operations 
against Napoleon in 1812, which were mainly based on strategic retreat 
combined with guerrilla operations. KMT‟s troops, nevertheless, during this 
battle, demonstrated to have the ability to perform mobile operations, with 
Du Yuming‟s double envelopment of Siping and the cut-off of Lin‟s route of 
retreat:
 765
 a clear sign that also KMT‟s tactical assessments were 
responding to specific cultural traits in warfare.    
The same tactical problem emerged after the KMT troops managed 
to occupy Yan‟an, in early 1947. In that case, Mao forced Lin Biao to 
undertake a counteroffensive against the KMT‟s positions in Siping, which 
unfortunately for the Communist forces, proved to be unsuccessful due to 
the superior Nationalist forces.
766
  
These tactical misinterpretations – that is, the desire to defeat the 
Nationalists in a decisive battle – critically conditioned part of the Chinese 
military struggle in Manchuria, yet in 1945 the CCP had already established 
the new tactical conditions that even Mao had agreed upon. After the Liaoxi 
campaign – conducted in the fall 1945 in order to block Nationalist access in 
Manchuria – the CCP realized how “the Communist soldiers were not 
prepared to conduct defense of static positions or engage in large-scale 
mobile operations in the field.” Advocating the necessity to shift from purely 
guerrilla tactics to conventional ones represented, inevitably, the step the 
Communist forces had to go through, however, the “transition” had occurred 
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only at the organizational level; “beneath the surface, the men and officers 
were still guerrilla warriors.”
767
 
In other circumstances, instead, Mao proved to have grasped the 
third phase planning which started to be implemented in 1947 with 
devastating effects for the Nationalist forces throughout 1948. For example, 
still in 1947, the CCP, under the command of Liu Bocheng, targeted the 
Central Plains as the next area of expansion, which represented the KMT‟s 
stronghold. Moreover, the centrality of the Central Plains in military terms 
was also attested by Zhu De‟s historical considerations; he argued, in fact, 
that “the Central Plains battlefield has been the scene of decisive battles. 
Since ancient times, those who have triumphed in the Central Plains have 
become the final victors.”
768
 
The Communist operation conducted in the Central Plains, which 
relied on swift maneuvers, highlighted CCP‟s ability to penetrate into KMT‟s 
core areas.
769
 Specifically, the Central Plains campaign “marked the 
beginning of a profound change” in the overall Communist tactics: “without 
renouncing its traditional hit-and-run tactics, the Red Army now showed that 
it no longer feared to undertake sieges.” Moreover, Communist involvement 
in Central Plains proved to be very important because it highlighted 
Communist willingness and readiness to face the Nationalist troops at the 
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conventional level.
 770
 The Communist involvement in the Central Plains 
would have been later confirmed, in January 1948, by the commander Su 
Yu who advocated the importance of conducing a “„suddenly concentrate-
suddenly disperse‟ operational method” of warfare, in order to achieve the 
total destruction of the Nationalist army.
771
 
However, notwithstanding the first attempts at executing 
conventional military operations, PLA army had never given up its traditional 
way of fighting, which relied on swift maneuvers and dispersed attacks on 
enemy‟s forces. We have to wait until the second half of 1948, before we 
can actually see the PLA directly challenging the Nationalist army in decisive 
battles. As briefly described earlier, even if the idea was to finally challenge 
the KMT through direct military confrontations, and even if between 1946 
and 1948 Communist armies had reached a very strong position that 
allowed them to move such types of operations against it had they desired to 
do so, “the Communists remained reluctant to directly challenge large 
Nationalist maneuver forces,” preferring to concentrate their military effort on 
swift maneuvers.
772
 In other words, the weight of the Chinese strategic 
culture – that is, the reliance on flexibility, speed, and swift maneuvers – still 
governed the Communist strategic thinking in matters of war.    
During the Summer Offensive in 1947, the Communists, led by Lin 
Biao, managed to attack and defeat part of the KMT‟s army in Manchuria. 
Specifically, the battle of Huaide represented “a textbook example of Lin 
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Biao‟s tactical style.” First of all, he moved his troops north of Huaide to 
block the potential reinforcement sent in support of Nationalist troops. 
Secondly, once having secured the Communist rear, he applied the “one 
point, two flanks” tactic: “he chose two primary breakthrough points and one 
secondary point, or „flank.‟” This easily allowed Lin‟s troops to win over the 
Nationalist troops.
773
  
The second major military operation of the year – in strictly military 
terms “the crucial maneuver of the civil war” – conducted in winter and 
concluded at the beginning of 1948, was based in Manchuria, after Lin Biao 
planned the Winter Offensive, which was mainly based on the double 
movements of troops from east and west. The area of the military operations 
concerned the city of Shenyang. The city was attacked by several fronts. Li 
Zoupeng, Lin‟s chief planner, was in charge of the northwest offensive. 
Exploiting the superior mobility of the Communist troops he “moved stealthily 
through the forest and deep snow north of Shenyang.” After Li‟s initially 
successful maneuver, Lin moved with his army on the western part of the 
city, surrounding the town of Xinlitun, while sending other forces on the 
eastern part of Shenyang.
774
  
In the spring of 1948, full of confidence about his conventional 
methods, Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi reported another important victory at the 
battle of Kaifeng. The Communists, “abandoning guerrilla tactics for 
positional warfare, were to join battle with the Nationalists in open country 
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and maneuver large masses of infantry, artillery, and even some tanks.” 
However, even if engaged in a conventional confrontation, the CCP troops 
did not lose their high flexibility and mobility. For example, Chen Yi, once he 
realized that he could not strike Kaifeng directly, “abandoned his initial 
scheme of maneuver and improvised a swift descent upon the capital of 
Honan [Henan]” by attacking KMT‟s Fifth Army at the rear. However, even 
the Nationalists managed to adopt flexible maneuvers, to the extent that 
they easily regrouped, forcing Chen Yi to retreat from the occupied city, and 
challenged the Communists right outside of it. The battle that took place 
“within a triangular area” composed of three small towns lasted until 9 July 
with a partial defeat of the Communists.
775
 
However, between the fall of 1948 and beginning of 1949, the CCP 
launched three famous operations which would have finally declared 
Communist victory over the KMT. The first one, the LiaoShen campaign, a 
proper manifestation of Mao‟s People‟s War – as attested by the Heishan 
battle in which the CCP managed to mobilize the entire population for the 
war effort, just to cite an example
776
 – was fought in the Liaoning province in 
the fall of 1948. It had mainly represented the final epic battle between the 
CCP and the KMT in Manchuria. The second operation, the Ping-Jin 
Campaign, involved the capture of Beijing and Tianjin, between November 
1948 and January 1949. Finally, the third one, the HuaiHai campaign – 
another importance evidence of Mao‟s application of People‟s War “carried 
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out on a grand scale”
777
 – fought near the Huai river and the town of 
Haizhou between 1948 and 1949, which gave their names to the operation, 
was mainly conceived as the military tool through which the CCP could 
finally extend its territorial grasp south of Manchuria, that is, in all those 
territories north of the Yangzi River. The river and the town represented the 
“southern and the eastern extremes of the battle.”
778
  
For what concerns the first campaign – the LiaoShen, conducted 
between September and November 1948 – KMT and CCP fought a decisive 
war for Manchuria. After developing the right “configuration” ( the shi as Sun 
Tzu would have put it) throughout 1948, Lin and Mao were determined to 
move on the offensive.
779
 It concerned mainly the city of Jinzhou, the Bei-
Ning railway line (that connected Manchuria to China Proper), the county of 
Yixian, the city of Mukden (Shenyang), and the city of Changchun. This 
campaign represented a crucial outcome of the overall Civil War.
780
 Its 
significance is related to two major factors: the first one is KMT‟s overall 
defeat in Manchuria, paving the way for the complete territorial control by the 
CCP, while the second factor is related to the fact that this campaign 
“marked the Communist forces‟ transition from guerrilla warfare to large-
scale maneuver operations.”
781
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Lin Biao, “who maneuvered in a manner worthy of Napoleon‟s first 
Italian campaign, or of the Germans at Tannenberg,” managed to defeat 
Nationalist troops through the application of mobile maneuvers aimed at 
attacking the enemy on the flank and at the rear. The Nationalists controlled 
the area through the Fifty-second and the Fifty-third Army where the former 
controlled, though weakly, the Mukden-Yingkou rail line. This represented a 
good tactical opportunity for Lin who now had to find a way to avoid being 
squeezed in the middle between the advancing Nationalist troops from the 
south and the General Liao Yaoxiang‟s troops from the north. Leaving 
behind the 9
th
 and the 11
th
  columns to guard the Nationalist movement from 
the south, Lin brought his eleven columns, through a quick southeast 
maneuver, directly to the flank and rear of Liao‟s army, completely 
destroying it.
782
      
Another very important military engagement, right before the battle 
for Jinzhou, occurred at the village of Tashan, which, even if small, 
represented a crucial strategic asset for the final capture of Jinzhou. The 
village of Tashan was a tactical challenge. The terrain, in fact, proved to be 
a delicate position both for the defender and the attacker. For the former, the 
village did not provide any natural barriers that could be used as an extra 
layer of defense, while for the latter the village did not provide enough space 
for the deployment of a frontal attack. Because of these reasons, and 
because of its importance, Lin Biao was determined to fight to the last man 
in order to defend this position, therefore he proceeded to deploy his troops 
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in a very delicate situation, hoping that this would have encouraged them to 
fight with more determination. This reflected one of the principles of Sun 
Tzu, which stated how important it was to put one‟s own troops in a 
“desperate terrain”, “where defeat would mean annihilation,” so as to force 
them to fight with all their strength in order to survive and therefore prevail. 
The curious aspect of this tactical display is that even Chiang decided to 
deploy his army in a desperate condition, so as to oblige them to fight hard 
to defeat Lin or at least “die trying.”
783
    
 While fighting at Tashan, the Communist forces were also involved 
in the famous battle of Jinzhou, where “the deep turning movement 
executed by his [Lin‟s] huge force, after the surprise strikes by four advance 
columns that cut the Shanhaikuan-Shenyang Railroad at several key points, 
must rank in military annals with such major maneuvers as the Schlieffen 
Plan.”
784
 In this case, the Communists applied the major tactical principles 
highlighted by Lin Biao, that is, the focus on mobile operations and flexibility. 
For example, during the major military operations they adopted Lin‟s 3-3 
system in order to keep “dispersed troops formations.” Moreover, the troops 
advanced “along multiple vectors in small teams, dividing, surrounding, and 
annihilating Nationalist units.” While fighting within the city street, instead of 
frontally attacking the Nationalists, CCP forces created holes through the 
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buildings “a process that they called „cutting tofu‟ – in order to create paths 
through which they could advance and outflank enemy units.”
785
  
The HuaiHai campaign (November 1948-January 1949), moreover, 
represented, at the military level, the culmination of the Maoist protracted 
warfare‟s third phase, since it was “the largest military engagement fought 
after World War II.” The statistics of this campaign were astonishing: 1,8 
million soldiers employed “across front lines of about two hundred 
kilometers.”
786
 And with a total of 5 million civilians mobilized “to move 
supplies to support PLA combat units.”
787
  
General Su Yu, who worked out the overall strategy of the HuaiHai 
campaign under Mao‟s supervision, “was aware of the difficulties of fighting 
around Xuzhou when coming in mainly from the North.” This was the result 
of his historical awareness over Chinese ancient military engagements that 
had occurred in the same area: “He had read the imperial annals and knew 
that Southern dynasties since before the Han had preferred to make battle 
just here [Xuzhou], where rivers and hills abounded, but where the 
landscape was flat enough for the troops not to be easily cut off from their 
supply lines in the South.”
788
  
However, he was also aware, in Sunzian terms, that the previous 
loss of Jianan by the Nationalists, coupled with the arrival of the cold 
weather, would have further undermined the army‟s spirit, therefore making 
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a Communist advance particularly valuable according to the ancient Chinese 
tactical principle of “attacking an army when its spirit is waning.” This tactical 
mentality also responded to another important Sunzian principle: the shi, 
briefly mentioned above. Translated as “strategic advantage,” or “strategic 
military power,” the term describes a situation in which several factors 
condense into a unique favorable circumstance, making the use of full 
military power particularly advantageous. And this is what Su Yu was trying 
to achieve through the execution HuaiHai campaign.
789
   
CCP forces were deployed right according to these topographical 
features, hoping that their maneuvers would deceive KMT‟s expeditionary 
force sent to stop the Communist advance. This particular military 
disposition reflected the major advantage of the Communist forces: the 
“information superiority,” which led to a “numerical superiority that, in turn, 
creates the potential for victory through maneuver.”
790
 The information 
aspect played a decisive role for the Communists especially in two sectors: 
military deception and psychological operations, with the former to be 
employed in actual military actions and the latter to be used for political 
work.
791
 A concept, the control of information, that even Sun Tzu critically 
highlighted in his military treatise when stating: “If I am able to determine the 
enemy‟s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own then I can 
concentrate and he must divide.” A condition that would force the enemy to 
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take too many countermeasures, with the result that “when he prepares 
everywhere he will be weak everywhere.”
792
 
 Moreover, the geographical conditions represented, for the 
Communists, the right place where to execute the tactic of “rapid 
concentration and rapid dispersal.”
793
 Su Yu divided his forces in two units. 
His and Chen Yi‟s army in the North, while Deng Xiaoping‟s in the West. The 
objective was the capture of the city of Xuzhou, however, the Communist 
armies had to go first for other close-by targets in order to deceive KMT‟s 
troops about the real Communist intentions. CCP‟s southward movement 
concerned KMT‟s 7
th
 Army Group, which moved immediately from the coast 
to the city of Xuzhou. This was what the PLA was waiting for. By occupying 
the city of Taierzhuang, the PLA stood in the middle between the 7
th
 Army 
and Xuzhou, therefore, undermining Nationalists‟ response. This 
immediately led to the surrender of the Nationalist troops. Jiang, then, 
decided to send more troops, without being aware of the presence of Deng‟s 
troops which were closing in. Only Du Yuming, the Nationalist General sent 
to Xuzhou, acknowledged the existence of Deng‟s troops in the south, 
asking then Jiang for permission to concentrate the major military effort 
against these troops instead of the ones in Taierzhuang. Du‟s thought was 
well motivated by his knowledge of CCP‟s deceptive tactics; that is, placing 
the troops in areas “that may be of use as a strategic retreat once the battle 
has started.” However, Jiang did not follow his suggestions and commanded 
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the 7
th
 Army Group to engage Communist forces outside Xuzhou. This was 
exactly what the Communists were hoping Jiang would do. By mid 
November the encircling maneuvers managed to isolate Xuzhou and defeat 
Nationalist troops. Even in this case, “the tactics CCP used were similar to 
those employed in the Northeast: heavy artillery concentrating on the main 
units at the center of the GMD formations, and highly mobile Communist 
regiments at the outskirts of the battlefield, cutting off the outer edges of the 
enemy armies, pushing their flanks into positions increasing vulnerable to 
PLA shelling.”
794
   
Jiang‟s lack of political vision and leadership qualities, coupled with 
the problem number one of the KMT, that is, its chronic factionalism, 
undermined the overall Nationalist effort to counter CCP advance. The final 
collapse of the Nationalist army does not reflect a lack of embeddedness 
onto Chinese strategic culture, since KMT‟s army, under Du, was, in fact, 
adopting, with small variations, the same tactical approaches that CCP 
designed for the HuaiHai campaign. For example, during the CCP initial 
advance, KMT cadres adopted a plan to increase the army‟s size by 
1,500,000 men so as to increase “strategic and operational-level 
flexibility.”
795
 
Moreover, the KMT had also tried to implement another old strategic 
concept, such as “trapping the Communist units between the hammers of 
maneuver forces and the anvils of forces defending in place.” The idea was 
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to have maneuver units swiftly moving around the Communist troops 
pushing them against the fire of the fixed Nationalist defenses. This idea, 
therefore, aspired to produce a counter-encirclement of the Communist 
forces which were trying, in turn, to implement their own. This operational 
strategy was also accompanied by the “fishing tactic,” that is, the idea of 
placing one unit into an easily defensible position, while withdrawing the 
other units from the area so as to attract a Communist attack on the lone 
unit. Once a CCP attack had been performed the other withdrawn units 
would have come back and encircle the Communists through exterior lines 
of operation. However, the Nationalists, due to their lack of a clear 
operational vision, were not able to perform them throughout the 
campaign.
796
     
Notwithstanding the now numerical superiority, the CCP did not 
refrain from using the first phase of protracted warfare even in the middle of 
the third. Once the battle for Xuzhou ended with a Communist victory, Mao 
ordered his troops to take care of the 12
th
 Army Group, commanded by 
Huang Wei, “which slowly was making its way from Wuhan to retake Suxian 
and open communications with Xuzhou from the south.” Communist 
commanders, however, did not want to risk their troops in the engagement 
with Wei‟s troops, since Du Yuming could have seized the moment in order 
to attack Xuzhou from the south. To avoid such a tactical misfortune, the 
Communists argued how important it was to lure “the GMD forces into a 
trap, in which the terrain would assist the PLA in an encirclement.” The trap 
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was set at Shuangduji: “pretending to be in hasty retreat toward Suxian, by 
late November the CCP forces held Huang‟s army to the banks of an arm of 
the Huai River, with hills to the north and east.” The execution of this trap 
completely isolated “probably the best fighting force left in Jiang‟s army.”
797
          
A similar tactic had been employed when the CCP tried to occupy 
the northern cities of Beijing and Tianjin in the last phases of the civil war 
along with the HuaiHai campaign. In tactical maneuvers “reminiscent of the 
first part of the HuaiHai campaign,” CCP forces, led by Nie Rongzhen, 
managed to conduct KMT‟s 11
th
 Army into a trap “as they were retreating 
toward the Northern Capital.” The final engagement, occurred on 22 
December, took place at Xinbao‟an and reported a final PLA victory over 
Nationalist troops.
798
 
Mao‟s military thought and therefore the application of People‟s War 
doctrine really constituted a radical shift in the strategic thinking of the 
twentieth century, inaugurating what has been labeled the “age of the 
guerrilla.”
799
 Furthermore, this historical peculiarity is best highlighted by the 
empirical evidence. Unlike its previous application in history, Mao pointed 
out that “guerrilla warfare had stepped out of the bounds of tactics and now 
knocked at the door of strategy, demanding [to] be considered from a 
strategic viewpoint.”
800
 This seems to have occurred because the “guerrilla 
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component absorbed social, economic and political expertise while the 
political component absorbed organizational and military knowledge.”
801
 The 
theorization and implementation of guerrilla warfare proved to be a decisive 
factor for the CCP‟s final victory over the Nationalists, mainly because it also 
allowed the party to gain a detailed and well coordinated knowledge on the 
“organization of supplies and support for its armies.” After the outbreak of 
the Civil War, the major task for the CCP was to “transfer this knowledge to 
a much more massive form of warfare.”
802
 Hence, all these elements 
contributed to create “the form of political warfare called „people‟s war.‟”
803
 
This explanation clarifies why China, because of its historical legacies, “is 
the only state officially proclaiming a national strategy of People‟s War; a 
theory which involves the indoctrination of the people in preparation for 
mobilization.”
804
 A doctrine, therefore, that could be easily applied in other 
military spheres.    
 
4.3. Conclusions 
 
As this chapter highlighted, Chinese People‟s War doctrine, 
expressed mainly during the Civil War, follows a specific pattern that can be 
intercepted by looking at China‟s history and its historical legacies. The Civil 
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War, for sure, helped People‟s War Doctrine reach the apex of its 
application, but its overall elements that have been discussed in the 
previous chapters still hold. One crucial element that the Maoist era 
emphasized and that also represented a key strategic component during the 
war effort is represented by the importance of morale in winning battles. 
Moreover, the associated element concerns the mobilization policies which 
played a crucial role for both parties‟ military struggle, even if Mao, in the 
end, proved to be far more successful than Jiang. By relying on ancient texts 
and examples Mao contributed to “give faith, a creed, to the peasants of 
China.” During his vast educational campaign, “the peasant-in-arms rapidly 
became a fanatic, an apostle of the new religion, ready to sacrifice his life for 
the better tomorrows.” In other words, Mao perfectly understood that wars, 
even or especially the civil ones, are “won by the side which knows how to 
gain the support of the people.”
805
 
The depth of the Chinese strategic culture is also represented by the 
way the Civil War had been conducted. The teachings extrapolated from 
Sun Tzu‟s The Art of War had been extensively applied. The operational art 
the CCP implemented in its warfare operations has “Sunzian qualities,” 
demonstrating that we definitely encountered an “operational art with 
Chinese characteristics.” Therefore, the fact that Chinese overall military 
instruments were deployed and coordinated according to a particular 
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strategic, tactical, and therefore, operational attitude, demonstrates the 
existence of a Chinese way of war.
806
  
A lot can be said about the true reasons behind Jiang‟s ultimate 
defeat. As this chapter tried to demonstrate also Jiang was embedded in the 
overall Chinese strategic culture, especially during the first phase of the Civil 
War, that is, during the Sino-Japanese war. Things started to rapidly change 
after that Jiang was striving to gain the American help, which caused KMT‟s 
overall strategic disorientation. In other words, the KMT tried to learn 
Western-type of warfare and this led it astray with respect to the actual way 
of fighting that the context required. For example, CCP forces lacked an air 
force, however, “Nationalists units wasted endless time in confecting artful 
camouflage and digging innumerable shelters as protection against air 
attacks which obviously would never come.”
807
  
Moreover, another important element worth considering when 
analyzing KMT‟s strategic approach is the weight of their past experiences 
that pushed them to embrace a slightly different type of strategy. Generally 
speaking, KMT‟s warfare approach mainly relied on the capture of territory, 
with a particular emphasis for the cities and transportation lines. This 
represented the direct consequence of its historical legacies, especially 
during the war against warlords.
808
 
Nevertheless, along this historical legacy, KMT also adopted, as 
explained above, a circle-type of strategy which reflects more the typical 
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Chinese strategic culture mentality with emphasis on mobility, flexibility, and 
not direct annihilation of the enemy‟s forces. For example, during the Fifth 
Extermination Campaign, which targeted the Communists, Chiang relied on 
the following formula: “First, achieve absolute superiority in numbers, 
Second, surround the base area with a system of blockhouses and roads. 
Third, draw the circle tighter and tighter in order to conscript the enemy in a 
small area.”
809
  
What the Civil War taught us then mainly concerns the pervasiveness 
of the People‟s War Doctrine within the overall Chinese strategic thinking. In 
other words, the idea that it could help China create a fertile ground for 
military modernization and people‟s mobilization. This explains why, besides 
the inevitable ideological legacies left by Mao, future generations of leaders 
still considered People‟s War Doctrine useful for the design of their national 
strategy. 
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Chapter Five:  
People’s War Doctrine 
between Cyber warfare and 
Maritime Militia 
 
 
“We will continue to adhere to the strategy of 'people's war'”
810
 
Gen. Li Deshun 
 
 
 
 
This final chapter of this research on Chinese strategic culture will 
investigate China‟s military transformation since the end of the Cold War, 
with a specific emphasis on the Xi jinping‟s era. It also investigates how 
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People‟s War doctrine still exerts a core military strategy within an overall 
political, social, and military transformation. A transformation that started to 
spread since the advent of the First Gulf War.  
The 1991 Gulf War changed some of the central pillars of the 
conduct of warfare. Besides its mere political symbolism (first major war in 
the post-Cold War era), the Gulf War represented a shift in the employment 
of new technological devices. This, coupled with the advent of globalization, 
significantly altered the major doctrines of war, by blending offense with 
defense and by altering the temporal and spatial dimensions of conflict, thus 
leading to an emphasis on disruption rather than destruction.
811
 
The advent of the information revolution has also led to the 
transformation of the organizational aspect of warfare. Now the central 
setting is based on networks rather than hierarchies.
812
 A network-like 
approach to warfare has also led to an “increasing „irregularization‟” of war 
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and its associated strategies and tactics are inevitably reflecting this 
mutation.
813
  
China was literally shocked by the new manifestation of warfare in 
1991, to the extent that decided to speed up the process of network 
infrastructure, in order to pave the way for information warfare. In China, due 
also to important historical legacies, the new technological setting 
incentivized the development of a proper “technonationalism,” through which 
the government implied that “technology is fundamental to both national 
security and economic prosperity.”
814
 Also Mao took into consideration the 
importance of technology when he stated that: “whatever [other states] have, 
we must have.”
815
 This led inevitably to a contradiction, since he has 
constantly theorized that manpower would always be superior to technology.  
The Chinese approach to informatization, for example, paved the 
way for a peculiar Chinese cyber warfare doctrine which, since its inception, 
manifested unique traits that scholars and Chinese experts tried to analyze 
with little success, mainly because one of the common issues that affects 
their different perspectives on the topic is that they “often discuss cyber 
warfare in the broader context of China‟s „informatization‟ strategy, but they 
usually have little to say about civilian cybersecurity policy or civil-military 
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integration in China, even though most of the relevant technology is created 
and used by civilians.”
816
 The implementation of the 863 Plan, in fact, 
opened up a new phase of Chinese informatization, however, China did not 
follow the conventional technological patterns and this raised questions 
about the Chinese way to cyber warfare. 
The peculiarity surrounding Chinese cyber warfare has affected the 
current literature on the topic. The current literature has reached so far four 
different theoretical perspectives: the first perspective tries to look at 
Chinese cyberwar doctrine through the lens of deterrence theory.
817
 While 
the general idea is quite relevant, the overall argument lacks a fundamental 
understanding: unlike deterrence, cyber operations in the cyberspace are 
very attractive because of their elusiveness, fluidity, and, above all, 
anonymity.
818
  
Cyber warfare‟s unconventional setting led other scholars to draw 
similarities between cyberwar and nuclear warfare. There are two major 
reasons for this type of comparison: the first one is related to the nature of 
RMA and the profound effect it has exerted on strategic affairs. RMA is 
considered as a real military revolution only comparable to the nuclear 
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one.
819
 The second reason, related to the first one, refers to the 
underdeveloped study of cyber warfare, which has been compared to the 
“lack of research on the dynamics of nuclear weapons in the 1950s.”
820
 
Meaning, in other words, that the revolutionary aspects of RMA and its major 
offshoot are at a such an early stage that strategists are still struggling to 
grapple with this new transformation like at the time of the advent of the 
nuclear age. However, even if it true that today‟s research on cyber warfare 
is underdeveloped like the nuclear doctrine in the „50s, one enormous 
difference stands out: historically, during the inception of the nuclear military 
revolution, policy-makers and strategists at least had to deal with something 
new whose huge lethality had been tested only a couple of years before. 
While in this case, when dealing with cyber warfare, we have only marginal 
and controversial empirical data that does not help us ascertain the validity 
of our assumptions. Moreover, as already stated, the major objective of 
cyberwar doctrine is the disruption of the enemy‟s information, since 
knowledge has become the new target in cyberspace. 
The third perspective tries to compare cyber warfare with the air 
power doctrine, claiming the possibility of a “digital Pearl Harbor.” It should 
be underlined that cyberwar can be compared to air power only when 
dealing with tactics, since the airplanes allow for an extended control of the 
airspace and a higher flexibility in maneuvers. Something that similarly 
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occurs in the cyberspace as well. However, the similarity ends there, since 
air power follows its own logic. And the current Chinese officers‟ design to 
implement cyberwar operations in the air theatre shifts cyberwar from a 
strategic perspective to a mere tactical one.
821
  
The fourth approach is closer to my argument: deception and 
asymmetry as two frameworks to explain Chinese cyber warfare.
822
 The 
fluidity of the cyberspace, its anonymity, and ubiquity clearly put cyberspace 
and its associated strategies closer to the implementation of an asymmetric 
military posture, in order to achieve specific political objectives. In the 
Chinese case this is more evident if we look at its cyberwar doctrine and 
empirical cases. However, this general idea immediately raises a question: if 
China seems to adapt cyber warfare into the overall asymmetric strategy of 
war, why does not the same argument apply to the US as well, for example? 
This question and its possible answer highlight even more the importance of 
strategic culture. Within this fourth approach,  Ji-Jen Hwang‟s work – 
China's Cyber Warfare: The Strategic Value of Cyberspace and the Legacy 
of People's War
823
 – represents one promising theory towards the creation 
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of a theoretical connection between Chinese cyberwarfare doctrine and the 
legacy of People‟s War. However, it failed exactly where it should have 
succeeded: the connection of cyberwar with People‟s War is not clear, often 
creating confusing theoretical assumptions that do not help scholars 
understand why we should be concerned of the historical and strategic value 
of People‟s War. The depth in the analysis of how cyber attacks work is not 
matched at all with the depth that should have been devoted to the study of 
People‟s War and how it affects today‟s China‟s strategic doctrine.  
It should be added that there might be a fifth analytical perspective 
on Chinese cyberwar which can be considered as a general theme 
connecting all the four previous perspectives: Chinese industrial 
espionage.
824
 It represents, for sure, an important analysis, even if it is still 
debated how much damage it really plays into the industrial economy.
825
 
However, that being said, studying Chinese cyberwar doctrine through the 
industrial espionage, though significant, does not help identify the doctrine 
underpinning Chinese involvement into military affairs. 
The theoretical uncertainties surrounding cyber warfare are also 
evident for the other two military sectors that this chapter tries to shed some 
light on: the maritime militia and the civil-military relationship. For what 
concerns the maritime militia, there is still a deep commitment to look at the 
sole Chinese military attempts to build the second aircraft carrier, dismissing 
or underestimating the strategic value of what has been labeled by other 
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scholars as the “people‟s war at sea,” which implies the application of 
specific maritime systems mainly based on flexibility and deception.
826
 This 
is also the reflection of the PLA Navy‟s radical transformation. This has been 
motivated by the recent assumption that China should abandon the 
“traditional mentality that land outweighs sea.”
827
 The maritime reform 
culminated into two recent, significant events: the creation of the Chinese 
Coast Guard in 2014,
828
 whose aim is to conduct paramilitary activities, and 
for the beginning of 2016, the construction of a new aircraft carrier, the 
Shandong aircraft carrier, intended to operate alongside the other that China 
had bought from Ukraine in 2012.
829
  
The same applies to the civil-military relationship. Few scholars 
studied this peculiar Chinese military system,
830
 preferring instead to focus 
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more on the professionalization process of the Chinese army. Even if it is 
true that Chinese government is struggling to find a way to professionalize 
its army, on the other it is also important to highlight this peculiar historical 
trend, which intermingles the civil and the military sectors, creating a flexible 
system which increases the military involvement of the civilians even during 
peaceful times as well as the speed of military mobilization in time of war. 
All these elements make clear why most of the attempts to explain 
the overall nature of Chinese military transformation failed to reach their 
objectives: their constant underestimation of the existence of a Chinese way 
of war which is connected to its overall strategic culture undermined their 
scientific analyses. Strategic culture‟s importance is highlighted by the fact 
that “a state‟s choices in the pursuit of wealth and power are constrained by 
domestic politics, historical choices, and cultural viewpoints. Failure to 
understand or acknowledge these constraints can heighten the potential for 
mistrust and miscalculation.”
831
  
In the case of the US, for example, it seems clear why it is trying to 
implement cyberwar into a different type of strategic framework, and this has 
to do with the overall liberal attitude to war, which has historically relied on 
technology, in order to avoid high casualties while still pursuing  political 
objectives.
832
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In the Chinese case, the legacy of People‟s war represents a 
valuable asset, not only because of its centrality during most of China‟s 
twentieth century strategic thought, but also because it encapsulates 
distinctive cultural features of the Chinese way of war. In other words, 
People‟s War doctrine, as I will demonstrate, reproduces
833
 Chinese 
strategic culture, helping us frame today‟s China‟s cyberwar doctrine, 
maritime strategy, and people‟s mobilization.  
The first part of this chapter will be dealing with the concepts of the 
RMA and how China has internalized this transformation in military affairs. 
The second part will be dealing with the analysis of the Maoist people‟s war 
in order to fully capture its essence and therefore its applicability in today‟s 
military affairs. Finally, the last section will, therefore, discuss cyber warfare, 
maritime militia, and the civil-military relationship, that is the junmin ronghe, 
in order to discuss what they represent and how we could define them. In 
other words, the last part, by using three analytical levels (people‟s 
mobilization, strategic design, and tactical design) will try to illustrate the 
main features of today‟s Chinese cyber warfare, maritime militia, and civil-
military relationship in connection to the people‟s war doctrine.  
 
5.1. The Analysis of RMA and the Chinese 
Context 
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In 1991 Jean Baudrillard wrote a book with the controversial title: 
“The Gulf War Did Not Take Place.”
834
 The apparent absurdity of his title 
concealed a more sophisticated idea. The concept behind that statement 
was that the new information age has radically transformed the way we 
conceptualized the manifestation of war. The RMA and the cyber technology 
transformed the essence of war which could now be conducted through a 
digital battlespace – that is, cyberspace – making it an almost “fictional, non-
existent phenomenon.”
835
 
The operational modalities of the Gulf War literally shocked China 
which tried, from that time onwards, to embrace this new technological 
transformation. Before 1991, however, Deng Xiaoping had the hard task to 
transit China from one era to the other, in order to embrace the new 
technological developments. In this context, technological innovations 
progressively intermingled with the existing Chinese national strategy which, 
through the codification of People‟s War doctrine, inaugurated a new world 
warfare generation: the so-called fourth generation warfare,
836
 even if other 
authors prefer to use the term Complex Irregular Warfare (CIW).
837
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Therefore, even if a technological transformation was on its way, 
Deng did not abandon People‟s War doctrine.
 838
 There were, for sure, 
internal resistances, especially from the PLA, against any attempt to 
radically change such a deep and pervasive national strategy. However, 
cultural and historical legacies offer a better picture of this strategic setting 
since, although cultural tradition can evolve in accordance to the changes of 
environment, “yet at the same time people can always see those unchanged 
things that are called the character of a civilization and the character of a 
nation. Thereby comprehending the tradition of strategic culture of a nation 
and a civilization must be based on long time investigation of their historical 
experience to grasp their relatively stable characteristics that are continuous 
and have survived repeated historical changes.”
839
  
Deng, therefore, started to promote the so-called “People‟s War 
under modern conditions” which was supposed to fuse together Maoist 
doctrine of asymmetric fighting with the necessities of the modern 
technology. Tactical concepts like “luring the enemy deep” and “preparing to 
fight a total war” were replaced by “extended depth of defense” and “local 
war in China‟s periphery.”
840
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Because of Chinese concerns about its periphery, People‟s War 
Doctrine soon became Local War Doctrine, later labeled Local War Under 
Modern High-Technology Conditions. By applying this label, Chinese 
officials required the application of more flexibility; units had to be more 
mobile, “capable of extending their reach farther, and better prepared to 
work together as a joint army, navy, and air force team. By the middle of the 
decade, Local War Under Modern High-Technology Conditions had become 
the dominant doctrinal thought in the PLA.
841
 However, the final process of 
this strategic design culminated in the formulation of “Local War under 
conditions of informatization.”
842
 Even if we can witness a progressive 
updating process, in the early „90s, Major General Wang Pufeng reaffirmed 
what was the real essence of Chinese doctrinal transformation by stating 
that: 
 
“We will continue to adhere to the strategy of 'people's 
war', but high-tech weapons will only reinforce our 'people's 
war' strategy, like adding wings to tigers. Under the current 
circumstances, we must ponder over two questions: How to 
fight a people's war in light of high-tech weapons, and how to 
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develop high-tech weapons to facilitate our people's war. These 
questions concern the security and survival of our nation, as 
well as China's position and role in the world‟s future strategic 
pattern.”
843
 
 
The major objective of the third millennium is to understand “how to 
fight … „a multi-variant war‟ waged across a new spectrum of conflict that is 
characterized by a „high-low‟ mix of operations.” This mixture is the result of 
the understanding that “clear distinctions between conventional and 
unconventional conflicts are fading, and any future major conflict is almost 
certain to see a routine commingling of such operations.”
844
 The new 
spheres of intervention are becoming the financial markets, the industry and 
the economy of rival states, and even the contamination of states‟ internet 
network through powerful viruses.
845
  
As a matter of fact, PLA has invested lots of energy in 
understanding strategically and operationally the conduct of cyber 
operations. A strategic tendency which can be traced back to the so-called 
“Project 863,” inaugurated by Deng Xiaoping, which developed new 
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technological plans “with a focus on national-priority high-tech projects, 
including military programs.”
846
  
From „80s onwards, and especially after the outbreak of the Gulf 
War, China has therefore strived to acquire the digital expertise in order to 
encapsulate this new technological domain into the existing national 
strategy. However, only in 1999 Chinese leaders “began to pay a lot more 
attention to information warfare (IW),” mainly because of the US bombing of 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, whose staff, “it was later revealed … were 
rebroadcasting command and control information for the defending Serbian 
forces.”
847
 But why is IW so important and so beneficial for the Chinese 
strategy? Simply for one reason: “IW represents an asymmetric weapon that 
China can exploit. In fact, “it could give the PLA a longer-range power 
projection capability against U.S. forces that its conventional forces cannot 
currently hope to match.” In other words, as I will demonstrate in the 
following pages, Chinese Information Warfare can be recognized as an 
updated version of People‟s War.
848
  
This is not only for the presence of an asymmetric nature of 
operations, but also because of the new intimate nature of cyberwarfare. In 
fact, conflicts of the contemporary and future era “will increasingly depend 
on, and revolve around, information and communications – cyber matters.” 
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In other words, whether dealing with state-actors or not, “information-age 
modes of conflict (and crime) will be largely about „knowledge‟ – about who 
knows what, when, where, and why, and about how secure a society, 
military, or other actor feels about its knowledge of itself and its 
adversaries.”
849
  
However, emphasizing the importance of knowledge in today‟s 
political and strategic realm raises two important questions: why has 
knowledge become so important today with respect to the past to the extent 
of creating the conditions for an Information Revolution? And, as a 
consequence, what role does technology play in this Information 
Revolution? When it comes to the first question, knowledge at war has 
always represented a vital component of strategy. Even Sun Tzu, more than 
two thousand years ago, stated: “知可以战与不可以战者胜,” He who knows 
when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious.” And he went even 
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further to argue that: “知彼知己者，百战不殆,” “Know the enemy and know 
yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”
850
 
On the western front of military doctrine, Clausewitz clearly stated 
how important information and knowledge were in war. His analysis still 
remains one of the central evaluation of the importance of knowledge, and 
therefore intelligence, in war: 
 
“Knowledge must be so absorbed into the mind that it 
almost ceases to exist in a separate, objective way. In almost 
any other art of profession a man can work with truths he has 
learned from musty books, but which have no life or meaning 
for him … when an architect sits down with pen and paper to 
determine the strength of an abutment by a complicated 
calculation, the truth of the answer at which he arrives is not an 
expression of his own personality … it is never like that in war. 
Continual change and the need to respond to it compels the 
commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his 
knowledge within him … By total assimilation with his mind and 
life the commander‟s knowledge must be transformed into a 
genuine capability.”
851
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Clausewitz‟s evaluation of the importance of knowledge is very 
insightful, since his description serves the scope to articulate the inherent 
nature of knowledge in relation with the overall complexity of the intelligence 
operation required in war: 
 
“By „intelligence‟ we mean every sort of information about 
the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of our own 
plans and operations. [However], many intelligence reports in 
war are contradictory; even more are false and most are 
uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he 
should possess a standard of judgment, which he can gain only 
from knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense. 
He should be guided by the laws of probability … This difficulty 
of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious 
sources of friction in war, by making things appear entirely 
different from what one had expected.”
852
 
  
But again, why do information and knowledge in war play today such 
a significant – revolutionary, I would say – role that should distinguish the 
establishment of a new pattern in military affairs with respect to the past? 
What has changed today is that knowledge and information have critically 
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become the end of the war itself
853
 and not the means to an end as they 
used to be in the past. In other words, “cyberwar … is characterized by the 
effort to turn knowledge into capability,”
854
 since “knowledge [itself] becomes 
the core of military power and the central resource of destructivity, rather 
than brute force.”
855
 Whatever belongs to the epistemology of an adversary 
becomes, therefore a target. In this case, “epistemology means the entire 
„organization, structure, methods, and validity of knowledge.‟”
856
  
Today, something that has been “viewed as immaterial and abstract 
… can be put to hard practical use to strengthen one party over another.” 
Therefore, in this new strategic context, where information plays a key role, 
the Clausewitzian concept of friction seems to be replaced by the concept of 
entropy; that is, “the tendency to become disorganized.” Also the concept of 
power has shifted from the classic material assumption to the immaterial 
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one. Now power relies more on “deep psychological, cultural, and ideational 
structures; it makes „the power of power‟ virtually metaphysical.”
857
   
However, this evident shift would not have occurred had not been for 
the important role played by technology. This leads, inevitably, to the second 
question; that is, how technology helped shape the new strategic 
environment and what its determinant role in strategic studies really is with 
respect to other factors such as geopolitics, culture, and political 
contingencies. Generally speaking, I tend to disagree with the proposition 
that advocates technology as an independent phenomenon that, once 
discovered, sets the pace for the transformation of military affairs.
858
  
When it comes to cyber warfare, for example, the Suntzunian 
expression finds confirmation, since cyber attacks can occur even without 
the implementation of brute violence. Lethality of military actions, despite 
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some scholars‟ contrary argument,
859
 is not always a fundamental 
prerequisite for a cyber attack to be considered an act of war. 
860
  
 
5.2. The Legacy of People’s War and China’s 
Military Transformation 
 
Having highlighted the political and strategic context of the RMA at the world 
level and having analyzed the structure of the Maoist doctrine of people‟s 
war, it is now important to demonstrate how it still exerts a fundamental 
influence in shaping Chinese military transformation, especially at the three 
sectors of cyber warfare, maritime militia and civil-military relationship 
already mentioned.  
 
5.2.1. First Process of Chinese Military Transformation: Civil-
Military Integration and People’s Mobilization  
 
As People‟s War doctrine necessitated the mobilization of the 
masses, in this case China puts as well great emphasis on the role of the 
people. In terms of cyber warfare: “due to the intrinsic features of 
cyberspace, such as anonymity, asymmetry, and shared information 
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infrastructure, everyone and anyone can be a warrior.” Beijing realized the 
inherent strategic potential of the digital era to the extent that the populace in 
cyber-territory “has become a crucial factor in terms of cyber security, and 
accordingly a civilian-based defensive strategy may well be the best security 
strategy for cyberspace.”
861
  
In addition to that, Chinese leaders are pursuing a closer civil-
military integration, like it used to be at the time of the implementation of 
People‟s War doctrine. Historically speaking, the invention of specific 
technological means developed first in one of the two sectors (either civilian 
or military) and then spread to the other. This had to do with the necessary 
adaptation period the military required, before introducing a new 
technological device. For example, “the military benefited from technology 
that had been developed mainly for civilian purposes, such as railroads and 
telegraphs, which vastly improved the ability of military forces to mobilize 
and to maneuver once they arrived at the battlefield.”
862
  
In the Chinese case, cyberwar, even if created and then 
implemented by the military, is already – has always been, I would say – an 
integral part of the civilian sector as well,
863
 of course with the all necessary 
restrictions the government has already adopted. In the security realm, in 
fact, China “has created the largest and most effective network of internet 
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monitors and censors in the world and its credited with spectacular 
successes in cyber espionage against the United States and other 
countries.”
864
 Moreover, there are two additional peculiarities in the Chinese 
case: the first one is the establishment of the Central Political and Legal 
Commission (CPLC) as the only agency assigned to the control of the entire 
national security. Under the CPLC, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
exerts a big “influence on information society policy. Its most powerful arm 
… appears to be the 11
th
 Bureau, which has responsibility for supervision of 
the security of all public information networks.”
865
 The second peculiarity is 
the transformation of the SILG (Small Informatization Leading Group) – 
which represents one of the highest governmental departments of the state 
bureaucracy – into the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and 
Informatization.” Moreover, the core of this group is composed of five 
Politburo members, making China the only country in the world 
concentrating “so many of its highest political leaders in a committee for 
informatization,” with clear interests in “security, military and propaganda” 
with respect to other fields like: science, education or simply technology.
866
 
The curious aspect of this political-military transformation has 
started to spread in China since 1980s with the inception of the idea of the 
development of an “information society” 信息社会 (xinxi shehui). This 
concept intertwines with the overall trend of the information revolution, which 
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in Chinese has been labeled as 信息化 (xinxihua), which can be translated 
as “informatization,” in order to distinguish it from the older industrialization 
concept.
867
 However, only in 2006, with the so-called “National 
Informatization Plan (NIP) 2006-2010,” Chinese government has established 
the guidelines for a real development of technology as a inherent element 
for the building of an “information society” which, it is believed, would cut 
“across a wide sweep of policy (politics, culture, art, economy, industry, 
education, science, technology, diplomacy and security).”
868
  
The government, especially under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has 
tried to develop this new political-technological phenomenon by advocating 
the establishment of two programs: “Locating Military Potential in Civilian 
Capabilities (yujun yumin;寓军于民)” and the “civil-military fusion” (junmin 
ronghe; 军民融合). In so doing, we could witness, from the presidency of Hu 
Jintao onwards, an increasing interdependence between the civilian and the 
military sector.
869
 Concerning the Military-Civilian Fusion, one of the official 
documents describing the spirit of the 18
th
 National Congress held in 2012, 
from which these reforms were based, clearly stated:  
 
“Deepening the integration between the military and 
civilian sectors. To promote the integrated development of the 
military and civilian sectors, we will establish – at the national 
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level – unified leadership, and institutions that coordinate 
between the military and local governments, link military 
demands to supplies, and share information. We will improve 
the national defense industry system and sci-tech innovation 
system serving national defense. We will reform the system and 
mechanism for the management of scientific research and 
production for national defense and armament procurement, 
and guide outstanding private enterprises into the fields of 
research, development, production and maintenance of military 
products. We will reform and improve the policies and systems 
for cultivating military personnel by relying on national 
education. We will open more areas of military logistics to 
ordinary enterprises. We will deepen the reform of national 
defense education, improve the national defense mobilization 
system, and the system of conscription during peace time and 
mobilization during wartime. We will deepen the reform of the 
militia reserve system, and adjust the management system of 
border defense, coast defense and air defense.” 
 
These institutional settings, in accordance to the historical legacies, 
have constantly blurred the distinction between the civilian and the military 
realm. In fact, the PLA relies on a network domain – central to the PLA – 
which “exists primarily as a civilian infrastructure.” Current Chinese military 
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writings, in fact, put a high emphasis on the “importance of civilian 
information technology and the civilian Internet to network warfare.”
870
 An 
additional explanation for this is also the fact that in the realm of cyberspace 
in general, but in the Chinese case in particular, both the military and the 
civilian sector “function on the same information network platform [making] 
the boundary between the battlefront and the rear disappear.”
871
 
From 2012 onwards, the MCF (Military-Civilian Fusion) has, 
therefore, “evolved into a holistic strategic concept that reaches beyond the 
defense industry.”
872
 It emphasizes the combination of all aspects of society 
along with the “five dimensional” (wuwei yiti 五维一体) warfare, 
“characterized by contests for supremacy in the ground, sea, air, space, and 
information domains, with the characteristics of these domains and the 
interconnections among them carrying major implications for force structure 
as well as command and control.”
873
 
                                                          
870
 Joe McReynolds, China's Evolving Military Strategy, p. 5. 
871
 Ji-Jen Hwang, China's Cyber Warfare: The Strategic Value of Cyberspace and 
the Legacy of People's War, pp. 10, 40. 
872
 Daniel Alderman, “An Introduction to China‟s Strategic Military-Civilian Fusion”, in 
Joe McReynolds ed., China's Evolving Military Strategy, pp. 404-405. Specifically, 
three are the areas in which the fusion should occur: the use of the information 
network that should develop the extension of one sphere into the other; make the 
civilian infrastructure suitable for military operations; and finally, the third one is 
related to the fusion of the industries with the military in order to increase both the 
economic development and the military production. 
873
 Taylor Fravel, “China‟s Changing Approach to Military Strategy: The Science of 
Military Strategy from 2001 to 2013”, in Joe McReynolds ed., China's Evolving 
Military Strategy, p. 53. 
524
 
 
The centrality of this program is, moreover, attested by the fact that 
Xi Jinping, after the Third Plenum held in the fall of 2013, issued a series of 
reforms with the intent of institutionalizing this fusion mechanism into a 
proper political entity. Between the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, 
Xi Jinping created the Military Civilian Fusion Leading Small Group 
(军民融合领导小组).874     
At the technical level, the Chinese government has implemented a 
wide communication infrastructure around the country. “The most evidential 
example is the construction of the National Cable Infrastructure, which 
followed the model „Eight Railway Lines from South to North and Eight 
Railway Lines from East to West.” The final result was named: “The 
Communication Network of Eight North-to-South and Eight East-to-West 
Optical Fibre Routes.” This massive technical achievement that manages to 
cover almost the entire size of the country “makes it possible for people 
everywhere in China to connect to cyberspace and act as a cyber warrior if 
necessary.” However, in order to prevent any backfire from the local 
hackers, this system, though massive, has a few ports connecting to 
internet, making it easier for the Chinese government “to set up censorship 
mechanisms on these ports to control and monitor the extensive 
cyberspace.”
875
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Because of China‟s deep concerns about the occurrence of a 
possible digital Tiananmen, the government has moved forward with other 
censorship system, since it has been recognized that there are many 
netizens who, besides attacking foreign networks, are also constantly trying 
to breach the government internet infrastructure; “a practice known as [翻墙] 
fanqiang, „scaling the wall.‟” It is not a coincidence that one of the first 
government‟s implementations, in fact, has been the Great Firewall, also 
recognized as the Golden Shield Project
876
: “an intricate system of Internet 
controls that filters out „harmful‟ domestic and foreign content and 
communications which, in practice, creates a Chinese intranet infrastructure 
through a cyber „demilitarized zone‟ complete with filters, deep packet 
inspections and other forms of „cyber border security.‟” All these measures 
are necessary for two major objectives: the first one has to do with the 
domestic political aim to fight “„revisionist organizations,‟ „separatists, 
extremists, splittists‟ and Western imperialist forces that aim to disrupt social 
stability,” while the second objective is related to Beijing‟s concern with how 
to create a concrete form of “Internet sovereignty;” a principle that China 
has, in fact, strongly advocated by emphasizing the right of a state “to 
control Internet activity within its own borders.”
877
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The similarity, again, with the Maoist era is significant. The PLA was 
the political tool of the communist army to clean up the regions from the 
bandits that still controlled some parts of the country. Another major problem 
was the presence of the “splittists” who, because of their regional power, 
menaced to promote political revolts against the central government. Also in 
this type of political scenario, the PLA was not marginal in assuring that PRC 
could effectively control the country. 
After having set an extended censorship system, China needs to 
fully exploit the civilian infrastructure. The Chinese government has, 
nevertheless, sponsored, tacitly, a recruiting campaign with the finality of 
setting up a proper cyber militia, which could conduct cyber operations in 
favor of the Chinese strategic design. Militias “are an enduring feature of 
Chinese military planning.” They have been widely employed since ancient 
time, and their importance culminated in the people‟s war doctrine of 
“drowning any invader in a „sea of humanity.‟”
878
 
Categorized as “non-governmental forces” 民间力量 (minjian liliang), 
these Chinese cyber warriors are “external entities that spontaneously 
engage in network attack and defense, but can also be organized and 
mobilized for network warfare operations.”
879
 Hackers in China, in fact, have 
been recognized as “government-approved network technology security 
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units.”
880
 Like during the civil war and its aftermath, when Mao could count 
on a huge manpower in order to conduct military operations – encouraging 
him to put man at the center of his military struggle – here again, something 
similar is happening. This new cyber militia should be composed of civilians 
who are able to use their computers as a means to develop viruses to be 
sent to potential enemies. And especially, it should be pointed out that: 
 
“Since approximately 2002, the PLA has been creating 
IW militia units comprised of personnel from the commercial IT 
sector and academia, and represents [sic] an operational nexus 
between PLA [computer network warfare operation] and 
Chinese civilian information security (infosec) professionals. 
The PLA has established militia units directly within commercial 
firms throughout China to take advantage of access to staff with 
advanced education, modern commercial-grade infrastructure, 
sophisticated software design capabilities, and the greater 
likelihood of finding „politically reliable‟ operators.”
881
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Moreover, like in the Maoist era – where Mao tried, at a later stage, 
to export the Chinese People‟s War
882
 by “artificially inseminate” revolutions 
around the world
883
 – Chinese government in the digital age has extended 
the concept of the people, which now does not simply refer to the renmin 
(人民) – the masses – but it may “indicate all global Chinese users of the 
internet all over the world. The mobilization of this global population is 
accordingly not limited to Chinese geographical territory.”
884
 The reason 
behind this type of political consideration over the Chinese living abroad is 
related to the unique Chinese perspective, which treats “instinctively” the 
diaspora community “as an internal affair.”
 885
 Political attitude that has 
encouraged the Chinese government in 2009 to launch a very expensive 
project, called waixuan gongzuo, which aims at the development of an 
“overseas propaganda” with the goal of creating “a network of overseas 
bureaus to portray China in a favorable light to countries.”
886
 
This parallels another, though slightly different, Chinese approach to 
overseas interests during the Cold War, when Premier Zhou Enlai “stated 
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that overseas Chinese communities should consider themselves citizens of 
the countries in which they resided.” However, this statement was made at a 
time “when concern about the potential for such communities to serve as a 
fifth column for communist subversion was high.”
887
   
Yet the same cyber warriors that the government employs for the 
cyber operations could easily backfire, especially since informatization has 
opened up a new wave of levée en masse, this time developed on the 
cyberspace.
888
 The global communications, in fact, have led to a progressive 
step towards democratization, even in China, as the 1989 upheaval, 
culminating in the Tiananmen massacre, demonstrates. However, in order to 
prevent such a thing to happen again, the government, beside the building 
of a massive censorship system described above, has developed an 
extensive propaganda, nationalistic, but at the same coercive campaign. 
Since 1991, in fact, the Chinese government has begun the “Patriotic 
Education Campaign,” with the main objective of mobilizing, nationwide, 
Chinese youth, through an extensive ideological program, which centered 
around the reinterpretation of history. This program, along with the past 
ones, has been considered as “the most massive attempt at ideological 
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reeducation in human history.”
889
 Beijing has, in fact, introduced in schools a 
new set of terminologies in textbooks, in order to shift people‟s attention 
from the “interior-oriented, anti-corruption, and anti-dictatorship democratic 
movements in the 1980s to the rise of external-oriented, anti-Western 
nationalism in the 1990s.”
890
 
 The campaign aimed at constantly blaming the Western countries 
for the miserable conditions China had to face during most of the twentieth 
century. In other words, what in textbooks was commonly recognized as the 
“victory narrative” (namely, China‟s victory during the civil war), was 
replaced by the “victimization narrative” (namely Western fault for China‟s 
suffering). Therefore, through this massive campaign, “Beijing has creatively 
used history education as an instrument for the glorification of the party, for 
the consolidation of the PRC‟s national identity and for the justification of the 
political system of the CCP‟s one party rule.”
891
 In fact, this is how the 1994 
Outline of the CCP explained the objectives of the campaign: 
 
“The objectives of conducting patriotic education 
campaign are to boost the nation‟s spirit, enhance cohesion, 
foster national self esteem and pride, consolidate and develop 
a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and 
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direct and rally the masses‟ patriotic passions to the great 
cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
892
    
 
This government campaign recalls what Mao established during the 
„50s: The PLA, for example, was also employed for carrying out operations 
related to the mass line campaigns. “The concept of the „mass line‟ concerns 
itself with the techniques by which the party and government ensures that it 
is not alienated from the people whom it leads and controls. It also seeks to 
canalize the enthusiasm and energies of the „masses‟, and to associate 
them more closely with the process of policy formulation and government,” 
which allowed him to exploit “the tremendous energy of the masses” for 
bringing its political agenda to completion.
893
 
Chinese massive reeducation campaign bore its fruits, even if 
facilitated by the international events affecting China directly. In the same 
decade of the Patriotic Campaign, China witnessed the manifestation of 
patriotic hacking which, even if already active some years before, “exploded 
with even greater force,” by directly attacking China‟s enemy websites. Their 
hacking operations, in fact, erupted especially after “the atrocities committed 
against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians in 1998 after the fall of the Suharto 
regime.” But two additional events proved to be extremely important for the 
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understanding of the potency of Chinese hacking and popular mobilization: 
1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the “collision of 
a US Navy electronic and intelligence collection aircraft with a PLA air force 
fighter in 2001.” Especially the first one, the US bombing, represented an 
interesting event, because in that case “the reference to „people‟s war‟ in 
connection with the informatized war strategy [became] especially significant 
… it revealed China‟s intention, as with its ground forces, to maintain 
sizeable militia forces among the civilian population, trained in information 
technologies, for possible emergency mobilization in wartime.”
894
 The war, in 
the end, did not break out. However, Chinese mobilization against the US 
represented a critical event at the diplomatic level. The bombing, in fact, 
according to a Chinese deserter, would have offered “an irresistible 
opportunity for the Chinese government to implement the new 
hypernationalism.” In the following days, in fact, the world acknowledged the 
outbreak of violent riots, not protests.
895
      
The second event, the air collision, incentivized China to activate 
proper cyber operations against the US. In fact, in 2003, two years later, 
Chinese conducted “one of the more audacious series of cyberattacks … 
against U.S. military, government, and government contractor websites. The 
intrusion, collectively dubbed „Titan Rain,‟ struck hundreds of government 
computers.”
896
 These two historical legacies played a significant role in 
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shaping even more the connection between cyber warfare and People‟s 
War. In 2008, in fact, a PLA Major General Dai Qingmin stated that the PRC 
takes into strategic consideration the necessity to launch a 人民网路战 
(renmin wanglu zhan) People‟s Cyber Warfare.
897
 
The junmin ronghe and, to a larger extent, the doctrinal principle of 
People‟s War, are also playing a relevant role in the formation and 
consolidation of the maritime militia, the so-called haishang minbing 
(海上民兵). Because of its peculiar organizational structure, the current 
maritime militia was labeled by Professor Andrew Erickson (a leading expert 
of Chinese maritime issues) as “Little Blue Men”; that is, a readjustment of 
the term “Little Green Men”, in vogue in the military, which describes the 
asymmetric warfare operations Russia has conducted in Crimea, through 
the use of a special group of soldiers, equipped with modern military 
equipment.
898
 
The maritime militia represents one of the clearest manifestations of 
the junmin ronghe and People‟s War simply because, as the principles of the 
civil-military integration explain, “the mixture of economic integration with the 
State and the banner of nationalism form an effective patron-client 
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relationship that benefits both the Chinese fishing community and the 
Chinese Communist party.”
899
  
This has been also exemplified by the 13
th
 Five Year Plan 2016-
2020, released on March 17, 2016, which clearly stated China‟s maritime 
objectives for the near future. This document is quite important because it 
highlights the importance that China started to attach to the maritime 
domain, since, historically, China has vastly dedicated its military effort to 
the development of land forces. Now the objective is different, with the 
fundamental idea that China should become a “hybrid land-and-sea power.” 
An authoritative document, the 2001 Science of Military Strategy, in fact, 
highlights that this is an “era of sea,” characterized by the application of the 
„Mahanian and other strategies „to actively develop comprehensive sea 
power‟ and „expand strategic depth at sea.‟” It stated that China needs:  
 
1. Build itself into a “maritime power”;
900
  
2. Strengthen the exploration and development of 
marine resources;  
3. Deepen historical and legal research on maritime 
issues;  
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4. Create a highly effective system for protecting 
overseas interests and safeguard the legitimate 
overseas rights/interests of Chinese citizens and 
legal persons. 
5. Active promote the construction of strategic strong 
points (zhanlue zhidian 战略支点) for the “21st 
century Maritime Silk Road” 
6. Strengthen construction of reserve forces, 
especially the construction of maritime mobilization 
forces.
901
 
 
This theoretical development originated from the early twenty-first 
century‟s military thinking which emphasized the employment of 
“preemption, a broad spectrum of advanced military technologies, and 
integration of civilian and military forces in missions (e.g. „guerrilla warfare 
on the sea‟) that incorporate political, economic, and legal warfare.” The 
emphasis, moreover, is on the use of asymmetric platforms – here 
considered to be shashoujian (杀手锏), that is, trump cards – through which 
the enemy‟s weaknesses are exploited.
902
    
Moreover, the creation of the maritime militia is also related to the 
fact that “China operates the world‟s largest fleet of civilian fishing vessels 
and trawlers, and many of their crews and ships form a maritime militia used 
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to advance the country‟s geopolitical claims in the East China Sea and 
South China Sea.” It should be pointed out that maritime militia represents 
an important asset not only for the naval military operations, but also as a 
way of defending fishermen which would find in the militia the protective 
shield against the foreign competition for the control of the fish stocks. It 
should be specified that historically “the use of fishing vessels as an adjunct 
to naval forces is not new, although the scope and depth of China‟s effort is 
unprecedented.”
903
 
China has adopted the maritime militia in its recent history, even if 
its doctrinal evolution belongs to the last ten years‟ political guidance under 
Hu Jintao first, and Xi Jinping after. In 1974 the maritime militia played a 
crucial role in “helping China win the Battle of the Paracels against 
Vietnam.”
904
 
The maritime militia is not managed by the People's Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN), which operates only in cases of coordinated activities at the 
provincial level. Specifically the local activities, in addition to being managed 
by PAFD (People's Armed Forces Department), are coordinated by the 
civilian government groups. In these phases, the primary aim is to make 
“special cells militia” (专职人民 武装干部), “leaders of business units,” and 
“personal information” (信息员) operational. These selected personnel are 
the central element of the maritime militia and promotes the implementation 
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of the party‟s command and control, as well as the maintenance of the 
military-political cohesion among the various units. Essential to the 
implementation of the political control over the militia are the “ship captains” 
(船老大) and staff information.905  
This system could be implemented because of the large Chinese 
commercial fishing sector “with fourteen million people working in the 
industry – 25 percent of the world‟s total.” Through this vast pool of 
manpower, “fishermen are assigned to collectives or attached to civilian 
companies and receive military training and political education in order to 
mobilize and promote China‟s interests in the ocean.” Their training, as a 
militia (besides the mere civil defense training), develops the ability to 
intercept other ships, as well as assisting the overall Chinese effort to create 
artificial islands with their presence and material transportation.
906
 This 
training and the effects of nationalism are well evident in instances in which 
fishermen strive to become part of the overall militia force. In 2012, for 
example, He Jianbin, the chief of the State-run Baosha Fishing Corporation 
in Hainan province, advocated the inclusion of his division into the militia 
force for the PLAN 
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If we put 5,000 Chinese fishing ships in the South 
China Sea, there will be 100,000 fishermen … And if we make 
all of them militiamen, give them weapons, we will have a 
military force stronger than all the combined forces of all the 
countries in the South China Sea … Every year, between May 
and August, when fishing activities are in recess, we should 
train these fishermen/militiamen to gain skills in fishing, 
production and military operations, making them a reserve force 
on the sea, and using them to solve our South Sea problems.
907
  
 
The basic operating personnel of militia, instead, is composed of two 
main sub-components: on the one hand the ordinary reserves, that is, the 
personnel registered to the various militias, which, however, does not pay 
actual service. On the other hand, the primary force, composed of 
operational personnel, ready to be mobilized in case of need. The primary 
force, of course, is the one that gets all the paramilitary resources for its 
activities and, based on the monitoring operations conducted at the disputed 
islands in the South China Sea, it can be assumed that the primary force of 
the maritime militia is mainly composed of workers (including of course the 
fishermen) and demobilized soldiers, who, with their ships – usually no 
ordinary fishing vessels or merchant ships – start tiling operations of 
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suspicious ships with unconventional maneuvers, to the point of increasing 
the probability of accidents at sea.
908
 
This is one of the central objectives behind the implementation of 
the maritime militia. Its use should complicate the overall war scenario, 
creating political and military dilemmas within the enemy‟s overall strategic 
calculation. This confusion also applies to the actual military operations 
through which maritime militia would erase “the longstanding distinction 
between warships and civilian ships in the law of naval warfare.”
909
 
In 2014 China widely employed its maritime militia in order to 
strengthen its “peacetime power projection in the region,” especially when 
dealing with Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. During that 
year, China replaced its surveillance vessels with the maritime militia “in 
order to maintain a presence, while reducing the likelihood of a war with 
Japan.”
910
   
Another similar case occurred in the fall of 2015, when the Chinese 
vessels had an accident with the “USS Lassen,” an American destroyer, 
within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands, over which China claims its 
exclusive sovereignty. The case provoked protests in Beijing, but it also 
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highlighted even more the use of these vessels, which were assisting the 
coast Guard in the identification and expulsion operations.
911
 
In terms of technological development, the crew of the militia 
vessels is equipped with real military equipment, such as artillery and radar 
systems. One particularly relevant instrument, of which the majority of these 
ships are equipped, is the satellite navigation system Beidu, which allows 
the militia to intercept other ships at sea and at the same time convey 
messages, even complex, with the help of specific digital screens, through 
which sending also handwritten messages. These elements illustrate, 
generally, the capacity of the maritime militia to conduct information warfare 
operations.
912
  
However, it should not be underestimated that the same satellite 
system Beidu also performs other functions that make the Chinese maritime 
militia a particularly important organ for rescue operations at sea. The 
reputation of the militia also stems from the fact that it has led to safety 
those vessels that were in the midst of typhoons or storms. Thanks to this 
feature, the militia coordinates these activities with the Border Defense 
Department Station of Tanmen Village on the island of Hainan.
913
 
But what are the main militias operating in the South China Sea? 
The Militia Danzhou Militia belonging to the  Baimajing port, which has had a 
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particular role in the military operations against Vietnam during the Battle of 
the Paracel Islands in 1974. The second, also significant, is the Tanmen 
Village Militia Maritime Company, which also operates in Hainan, famous for 
its 2012 operations against the Philippines at the island of Scarborough 
Shoal, whose paramilitary role has received special government attention, to 
the extent that President Xi Jinping appointed village Tanmen as a model to 
emulate for future operations. In fact this militia has also widely supported 
the island constructions in the Paracel and in part of the Spratly  islands. 
The last two, finally, are respectively the Sansha City Maritime Militia, 
created in 2013, and Sanya Maritime Militia of 2001. The first, according to 
official sources, can be used for operations within the Paracel islands, while 
the second could be used for operations against the United States.
914
 
  
5.2.2. Second Process of Chinese Military Transformation: 
Strategic Design  
 
The creation of the massive infrastructural digital system in order to 
allow the government to move in two different but complementary directions 
– cyber mobilization and internet censorship – puts at the center of the 
Chinese strategic design the pursuit of an information supremacy as a 
clearly defined political objective. In Chinese political-military circles, 
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achieving control “within a specific time and place,” represents “the 
precondition for achieving supremacy in the air, at sea, and on the ground 
and it is critical to achieving and maintaining battlefield supremacy.”
915
 Since 
Jiang Zemin presidency, in fact, China has had not only “its eye on stepping 
up aspects of its military informatization,” but has also built the strategic 
concept that “„seizing information dominance‟ would become a „focus in 
warfare.‟”
916
 Therefore information becomes now the “center of gravity.”
917
 
The importance of information, moreover, envisages the Chinese use of 
cyberwar, which aims at the disruption of the enemy civilian infrastructure, 
because it “can be targeted more freely with network warfare than with 
conventional weapons, without provoking the degree of conflict escalation 
that a conventional attack on civilian targets would.” This strategic 
formulation has led to the idea of “„unrestricted network warfare‟ 
(网络超限战) [wangluo chaoxian zhan] long advocated by some of the PLA‟s 
more hawkish network warfare theorists.”
918
  
According to this basic assumptions, Chinese underpinning strategy 
remains active defense, that is, “a politically defensive, but operationally 
offensive strategy in which China will rhetorically maintain a defensive 
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posture up until the time it decides to attack.”
 919
 However, a closer look at 
the Chinese active defense in the information age shows that Chinese army 
strives to gain information dominance at the initial stage of a campaign, 
preferably through pre-emptive actions.
920
 Unlike the Maoist period, 
therefore, China has now adopted an extended version of active defense 
which also includes active offense. This additional component advocated 
that, “unlike … defensive information operations [that] merely fend off 
attacks without weakening the opposing side‟s forces … offensive 
information operations are the only way information superiority can be 
achieved.”
921
   
Active defense, therefore, would serve the purpose of gaining 
information superiority, where information is supposed to become both 
capability and target for the Chinese strategic design. “By striking enemy 
information systems, the PLA can take out the „eyes, ears, brain, and 
nervous system‟ of weapons systems, thereby causing paralysis and 
achieving victory with lower costs and in a shorter amount of time.”
922
 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand why China, despite the 
globalizing effects of the information age, still pursues the application of 
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active defense, which represents a strategy to be applied regionally. This 
can be explained by simply looking at China‟s strategic objectives which are 
still related to the safeguarding of its national stability and territorial integrity. 
In fact, in Jiang Zemin‟s opinion, China should develop an “information 
deterrent” which could complement “the country‟s nuclear deterrent.”
923
 The 
underpinning idea of this statement – even if wrong because of the 
impossibility of cyberwar to act as a deterrent means for reasons that I 
briefly discussed in the introduction and that I will illustrate in detail in the 
following section – clarifies, once more, Chinese regional interests which 
aim at the preservation of internal and regional stability. In fact, the last 
twenty years‟ Chinese naval modernization, even if it has sensitively 
projected Chinese influence at the global level, still relied on active defense 
as the key strategy, since regional concerns are still central in Chinese 
strategy, as attested by the progressive updating process of People‟s War 
doctrine, which shifted from “fighting a local war under high-tech conditions 
to fighting a local war under conditions of informatization.”
924
 The application 
of active defense at sea, in fact, has led some scholars, mainly from US, to 
define it as A2/AD, that is, Anti-Access and Area Denial, in light of its 
regional features.  
This explains, moreover, how China is willing to even pursue a 
“people‟s war at sea.”
925
 The Chinese PLAN, in fact, is trained to “adopt the 
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„attrition concept‟ of wearing and tearing down the enemy vessels from the 
source of resupply, and employing its overwhelmingly large number of 
conventional combat ships and fishing boats to „drown the enemy.‟”
926
 This 
training parallels some actual naval operations conducted in the „50s 
and‟60s, when the Chinese “proved adept at the art of naval ambush, 
concealing their torpedo craft behind reefs or fishing vessels.” This legacy 
still exerts an important influence, since “Chinese strategists advocate the 
employment of more technological means of hit-and-run combat at sea,”
927
 
as also attested by the 2006 White Paper which highlighted today‟s PLAN‟s 
attempt to implement a strategy – and the associated tactics – of “maritime 
people‟s war under modern conditions.‟” This specific strategic setting 
manifests the existence of “a multitude of military and civilian forces” whose 
objective is to allow “China to „flood the zone‟ with activity, confusing and 
complicating opponents‟ intelligence collection and targeting capacity. 
Massive deployments may also divert attention from the main effort, perhaps 
permitting certain movements to occur undetected. Could the harassment of 
the USNS Impeccable and USNS Victorious have been conceived to mask 
other activity happening at the same time? Indeed, these events took place 
as the People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy‟s South Sea Fleet was 
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conducting exercise involving destroyers, submarines, and helicopters in the 
South China Sea.”
928
  
China‟s increasing power at both a military and economic level has 
increased its potential leverage of the international area. From 2013 
onwards, along with the strategic principle of active defense, a new 
theoretical concept had been developed: “the forward edge defense.” It 
consists of extending “the potential culminating point of any future conflict as 
far from the mainland as possible.” In other words, the fundamental idea is 
to expand the strategic area of interest, projecting Chinese power beyond its 
territorial waters as far as creating an “arc-shaped strategic zone that covers 
the Western Pacific Ocean and Northern Indian Ocean.” In so doing, China 
could exploit this area as a “strategic outer line,” whose military operations 
occurring within would be supported by “operations with the mainland and 
the coastal waters as the strategic inner line.” This strategic vision is often 
referred to as “using the land to control the sea, and using the seas to 
control the oceans (yiluzhihai, yihaizhiyang 以陆制海，以海制洋).” This also 
reflected the 2015 Defense White Paper, in which, along with the traditional 
“near-seas defense” principle an additional one has been added: the “far-
seas protection (yuanhaihuwei 远海护卫).”929 
It is important to highlight that while the first part of this strategic vision 
(using the land to control the sea), “representing a continental approach to 
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maritime security,” has witnessed ample consideration, the second part, 
instead, “is newer in its emphasis,” emphasizing, therefore, how Xi Jinping 
has combined the traditional strategic principles with the new military assets. 
In relation to the newer elements, the 2013 edition of the Science of Military 
Strategy discusses the possible eight strategic missions that the PLAN 
should perform: “1) Participate in large scale operations in the main strategic 
axis of operations. 2) Contain and resist sea-borne invasions. 3) Protect 
island sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. 4) Protect maritime 
transportation security. 5) Engage in protecting overseas interests and the 
rights/interests of Chinese nationals. 6) Engage in carrying out nuclear 
deterrence and counterattack. 7) Coordinate with the military struggle on 
land. 8) Protecting the security of international sea space.”
930
 
The combination of these new sea strategic guidelines (using the land 
to control the sea, near-seas defense, and far-seas protection) contributed 
to the evolution of the active defense doctrine, leading to several important 
implications. The first and most important, refers to the transformation of the 
strategic space, which is now based on the above mentioned internal and 
external lines of operation as well as the combination of the two into a 
multidimensional one (neiwai jiangu, duowei liti 内外兼顾, 多维立体). Along 
with this assumption, the new Chinese strategic asset also envisages a 
reconsideration of the strategic directions and the theater of operations, 
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which have been radically expanded by the advent of the informatized 
warfare.
931
   
The 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy identifies four 
major transformations that China needs to implement in order to achieve 
strategic superiority and that represent all an evolution of traditional strategic 
thinking. The first one refers to the development of “functional versality” 
(gongneng duoyang 功能多样), that is, the ability to quickly swift from one 
strategic design to another. For example it “includes cultivating a strategic 
deterrence posture in peacetime and a rapid reaction capability when a 
crisis occurs to prevent escalation, while in wartime it requires the ability to 
seize the strategic initiative.” The second transformation is the advancement 
of the multidimensional integration (duoweiyiti 多维一体), which refers to the 
“transformation from emphasizing the ground forces to an „omni-
dimensional, multidimensional, and multi-domain‟ posture.” The third one 
refers to the development of an internal and external unity (neiwaijiehe 
内外结合) which consists of “creating a strategic posture that combines 
internal and external elements to shift from homeland defense to forward 
defense.” The fourth transformation is the encouragement of an integrated 
coordination (zhengti xietiao 整体协调), which refers to “the transformation 
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from compartmentalization of functions to the combination of centralization 
and decentralization that would improve the responsiveness of the PLA.”
932
 
 
5.2.3. Third Process of Chinese Military Transformation: 
Tactical Design 
 
The legacy of People‟s War helps explain also the tactical dimension 
of Chinese cyber warfare.
933
 Since 2010, China has developed its 
“Information Warfare Base.” And the year after, the PLA has consolidated “a 
doctrine of integrated network warfare: „the use of electronic warfare, 
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computer network operations, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefield 
information systems‟ especially through joint operations.” For the PLA, in 
fact, IW has become “an operational priority, and not just a broad strategic 
goal.” As a proof for this statement, some officials of the National Security 
Council reported that China “was planting „logic bombs‟ in the US power grid 
that could be activated in times of tension or war to disrupt power deliveries 
on a militarily and politically significant scale.”
934
  
As a matter of fact, Jiang Zemin strongly advocated the creation of 
an assassin‟s mace. In 1999 he declared that it was necessary “to master, 
as quickly as possible, a new shashoujian needed to safeguard state 
sovereignty and security.” Of course the assassin‟s mace can be identified in 
a big variety of weapons. For example, one early manifestation of this 
weapon application has been the infection of thousands of American 
computers with Chinese “zombies,” which refer to “malicious software 
packages that infect computers and allow hackers to turn them into „slave‟ 
computers for use in cyberattacks.”
935
 
Besides the mere network actions, cyber warfare tactics heavily rely 
on several fundamental elements in order to be successful that recall the 
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tactical elements of People‟s War. The importance of the people‟s 
mobilization still encourages, at the military level, the advocacy of an “all-out 
defense/offense,” where everyone can potentially become a soldier. This 
condition, in fact, could facilitate the PLA to employ “citizens‟ computers to 
host a botnet and conduct a simple Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack,”
 936
 where “a target becomes overwhelmed with more signals than it 
can process,”
937
 something resembling the idea of  the “swarm effect” and 
the “sting effect” which profoundly characterized People‟s War Doctrine.
938
 
In addition to that, speed (and the associated element of flexibility) 
and anonymity are, for example, other two fundamental tactical elements for 
the asymmetric conduct of warfare in cyberspace. With the application of 
speed, sophisticated computer networks can shut down significant segments 
of an enemy military infrastructure without being bogged down into friction. 
The speed of movement, in fact, guarantees the success in the battlefield as 
attested by Deng himself who put great emphasis on the creation of the 
RRUs (Rapid Reaction Units) in order to keep alive the concept of flexibility, 
which characterized Chinese military strategy and in a more extensive way 
Chinese strategic culture.
939
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The second element allows cyber warriors to carry out military 
operations without being detected.
940
 Not being intercepted represents a 
fundamental element for a successful result in warfare.
941
 Cyber warfare, 
therefore, specifically because of the last element, cannot be employed as a 
deterrent means of war. Deterrence, in fact, needs to be effectively signaled 
in order to make an enemy refrain from waging military operations. Cyber 
warfare, instead, does not need to be signaled; it needs to be kept secret
942
 
and delivered with speed through surprise.
943
 
The application of cyber warfare, according to these features, clearly 
reproduces Sun Tzu‟s famous dicta
944
 briefly analyzed in first section. 
Surprise and network attacks, for example, strengthen the famous principle 
of: “subduing the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.
945
 One 
empirical case, for example, confirms the applicability of this theoretical 
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statement: in Octorber 2010 the US military “lost control of 50 nuclear 
warheads for 45 minutes due to a „computer glitch,‟ which could have been 
caused by planted computer virus via the network system.”
946
  
Targeting information in cyber warfare clearly connects to another 
important Chinese tactical legacy: “know the enemy and know yourself; in a 
hundred battles you will never be in peril.”
947
 Through this mechanism, PLA 
can, in fact, not only gather intelligence, but it can also disseminate false 
information for pure deception.
948
 Deception, in the information age, 
confirms another important assumption made by Sun Tzu and later 
readjusted by Mao, as the previous chapter discussed it at length: “all 
warfare is based on deception, therefore when capable, feign incapacity; 
when active, inactivity, when near, make it appear that you are far away; 
when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; reign 
disorder and strike him.”
949
 Moreover, technology, above all other things, 
facilitates deception in war, which is therefore concerned in manipulating 
information, “showing what is false and hiding what is true. In this case, 
signaling becomes relevant, but for opposite purpose: deception and not 
deterrence.
950
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Along with deception, the digital age has improved Chinese approach 
to intelligence gathering to the extent that now China pursues an extended 
cyber espionage campaign. Also defined as “the greatest transfer of wealth 
in history,” Chinese espionage represents and indirect approach of fighting, 
which consists of stealing sensitive information to be implemented in the 
military and technological sector. This practice is believed to be leading to 
the “death by a thousand cuts,”
951
  which refers to the continuous disruption 
of an enemy‟s military competitiveness through information stealing. 
Chinese espionage activity, however, exerts some “fascination” because of 
its peculiarity, that is, its reliance on the principle of tiyong which refers to the 
political design of keeping “China‟s style of learning to maintain societal 
essence and adopt western learning for practical use.”
952
 One famous 
associated espionage tactic has been defined as “the thousand grains of 
sand approach,” which consists of stealing precious information by sending 
in “ten thousand of [China‟s] citizens abroad, instead of employing the 
classic intelligence means; exactly like those people that go to the beach 
and once back home “simply shake out their towels,” with the end result of 
having collected lots of sand without too much effort.
953
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For what concerns the maritime militia tactical asset, the presence of 
these vessels – lightly armed and easily mobilized – creates two basic 
conditions, so that the art of asymmetric warfare finds the best application: 
confusion and surprise.
954
 Even the international legal system also seems to 
favor this condition. The agreement between China and the US, the CUES 
(Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea), does not included maritime 
services – such as militia – but it only regulates the navy, ensuring the 
militia, therefore, the capacity to intervene, even militarily, performing 
irregular operations to achieve certain political objectives.
955
 Among other 
things the same militia members, in response to the need to apply a certain 
degree of strategic flexibility, wear - in an unconventional way - the military 
uniforms, so as to act as soldiers (if the situation requires it), or as simple 
fishermen (hence depriving themselves of uniforms), should it prove to be 
particularly disadvantageous to act under the strategic and tactical profile.
956
  
This tactical aspect also intertwines with the juridical aspect that 
characterizes the law of naval warfare. It “protects coastal fishing vessels 
from capture or attack unless they are integrated into the enemy‟s naval 
force.” This, therefore, increases the asymmetry of the maritime militia, 
whose central objective is to represent “a force multiplier” for the PLAN, 
“raising operational, legal and political challenges for any opponent.” Its use 
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allows it to become the “„eyes and ears‟ of China‟s burgeoning naval fleet 
and land-based force structure, and augment PLAN operations and 
intelligence activities” forming, ultimately, “China‟s network of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).”
957
  
Because of the development of the new type of warfare, which is 
mainly based on the informatized spectrum of operations, the civil-military 
fusion is brought a step forward with the theorization of the so-called 
“Integrated Joint Operations” (yitihua lianhe zuozhan 一体化联合作战).  The 
idea is to coordinate at a deeper level not only to the civil and the military 
spheres of action, but also the three military services.
958
   
This further strengthens the bureaucratic-operational merger between 
the military and the civilian sphere. This is expressed mainly in the 
institutionalization of operational sectors – of military character - for which 
civilians also receive a corresponding training and equipment, while 
maintaining, at the institutional level, their civil character.
959
 To explain this 
phenomenon, among Chinese analysts there is often used the following 
formula: “the military body expresses his demands, the NDMC [National 
                                                          
957
 James Kraska and Michael Monti, “The Law Of Naval Warfare And China's 
Maritime Militia,” p. 465 
958
 Andrew Erickson, “Doctrinal Sea Change, Making Real Waves: Examining The 
Maritime Dimension Of Strategy,” p. 120. 
959
 Sergio Miracola, "La Milizia Marittima E La Guerra Di Popolo Nel Mar Cinese Del 
Sud - CINAFORUM". 
557
 
 
Defense Committee Mobilitization] coordinates them and the Government 
implements them.”
960
 
Finally, the continuing nationalistic mobilizations, serve the main 
purpose of keeping a high level of attention, including civilians, and of 
course, the military, on the possible risks that the nation could face. In this 
way, two essential aspects for the proper execution of military operations are 
consolidated. Resolution of internal contradictions in order to enable a 
concerted national effort towards the safeguard of the country and, above 
all, at the military level, the continued consolidation of the inner unity of the 
military sector as a whole.
961
 
These very last elements, moreover, clearly explain another important 
tactical asset behind the employment of the maritime militia. If part of it gets 
destroyed when confronting enemy‟s vessels in proper naval combat 
operations, its annihilation could still be used as “the centerpiece of political 
and public diplomacy efforts by China to undermine enemy resolve. Even 
non-kinetic responses, such as electronic jamming of fishing vessel 
transmissions, will be incorporated into China‟s propaganda campaign to 
generate sympathy, particularly among other states in East Asia.” Moreover, 
even during peacetime operations, the maritime militia can perform “State-
sponsored agitation and low-level coercion in waters claimed by China or 
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that are associated with China‟s numerous maritime boundary disputes with 
its neighbors.”
962
  
 
5.3. Conclusions 
 
As this chapter highlighted, Chinese cyber warfare, maritime militia, 
and civil-military relationship follow a specific pattern that can be intercepted 
simply by looking at China‟s history and its historical legacies, instead of 
drawing general strategic overviews over it. For example, cyber warfare, 
because of its asymmetric nature, clearly parallels an earlier version fully 
deployed in Chinese history: People‟s War Doctrine. Moreover, this aspect 
reveals something more: “the strategy of asymmetric warfare will inevitably 
continue to be developed in China.”
963
 
Information warfare has put a high premium on disruption and on 
knowledge. These two elements have reinforced Chinese approach to cyber 
warfare through the lens of People‟s War. Information warfare “merges the 
miracles of modern information technology to an ancient strategy of victory 
without violence.”
964
 Therefore, this inherent characteristic helps, 
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furthermore, draw important connections between Sun Tzu and cyber 
warfare passing through Mao.   
In fact, even if it is true that China is working hard to implement the 
new effects of RMA, organizationally speaking, Chinese military cadres did 
not have to go through substantial modifications, since in China the network-
type warfare – which relies on decentralization – was already in place. In 
fact, the Chinese demonstrated through history to have a sanguine view of 
the People‟s Liberation Army‟s ability to confront even the most 
sophisticated opponent – so long as the conflict takes within or near the 
Chinese sphere of interest.”
965
 This is reflected in the Maoist organizational 
setting that “command must be centralized for strategic purposes and 
decentralized for tactical purposes.”
966
 This, therefore, attests the 
importance of historical legacies in war since “technical innovations, 
especially the truly revolutionary ones, have been initially applied enhancing 
performance in the service of old objectives.”
967
 In this light, “Mao‟s view of 
„People‟s War‟ has more relevance to the information age” than other 
doctrines employed to explain Chinese way in information warfare
968
 Mao‟s 
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military thought really constituted a radical shift in the strategic thinking of 
the twentieth century, inaugurating what has been labeled as the “age of the 
guerrilla.” This seems to have occurred because the “guerrilla component 
absorbed social, economic and political expertise while the political 
component absorbed organizational and military knowledge. From this 
interchange there emerged the form of political warfare called “people‟s 
war.”
969
 
The way Chinese political institutions conceived the civil-military 
relationship, the way the CCP has mobilized the people in Chinese history, 
and finally, the way the PLA has implemented asymmetric strategies and 
tactics both at the cyber and maritime level clearly uncover the real nature of 
the Chinese military transformation: the persistence of People‟s War 
Doctrine. A few countries in the world can, in fact, wage “civil offensive,” 
where civil “encompasses a range of measures including deceit, espionage, 
propaganda and diplomacy.”
970
 As Clausewitz stated, the asymmetric 
movement “should be nebulous and elusive; its resistance should never 
materialize as a concrete body, otherwise the enemy can direct sufficient 
forces at its core.”
971
 This sensitively reflects another and older Chinese 
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assumption: “故形人而我无形”972 “avoiding taking a specific configuration 
while inducing the adversary to take one.”
973
 Therefore all these features 
finally suggest that People‟s War has been, is, and will likely remain “the 
constant guideline of modern Chinese strategy.”
974
 
Cyber warfare, because of its asymmetric nature, clearly parallels an 
earlier version fully deployed in Chinese history: People‟s War Doctrine. 
Moreover, this aspect reveals something more: “the strategy of asymmetric 
warfare will inevitably continue to be developed in China.”
975
 
Information warfare has put a high premium on disruption and on 
knowledge. These two elements have reinforced Chinese approach to cyber 
warfare through the lens of People‟s War. Information warfare “merges the 
miracles of modern information technology to an ancient strategy of victory 
without violence.”
976
 Therefore, this inherent characteristic helps, 
furthermore, draw important connections between Sun Tzu and cyber 
warfare passing through Mao.  
 This explanation clarifies why China, because of its historical 
legacies, “is the only state officially proclaiming a national strategy of 
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People‟s War; a theory which involves the indoctrination of the people in 
preparation for mobilization.”
977
 A doctrine undoubtedly well suited to cyber 
warfare and maritime affairs.    
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
This research on Chinese strategic culture has represented a vast 
effort to conceptualize the nature of Chinese way of warfare and its way of 
thinking of strategy. At the same time, the objective of this research has also 
been to provide a new theoretical model for the analysis and identification of 
strategic culture, with the hope that it could be replicated for other case 
studies.  
The three levels of analysis of civil-military relationship, strategic 
design, and tactical dispositions seemed to have worked quite well for the 
analysis of Chinese strategic culture. When applying this model, I realized 
how complexity and generality seemed to have coexisted in order to 
guarantee the good balance between deep analysis of military affairs and 
general strategic trends. 
Moreover, this three-level analysis helped me investigate quite 
smoothly Chinese strategic culture by looking at the enormous historical 
data that each case study could offer. Only on this point, I feel like that I 
could have reduced the number of cases to be analyzed. However, it is also 
true that if I had done so, I would have reduced the explanatory power of 
strategic culture, reducing Chinese way of warfare only to a few theoretical 
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tests, therefore critically undermining the value of the strategic-culture 
paradigm.  
For what concerns the identification of Chinese strategic culture with 
a specific military doctrine, the conceptualization of the Chinese way of 
warfare into the overall perspective of the People‟s War Doctrine proved to 
hold the test, especially when confronted with the turning points in Chinese 
history that could have run counter the applicability of this military doctrine. 
And this aspect is not only very positive for my research, but also for 
the overall theoretical idea behind the study of Chinese strategic culture. 
Testing such a theoretical hypothesis against those four very different case 
studies demonstrated that the historical continuity theory of China does hold 
and can help scholars understand the complexities of Chinese civilization.  
At the military level, as this represents the principal objective of my 
research, the major findings concerned three important elements that 
demonstrated to have a tendency to persist over time. The first one is the 
combination of the opposites not only at the philosophical level, but also at 
the political and military level. The civil and the military, in Chinese history, 
walked hand in hand, mutually supporting and influencing. This aspect is 
particularly important, since it allows us to properly understand what is going 
on in the South China Sea with the contested islands and the Chinese 
project of artificially building them. 
Moreover, this combination is quite relevant also for another aspect: 
the role of the people. Chinese rulers tried historically to develop 
professional armies, but most of the times they ended up creating systems 
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that reflected what was already occurring at the social level, that is, the 
combination of the civilian roles with the martial duties. It is also true that by 
looking at the material characteristic, China‟s abundance of men also 
encouraged the creation of those political and military systems that could 
facilitate the mixture of these two spheres of actions, in order to increase 
agricultural productivity while also increasing the level of military service for 
the Chinese government. 
And this specific institutional and cultural setting, as demonstrated 
throughout my research, found its ultimate application in several, crucial 
policies: from the Warring States to the twenty-first century, China has 
moved from the “allowing the army live among the people” policy of the 
Warring States era, from the fubing system of the Tang dynasty, to the 
Maoist “soldiers should swim among the people” principle, and finally to the 
normative design of Xi Jinping, which advocated the fusion of the military 
with the civilian asset as well as the mutual influence between the civil with 
the military both at the cyber and maritime level.  
At the same time, it seems clear that in specific historical periods 
this type of system necessitated the application of a totalitarian political 
framework,
978
 something that during the Warring States and the Maoist Civil 
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 For a comprehensive analysis of the totalitarian asset of politics and 
warfare during the Warring States era see: Yuri Pines, "A “Total War”? 
Rethinking Military Ideology In The Book Of Lord Shang", Journal of 
Chinese Military History 5, no. 2 (2016): 97-134; Yang Shang and Yuri 
Pines, The Book Of Lord Shang (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2017). 
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War had been widely implemented. However, the other two case studies, 
the Tang dynasty and the era of the fifth generation of leadership, due to 
their higher economic development did not seem to have developed the 
need to apply such a system. This, in turn, demonstrates that the 
interpenetration between the civil and the military suggests that totalitarian 
measures are not needed in order to make such a system work properly, 
mainly because the Chinese cultural system seems to tend towards the 
implementation of this type of theoretical framework.  
At the strategic level, the combination of the opposites also 
manifested itself. Historically, attack and defense, through ample historical 
evidence, even during radical political transformations, were combined to 
serve a higher objective: to subdue the enemy with a strong combination of 
deceptive means and psychological operations which, if properly applied, 
would have severely weakened the country, making it, at last, an easy prey. 
In fact, the combination of the defense and the offense in a very fluid way 
guaranteed Chinese troops not only the possibility to confound the enemy 
army, but also to quickly change approach according to the strategic 
circumstances.  
At the tactical level, similar elements seemed to have passed the 
test of time. Chinese generals as well as the emperors advocated the 
building of armies that could easily move around the country and that made 
flexibility their central tactical principle. The disposition of the army, amply 
illustrated in those four case studies, demonstrate that Chinese governors 
strived to find ways to swiftly attack the enemy, making the army able to 
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quickly adjust its proper tactical balance according to the campaign 
dispositions or other changing circumstances. The five formations and the 
eight directions elaborated during the Tang dynasty perfectly captures this 
theoretical assumption.  
Therefore, this research, by looking at the Chinese strategic culture 
at specific historical junctures in Chinese history and by testing the 
dependent variable of People‟s War Doctrine in those turning points has 
demonstrated two crucial aspects: first, it has demonstrated that strategic 
culture, as a paradigm, can profoundly contribute to the analysis of another 
state‟s strategic design in general, and to the analysis of the Chinese case, 
in particular, by proving the strong existence of a continuous strategic 
tradition that does not seem to stop.            
The second aspect refers to the identification of People‟s War 
Doctrine as the crucial aspect of Chinese strategic culture. Through those 
historical cases, in fact, and thanks also to the three-level analysis, it was 
possible to highlight how specific normative, strategic, and tactical elements 
seemed to persist over time while responding to the dicta of what has been 
recognized in history as the People‟s War Doctrine. 
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